Telangana High Court

Vale Amruthamma vs Joint Collector And Additional ... on 10 February, 2025

       THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE K. SUJANA


     CIVIL REVISION PETITION Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020


COMMON ORDER:

Since the parties and the lis involved in both the

revision petitions are same, they were heard together and

are being disposed of by this common order.

2. CRP.Nos.836 and 887 of 2020 are preferred praying

this Court to set aside the common order dated 13.11.2019

passed in Appeal Nos.F1/02/2015 and F1/11097/2018 by

the Joint Collector, Mahabubnagar District, directing the

concerned Tahsildar to restore the possession of land to an

extent of their share in Sy.No.217 to and extent of Ac.18.00

gts, Sy.No.218 to an extent of Ac.10.38 gts, Sy.No.219 to

an extent of Ac.11.34 gts, Sy.No.257 to an extent of

Ac.14.39 gts, Sy.No.144 to an extent of Ac.2.00 gts,

situated at Choudoor Village, Nawabpet Mandal,

Mahabubnagar District, on the ground of being legal heirs

of Late V. Yadhaih.

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

3. The brief facts of the case are that Radhabai was the

original owner of various lands, including Sy.Nos.217, 218,

219, 257, and 144, totaling 57.31 acres. Vale Basappa was

the permanent tenant over the land, and Shaik

Mohinuddin was the agent collecting kaul on behalf of

Radhabai. After the death of Vale Basappa, his two sons,

Vale Yadaiah and Vale Sangaiah, were issued ownership

certificates under Section 38E of the Tenancy Act in 1977

(for short 'the Act') as evidenced by File

No.A10/3129/1977. However, it was alleged that the

tenants were forcibly evicted from the land and were

compelled to leave for Maharashtra to earn a living.

Subsequently, Vale Sangaiah filed an application before the

Tahsildar under Section 32 of Act for restoration of the

property, claiming that he was the sole heir after the death

of Vale Yadaiah. The Tahsildar passed orders in the year

2010, observing that the PT rights were still existing, and

the ownership certificates were issued to Vale Yadaiah and

Vale Sangaiah. Despite this, it was submitted that the

petitioners did not approach the authority for restoration of

possession, and instead, the land was sold to over 20

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

people through registered documents from the year 1991

onwards. The revenue records were also updated to reflect

the said transactions. The matter was remanded for fresh

inquiry, and appeals were filed by Vale Sangaiah and the

legal representatives of Vale Yadaiah. Ultimately, the

appeals were dismissed vide common order dated

13.11.2019 on the ground that the petitioners had become

owners of the land, making restoration of possession under

Section 32 of the Act becomes inapplicable.

4. Heard Sri Yogesh Kumar Heroor, learned counsel for

petitioners, and Sri Swaroop Oorilla, learned counsel for

respondents, in both the matters.

5. Learned counsel for petitioners submitted that the

common order under revision passed by the Joint Collector

is replete with errors and infirmities, and that the same is

against the facts of the case, as it fails to take into account

the evidence on record. He contended that the Court of

Joint Collector erred in not considering the provisions of

Sections 38-E and 32(1) of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana

Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Land Rules, 1950 (for short

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

'Rules 1950'), and averred that the said provisions are

crucial in determining the rights of the petitioners, who

claim to be the heirs of Late V. Yadhaih. He asserted that

the petitioners are entitled to restoration of possession, as

they have been dispossessed without following due process,

and by ignoring the provisions of Section 38-E(2), which

empowers the Tahsildar to restore possession to the

protected tenant after issuing a certificate. He lamented

that the bar of jurisdiction under the Act, which prohibits

civil Courts from settling or deciding questions under the

Act was not considered. He divulged that the lands in

question are protected tenancy lands, which cannot be

alienated to third parties without offering them to the

protected tenants.

6. Therefore, while advocating that there is no limitation

period for seeking restoration of possession under the Act,

he prayed this Court to allow the revision petitions, setting

aside the impugned common order dated 13.11.2019 and

to direct restoration possession of the land to the

petitioners on the ground of them being the legal heirs of

Late V. Yadhaih. In support of the said contentions, he

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

relied on the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme

Court, which are as follows:

• In Thota Sridhar Reddy and Others Vs. Mandala

Ramulamma and Others 1:

"Section 38-E contemplates that on grant

of certificate of ownership under Section

38-E, the protected tenants shall be

deemed to be the full owners of such land.

Further, Explanation provided under

Section 38-E(1) provides that if a protected

tenant has been dispossessed otherwise

than in the manner and by the order of

the Tahsildar as provided in Section 32,

then notwithstanding any judgment,

decree or order of any court, or the order

of the Board of Revenue or Tribunal shall

be deemed to be holding the land on the

date of notification. The Tahsildar is under

an obligation to either suo motu or in

furtherance of an application by the

protected tenant, to hold a summary

enquiry and direct taking of land in

possession of the landholder or any other

2021 SCC OnLine SC 851

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

person claiming through or under him.

