Syed Dastagir vs The State Of Telangana
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Telangana High Court

Syed Dastagir vs The State Of Telangana on 5 August, 2025

Author: N.Tukaramji

Bench: N.Tukaramji

       THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE N.TUKARAMJI

           CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO. 515 OF 2025

ORDER

This Criminal Revision Petition is filed under Section 438

read with Section 442 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

(hereinafter referred to as 'CrPC'), challenging the remand order

dated 08.07.2025 passed by the learned VII Additional Chief

Judicial Magistrate, Hyderabad, in connection with First

Information Report (FIR) No. 252 of 2025 registered at Malakpet

Police Station, Hyderabad.

2. I have heard Mr.Mohd. Azhar, learned counsel for the

petitioner and Mr.Jithender Rao Veeramalla, learned Additional

Public Prosecutor, representing the respondent-State.

3. The petitioner is arrayed as an accused No.8 for the

offences under Sections 318(4), 204 read with 3(5) of the

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (for short, 'the BNS, 2023).

4. Briefly stated, the relevant facts of the case are that the

petitioner was arrested by the concerned police and produced

before the jurisdictional Magistrate. Pursuant to such production,

and by virtue of the impugned remand order, the petitioner was

remanded to judicial custody.

2 NTR,J CRLRC_515_2025

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the

impugned remand order is vitiated in law on the ground that the

petitioner/Accused No. 8 was produced before the learned

Magistrate beyond the mandatory period of 24 hours from the

time of detention. It was contended that the Magistrate, without

duly considering this crucial procedural lapse, erroneously

remanded the petitioner to judicial custody.

To substantiate the contention of delayed production,

learned counsel drew attention to the remand case diary dated

08.07.2025, wherein it is specifically recorded that the petitioner

was apprehended from his residence on 07.07.2025 at

approximately 10:15 P.M. and in the remand order itself, the

learned Magistrate noted that the petitioner was produced before

the Court only at about 11:35 P.M. on 08.07.2025. This reflects a

delay of approximately one hour and twenty minutes beyond the

prescribed 24-hour period under Section 167 of the CrPC,

thereby rendering the remand illegal.

It was further argued that the alleged offences are

punishable with imprisonment for less than seven years.

Accordingly, as per the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar and Another, (2014) 8 SCC 273, 3 NTR,J CRLRC_515_2025

and in light of Section 41A of the CrPC/35(3) of the BNSS, the

petitioner ought to have been served with a notice for appearance

rather than being subjected to arrest. The investigating officer, in

blatant disregard of this well-settled legal position, proceeded to

effect the petitioner's arrest without justification.

It was also urged that the record discloses no specific or

substantive allegations against the petitioner that would satisfy

the essential ingredients of offences such as cheating or

impersonation. Consequently, no prima facie case is made out

against the petitioner. Despite the absence of material particulars

and procedural compliance, the learned Magistrate mechanically

passed the order of remand.

Learned counsel finally asserted that the time from the

apprehension of the petitioner to his production before the

Magistrate must be strictly accounted for under Section 167 of the

CrPC, and any violation thereof renders the remand order void. In

view of the above submissions, he prayed that the impugned

order be set aside and that the petitioner be set at liberty.

6. In response, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor

submitted that the police report and accompanying material prima

facie establish the involvement of the petitioner (Accused No. 8) 4 NTR,J CRLRC_515_2025

in the alleged offences. He contended that the learned Magistrate

had passed the remand order after due consideration of the

material placed before him. However, the learned Public

Prosecutor fairly conceded that the record indicates the petitioner

was indeed produced beyond 24 hours from the time of arrest.

Accordingly, he submitted that appropriate orders may be passed

as deemed fit in the circumstances of the case.

7. I have perused the materials on record.

8. A legally sustainable remand order must reflect the

following:

(i) physical production of the accused (except in exceptional

circumstances);

(ii) the Magistrate's perusal of the case diary and remand

application to assess the necessity of remand;

(iii) recording of specific reasons justifying the need for

custody, whether police or judicial; and

(iv) ideally, the accused's signature shall be taken on the

remand order, evidencing production before the Court.

The order should unambiguously indicate that the Magistrate

considered all relevant materials and applied judicial mind to the

facts before authorizing detention.

5 NTR,J CRLRC_515_2025

9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manubhai Ratilal Patel Tr.

Ushaben v. State of Gujarat & Others, AIR 2013 SC 313, has

authoritatively held that the act of remanding an accused is a

purely judicial function. A Magistrate does not act in an executive

capacity when ordering detention. It is incumbent upon the

Magistrate to be satisfied, based on materials placed before him,

that there exist reasonable grounds to remand the accused to

custody. The very purpose of remand under Section 167 CrPC is

to enable the Magistrate to ascertain whether custodial detention

is truly warranted. This determination necessarily requires the

Magistrate to peruse the case diary and remand report and to

discern whether there is justification for police remand, judicial

remand, or no remand at all.

10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further emphasized that the

Magistrate must not authorize remand mechanically. If police

custody is granted, the Magistrate must record that such custody

is necessary for the purpose of further investigation, recovery, or

confrontation with co-accused. An order lacking in such specific

details is liable to be characterized as non-speaking, mechanical,

and illegal.

