Mudavath Ramesh vs The State Of Telangana,
2025 Latest Caselaw 4948 Tel

Telangana High Court

Mudavath Ramesh vs The State Of Telangana, on 21 April, 2025

Author: K. Lakshman

Bench: K.Lakshman

    THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K.LAKSHMAN

           CRIMINAL PETITION No.641 OF 2025

ORDER:

Heard Sri R. Prashanth, learned counsel for the petitioners,

and Ms. Shalini Saxena, learned counsel representing Sri Palle

Nageshwar Rao, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for

respondents.

2. This criminal petition is filed under Section 528 of

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, 'BNSS') to

set aside the remand docket orders both dated 09.01.2025 in

Cr.No.154 and 155 of 2024 of P.S.Bomraspet, pertaining to the

same incident which is the subject matter of FIR No.153 of 2024 of

P.S. Bomraspet, passed by the II Additional Special Judge for Trial

of SPE &ACB Cases -cum - Special Judge for Trial of Cases filed

Under PDPP Act, Hyderabad (for short, 'the trial Court') and

consequently quash the proceedings in the above said crimes.

3. Vide the aforesaid remand orders, the trial Court

remanded the petitioners herein to judicial custody till 23.01.2025

in Cr.No.154 and 155 of 2024.

4.The particulars of the date, place and time of incident,

offences which are relevant and the same are extracted below:-

Cr.  Name of the     Place of the Time of             Offences
No.  complainant     incident     the
          &                       incident
     Designation
153/ N.Srinivasa     Anjaneya       12.20      under Sections 61 (2),
2024 Reddy,          Temple,        PM         191(2), 191(3) 132,109,
     Sub             Primary                   121(1), 126(2), 324 (4) read
     Divisional      School,                   with 190 BNS, Section 3 of
     Police          Lagcherla                 PDPPA
     Officer,
     Vikarabad
154/ Karra Kishan    Hanuman        Not        under Sections     191(2),
2024 MRO,            temple,        specific   191(3) 132,109, 121(1),
     Dudyal          Lagicherla     ally       126(2), 324 (4) read with
                                    mentio     190 BNS, Section 3 of
                                    ned in     PDPPA
                                    the
                                    complai
                                    nt
155/ District        Chellapuram    12.20      under Sections 191(2),
2024 Crime           Venkataiah's   PM         191(3) 132,109, 121(1),
     Report          residence,                126(2), 324 (4) read with
     Bureau,         Lagcherla                 190 BNS, Section 3 of
     (DCRB)                                    PDPPA
     DSP,
     Vikarabad

5. The petitioners herein are A.32, A.68, A.69 and A.70 in

Cr.No.153 of 2024.

6. The contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners are as follows:-

i. The proceedings are maliciously instituted with an intention

to implicate the petitioners in the present crimes. Therefore,

continuation of proceedings against the petitioners in the

aforesaid crimes is an abuse of process of law.

ii. The police completed material part of the investigation and

all material witnesses were examined as such there will be

no apprehension of tampering with the evidence.

iii. The petitioners attended the public hearing to express their

grievance relating to the proposed land acquisition

proceedings but not involved in the alleged incident as such

no such motive could be attributed to the petitioners.

iv. The prosecution failed to show that the petitioners herein

had shared a common object with other Members of the

alleged unlawful assembly.

v. The date of incident, place of incident etc., are same. Basing

on the same incident, the police cannot register the aforesaid

three crimes against the petitioner herein.

vi. The allegation against the petitioners herein is conspiracy.

vii. The allegations leveled against the petitioners in all three

crimes are one and the same and therefore, registration of the

other two crimes i.e. Cr.Nos.154 and 155 of 2024 is illegal

and they are liable to be quashed.

viii. Reliance is placed on the principle laid down in

Akbaruddin Owaisi vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 1, Smt.

K.Mathamma vs. State of Telangana 2.

With the said submissions, he sought to quash the Cr.Nos.154 and

155 of 2024.