The possession from a protected tenant

can be taken only if the surrender of

tenancy is approved by the Revenue

Divisional Officer. The landowner is liable

to restore possession in terms of Section

46 of the Act if he has failed to cultivate

the land personally within one year.

Therefore, there is an embargo on the

surrender of tenancy rights by protected

tenant and even if the tenancy is

terminated, the landholder is personally

liable to restore possession to the tenant,

if he fails to cultivate the land within one

year of termination of tenancy.

The order of the learned Single Bench

in Jupudi Bhushanam [Jupudi

Bhushanam v. Collector, Khammam, 1996

SCC OnLine AP 941] is to the effect that

once certificate under Section 38-E is

granted, and subsequently he has been

dispossessed, he has the right to seek

remedy from the civil court. The High

Court has failed to notice that the

Explanation in sub-section (1) of Section

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

38-E of the Tenancy Act specifically

provides that if a protected tenant, on

account of his being dispossessed

otherwise than in the manner and by

order of the Tahsildar as provided in

Section 32, is not in possession of the land

on the date of the notification issued

under sub-section (1), then, the Tahsildar

shall notwithstanding anything contained

in the said Section 32, either suo motu or

on the application of the protected tenant

hold a summary enquiry, and direct that

such land in possession of the landholder

or any person claiming through or under

him in that area, shall be taken from such

possession thereof and shall be restored to

the protected tenant."

• B.Bal Reddy Vs. Teegala Narayan Reddy and

Others 2:

"It is well settled that the interest of a

protected tenant continues to be operative

and subsisting so long as "protected

tenancy" is not validly terminated. Even if

such protected tenant has lost possession

2016 15 SCC 102

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

of the land in question, that by itself does

not terminate the "protected tenancy". The

observations of the Full Bench of the

Andhra Pradesh High Court in Sada

case [Sada v. Tehsildar, AIR 1988 AP 77 :

(1987) 2 An LT 749 : 1987 SCC OnLine AP

187] which were quoted with approval by

this Court in Boddam Narsimha v. Hasan

Ali Khan [Boddam Narsimha v. Hasan Ali

Khan, (2007) 11 SCC 410] are quite

eloquent: (Sada case [Sada v. Tehsildar,

AIR 1988 AP 77 : (1987) 2 An LT 749 :

1987 SCC OnLine AP 187] , SCC OnLine

AP para 44)

"44. In our view, this contention is not

correct. If a protected tenant is already in

physical possession on the date of

notification there is no problem at all. If

proceedings under Sections 19, 32 or 44

are pending, the date of vesting gets itself

postponed. If the "protected tenancy"

stood validly terminated by the date of

notification under Sections 19, 32 or 44,

in that case, no certificate at all can be

issued. But, as long as a

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

person continued to be a "protected

tenant" either under Sections 34, 37 or

37-A, as per the Act and has not lost that

status, whether he is in actual possession

or not on the date of notification, and is

also to be "deemed" to be in possession

under the first part of the Explanation

subject to Section 32(7) and the proviso to

Section 38-E(1), the ownership stands

transferred straightaway to such protected

tenant by the very force of Section 38-E(1).

Further, Section 38-E(2) read with the

Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area)

Protected Tenants (Transfer of Ownership

of Lands) Rules, 1973 contemplates a full-

fledged inquiry after notice to the

landholders or after hearing objections of

any other interested person (vide Rules 4

and 5). Once a certificate is issued, the

same is, under Section 38-E(2),

"conclusive evidence" of the ownership of

the protected tenant, and cannot be

defeated by the result of any inquiry under

second part of the Explanation to Section

38-E. Another reason for this view is that

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

the inquiry under Section 38-E(2) read

with the 1973 Rules referred to above, is

to be done by the Tribunal (the Revenue

Divisional Officer) and obviously his

decision to grant the ownership certificate

will not and cannot be jeopardised by the

result of any inquiry by a subordinate

official like the Tahsildar, who deals with

the granting of possession to a "protected

tenant"."

(emphasis supplied)

It is not the case of the appellants that the

protected tenancy of Teegala Shivaiah was

terminated in a manner known to law. In

the absence of such valid termination of

"protected tenancy", the interest of such

protected tenant continued to be operative

and subsisting in law and could devolve

on his legal heirs and representatives who

could then claim restoration of possession.

As laid down in Sada

case [Sada v. Tehsildar, AIR 1988 AP 77 :

(1987) 2 An LT 749 : 1987 SCC OnLine AP

187] even if the protected tenant had lost

possession, without there being valid

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

termination of his status as a protected

tenant, he would still be entitled to all

incidents of protection under the Act. In

the aforesaid premises, the view taken by

the High Court in allowing civil revision

petitions in favour of the respondents

herein was perfectly right and justified."

