Telangana High Court
Bhavanam Vasavya vs The High Court Of Telangana on 2 May, 2024
Author: N.Tukaramji
Bench: N.Tukaramji
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUJOY PAUL
AND
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE N. TUKARAMJI
WRIT PETITION Nos.12527, 12176, 12765, 12289, 11838 AND
11820 OF 2024
COMMON ORDER:
(per Hon'ble SP,J)
In these batch of Writ Petitions filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution, the petitioners have challenged the constitutionality of
Rule 2(k) and Rule (5.2)(A) of the Telangana State Judicial Service
Rules, 2023 (hereinafter called 'Rules of 2023') which prescribes
minimum and maximum age limit because of which few petitioners
became ineligible for submission of their candidature for the post of
Civil Judge (Junior Division). In addition, the petitioners have also
called in question the provisions of the Rule which permits only
Advocates practising in Telangana to participate in the selection
process. The requirement of obtaining certificate of practice from the
concerned Bar Association is another reason of grievance of the
petitioners.
Contention of Petitioners:
W.P.No.12527 of 2024:-
2. The petitioners of this case are aggrieved by Rules 2 (k) and
(5.2)(A) of Rules of 2023 and Clause 6 (A) of Notification dated
10.04.2024, on the ground that since they have crossed age of 26
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years and the Rule prescribes the maximum age of 26 years, the
Rules are ultra vires and liable to be struck down.
3. To elaborate, Sri Anup Koushik Karavadi, learned counsel for
the petitioners, submits that in All India Judges' Association and
others vs. Union of India 1, the Apex Court in clear terms opined
about the need of meritorious candidates in the Judicial Services
and laid down the law with the clear finding that in case of any
modification in the judgment of the Apex Court is required,
necessary directions must be obtained from the Supreme Court only.
The High Court for the State of Telangana in R. Anitha vs. State of
Telangana and others 2 followed the said judgment in All India
Judges' Association (supra) and interfered with the rules which
were contrary to the principles/law laid down in the case of All
India Judges' Association (supra). Applying the same principles,
offending conditions of the Rules which run contrary to the
judgment of the Apex Court are liable to be set aside.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that in
addition to the above offending portion of Rules of 2023, namely
Rule (5.2)(A), the petitioners are also questioning Rule 2(k), which
was not subject matter of challenge in Bodugula Brahmaiah and
(2002) 4 SCC 247
2019 SCC Online TS 2075
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others vs. State of Telangana 3. In the said case, the Division
Bench of this Court opined that in the teeth of Rule 2(k), the 'High
Court' 'means and includes' the High Court for the State of
Telangana and other Courts which are working under the
supervision of the High Court for the State of Telangana. It is
submitted that the phrase 'means and includes' is wide enough to
include other High Courts and their Subordinate Courts also.
5. By placing heavy reliance on the judgment of the Supreme
Court in the case of Chebrolu Leela Prasad Rao vs. State of
Andhra Pradesh 4, it is submitted that any Rule which prescribes
100% reservation for local candidates will be unconstitutional and
liable to be struck down.
6. The judgment of this Court in W.P.No.18002 of 2023 is passed
without considering the judgment of the Apex Court in Chebrolu
Leela Prasad Rao (supra) which makes it per incuriam. It is
submitted that there is no justification in prescribing maximum age
of 26 years and said Rule is arbitrary and may be set aside. As an
interim measure the petitioners may be permitted to participate
provisionally in impugned selection process. The last date of
submission of candidature is 17.05.2024.
2023 SCC Online TS 4105
(2021) 11 SCC 401
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7. As canvassed, the petitioners, who have either completed more
than 26 years of age or are of less than 23 years, the minimum and
maximum age limit prescribed in the Rules of 2023 is coming in
their way. By adopting argument of Sri Anup Koushik Karawadi, the
learned counsel for the petitioners of W.P.No.12765 of 2024, the
learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that such impediment
of age is bad in law. In addition, it is submitted that Clause III of
the impugned Rules mandates that the candidate must produce
Certificate of Practice obtained from concerned Bar Association.
Criticizing this, Sri Satish Munuga, learned counsel for the
petitioners submits that as per Section 24 (1) (b) of Advocates Act,
1961, a person who is inspiring to become an Advocate has to be of
minimum age of 21 years. There is no justification in depriving such
meritorious advocates to become Civil Judge (Junior Division) by
providing minimum age limit of 23 years.
W.P.No.12176 of 2024:
8. Learned counsel for the petitioners has adopted the aforesaid
argument and apprised this Court that the petitioners of this case
are below 23 years.