7. Whereas, learned Public Prosecutor would contend that

the allegations leveled against the petitioners in the aforesaid three

crimes are different. Place of incident is different. Victims and

accused are different. Even the offences are also different. There is

no political motive. The petitioners have attacked the District

Collector, Special Officer, KADA and other officials, who went to

the spot for the purpose of conducting public hearing. They have

formed into unlawful assembly and attacked the said Special

Officer, KADA with deadly weapons. Investigation is at the

threshold. Quashing of the three crimes at the threshold is

impermissible as per the principle laid down by the Apex Court

2013 (6) ALT 101

2022 (1)ALT (Crl) 12 (T.S.)

and this Court in Crl.P.Nos.1232 of 2022 and batch vide order

dated 29.04.2022. He has placed reliance on the principle laid

down in TT Antony vs. State of Kerala 3 and Jacob John vs.

State of Manipur4 and common order dated 29.04.2022 in

Crl.P.No.1232 of 2022.

8. Perusal of the aforesaid complaints in Cr.Nos.153, 154

and 155 of 2024 pending on the file of Bomraspet Police Station,

would reveal that the District Collector, Special Officer, KADA

and other officials went to the outskirts of Lagcherla Village for the

purpose of conducting public hearing with regard to establishment

of Pharma Company. Villagers and other stakeholders were not

found to participate in the public hearing. A.2 informed the District

Collector and other officials stating that nobody will come to the

said place of meeting and they have to conduct public hearing at

Lagcherla village. They can hold gramsabha in the village.

Thereafter, the District Collector and other officials believed his

version bonafidely and went to Lagcherla village in his car bearing

(2001) 6 SCC 181

(2020) Supreme (Manipur) 176

No.TS 07 EV 2929. Other officials including defacto-complainants

in all the said crimes followed them to the village.

9. It is further alleged that in Lagcherla village, the people of

Lagchrela, Rotibanda Thanda and Pulicherlakunta Thanda formed

themselves into an unlawful assembly with stones, sticks and Chili

powder. At about 12.20 hours, when all the officials including the

Collector reached Lagcherla village, accused and others raised

slogans against the District Collector saying that 'go back Pharma'.

They have also obstructed the Collector's vehicle and also Special

Officer, KADA. They have attacked the Collector. They have also

attacked the defacto-complainants in all the aforesaid crimes with

stones, sticks and chilli powder. They have also damaged

Collector's vehicle. When Special Officer, KADA tried to

convince the accused and other people, they have attacked him. In

the said attack, he received injuries on the left hand and back side

of his neck and right leg etc. He has saved himself, otherwise they

would have killed him. Thus, all the accused formed into unlawful

assembly, tried to kill the Collector, Special Officer, KADA and

other officials for conducting public hearing.

10. In all the aforesaid three complaints, there is no

allegation against the petitioners herein that the petitioners

conspired with other accused and attacked the District Collector,

Special Officer, KADA and other officials who came to Lagcherla

village for conducting public hearing. In the remand report, there

is an allegation of conspiracy against the petitioners herein. A.32

and A.68 were arrested on 05.12.2024, A.69 was arrested on

16.11.2024 and A.70 was arrested on 22.11.2024. They were also

accused in Cr.Nos.154 and 155 of 2024. Basing on the statements

recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. of L.Ws.4 and 5, and on the

confession made by the petitioners herein, the aforesaid crimes

were registered against the petitioners herein. In all the aforesaid

three complaints, the date of incident is 11.11.2024 and time of

incident is around 12.20 P.M.

11. In all the three complaints in the aforesaid three crimes,

it is specifically alleged about forming of unlawful assembly by the

accused, attacking the District Collector, Special Officer, KADA

and other officials who came to Lagcherla village for the purpose

of conducting public hearing. They have also raised slogans 'go

back Pharma'. They are opposing establishment of Pharma

Company in the said village and also opposing the public hearing.

They have attacked the District Collector, Special Officer, KADA

and damaged their vehicles. Special Officer, KADA received

injuries.