• Edukanti Kistamma Vs. S.Venkatreddy 3

"The certificate issued under Section 38-

E(2) shall be conclusive evidence of the

protected tenant having become the owner

of the land with effect from the date of the

certificate, as against the landholder and

all other persons having any interest

therein. In case the protected tenant is not

in possession of the land, he has a right to

restoration of the possession of the said

land through the Tahsildar. The protected

tenant cannot be dispossessed illegally by

the landlord or anybody else. If so

dispossessed, he has a right to restoration

of the possession. He can be dispossessed

only by taking recourse to the procedure

2010 1 SCC 756

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

prescribed under Section 32 of the 1950

Act.

The     1950        Act     being          the   beneficial

legislation         requires          interpretation     to

advance social and economic justice and

enforce the constitutional directives and

not to deprive a person of his right to

property. The statutory provisions should

not be construed in favour of such

deprivation. Interpretation of a beneficial

legislation with a narrow pedantic

approach is not justified. In case there is

any doubt, the court should interpret a

beneficial legislation in favour of the

beneficiaries and not otherwise as it would

be against the legislative intent. For the

purpose of interpretation of a statute, the

Act is to be read in its entirety. The

purport and object of the Act must be

given its full effect by applying the

principles of purposive construction. The

court must be strong against any

construction which tends to reduce a

statute's utility. The provisions of the

statute must be construed so as to make it

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

effective and operative and to further the

ends of justice and not to frustrate the

same. The court has the duty to construe

the statute to promote the object of the

statute and serve the purpose for which it

has been enacted and should not efface its

very purpose. (Vide S.P. Jain v. Krishna

Mohan Gupta [(1987) 1 SCC 191 : AIR

1987 SC 222] , RBI v. Peerless General

Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. [(1987) 1

SCC 424 : AIR 1987 SC 1023] , Haryana

SEB v. Suresh [(1999) 3 SCC 601 : 1999

SCC (L&S) 765 : AIR 1999 SC 1160]

, Gayatri Devi Pansari v. State of

Orissa [(2000) 4 SCC 221 : AIR 2000 SC

1531] , High Court of Gujarat v. Gujarat

Kishan Mazdoor Panchayat [(2003) 4 SCC

712 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 565 : AIR 2003 SC

1201] , Indian Handicrafts

Emporium v. Union of India [(2003) 7 SCC

589 : AIR 2003 SC 3240] , Ashok Leyland

Ltd. v. State of T.N. [(2004) 3 SCC 1]

, Ameer Trading Corpn. Ltd. v. Shapoorji

Data Processing Ltd. [(2004) 1 SCC 702 :

AIR 2004 SC 355] , Deepal Girishbhai

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

Soni v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. [(2004) 5

SCC 385 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1623 : AIR 2004

SC 2107] , Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. Ram

Lal [(2005) 2 SCC 638 : 2005 SCC (L&S)

308 : AIR 2005 SC 851] , Oriental

Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Brij Mohan [(2007) 7

SCC 56 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 304 : AIR

2007 SC 1971] and Karnataka State

Financial Corpn. v. N.

Narasimahaiah [(2008) 5 SCC 176 : AIR

2008 SC 1797] .)

There can be no doubt that once a

protected tenant gets a certificate of

ownership under Section 38-E(2) of the

1950 Act, he has a right to apply for

restoration of possession to him if he has

been dispossessed. The protected tenant

has a right to ask for summary eviction of

a trespasser."

• Y.Chandraiah @ Y.Chandra Reddy Vs.

Commissioner of Police, Cyberabad, Rangareddy

District and Others 4 :

"It requires to be noticed that in P. Anil

Kumar v. The Joint Collector, Rangareddy

2006 SCC OnLine AP 1148

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

District at Hyderabad, 1988 (2) ALT 583, a

Division Bench of this Court considering

the scope of Sections 32 and 40 of the Act

held that the power of the Tahsildar under

Section 32 is vast and inclusive, not

merely preventive or prohibitive and

extends to restoring his lost possession

including by granting interim injunction in

favour of the protected tenant. The

Division Bench further held that the civil

Court has no jurisdiction in this matter."

• Dharvath Kotia and Others Vs. Joint Collector,

and Additional District Magistrate, Khammam

District and Others 5:

"From a bare reading of the above, it is

obvious that two aspects are relevant for

the purpose of answering the present

reference. Firstly, under Section 29(2) of

the Limitation Act, 1963 there is no

provision making Articles 65 and Section

27 thereof, applicable to special laws, -- in

the instant case, the special law is the

Act. Secondly, the right of a protected

tenant to recover possession of land is

2006 SCC OnLine AP 58

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

uninhibited by any principle of adverse

possession. 'Adverse possession' is a

concept, which otherwise deals with the

aspect of limitation."

