Telangana High Court

The Director General Of Income Tax ... vs Central Information Commission on 12 February, 2025

Author: Nagesh Bheemapaka

Bench: Nagesh Bheemapaka

      HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA

            WRIT PETITION No. 18897 of 2024

Between:

The Director General of Income Tax (Investigation)
                                                     ... Petitioner
and

Central Information Commission & another
                                                 ...Respondents

Date of Judgment Pronounced: 12-02-2025

Submitted for Approval:
     Hon'ble Sri Justice NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA


Whether Reporters of Local newspapers                  No
may be allowed to see the judgments ?

Whether copies of judgment may be                     Yes
marked to Law Reporters/Journals

Whether His Lordship wish to                           No
see the fair copy of the Judgment ?


                                  _____________________________
                                  (NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA, J)
                                      2




 * THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA

                 WRIT PETITION No. 18897 OF 2024

                           % Dated 12.02.2025

Between:

# The Director General of Income Tax (Investigation)
                                                       ... Petitioner
and

Central Information Commission & another
                                                   ...Respondents


! Counsel for the petitioner     :   K. Mamatha Chowdary

^ Counsel for the respondent No.2: Nooty Vashist Venakteswarlu


<GIST:


>HEAD NOTE:

? Cases cited:
(2013) 1 SCC 212
(2011) 15 SCC 1
2021 Law Suit (Mad) 5130
                                   3




       HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA

             WRIT PETITION No. 18897 OF 2024

O R D E R:

Petitioner - Director General of Income Tax

(Investigation) questions the order dated 04.06.2024, by which,

the 1st respondent - Central Information Commission, New

Delhi directed to inform the 2nd respondent the status of action

taken on his complaint (as mentioned in RTI Application) as on

date of RTI Application and at present; if the said Application

has already been disposed of, then the broad outcome should be

provided to him within three weeks from the date of receipt of

the said order.

2. While entertaining the Writ Petition, on 23.07.2024,

this Court directed stay of the order impugned prima facie, on

the ground that the said order was passed without considering

the fact that the Application filed by the 2nd respondent under

Section 6(1) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (for short, 'the

Act') was disposed of vide order dated 17.02.2022; Appeal was

preferred under Section 19(1) and the same was also disposed of

on 14.12.2022 by the appellate authority.

3. The brief facts relevant for deciding the Writ Petition

are: the 2nd respondent filed an Application under Section 6(1)

of the Act on 03.11.2022 seeking certain information relating to

the complaint filed by him with regard to binami transactions

carried on by Sri M.V. Sharma with PAN No. AHMPM 1756E

along with Sri Cherukuri Sreedhar, MD & CEO of Transtory

Infrastructure Company, Jubilee Hills, Hyderabad. The said

Application was rejected vide reply dated 17.02.2022, relying on

the judgment in Katapally Sathya Reddy v. ACIT (BPU),

Hyderabad dated 23.10.2020, on the ground that Section 24(2)

of the Act exempts certain government organisations which find

mention in Schedule II, as notified by the Central Government

in the Official Gazette. The Director General of Income Tax

(Investigation) is included vide Official Gazette dated 28.03.2008

in the list of organisations which are exempted from providing

information as per Section 24. The Benami Transactions

(Prohibition) Unit comes under control of the Directorate

General of Income Tax (Investigation). Hence, this office is

exempted from providing such information. The First Appellate

Authority dismissed the Appeal of the 2nd respondent by order

dated 14.12.2022, opining that appellant is inquisitive to know

the details of investigation findings and the outcome of his TEP.

However, it is noteworthy to affirm that the Office of the Director

General of Income Tax (Investigation) has been excluded from

the purview of the Act. Aggrieved thereby, the 2nd respondent

filed the Second Appeal before the 1st respondent, who passed

the order impugned, as stated supra.

4. The 1st respondent - Commission opined that the

broad outcome of the action taken on the Application or status

of the complaint / letter should have been informed to the 2nd

respondent under the Act. The Commission relied on the

judgment in Kamal Bhasin v. Radha Krishna Mathur

(W.P.(C) No. 7218 of 2016) dated 01.11.2017 wherein it was

observed that 'by virtue of the aforesaid proviso to Section 89(1)

of the Act, it is enacted that information which cannot be denied

to the Parliament or a State Legislature shall not be denied to

any person. In the present case, it was doubtful whether

information as to the fate of the complaints can be considered

as personal information that has no relationship with public

interest or public activity. The activity of the Central Vigilance

Department includes investigation and taken action in cases of

corruption. Secondly, the complaint related to the allegations of

misconduct and how these complaints were treated were clearly

matter of public interest'.

5. Admittedly, the 2nd respondent filed a complaint

with regard to the benami transactions between Sri M.V.

Sharma and Sri Cherukuri Sreedhar and he sought information

in relation thereto. Learned counsel for petitioner Ms. K.

