Telangana High Court

Mahesh Muralidhar Bhagwat I.P.S vs Birla Mallesh on 30 April, 2025

   THE HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE SUJOY PAUL
                         AND
        THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE RENUKA YARA

        WRIT APPEAL NOS.506, 508, 511 AND 514 OF 2025

COMMON JUDGMENT:

(Per the Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice Sujoy Paul)

Sri S.Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel representing

learned counsel Sri M.V.Pratap Kumar; Sri D.Prakash Reddy,

learned Senior Counsel representing learned counsel Sri Khamar

Kiran Kantamneni; and Sri M.V.S.Suresh Kumar, learned Senior

Counsel, representing learned counsel Sri Naren Sai Chiramdasu

and learned counsel Sri D.Aniketh Reddy, for the petitioners.

Sri L.Ravi Chander, learned Senior Counsel representing

Sri Meer Akbar Ali Hashmi, learned counsel for respondent No.1;

Sri Muralidhar Reddy Katram, learned Government Pleader for

Revenue; Sri Mahesh Raje, learned Government Pleader for Home;

Sri Kiran Gattu, learned Standing Counsel for Telangana Bhoodan

Yagna Board; Sri V.T.Kalyan, learned Standing Counsel for

Enforcement Directorate and Sri T.Srujan Kumar Reddy, learned

Standing Counsel for Central Bureau of Investigation, for the

respondents.

2. Regard being had to the similitude of the matters, on the

joint request, the matters were heard on admission analogously.

3. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants in these matters

submit that although these matters are arising out of an ex parte

interim order, wherein the present appellants, who were unofficial

respondents before the writ court, were not put to notice and the

learned Single Judge has passed the impugned order, the said ex

parte interim order is bad in law because the learned Single Judge

has even treated Survey Nos.194 and 195 as 'Bhoodan' land,

whereas it is, admittedly, a patta land. Apart from this,

observations made in last three paragraphs of the impugned order

were totally uncalled for and could not have been passed without

hearing the appellants.

4. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants placed reliance on

the judgment of the Supreme Court in LIC of India v. Sanjeev

Builders (P) Ltd. 1 and submit that even an ex parte interim order

can be interfered with if it fulfils the requirement of "judgment".

Certain findings mentioned in last two paragraphs of the

impugned order have serious ramification and there was no

(2018) 11 SCC 722

occasion for the learned Single Judge to give such observations

without hearing the appellants.

5. Learned Senior Counsel for respondent No.1 supported the

impugned order and urged that the impugned order is ex parte in

nature. The appellants may file an application for vacation of the

interim order and the learned Single Judge may pass appropriate

order thereupon.

6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties on this

aspect.

7. Admittedly, the appellants are party respondents before the

learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge has passed the

impugned order without putting the appellants to notice. Thus,

the appellants can certainly file applications for vacation of the

aforesaid order. If such applications are filed, the learned Single

Judge will certainly examine the same and in that event, it cannot

be said that the order impugned passed by the learned Single

Judge has attained finality or falls within the ambit of "judgment".

Thus, the judgment of the Supreme Court in LIC of India (supra)

is of no assistance in the factual backdrop of this matter. The

point involved in this case is no more res integra. In catena of

judgments, it was held that against an interlocutory order, a

Letters Patent Appeal/Writ Appeal can be entertained with

circumspection and upon fulfilling the requirements of certain

factors.

8. In University of Hyderabad, rep. by its Registrar, Central

University Campus (P.O), Gachibowli, Hyderabad v. Sadik

Hussain 2, a Division Bench of the erstwhile High Court of Andhra

Pradesh at Hyderabad considered Clause 15 of the Letters Patent

and opined that it provides an appeal from a "judgment" of Single

Judge in exercise of original jurisdiction to a Division Bench. The

judgment of the Supreme Court in Shah Babulal Khimji v.

Jayaben D.Kania 3 was considered and it was held that 'orders

falling under categories (iv) and (v) are not 'judgments' for the

purpose of filing appeals provided under the Letter Patent'.

Categories (iv) and (v) read thus:

"(iv) Routine orders which are passed to facilitate the progress of the case till its culmination in the final judgment.

(v) Orders which may cause some inconvenience or some prejudice to a party, but which do not finally determine the rights and obligations of the parties."

2013 SCC OnLine AP 342

AIR 1981 SC 1786

Lastly, the Division Bench recorded as under:

" At the cost of the repetition, it is to be noticed that the learned Single Judge has not decided the rights and obligations of the parties and only passed interlocutory orders and hence in our considered view the same does not satisfy the trappings of the judgments as defined under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and it will be appropriate for the appellant to file vacate petition. Accordingly, the writ appeal is disposed of with the said observation."

(Emphasis Supplied)

9. In Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Chunilal

Nanda 4, on which heavy reliance is placed, the Supreme Court

held as under:

"15. Interim orders/interlocutory orders passed during the pendency of a case, fall under one or the other of the following categories:

(i) Orders which finally decide a question or issue in controversy in the main case.

(ii) Orders which finally decide an issue which materially and directly affects the final decision in the main case.

(iii) Orders which finally decide a collateral issue or question which is not the subject-matter of the main case.

(iv) Routine orders which are passed to facilitate the progress of the case till its culmination in the final judgment.

(v) Orders which may cause some inconvenience or some prejudice to a party, but which do not finally determine the rights and obligations of the parties.

(2006) 5 SCC 399

16. The term "judgment" occurring in clause 15 of the Letters Patent will take into its fold not only the judgments as defined in Section 2(9) CPC and orders enumerated in Order 43 Rule 1 CPC, but also other orders which, though may not finally and conclusively determine the rights of parties with regard to all or any matters in controversy, may have finality in regard to some collateral matter, which will affect the vital and valuable rights and obligations of the parties. Interlocutory orders which fall under categories (i) to

(iii) above, are, therefore, "judgments" for the purpose of filing appeals under the Letters Patent. On the other hand, orders falling under categories (iv) and (v) are not "judgments" for the purpose of filing appeals provided under the Letters Patent."

(Emphasis Supplied)

10. The Supreme Court in a recent judgment in Shyam Sel and

Power Limited v. Shyam Steel Industries Limited 5 took a

similar view.

11. The Supreme Court laid down the litmus test to determine

whether the order impugned is a "judgment" within the meaning

of Letters Patent. If the present matter is examined on the anvil of

said principles, it will be clear that (i) by impugned order the

learned Single Judge has not finally decided the question or issue

in controversy in the main case, (ii) the impugned order has not

decided any issue which materially or directly affects final decision

in the Writ Petition, (iii) the impugned order does not have any