• Sada Vs. Tahsildar, Uthnoor, Adilabad 6:

"Now the new proviso to S. 38-E(2) was

introduced by Act 2/1979 to get round the

difficulty created by the judgment

in Narsaiah's case (1), There, it was held,

that once the protected tenant has become

owner, there is no machinery in the Act

enabling him to obtain possession. It was

pointed out that the provision in the latter

part of the Explanation to S. 38 E (1)

enabling a 'protected tenant' to obtain

possession through the Tahsildar was not

applicable to the case of an application by

an owner, even if it be a case of a

protected tenant becoming an owner.

In our view, the Legislature wanted to fill

up the difficulty created by Narsaiah's

case when it added the new proviso to S.

38-E(2) enabling the Tahsildar to restore

AIR 1988 AP 77

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

possession to a former protected tenant

who had become the owner.

It is, however, argued that this

amendment is prospective from 11-1-1979

and that the benefit of restoration of

possession through the Tahsildar is

available only to those protected tenants

who have been given ownership

certificates after 11-1-1979. In our view,

this is not correct. It was, in our view, nor

the Intention of the legislature that these

protected tenants who obtained ownership

certificates before 11-1-1979 should go to

the Civil Court and those obtained

certificates after 11-1-1979 should go to

the Tahsildar. The intention of the

Legislature was to benefit all cases,

whether the ownership certificates were

issued before or after Act 2/79. As already

stated, the actual date of issuance of the

ownership certificate has, no bearing on

the statutory transfer of ownership under

Sec, 38-E(1) with effect from the date of

notification for the certificate dates back to

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

the date of the notification under Sec. 38-

E(1).

It is then argued that the words "the

ownership has been transferred" in the

new proviso to S. 38-E(2) show that the

amendment does not apply to cases where

the ownership certificate has been issued

before 11-1-1979. This interpretation is

not correct. We fully endorse the reasons

given in Chennaiah's case to say that

these words cannot be given such a

restricted meaning. Point No. 4 is decided

accordingly."

• Potta Nagabhushanam and Others Vs. Revenue

Divisional Officer, Kothagudem, Khammam

District and Others 7:

"To sum up, under the scheme of the Act,

a protected tenant is entitled to be

declared as owner of the land. When he is

not in possession, notwithstanding any

judgment, decree or order of any Court or

any Revenue Tribunal, the law presumes

the protected tenant to be in possession of

the land and when once a certificate is

MANU/AP/0746/2000

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

issued under Section 38-E of the Act, it

shall be lawful for the Tahsildar to restore

physical possession to the protected

tenant (holder of the certificate), as, such

certificate holder is entitled to possession

of the land covered by the certificate. In

this background, Section 32 may be

examined."

7. Learned counsel for respondents vehemently opposed

the submissions made by learned counsel for petitioners

and submitted that the respondents are not in illegal

possession of the petition lands, as the original landholder,

Smt. Radha Bai, sold the lands to Mohd Khaja Saib prior to

1954 through a registered sale deed. He lamented that the

contention of revision petitioners that they were in

possession of the lands as on the date of issuance of the

Section 38-E Certificate is incorrect, and stated that as a

matter of fact, the protected tenant, V. Basappa, died 40

years ago, and his sons, V. Sangaiah and V. Yadaiah, were

in possession of the lands. He divulged that the

respondents purchased the subject lands through

registered sale deeds and have been in possession of the

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

subject lands as absolute owners since the date of

purchase.

8. Learned counsel for respondents incessantly

contended that the revision petitioners were aware of the

said purchases but kept quiet for over 37 years without

claiming any right over the lands. He further contended

that the contention of revision petitioners with regard to

restoration of possession is barred by limitation, as they

failed to avail the remedies provided to them by the statute

within a reasonable period of time.

9. While praying this Court to dismiss the revision

petitions, in support of the said contentions, learned

counsel for respondents, relied on the following judgments:

• Joint Collector Ranga Reddy District and Another

Vs. D.Narsing Rao and others 8

"No time-limit is prescribed in the above

section for the exercise of suo motu power

but the question is as to whether the suo

motu power could be exercised after a

2015(2)ALT (SC) 1

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

period of 50 years. The Government as

early as in the year 1991 passed an order

reserving 477 acres of land in Survey Nos.

36 and 37 of Gopanpally Village for house

sites to the government employees. In

other words, the Government had every

occasion to verify the revenue entries

pertaining to the said lands while passing

the Government Order dated 24-9-1991

but no exception was taken to the entries

found. Further the respondents herein

filed Writ Petition No. 21719 of 1997

challenging the Government Order dated

24-9-1991 and even at that point of time

no action was initiated pertaining to the

entries in the said survey numbers.

Thereafter, the purchasers of land from

Respondents 1 and 2 herein filed a civil

suit in OS No. 12 of 2001 on the file of the

Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy

District praying for a declaration that they

were lawful owners and possessors of

certain plots of land in Survey No. 36, and

after contest, the suit was decreed and

said decree is allowed to become final. By

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

the impugned notice dated 31-12-2004 the

suo motu revision power under Section

166-B referred to above is sought to be

exercised after five decades and if it is

allowed to do so it would lead to

anomalous position leading to uncertainty

and complications seriously affecting the

rights of the parties over immovable

properties.