12. As discussed supra, learned counsel for the petitioners

contended that the allegations in all the aforesaid complaints is one

and the same. Therefore, the Police, Bomraspet Police Station

cannot register crimes vide Cr.Nos.154 and 155 of 2024 on the

very same allegations. It is contrary to the procedure laid down in

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 ( for short, 'BNSS') and

also principle laid down by the Apex Court and this Court in catena

of decisions.

13. In the light of the said discussion, it is relevant to note

that in TT Antony (supra), the Apex Court had an occasion to deal

with the registration of multiple F.I.Rs. In paragraph No.24, the

Apex Court held that there can be no second FIR and consequently

there could be no fresh investigation in receipt of every subsequent

information in respect of the same cognizable offence or some

occurrence or incident giving rise to one or more cognizable

offences. It was further held that only the information about the

commission of cognizable offence(s), which is first entered in the

Station House Diary by the Officer In-Charge of the Police Station,

can be regarded as First Information Report under Section 154 of

Cr.P.C; on subsequent information, the same offence will be

covered by Section 162 of Cr.P.C.

14. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are

extracted below:-

A just balance between the fundamental rights of the citizens under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution and the expansive power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence has to be struck by the Court. There cannot be any controversy that sub-section (8) of Section 173 Cr.P.C. empowers the police to make further investigation, obtain further evidence (both oral and documentary) and forward a further report or reports to the Magistrate. In Narangs' case (supra) it was, however, observed that it would be appropriate to conduct further investigation with the permission of the Court. However, the sweeping power of investigation does not warrant subjecting a citizen each time to fresh investigation by the police in respect of the same incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences, consequent upon filing of successive FIRs whether before or after filing the final report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. It would clearly be beyond the purview

of Sections 154 and 156 Cr.P.C. nay, a case of abuse of the statutory power of investigation in a given case. In our view a case of fresh investigation based on the second or successive FIRs, not being a counter case, filed in connection with the same or connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction and in respect of which pursuant to the first FIR either investigation is underway or final report under Section 173(2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate, may be a fit case for exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or under Article 226/227 of the Constitution.

15. Relying on the said judgment, in Akbaruddin Owaisi

(supra), this Court held that the sweeping power of investigation

does not warrant subjecting a citizen each time to a fresh

investigation by the police in respect of the same incident, giving

rise to one or more cognizable offences, consequent upon filing of

successive, FIRs, whether before or after filing the final report

under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. the Court, observed that case of fresh

investigation based on the consequent or successive FIRs not being

counter-case, filed in connection with the same or connected

cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course of

the same transaction and in respect of which pursuant to the first

FIR either investigation is under way or final report under Section

173 (2) of Cr.P.C. has been forwarded to the Magistrate, may be fit

case for exercise of power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. or under

Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India.

16. In Upkar Singh (supra), the Apex Court clarifying the

principle laid down by it in TT Antony (supra), held that any

further complaint by the same complainant or others against the

same accused, subsequent to the registration of a case, is prohibited

under the Code because an investigation in this regard would have

already started and further complaint against the same accused will

amount to an improvement on the facts mentioned in the original

complaint, hence will be prohibited under Section 162 of the Code.

17. In Babu Bai vs. State of Gujarat 5, in paragraph No.21,

the Apex Court held as follows:-

"21. In such a case the court has to examine the facts and circumstances giving rise to both the FIRs and the test of sameness is to be applied to find out whether both the FIRs relate to the same incident in respect of the same occurrence or are in regard to the incidents which are two or more parts of the same transaction. If the answer is in the affirmative, the second FIR is liable to be quashed. However, in case the contrary is proved, where the version

(2010) 12 SCC 254

in the second FIR is different and they are in respect of the two different incidents/crimes, the second FIR is permissible. In case in respect of the same incident the accused in the first FIR comes forward with a different version or counterclaim, investigation on both the FIRs has to be conducted."

This Court held that the relevant enquiry is whether two or more FIRs relate to the same incident or relate to incidents which form part of the same transactions. If the Court were to conclude in the affirmative, the subsequent FIRs are liable to be quashed. However, where the subsequent FIR relates to different incidents or crimes or is in the form of a counter-claim, investigation may proceed. [See also in this context ChirraShivraj v. State of A.P. [ChirraShivraj v. State of A.P., (2010) 14 SCC 444 :

(2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 757] and Chirag M. Pathak v.