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W.P.Nos.12765, 12289 and 11838 of 2024:
9. It is jointly informed by the learned counsel for the petitioners
that the petitioners in these cases have crossed 26 years of age and
aforesaid impediment of Rule is coming in their way and depriving
them to enjoy their right of consideration. They also borrowed
aforesaid arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the
petitioners.
W.P.No.11820 of 2024:
10. Sri Pratap Narayan Sanghi, learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the petitioners, submits that the petitioners are above the age of
26 years. While borrowing all the arguments of the previous
counsel, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners submits that
the respondents have divided the candidates into three categories,
but all such candidates are intending to participate for the selection
of Civil Judge (Junior Division). The prescription of maximum age is
an artificial prescription, without there being any intelligible
differentia or any object sought to be achieved. In support of his
submission, he relied upon the judgment in the case of Indravadan
H. Shah vs. State of Gujarat 5 and urged that in absence of showing
the aforesaid nexus and object, the offending provision is liable to be
interfered with by this Court.
AIR 1986 SCC 1035
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Stand of Respondents:
11. Sri Harender Pershad, learned Senior Counsel for the High
Court appeared on advance copy and placed reliance on "Synopsis of
Response".
12. It is submitted that there is no basis for challenge to Rule 2(k)
of Rules of 2023 i.e., 'definition clause' and it is the prerogative of
the rule makers to frame the rules as per their administrative
requirement. The Rule 2(k) became subject matter of discussion
recently before Division Bench of this Court in Bodugula
Brahmaiah. This Court has not agreed with the similar contention
and opined that the definition relates to High Court of Telangana
and Courts working subordinate thereto.
13. Learned counsel for the respondent further submits that there
are three classes in the instant recruitment. He prepared a chart
which reads as under:-
Class I Class II Class III
Enrolled as Not Enrolled Enrolled as
an Advocate as an an Advocate
with practice Advocate with
of 3+ years OR OR practice of
less than 3
years
Certificate of Required Not required Not required
Practice
Graduation No minimum Atleast 60% Atleast 60%
Score score or 55% as or 55% as
the case the case
may be may be
Age Group 23 to 35/40 23 to 26/31 23 to 26/31
years years years
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14. It is submitted that no fault can be found in the rules. He
submits that Rule 5(1)(a) of Rules of 2023 was also subject matter of
challenge before the Division Bench in the aforesaid case and the
constitutionality of the rule was upheld. The notification dated
12.01.2015 issued by the Bar Council of India in Clause 6.1 makes
it obligatory for the Advocates to get themselves registered as a
member of Bar Association where he ordinarily practises law or
intends to practice law. Thus, one such condition of obtaining
certificate of practice from the concerned Bar Association cannot be
said to be without any basis or without there being any object
sought to be achieved. This is in order to ensure that the person is
actually practising in the Court or not. This provision cannot be
treated to be arbitrary or unconstitutional in nature.
15. So far prescription of minimum and maximum age limit is
concerned, learned Senior Counsel for the High Court submits that
the decision of prescribing age for the employees is in the realm of
'policy decision'. It can be challenged on limited grounds. The same
cannot be challenged merely because an individual is deprived
because of an age limit prescribed by the Rules. A cutoff date has to
be prescribed which will certainly deprive few persons who are below
and above the cutoff age. This deprivation alone cannot be a reason
to interfere with the Rules. By placing reliance of Orissa High Court
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judgment in Jnyananda Panda vs. State of Orisa 6, it is submitted
that Dr.B.S.Chauhan, (as his Lordship then was) speaking for the
Bench upheld the prescription of 32 years of maximum age for the
purpose of selection of Civil Judge. Similarly, reliance is placed on a
Division Bench Judgment of Himachal Pradesh High Court in Satish
Kumar and Others vs. State 7 where the prescription of minimum
and maximum age limit of 21 and 30 years for judicial services was
unsuccessfully challenged. The Apex Court Judgment in Hirandra
Kumar vs. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad 8 and High
Court of Delhi vs. Devina Sharma 9 were referred to where the
cutoff age or years of practice became subject matter of adjudication
by the Supreme Court. It is submitted that in both the cases, the
Supreme Court made it clear that this being a 'policy matter' cannot
be challenged. At the end, the learned counsel for the respondents
submits that in view of the recent judgment of Madhya Pradesh High
Court in case of Devansh Kaushik and others vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh 10, it is clear that the judgment of Apex Court in All India
Judges' Association (supra) is not coming in the way of the
employer to frame the rules. The Madhya Pradesh High Court did
not agree with the similar contention and dismissed the petition.