Mamatha Chowdary submits that Section 24(2) of the Act

exempts certain government organisations which find mention

in Schedule II, as notified by the Central Government in the

Official Gazette. The Director General of Income Tax

(Investigation) is included vide Official Gazette dated 28.03.2008

in the list of organisations which are exempt from providing

information as per Section 24. The Benami Transactions

(Prohibition) Unit comes under the control of the Directorate

General of Income Tax (Investigation), hence, this office is

exempted from providing such information. According to her,

the information sought by the 2nd respondent does not relate to

allegations of corruption and human rights violation as per

Proviso to Section 24(1), hence, the same cannot be provided. It

is further argued that the 2nd respondent has not discharged

the onus of proving the elements of corruption on the part of the

investigator. She relies on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in Girish Ramchandra Deshpande v. Central

Information Commissioner 1 and contends that the details

called for by the 2nd respondent are qualified to be 'personal

information' as defined in clause (j) of Section 8(1), disclosure of

which would cause unwarranted invasion of privacy of that

individual; if the Central Public Information Officer or the State

Public Information Officer or the appellate authority is satisfied

that larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such

information, appropriate orders could be passed but the 2nd

respondent cannot claim those details as a matter of right.

6. Per contra, the 2nd respondent - party-in-person

filed a detailed counter-affidavit and argues that the information

sought falls under the Proviso to Section 24(1) of the Act, as

there are allegations of corruption. It is further contended that

information sought by him would in no way prejudicially affect

(2013) 1 SCC 212

the sovereignty and integrity of India in any manner. He draws

attention to Section 8 of the Act and submits that information

sought for by him does not fall in any of the exemption clauses.

According to him, it is well-established that unless information

sought for prejudicially affects the sovereignty and integrity of

India, the security of India or disclosure of information could

impead the process of investigation or apprehension or

prosecution of offenders, then, in all such cases, information is

exempted from disclosure, but not when it does not fall foul of

any of the factors mentioned herein above, hence, his

Application could not have been rejected.

It is further submitted that the 2nd respondent

entered into a caveat and served it on the Public Information

Officer (PIO) in advance; to defeat the very purpose of serving

advance notice on him, the PIO as well as the First Appellate

Authority have not been impleaded as petitioners, however,

strangely, PIO, who is respondent in the caveat petition, has

attested the affidavit in this Writ Petition which brings out the

hand-in-glove operation undertaken by petitioner. It is

therefore, established that petitioner has approached this Court

with unclean hands and when an ex parte interim order was

obtained by suppressing the factum of caveat, then, such an

interim order cannot be allowed to survive.

The 2nd respondent further argued that petitioner

had taken a mechanical and strange plea in the Writ Petition

that CIC has not followed the judgment in Kupapally Satya

Reddy's case (supra) which has no application to the facts of

the case. The 1st respondent, unhesitatingly, decided that Public

Information Officer is notified under the RTI Act, but not under

the Binami Transactions (Prohibition) RTI Act, therefore, the

principle enunciated in the earlier decision has absolutely no

application to the instant case.

7. The Legislature, in its wisdom, have kept certain

organisations, which are engaged in activities involving sensitive

information, secrecy of the State, away from the purview of the

Act by including such Organisations in the Second Schedule. It

does not, however, mean that all information relating to these

organisations are completely out of bound of the public. Even

though Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Unit is one of such

organisations, it does not mean that all information relating to it

is out of bound of the public. The purpose of excluding all these

organisations from the purview of the Act, as provided under

Section 24, is to merely protect and ensure the confidentiality of

the sensitive works and activities undertaken by them.

Therefore, if there is any information, which does not impinge

upon the confidentiality of the sensitive activities of the

organisation and if such information is also relatable to the

issues of corruption or violation of human rights, disclosure of

the same cannot be withheld.

8. In this connection, learned counsel for petitioner

submits that the 2nd respondent failed to discharge the onus of

proving the allegation of corruption and violation of human

rights. Admittedly, the 2nd respondent lodged a complaint on

18.02.2021 as well as 07.05.2021, but the information relating

to the action taken thereon was not known, which amounts to

corrupt practice, according to the 2nd respondent, hence, he

filed the RTI Application on 03.11.2022 seeking information

relating to internal file notings made on the compliant, action

taken thereon, if any notice is served to Sri M.V.Sharma, true

copy of reply, if any, information relating to the action finalized

in the matter and true copy of the orders in the matter. Unless

and until information as sought is furnished, the 2nd respondent

cannot prove corruption on the part of the investigating agency.

Since the allegation of corruption and / or violation of human

rights is involved in the process, information has to be

furnished under Proviso to Section 24(1) of the Act. If the

relevant information is wrapped up and the outcome of

investigation is not made known to him, till then, he cannot

discharge the same.