In the light of what is stated above we are

of the view that the Division Bench

[Collector v. D. Narasing Rao, 2010 SCC

OnLine AP 406 : (2010) 6 ALD 748] of the

High Court was right in affirming the view

of the learned Single Judge of the High

Court that the suo motu revision

undertaken after a long lapse of time, even

in the absence of any period of limitation

was arbitrary and opposed to the concept

of rule of law."

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

• Ithagani Lachaiah and others Vs. Joint Collector

and Additional District Magistrate, Nalgonda and

Others 9

"In the several decisions relied upon by

the learned counsel for the petitioners,

uniformly it is held that whenever there is

inordinate delay in invoking the provisions

of a statute, an application should be

rejected on that ground alone. Principle

reiterated from time and again that even if

no time limit is prescribed in the statute

for exercise of power, such power has to

be exercised within reasonable time and

what is reasonable time depends on the

facts of each case. In the cases discussed

above, the delay in filing an application for

suo moto exercise of power ranged

between five years in one case to 12 to 15

years in another case and delay of 20

years and more in other cases. The

Supreme Court held it is unreasonable to

exercise power in such cases."

2015(4) ALD 490

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

• Chinnaboini Narsaiah Vs. Tahsildar 10

"If was lastly contended by the learned

counsel for the appellants that the power

to restore possession to a protected tenant

out of possession can be exercised by the

Tahsildar under the explanation to sub-

sec. (1) of Sec. 38-E of the Act only when

the protected tenant is dispossessed. The

contention is that there may be cases of

surrender of possession or voluntary

abandonment of possession by the

protected tenant and in such events

possession cannot be restored to the

protected tenant. The express language of

the Explanation itself is that possession

can be restored by a summary enquiry in

favour of a tenant who is dispossessed.

Obviously, that power cannot be exercised

in favour of a tenant or protected tenant

who voluntarily surrenders his possession

or who has abandoned the possession.

The question whether a protected tenant

was dispossessed or abandoned

possession voluntarily is, however, a

1978 (2) (hc)

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

question of fact. Suffice it to say, that the

restoration of possession could only be in

favour of a protected tenant who is

dispossessed in contravention of Sec. 32 of

the Act and not one who has surrendered

or abandoned possession.

It can also be noted that the notices

issued by the patwari purporting to be in

possession of an order of the Tahsildar are

one to which the appellants-petitioners

were not parties. In the view of the matter

we have taken, any order of dispossession

by the Tahsildar subsequent to the Issue

of ownership certificate is not only illegal

and invalid, but is also not an order under

the provisions of the Act. It cannot be said

that the writ petitions are not

maintainable on the ground that

alternative remedies of appeal are

available to the petitioners. The question

that the petitions are not maintainable

was not also seriously canvassed before us

by the respondents. Even otherwise, we

hold that the writ petitions are

maintainable. For the aforesaid reasons,

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

we hold that the impugned notices issued

by the patwari and also the ownership

certificate issued by the 2nd respondent in

favour of the protected tenants without

notice to the petitioners (persons in

possession) and the restoration of

possession having not preceded the issue

of ownership certificate, are illegal. Thus,

writs of mandamus would issue

restraining the respondents from

disturbing the possession of the

appellants-petitioners. This would not

preclude the authorities under the Act

from taking fresh proceedings after due

notice to the petitioners to consider

whether respondents 4 to 7 or 4 to 9 in

the other case are entitled to recover

possession and the further question

whether they are entitled to the ownership

certificates. The appellants-petitioners

would be at liberty to raise all objections

including the objection as to the rights of

the protected tenants for restoration of

possession on the ground of

extinguishment of their right."

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

• Jupudi Bhushanam Vs. Joint Collector,

Khammam and Others 11 and Ramulu and Others

Vs. Sumitra Bai12.

10. Having regard to the rival submissions made and on

going through the material placed on record, it is noted

that the only question to be decided in these revision

petitions is whether the Tahsildar is competent to restore

the possession after granting Section 38-E Certificate.

Subsequently, the petitioners were dispossessed from the

PT lands. The contention of learned counsel for petitioner is

that the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for

respondent in the case of Ramulu (supra 12) is not

applicable to the facts of the case on hand and that basing

on the judgment rendered in the case of Sada (supra 6) the

petitioners are entitled for the relief as prayed for.

1996 SCC OnLine AP 941

2013 (1) ALD 215

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

11. Considering the averments of the case, at this stage,

it is pertinent to note that in the case of V.Ramaswamy Vs.

State of Telangana 13 this Court observed that the proviso

to Secion 38-E (2) entitles a protected tenant even after he

obtained a certificate under Section 38E to seek restoration

of possession, and the legislature never intended to put any

limitation/time limit for the same by linking the date of

issuance of ownership certificate to the date when the

application for restoration of possession was sought under

the said provision. Thus the concept of laches/delay has no

application at all having regard to the beneficial legislation

intended to protect tenants and their successors.