Dollyben Kantilal Patel [Chirag M. Pathak v. Dollyben Kantilal Patel, (2018) 1 SCC 330 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 369]

18. In Anju Chaudhary vs. State of UP 6, the Apex Court had

an occasion to deal with the concept of registration of second FIR

at length. In paragraph No.14, the Apex Court held as follows:

14. On the plain construction of the language and scheme of Sections 154, 156 and 190 of the Code, it cannot be construed or suggested that there can be more than one FIR about an occurrence. However, the

2013 (6) SCC 384

opening words of Section 154 suggest that every information relating to commission of a cognizable offence shall be reduced to writing by the officer in-charge of a Police Station. This implies that there has to be the first information report about an incident which constitutes a cognizable offence. The purpose of registering of an FIR is to set the machinery of criminal investigation into motion, which culminates with filing of the police report in terms of Section 173(2) of the Code. It will, thus, be appropriate to follow the settled principle that there cannot be two FIRs registered for the same offence. However, where the incident is separate;

offences are similar or different, or even where the subsequent crime is of such magnitude that it does not fall within the ambit and scope of the FIR recorded first, then a second FIR could be registered. The most important aspect is to examine the inbuilt safeguards provided by the legislature in the very language of Section 154 of the Code. These safeguards can be safely deduced from the principle akin to double jeopardy, rule of fair investigation and further to prevent abuse of power by the investigating authority of the police. Therefore, second FIR for the same incident cannot be registered. Of course, the Investigating Agency has no determinative right. It is only a right to investigate in accordance with the provisions of the Code. The filing of report upon completion of investigation, either for cancellation or alleging commission of an offence, is a matter which once filed before the court of competent jurisdiction attains a kind of finality as far as police is concerned, may be in a given case, subject to the right of further investigation but wherever the investigation has been completed and a person is found to be prima facie guilty of committing an offence or otherwise, reexamination by the investigating agency on its own should not be permitted merely by registering another FIR with regard to the same offence. If such protection is not given to a suspect, then possibility of abuse of investigating powers by the Police cannot be

ruled out. It is with this intention in mind that such interpretation should be given to Section 154 of the Code, as it would not only further the object of law but even that of just and fair investigation. More so, in the backdrop of the settled canons of criminal jurisprudence, re- investigation or de novo investigation is beyond the competence of not only the investigating agency but even that of the learned Magistrate. The courts have taken this view primarily for the reason that it would be opposed to the scheme of the Code and more particularly Section 167(2) of the Code. [Ref. Rita Nag v. State of West Bengal [(2009) 9 SCC 129] and Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali @ Deepak & Ors. (SLP (Crl) No.9185- 9186 of 2009 of the same date).

19. In Kari Chowdhary vs. Sita Devi7, in paragraph No.11,

the Apex Court held as follows:-

"11. Learned counsel adopted an alternative contention that once the proceedings initiated under FIR No. 135 ended in a final report the police had no authority to register a second FIR and number it as FIR No. 208. Of course the legal position is that there cannot be two FIRs against the same accused in respect of the same case. But when there are rival versions in respect of the same episode, they would normally take the shape of two different FIRs and investigation can be carried on under both of them by the same investigating agency. Even that apart, the report submitted to the court styling it as FIR No. 208 of 1998 need be considered as an information submitted to the court regarding the new discovery made by the police during investigation that persons not named in FIR No. 135 are the real culprits. To quash the said proceedings merely on the ground that final report had been laid in FIR No. 135 is, to say the least, too technical. The ultimate object of every

2002 (1) SCC 714

investigation is to find out whether the offences alleged have been committed and, if so, who have committed it."

(Emphasis supplied).

20. On consideration of the said principles laid down in the

said judgments, in the State of Rajasthan vs. Surender Singh

Rathore 8, the Apex Court laid down the following principles with

regard to the permissibility of registration of second FIR:-

9. From the above conspectus of judgments, inter alia, the following principles emerge regarding the permissibility of the registration of a second FIR:

9.1 When the second FIR is counter-complaint or presents a rival version of a set of facts, in reference to which an earlier FIR already stands registered.