2009 SCC Online Ori 110
2005 SCC Online HP 161
2020 (17) SCC 401
2022 (4) SCC 643
2024 SCC OnLine MP 2272
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The petition was also dismissed where certain percentage of marks
prescribed as minimum eligibility condition under the Rules were
also called in question. This judgment of Madhya Pradesh High
Court was unsuccessfully challenged before the Supreme Court in
SLP (C) No.9570 of 2024 which is dismissed by passing a reasoned
order on 26.04.2024. In this view of the matter, there exists no
reason for interference by this Court.
16. Parties confined their arguments to the extent indicated above.
We have heard them at length.
FINDINGS:
17. Before dealing with rival contentions advanced at the Bar, it is
apt to reproduce the relevant provision i.e., Rule (5.2)(A) of Rules of
2023 which reads as under:
"5. Eligibility for Direct Recruitment and Recruitment by
transfer:
(5.1) ...
(5.2) Civil Judge (Junior Division):
(A) By Direct Recruitment: A person to be appointed to the
category of Civil Judge (Junior Division):
(I) Shall posses a Degree in Law of a University in India established
or incorporated by or under a Central Act or a State Act or an
Institution recognized by the University Grants Commission and
enrolled in the Bar Council as an Advocate.
(and)
Must have been practicing as an· Advocate or Pleader in the High
Court or Courts working under the control of the High Court for
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a period of not less than 3 years as on the date of Notification for
recruitment to the post. Candidate shall produce certificate of
practice obtained from the concerned Bar Association as proof.
(and)
Must have attained the age of 23 years and must not have
attained the age of 35 years in the case of open category and 40
years in the case of persons belonging to Scheduled Castes,
Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes as on the date of
Notification for recruitment to the post is made.
(or)
(II)(a) Must be a Law Graduate possessing a Degree in Law from a
recognized University as mentioned in Clause (I) above, who is
eligible to be enrolled as an Advocate and who has secured an
overall 60% marks in acquiring such a Law Degree in case of
open categories and 55% marks in respect of other reserved
categories and has not enrolled as an Advocate. To fall into this
category, candidate·must have obtained Degree of Law within a
period of three years prior to the date of Notification.
(and)
(b) Must have attained the age of 23 years and must not have
completed the age of 26 years as on the date of notification for
selection to the post is issued. The upper age limit is relaxable
by 5 years in case of persons belonging to Scheduled Castes,
Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes.
(or)
(III)(a) Shall be a person who has enrolled as an Advocate, but do
not possess three· years practice at the Bar would be
eligible to appear in the recruitment for the post of Civil Judge,
under the category of fresh Law Graduates, provided they satisfy
the other requisite eligibility criteria. Candidate shall produce
certificate of practice obtained from the concerned Bar
association as proof."
Violation of directions issued by the Apex Court in the case of
All India Judges' Association (supra):
18. The petitioners urged that in view of the judgment of the Apex
Court in All India Judges' Association (supra), the pre-requisite of
three years experience at Bar must be held to be impermissible and
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deserves to be declared as unconstitutional. This aspect was
recently considered by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Devansh
Kaushik's case (supra). While dealing with and rejecting the similar
argument, the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the said case held as
under:
"32. ...The best talent available have been given an
opportunity to compete in the exam. It is no longer mandatory
that an applicant should possess a three years practice.
Therefore, we do not find that any clarification was required
before the impugned amendment could be brought about. In
our considered view, a clarification would have been required, if
the High Court or the State Government were of the view that
either it is mandatory to have a three years practice or/and it is
not necessary to allow fresh graduates to practice. Fresh law
graduates have not been prevented from competing in the
exam. Furthermore, what was done away with in the aforesaid
judgment was a mandatory condition of having a three years
practice. It does not debar a candidate who has a three
years practice at the Bar. The stress is on the word
"mandatory". The impugned amendment does not make it
mandatory for a candidate to have a three years practice.
Furthermore, it does not prevent an advocate with a three
years practice from competing. The order of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court is based on the recommendation of the Shetty
Commission, which suggested that brilliant law graduates with
a brilliant academic career should be allowed to compete in the
exam. However, so far as the impugned amendment is
concerned, it has not debarred fresh law graduates from
competing in the exam."