12. Further, in the case of Thota Sridhar (supra) the

Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the order of the learned

Single Bench in Jupudi Bhushanam [Jupudi Bhushanam v.

Collector, Khammam, 1996 SCC OnLine AP 941] is to the effect that

once certificate under Section 38-E is granted, and

subsequently he has been dispossessed, he has the right to

seek remedy from the civil court. The High Court has failed

to notice that the Explanation in sub-section (1) of Section

MANU/TL/0702/2021

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

38-E of the Tenancy Act specifically provides that if a

protected tenant, on account of his being dispossessed

otherwise than in the manner and by order of the Tahsildar

as provided in Section 32, is not in possession of the land

on the date of the notification issued under sub-section (1),

then, the Tahsildar shall notwithstanding anything

contained in the said Section 32, either suo motu or on the

application of the protected tenant hold a summary

enquiry, and direct that such land in possession of the

landholder or any person claiming through or under him in

that area, shall be taken from such possession thereof and

shall be restored to the protected tenant. That in the

judgment of Kasa Muthanna [Kasa Muthanna v. Sunke Rajanna,

2015 SCC OnLine Hyd 592], the plaintiff was relying upon a

certificate under Section 38 of the Act whereas the

defendant was relying upon a sale which was void in terms

of Section 38 of the Act. The High Court was examining in

second appeal filed by the defendant, when the certificate

under Section 38-E was granted to the plaintiff or their

predecessors. In the aforesaid case, a certificate issued

under Section 38-E had become final and binding for not

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

being challenged as per the procedure established by law.

The Court held that the revenue entries made ignoring the

Section 38-E certificate are illegal and that when once the

title is established and the defendants had failed to prove

adverse possession or any other right to remain in

possession, the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of

recovery possession.

13. Looking at the other sphere, in the judgment

rendered by this Court in Ithagani Lachaiah (supra 9) it

was uniformly held that an application should be rejected

due to inordinate delay in invoking the provisions of a

statute. This principle is rooted in the concept of laches,

which dictates that a party seeking relief must do so within

a reasonable time. The Courts have consistently

emphasized that delay can be a bar to relief, even in the

absence of a specific time limit prescribed by the statute.

The principle consistently reiterated is that even in the

absence of a prescribed time limit in the statute, the power

must be exercised within a reasonable time, which is

determined on a case-by-case basis. This means that the

Courts will consider the specific circumstances of each

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

case, including the length of the delay, the reasons for the

delay, and the potential prejudice to the other party. In the

cited cases thereof, the delay in filing an application ranged

from 5 years in one case, to 12 to 15 years in another case,

and up to 20 years and more in other cases. The Hon'ble

Supreme Court deemed these delays unreasonable, leading

to the rejection of the applications. The Court held that

such inordinate delays are not justified and can lead to

serious prejudice to the other party. By rejecting the

applications, the Court emphasized the importance of

exercising statutory powers within a reasonable time to

ensure that justice is served and the rights of all parties are

protected.

14. In addition, in the case of Joint Collector Ranga

Reddy District (supra 8) it was summarized that delayed

exercise of revisional jurisdiction is discouraged because it

can lead to avoidable and endless uncertainty in human

affairs. If actions or transactions were to remain forever

open to challenge, it would undermine the rule of law. Even

in the absence of a prescribed limitation period, intervening

delays can result in the creation of third-party rights,

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

which cannot be disregarded by a belated exercise of

discretionary power, especially when no valid explanation

for the delay is provided. The rule of law must align with

the rule of life. Even in cases involving fraudulent orders,

the exercise of revisional power must occur within a

reasonable period after the discovery of the fraud. Mere

allegations of fraud do not indefinitely extend the time for

correction. Failure to exercise revisional power within a

reasonable timeframe would itself be tantamount to a fraud

on the statute that vests such power in an authority.

15. For the sake of convenience, paragraph Nos.9 to 10

of the judgment rendered in the case of Ramulu (supra 12)

are extracted below:

"9. However, the question that remains to be

considered is, whether on the facts of this case, the

petitioners are entitled to restoration of possession.

In Paragraph 5 of the written statement filed in OS

No.16 of 1978, the petitioners averred as under:

"That as regards the Para 4 of the

plaint it is submitted that the

R.D.O., Vikarabad has rightly

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issued ownership certificate under

Section 38E in favour of the

defendants and so the allegation

and statement made in the para

are false and so denied. It is

submitted that the defendants are

in actual possession and

enjoyment of the suit land,

therefore the suit for injunction is

not maintainable as the plaintiff is

not in possession of the suit land

on the date of filing the suit and

also prior and after. D2 to D6 were

dispossessed in 1977 and so D2 to

D6 were not in possession of the

suit land again by R.1. under

panchanama on 6.6.1978. Since

then the defendants are in

possession and enjoyment of the

suit land."