9.2 When the ambit of the two FIRs is different even though they may arise from the same set of circumstances.

9.3 When investigation and/or other avenues reveal the earlier FIR or set of facts to be part of a larger conspiracy.

9.4 When investigation and/or persons related to the incident bring to the light hitherto unknown facts or circumstances.

9.5 Where the incident is separate; offences are similar or different.

21. On examination of the facts of the said case wherein the

first FIR refers to a particular incident, action taken therein was

limited, the second FIR pertains to the larger issue of widespread

corruption in the concerned department and, therefore, is much

2025 Law Suit (SC) 249

larger in its scope than the previous FIR. On consideration of the

said facts, the Apex Court held that two incidents are different and

distinct. Therefore, registration of second FIR is permissible.

22. In Arnab Ranjan Goswami vs Union Of India9, the

Apex Court, on examination of the facts therein, more particularly,

registration of multiple F.I.Rs against the petitioner therein, based

on TV show aired on a particular day i.e. 21.04.2020, the facts

mentioned in all the F.I.Rs. was the same, TV show and that it was

held that no subsequent FIR can be registered in respect of same

incident arising out of the same occurrence or incident.

23. In Krishna Lal Chawla vs. State of UP 10, the Apex

Court reiterated the principle laid down in TT Antony (supra), and

Upkar Singh (Supra) and held as follows:

7. This Court in Upkar Singh [Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash, (2004) 13 SCC 292 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 211] has clearly stated that any further complaint by the same complainant against the same accused, after the case has already been registered, will be deemed to be an improvement from the original complaint.

Though Upkar Singh [Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash,

AIR 2020 SC 2386

AIR 2021 SC 1381

(2004) 13 SCC 292 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 211] was rendered in the context of a case involving cognizable offences, the same principle would also apply where a person gives information of a non-cognizable offence and subsequently lodges a private complaint with respect to the same offence against the same accused person. Even in a non-cognizable case, the police officer after the order of the Magistrate, is empowered to investigate the offence in the same manner as a cognizable case, except the power to arrest without a warrant. Therefore, the complainant cannot subject the accused to a double whammy of investigation by the police and inquiry before the Magistrate.

24. In C. Muniappan (Supra), the Apex Court held that two

or more crimes can be clubbed if the circumstances and facts

indicate that the second crime was connected or was a result of the

first crime. The relevant portion is extracted below:

37. The submission on behalf of the appellants that two crimes bearing Nos. 188 and 190 of 2000 could not be clubbed together, has also no merit for the simple reason that if the cases are considered, keeping in view the totality of the circumstances and the sequence in which the two incidents occurred, taking into consideration the evidence of drivers and conductors/cleaners of the vehicles involved in the first incident and the evidence of C. Ramasundaram, VAO (PW 87), we reach the inescapable

conclusion that the second occurrence was nothing but a fall out of the first occurrence. The damage caused to the public transport vehicles and the consequential burning of the University bus remained part of one and the same incident. Merely because two separate complaints had been lodged, did not mean that they could not be clubbed together and one charge-sheet could not be filed (see T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala [(2001) 6 SCC 181 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1048] ).

25. The decisions in Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah (Supra)

and Yanob Sheikh (Supra) relied upon by the Petitioners herein

also reiterate that multiple FIRs relating to the same transaction

and between same parties are not maintainable.