9. Learned counsel for petitioner further contends that

petitioner is not entitled to be furnished information sought as it

falls within the ambit of Section 8(1)(j). A plain reading of

Section 8(1)(j) of the Act makes it clear that in order to claim

exemption from disclosure of any information, the essential

conditions that must be satisfied are i) that it is personal

information, disclosure of which has no relationship to any

public activity or interest; or b) that it would cause unwarranted

invasion of the privacy of the individual. However, even if the

aforesaid conditions are satisfied, the Central Public

Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer or the

Appellate Authority may disclose the information if they are

satisfied that larger public interest justified disclosure of such

information. Proviso to Section 8(1)(j) also makes it clear that

information, which cannot be denied to the Parliament or a

State legislature shall not be denied to any private person.

10. The 1st respondent, in the impugned order, satisfied

that larger public interest justifies disclosure of such

information and further information sought cannot be denied to

Parliament or a State Legislature, hence, the same cannot be

denied to any person. In view of the same, it cannot be said

that information sought by the 2nd respondent does not fit in the

corners of Sections 24 and 8(1)(j) of the Act.

11. Section 8(1)(j) of the Act bars disseminating

personal information, disclosure of which has no relationship to

any public activity or interest, or which would cause

unwarranted invasion of privacy of the individual. Under

Section 24, the information pertaining to intelligence, strategy,

scientific work and safety of nation may be absolutely excluded

from the provisions of the Act, while the other information may

be dealt with as per provisions contained in the Act.

12. In the instant case, the 2nd respondent sought

information relating to action taken on his complaint apart from

requesting to furnish certain true copies of documents

mentioned in his Application. The purport of the RTI Act is to

provide information, duly respecting the proscriptions under

Sections 24 and 8(1)(j) and the RTI Act is a citizen-empowering

Act promulgated to bring transparency in all spheres of public

activity and, in certain contexts, even personal activity that has

an element of larger public interest. Thus, the Act does not set a

pre-requirement for an individual to disclose the necessity for

asking the information, much less 'establish' or 'prove'

something at the stage of seeking information, so long as it does

not fall within the ambit of the limitations under Sections 24

and 8(1)(j) of the Act.

13. Further, in the instant case, the 2nd respondent is

seeking information relating to his complaint and he is neither

seeking information regarding personal details of persons

involved in the investigation or modus operandi of the

investigation nor sensitive or intricate investigation details,

therefore, the information sought cannot, by itself, be

unilaterally deemed to be barred under the Act. Furthermore,

the shelter being taken by petitioner, under the category of

'excluded department' is only confined to requests that are

covered under the explicit language under Sections 24 and

8(1)(j) of the Act and it is to be noted that even the excluded

Departments under the Act are bound to respond to queries

relating to human rights violation and corrupt practice

allegations against the staff/officers working in the department

and though the department may not disclose intricate and

sensitive details relating to investigations thereof, which could

possibly hamper or impede the fair process, it cannot shy away

from disclosing the stage of investigation or trial of corrupt

practices/human rights violations, for the investigation or trial

per se involves larger public interest.

14. So, even by reading this Section 24 in conjunction

with Section 8(1)(j) of the Act, and correlating it with the

information sought by the Applicant, the information sought for

and the proscriptions under the Act are at tangent and there is

no overlap. The Applicant is neither seeking personal

information nor the one relating to intelligence or security of the

country, disclosure of which could potentially jeopardise the

national security or interests of the country. In this connection,

the 2nd respondent relied on the order in

CIS/LS/A/2012/001368, wherein the Central Information

Commissioner referred the case in FAA, Addl. DGP CID of

Haryana v. CIC (CWP No. 12904 lf 2009) dated 27.01.2011. It

was held therein that 'a combined reading of these provisions

would reveal only that information is exempted which is directly

effecting and correlated to the "Intelligence" and "Security" of

that organisation of the Ste and not otherwise'. In the order of

Manipur High Court in Sri Phairemban Sudhesh Singh v.

State of Manipur (W.P.(C).No. 642 of 2015), it was held that 'It

may be noted that the right to information is a facet of "freedom

of speech and expression", as contained in Article 19(1)(a) of the

Constitution, which are the foundation of all democratic

organisations. Fundamental rights should not be cut down by

too restricted an approach. Even prior to the enactment of RTI

Act, 2005, the expression "freedom of speech and expression"

has been construed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in a catena

of decisions, to include not only liberty to propagate one's views,

ideas, opinions and thoughts but also the right to acquire

information. In other words, the right to information can be

said to be a fundamental right subject to the exemptions as

contained in Section 8 and 24 of the RTI Act'. The 2nd

respondent also relied on the judgments in Chief Information

Commissioner v. State of Manipur 2 and Gulab Singh Rana

v. Central Public Information Officer 3.

15. Now coming to the manner in which this Writ

Petition is sought to be canvassed, it is not disputed that Public

Information Officer is caveated by the Applicant and therefore,

the parties are bound by the Writ Rules. It is beyond

comprehension of this Court as to why petitioner chose not to

make the PIO, who suffered the order before the CIC, a party to

this writ proceedings. This Court expects the parties to apprise

true facts without suppression, thereby assist the Court by

making all the affected parties and stakeholders as parties to

the petition to aid the cause of justice, more so when a person is

on Caveat, rather than obtain orders behind the back taking the

Court for a ride.