From the above-mentioned averments, it is clear that

after the grant of Section 38E certificate, the

petitioners' possession was restored by the Revenue

Inspector under panchanama on 6.6.1978. In my

opinion, once the tenants, in whose favour ownership

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

certificate has been issued under Section 38E of the

Act, have been put in possession of the property, they

cannot approach the Tahsildar again and again for

restoration of possession whenever they are

dispossessed for, they no longer continue to be under

protection of the provisions of theAct as they have

evolved into full-fledged pe owners with the issuance

of the ownership certificate under Section 38E of the

Act. If they are subsequently dispossessed, they can

only approach the competent civil Court by way of a

suit. This view of mine is fortified by the judgment of

this Court in Jupudi Bhushanam v. Joint Collector,

Khammam and others, 1997 (1) ALD 440 1997 (1)

ALT 627.

10. In the light of the above discussion, I am in

agreement with the conclusion arrived at by the

learned Joint Collector in the impugned order though

for different reasons. The petitioners having become

owners of the property are entitled to seek restoration

of their possession as owners thereof through a civil

Court. Accordingly, while holding that the petitioners

are the owners of the property to the extent of

Ac.1.34 ½ guntas, they are permitted to file a civil

suit for recovery of their possession, in accordance

with law."

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

16. In the case of Chinnaboini Narsaiah (supra 10) it

was categorically observed that the power of Tahsildar to

restore possession to a protected tenant under Section 38-

E of the Act is limited to cases where the tenant is

dispossessed, not where they voluntarily surrender or

abandon possession. The court held that restoration of

possession can only be in favor of a protected tenant

dispossessed in contravention of Section 32 of the Act. The

notices issued by the patwari and the ownership certificate

issued by the 2nd respondent without notice to the

petitioners were deemed illegal. Consequently, writs of

mandamus were issued, restraining the respondents from

disturbing the petitioners' possession. However, this did

not preclude the authorities from taking fresh proceedings

after due notice to consider the respondents' entitlement to

recover possession and ownership certificates, allowing the

appellants-petitioners to raise objections, including the

extinguishment of the protected tenants' rights.

17. Reverting to the case on hand, the learned counsel

for respondents opposes the plea of learned counsel for

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petitioners, on two main grounds, one is the ground of

delay as there is inordinate delay of 37 years and the other

is that once the protected tenant has become owner and

possession is delivered to him, after dispossession of the

protected tenant, the said possession cannot be restored by

the Tahsildar and that he has to approach competent civil

Court for the same.

18. With regard to the said objections, learned counsel

for petitioners had mainly relied on the judgment rendered

by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Thota Sridhar

(supra) whereunder, it was observed that the certificate

issued under Section 38-E(2) shall be conclusive evidence

of the protected tenant having become the owner of the

land with effect from the date of the certificate, as against

the landholder and all other persons having any interest

therein. In case the protected tenant is not in possession of

the land, he has a right to restoration of the possession of

the said land through the Tahsildar. The protected tenant

cannot be dispossessed illegally by the landlord or anybody

else. If so dispossessed, he has a right to restoration of the

possession. He can be dispossessed only by taking recourse

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

to the procedure prescribed under Section 32 of the 1950

Act.

19. On going through the judgment rendered in Thota

Sridhar (supra) it can be said that it is a well-established

principle of law that a protected tenant's rights of

ownership under Section 38-E of the Act are not automatic,

but rather are contingent upon fulfilling specific

requirements. Firstly, a certificate of ownership must be

issued to the protected tenant, which serves as proof of

their ownership rights. Secondly, the protected tenant must

pay the determined amount to the landowner, which

represents the consideration for the transfer of ownership.

Failure to obtain a certificate of ownership, produce a deed

of lease, or pay the determined price can result in the

annulment of ownership. This is because the protected

tenant has not fulfilled the necessary conditions for

acquiring ownership rights. In cases where a protected

tenant or their successors are dispossessed from the land,

they can seek relief under Section 32 of the Act. This

provision allows them to file an application before the

Tahsildar for recovery of possession. However, it is

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

essential that they pursue this remedy in a timely manner,

as delay or failure to do so can result in the loss of their

rights. Moreover, if the land is subsequently acquired or

third-party rights are created, the protected tenant's rights

may be extinguished. Therefore, it is crucial for protected

tenants to be diligent in pursuing their rights and remedies

under the Tenancy Act to avoid losing their ownership

rights.

20. That being so, on reverting to the facts of the case on

hand, it is pertinent to note that according to petitioners,

after the death of their father, they were granted protected

tenancy but they left village and settled in other places for

about forty years and by that time the land holder sold the

properties to others.

21. The specific contention of revision petitioners is that

they are in possession of subject lands as on the date of

grant of Section 38E certificate and that as a matter of fact,

late V. Yadhaih filed petition before the RDO praying to

grant stay order to protect their rights and also a vacate

petition was filed in this regard when Shaik Moinuddin

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obtained stay. The said fact would clearly brief that it is the

specific stand of protected tenants that they were allegedly

dispossessed from the lands, subsequent to grant of

Section 38E Certificate and as on the date of grant of

Section 38E Certificate, they were in possession of property

which shows that they were in possession of the property

and Section 38E Certificate was granted.