. 26. In Akbaruddin Owaisi (supra), this Court held that

multiple FIRs cannot be registered if the offences relate to the same

incident and arise out of same circumstances. The Court therein

discussed the test of sameness to be applied while deciding

whether the subsequent FIRs are maintainable. The Court held as

follows:

39. Let us now briefly refer to the tests which should, ordinarily, be applied to determine whether or not the two FIRs under consideration relate to the same incident/transaction. The law recognizes a common trial

or a common FIR being registered for one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction as contemplated under Section 220 Cr.P.C. The expression 'same transaction', from its very nature, is incapable of exact definition. (Anju Chaudhary, (2013 Cri LJ

776); Mohan Baitha v. State of Bihar57.). The distinction between two FIRs relating to the same incident, and two FIRs relating to different incidents or occurrences of the same incident, should be carefully examined. (Babubhai) : 2010 AIR SCW 5126. The merits of each case must be considered to determine whether a subsequently registered FIR is a second FIR relating to the same incident or offence or is based upon distinct and different facts and whether its scope of inquiry is entirely different or not. It will not be appropriate for the Court to lay down one straight jacket formula uniformly applicable to all cases. This will always be a mixed question of law and fact depending on the merits of a given case. (Anju Chaudhary.). The test, to determine whether two FIRs can be permitted to exist, is whether the two incidents are identical or not. (Ram Lal Narang, (1979 Cri LJ 1346)).

40. The concept of "sameness" has been given a restricted meaning. In order to examine the impact of one or more FIRs. the Court has to rationalise the facts and circumstances of each case and then apply the test of 'sameness' to find out whether both FIRs relate to the same incident and to the same occurrence; and whether

they are in regard to incidents which are two or more parts of the same transaction or relate completely to two distinct occurrences.It is only if the second FIR relates to the same cause of action, the same incident, there is sameness of occurrence and an attempt has been made to improvise the case, would the second FIR be liable to be quashed. In cases where every FIR has a different spectrum, and the allegations made are distinct and separate, it may be regarded as a counter complaint, but it cannot be stated that an effort has been made to improve the allegations that find place in the first FIR or that the principle of "sameness" is attracted. (Babubhai, (2010 AIR SCW 5126); Surendra Kaushik v. State of Uttar Pradesh-

2013 CrlLJ 1570).

41. It is not possible to enunciate any formula of universal application to determine whether two or more acts constitute the same transaction. They are to be gathered from the circumstances of a given case indicating proximity of time, unity or proximity of place, continuity of action, commonality of purpose or design. For several offences to be part of the same transaction, the test to be applied is whether they are so related to one another in point of purpose or of cause and effect or as principal and subsidiary, so as to result in one continuous action. Where there is commonality of purpose or design, where there is a continuity of action, then all those persons involved can be accused of the same or different offences "committed in

the course of the same transaction". Where two incidents are of different times with involvement of different persons, there is no commonality, the purpose thereof is different, they emerge from different circumstances, and would not form part of the same transaction. (Anju Chaudhary, (2013 Cri LJ 776)).

27. In Jakka Vinod Kumar Reddy vs. The State of

Telangana 11, this Court discussed various decisions held that in

following cases multiple FIRs are maintainable:

20. The sum and substance of the above said judgments is that there is no embargo for registration of two FIRs on the following circumstances/grounds:

(a) where the allegations made in both the FIRs are from different spectrum, where there are different versions from different persons;

(b) same set of facts may constitute different offences;

(c) where there are two distinct offences having different ingredients;

(d) where the allegations are different and distinct;

(e) when there are rival versions in respect of same episode, they would normally take shape of two different FIRs and investigation can be carried out under both of them by the same Investigating Agency.

2021(2) ALT (Crl) 171 (TS)

The decision in Jakka Vinod Kumar Reddy (Supra) was

subsequently followed by this Court in K. Mathamma (Supra).

28. Relying on the said principles, this Court in

Crl.P.No.1232 of 2022 held that registration of multiple FIRs is

impermissible, if they relate to the occurrence of same incident,

involve same parties and arise out of the same cause of action.

Registration of multiple FIRs is impermissible even in cases of

different incidents if such incidents form part of the same

transaction. In other words, if the subsequent offence alleged in the

subsequent FIR is connected with the first FIR or is the

consequence of the first FIR, such subsequent FIR is not

maintainable. The courts before reaching a conclusion that the

subsequent FIRs are not maintainable, shall see if the alleged

incidents or offences are identical or not and whether any

commonality between the accused and the complainant exists.

Further, registration of subsequent FIRs are impermissible if they

are filed only to improve the case of the prosecution or fill up the

lacunae in the earlier complaint.