(Emphasis Supplied)
19. The above judgment was promptly challenged before the Apex
Court in SLP (C) No.9570 of 2024 which was dismissed on
26.04.2024 by a reasoned order. The relevant portion of the said
judgment reads as under:
" Learned counsel has made elaborate argument to challenge
the impugned judgment of the Division Bench upholding the
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validity of the Rule 7(g) of the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service
(Recruitment and Condition of Service) Rules, 1994. The
justification given by the High Court to uphold the validity of the
Rule has been taken into account. We see no reason to interfere
with the said view. The Special Leave Petitions are accordingly
dismissed."
(Emphasis Supplied)
20. In the instant case also, the meritorious law students got full
chance to participate in the selection. In addition, the Advocates
also became eligible, if they fulfil the requirement of Rules of 2023.
Thus, we are unable to hold that Rules of 2023 are bad in law and
passed in contravention of judgment of the Apex Court in All India
Judges' Association (supra) and this Court in R.Anitha (supra).
21. It is trite that when SLP is dismissed without assigning any
reasons in limine, it cannot be said that finding given by the High
Court got a stamp of approval from the Apex Court. In converse, if a
finding is given by passing a reasoned order by the Apex Court, the
position will be other way round. In this view of the matter, we are
inclined to follow the view taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court
in Devansh Kaushik (supra).
Validity of Rule 2(k):
22. Rule 2(k) of Rules of 2023 reads as under:
"2(k) "High Court" means and includes High Court for the State
of Telangana w.e.f. 02.06.2014."
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23. The above Rule i.e., Rule 2(k) and Rule (5.2)(A) became subject
matter of criticism and challenge on the ground that the candidature
cannot be confined for the Advocates practising in High Court
Telangana and Courts subordinate to it.
24. Another limb of argument of Sri Anup Koushik Karavadi,
learned counsel for the petitioners, was that in Rule 2(k), the law
makers used the expression 'means and includes High Court' which
is wide enough to include any other High Court and its subordinate
Courts. We are unable to persuade ourselves with this line of
argument. The purpose of using the expression 'means and includes
High Court' was considered in extenso by a Division Bench of this
Court in Bodugula Brahmaiah and relevant portion thereunder
reads as under:
"23. In the definition clause, Rule 2(k) uses the expression
'means and includes'. It is well settled rule of statutory
interpretation that when a particular expression is defined by
the legislature by using the word 'means and includes', the
use of word 'means' that the definition is hard and fast
definition and no other meaning can be assigned to the
expression that is put down in the notification. The word 21
'includes' when used enlarges the meaning of the expression
defined, so as to comprehend not only such things as they
signify according to their natural import but also things which
the clause declares that they shall include. It is equally well
settled in law that expression 'means and includes', on the
other hand, indicate "an exhaustive explanation of the
meaning which, for the purposes of the Act, must invariably
be attached to these words or expressions (See P.Kasilingam
vs. P.S.G.College of Technology {1995 Supp (2) SCC 348}). The
aforesaid principle of statutory interpretation was re-affirmed
by a three Judge Bench of Supreme Court in Bharat
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Cooperative Bank (Mumbai) Limited vs. Cooperative Banks
Employees' Union {(2007) 4 SCC 685}.
24. In the backdrop of aforesaid well settled legal principles of
statutory interpretation, we may refer again to Rule 2(k) of the
Rules. The erstwhile State of Andhra Pradesh was bifurcated
into two successor States, namely State of Telangana and
State of Andhra Pradesh with effect from 02.06.2014. The
High Court for the State of Telangana was established with
effect from 01.01.2019. The Rule requires that an advocate
must have put in seven years of practice. In case the aforesaid
requirement of seven years would have been counted from the
date of establishment of the High Court, no candidate would
have been eligible. Therefore, the Rule Making Authority has
used the expression 'includes' to mean High Court for the
State of Telangana with effect from 02.06.2014 so that the
advocates practising before the erstwhile High Court for the
then State of Andhra Pradesh as well as the High Court for the
State of Telangana would be eligible for consideration for
recruitment to the post of District Judge. The contention
that the expression 'High Court' used in Rule 2(k) of the
2023 Rules includes other High Courts as well is
misconceived and the same is therefore negatived. The
third issue is answered accordingly."
(Emphasis Supplied)
25. This Court in paragraph 24 poignantly made it clear about the
purpose of using the words 'means and includes' in Rules of 2023.
We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by the previous
Bench. Thus, it cannot be held that the word 'includes' is wide
enough to include other High Courts.
26. The definition 'High Court' was inserted in Rule 2(k) for a
purpose which is explicitly made clear in paragraph 24 of the
aforesaid judgment. Since there exists an object sought to be
achieved for inserting such definition, it cannot be said that Rule
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2(k) of Rules of 2023 is unconstitutional in nature. Thus, challenge
to constitutionality must fail.