22. In other words, the factual matrix of the cases on

hand does not revolve around dispossession of parties.

Originally, when certificate under Section 38E was granted,

the possession was delivered to PT, but it is the case of

petitioners that subsequently the landlord sold the

properties to others. On the contrary, it is the specific

stand of learned counsel for respondents that in the year

1933 itself the properties were sold to Radhabai and Shaik

Mohinuddin.

23. On going through the impugned common order, it is

seen that despite being aware of the sale, petitioners waited

over 37 years to assert their rights over the land and the

Appellants' entitlement to possession was rejected on the

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

ground that the Tahsildar has no power to grant

possession to them, as they were dispossessed subsequent

to the issuance of the Section 38-E certificate.

24. Keeping in mind the factual matrix and having

considered the legal position as stated above, it is noted

that in these cases the primary point to be decided is

whether the Tahsildar is having power to restore the

possession after dispossession of the protected tenants

from the land. At this stage, it is pertinent to note the legal

position of Section 32 of the Act. Section 32 of the Act

provides a framework for protected tenants to seek

restoration of possession. This provision allows tenants to

apply to the Tahsildar for possession, ensuring that

landlords cannot obtain possession without following the

due process of law. The Tahsildar is required to conduct an

inquiry and pass an order that is deemed fit. This process

ensures that the rights of both the tenant and the landlord

are protected. However, in the present case, the protected

tenant's application for restoration of possession was made

after a significant delay. Further, in these cases,

admittedly, the possession was delivered to the protected

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

tenant after issuance of 38E certificate and the same is

mentioned in the counter filed by the respondent when the

landlord challenged the Section 38E proceedings. Once the

Section 38E certificate was issued and possession was

delivered, he is no more the protected tenant and he is the

owner. Further, when he is not the tenant of the land, there

is no question of applying the tenancy laws. Therefore, the

Tahsildar, is not having the power to deal with the matter

as the same does not come under the tenancy laws.

25. To be precise, the evidence on record indicates that

Shaik Mohluddin preferred an appeal,

File No.B7/194/1977, before the Joint Collector of

Mahabubnagar. The appeal challenged the legitimacy of the

Section 38-E Certificate granted to the petitioner and his

brother, V. Yadaiah. This certificate was issued through

File No. K/3129/1977. In response to this appeal, the

petitioner and his brother took proactive measures to

protect their interests. On December 30, 1977, they filed a

Caveat Petition before the District Revenue Officer of

Mahabubnagar. This petition was submitted through their

advocate, Sri R. Ramesh Rao. As part of their Caveat

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Petition, the brother of petitioner also provided a sworn

affidavit, and in the said affidavit, he attested that the

Revenue Divisional Officer had indeed granted the Section

38-E Certificate to them through File No. K/3129/1977.

Furthermore, the petitioner and his brother filed a

comprehensive counter on June 26, 1978. In the said

counter, the petitioner and his brother emphasized that

they had been rightfully granted the Section 38-E

Certificate by the Revenue Divisional Officer. Moreover,

they even asserted that they were in possession of the

lands in question and had been so for a considerable

period. The said counter cautioned that if a stay were

granted on the Section 38-E Certificate, it would empower

the appellant, Shaik Mohiuddin, to interfere with their

rightful possession of the lands. Therefore, it can be

observed that the said material shows that revision

petitioners were in possession after grant of Section 38E

certificate according to their counter itself. As such, the

contention of learned counsel for revision petitioners, the

revision petitioners were not given the possession and the

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

same is against their own pleadings in the counter filed in

File No. K/3129/1977.

26. At this stage, it is imperative to note that the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in the case of Jupudi (supra 11) in

paragraph No.6 held as under:

"6. I am unable to agree to the submission. Once

Section 38(E)Certificate is issued, the protected

tenant becomes the owner. For any subsequent

dispossession he has to resort to the Civil Court. He

cannot rely upon the provisions of the Tenancy Act.

The facts of the Full Bench judgment are quite

different and this case is distinguishable on facts.

The lower Tribunals held concurrently against the

petitioner on this aspect. I do not want to interfere

with the order of the Collector."

27. Further, in the case of Ramulu (supra 12) it was

observed that "the petitioners having become owners of the

property are entitled to seek restoration of their possession

as owners thereof through a civil Court". That being so, it

can be noted that the Tahsildar has no right once the

possession and Section 38E Certificate is granted to the

SKS,J CRP.Nos.887 & 836 OF 2020

protected tenants as they are no more protected tenants as

consequence of the same. Therefore, the tenancy law

cannot be applicable and the bar under Section 99 of the

Act, in any manner, does not come in the way, to approach

the civil Court.