6 NTR,J CRLRC_515_2025

11. In the instant case, the remand case diary clearly states

that the petitioner was apprehended at 10:15 P.M. on 07.07.2025,

and the remand order refers to production before the Magistrate

at 11:35 P.M. on 08.07.2025, a delay of more than 24 hours. A

Division Bench of this Court, in T. Ramadevi v. State of

Telangana & Others, W.P. No. 21912 of 2024, held that the

period of apprehension must be considered in calculating the 24-

hour timeline under Section 57 of CrPC, not merely the time

recorded in the arrest memo and production beyond 24 hours

from initial apprehension violated the statutory mandate and

rendered the detention illegal. The learned Additional Public

Prosecutor fairly admitted that the petitioner was produced

beyond 24 hours from the time of apprehension, with a delay of

one hour and twenty minutes.

12. Additionally, the impugned remand order merely notes the

fact of production, engagement of counsel, alleged physical

abuse, medical assistance, and compliance with Sections 47, 48,

53, and 58 CrPC. It cursorily observes that a prima facie case

exists against the petitioner, without addressing the legality of the

arrest, the delay in production, or the statutory mandate under

BNSS and Article 21 of the Constitution of India. This omission 7 NTR,J CRLRC_515_2025

indicates that the Magistrate failed to apply judicial mind to the

essential requirements before authorizing judicial custody,

thereby vitiating the remand order. Consequently, the

continuation of custody and the judicial remand under the

impugned order are vitiated for non-compliance with Section 57

and 167 CrPC.

13. That apart, Section 35 of the BNSS empowers a police

officer to arrest a person without obtaining a warrant or prior

sanction from a Magistrate if the person commits a cognizable

offence in the officer's presence, or if credible information or

reasonable suspicion exists that the person has committed a

cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment up to seven

years. However, such arrest must be justified on specific grounds,

such as the necessity to prevent further offences, to ensure

proper investigation, to prevent tampering with evidence, or to

avoid inducement, threats, or coercion of witnesses. Otherwise,

the police are first required to serve a notice under Section 35(3)

of BNSS, calling upon the accused to appear before the

investigating officer. Thereafter, arrest is permitted only if the

person fails to comply with such notice without sufficient cause,

and the officer must record reasons for the arrest in writing.

8 NTR,J CRLRC_515_2025

Thus, while Section 35 permits warrantless arrests, however it

incorporates significant procedural safeguards to protect

individual liberty.

14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar v. State of

Bihar and Another, (2014) 8 SCC 273, has clearly laid down that

in cases involving offences punishable with imprisonment less

than seven years, arrest is not automatic and arrests for

cognizable offences punishable up to seven years must be

justified by written reasons such as prevention of further offences,

ensuring presence during trial, or prevention of tampering with

evidence. Therefore the investigating officer is obligated to issue

a notice of appearance under Section 35(3) of BNSS unless

exceptional circumstances exist. It has been expressly directed

that Magistrates must not authorize detention mechanically but

must record detailed and reasoned orders reflecting judicial

satisfaction. Failure to comply with these directives renders the

remand unlawful and invites judicial or departmental scrutiny.

These safeguards are incorporated into the BNSS under Sections

35(3), 35(2), and 35(6).

15. In the present case, the grounds for arrest as cited include:

(a) the likelihood of the accused resuming illegal activities if 9 NTR,J CRLRC_515_2025

released; (b) apprehension that evidence may be tampered with;

(c) possibility of threats, inducements, or coercion of witnesses;

(d) ensuring the presence of the accused during trial; and (e) the

fact that Accused Nos. 1 to 5 are absconding. While these

grounds may provide a basis for arrest in theory, they must be

assessed in light of the procedural safeguards mandated by law

and judicial precedent. The record fails to show that the

Magistrate made such an assessment.

16. For all the aforementioned reasons, it is evident that the

investigating agency failed to adhere to the procedural

safeguards laid down in Arnesh Kumar (supra) and the learned

Magistrate authorized judicial remand without applying judicial

mind to the delay in production or the statutory prerequisites.

17. In consequence, the impugned remand order dated

08.07.2025 passed by the learned VII Additional Chief Judicial

Magistrate, Hyderabad, in FIR No. 252 of 2025 registered at

Malakpet Police Station, Hyderabad, is hereby set aside and

quashed.

18. In view of the peculiar circumstances of the case and

considering the period the petitioner has remained in judicial

custody, the VII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 10 NTR,J CRLRC_515_2025

Hyderabad, upon receipt of a copy of this order, shall take

immediate and appropriate steps to secure the release of the

petitioner, namely Accused No. 8, without any further delay.

Within one week from the date of his release, the

petitioner/Accused No. 8 shall execute a personal bond for

Rs. 10,000/- and furnish two sureties, each for an equivalent

amount, to the satisfaction of the VII Additional Chief Metropolitan

Magistrate, Hyderabad.

The petitioner shall remain available and cooperate with the

ongoing judicial proceedings.

It is needless to say that any failure in compliance of the

order would make the petitioner liable for action by the

investigating agency and the Court, as per law.

19. In the result, the criminal revision case is allowed.

Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand

closed.

_______________ N.TUKARAMJI, J Date:05.08.2025 ccm NOTE:

Registry is directed to communicate this order to the Court concerned forthwith.

B/O ccm