27. A conjoint reading of different clauses of Rule (5.2)(A) and
impugned notification leaves no room for any doubt that High Court
and other Courts working under the control of High Court means the
High Court of Telangana and the Courts working under the said
High Court. We do not see any reason to take a different view and
held these provisions as ultra vires.
28. In the case of Bodugula Brahmaiah (supra), another set of
attack was on Rule (5.1)(a) of Rules of 2023. To assail this Rule, the
judgment of Chebrolu Leela Prasad Rao (supra) was also relied
upon. The Division Bench clearly held as under:
"32. Thus, no factual foundation has been laid in the pleadings
with regard to challenge to validity of Rule 5(1)(a) of 2023
Rules. Even otherwise, the Rule has been enacted to ensure
suitable and proper persons in the judicial service with a view
to secure fair and efficient administration of justice and the
Rule Making Authority is competent to prescribe qualifications
for eligibility for appointment. The object of enactment of the
aforesaid Rule is to recruit suitable candidates to Telangana
State Judicial Service who are acquainted with the practice of
local Courts in Telangana and have the knowledge of local laws.
The practice in subordinate courts or in the High Court is also
a relevant test to prescribe.
33. It is pertinent to note that validity of a pari
materia provision, namely Rule 5(3)(b) of Maharashtra Judicial
Service Rules, 2008 was challenged before a Division Bench of
High Court of Bombay in Shobhit Gaur (supra). Relevant
portion of Rule 5(3)(b) is extracted for the facility of reference:
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5(3)(b) Experience-Must have practiced as an Advocate in
the High Court or Courts subordinate thereto for not less
than three years on the date of publication of
Advertisement; or Must be a fresh law Graduate who - (i)
has secured the degree in law by passing all the
examinations leading to the degree in the first attempt;
34. The said Rule was challenged on the touchstone of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India on the ground that it
unfairly discriminates between the advocates who are
practising in Maharashtra and the advocates who are
practising outside. The Division Bench of Bombay High Court
held that the petitioner in the said case was an Advocate
practising in Delhi. The Bombay High Court by Judgment
in Shobhit Gaur (supra) upheld the validity of Rule 5(1)(b) of
Maharashtra Judicial Service Rules, 2008. It is also pertinent
to note that a Special Leave Petition preferred against the
Judgment dated 24.08.2018 passed by the Division Bench of
Bombay High Court in Shobhit Gaur (supra) was dismissed by
the Supreme Court vide order dated 09.12.2021 passed in
S.L.P. (C) No. 27341 of 2018.
35. Admittedly, the petitioners are not practising advocates in
the High Court for the State of Telangana or the Courts
subordinate thereto for a period of seven years. For the
aforementioned reasons, Rule 5(1)(a) of 2023 Rules does not
suffer from any infirmity. Accordingly, the fourth issue is
answered."
(Emphasis Supplied)
29. A plain reading of the aforesaid finding makes it clear that Rule
(5.1)(a) is analogous to Rule 5(3)(b) of the Maharastra Judicial
Service Rules, 2008 which became subject matter of challenge before
the High Court of Bombay. The High Court of Bombay gave its
stamp of approval to the said rules. The said judgment of High
Court of Bombay dated 24.08.2018 was unsuccessfully challenged
before the Apex Court by way of SLP, which came to be dismissed on
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09.12.2021. For this reason also, we are persuaded to follow the
judgment of this Court in Bodugula Brahmaiah (supra).
Requirement of certificate of practice from Bar Association:
30. Rule (5.2)(A) makes it obligatory for practising Advocate
candidates to produce certificate of practice obtained from concerned
Bar Association as proof. Clause 6.1 of Bar Council of India
notification dated 12.01.2015 published in Official Gazette reads
thus:
"6.1 An advocate, after having obtained a Certificate of
Enrollment under section 22 of the Advocates Act, 1961, is
required to get himself registered as a member of the Bar
Association where he ordinarily practices law or intends to
practice law. And if any Advocate does not intend to be a
member of any Bar Association duly recognized by concerned
State Bar Council, then he shall be required to intimate the
same to the State Bar Council and he shall have to explain as to
how shall he be getting the benefits of any welfare scheme
floated by the State Bar Council or the Local Bar Association.
The decision of State Bar Council shall be final in this regard."
(Emphasis Supplied)
31. Thus, the requirement to furnish such certificate is not without
any basis. The purpose to obtain that certificate is to ensure that
the Advocate is actually practising in the concerned Court. Since
there is an object sought to be achieved, the same cannot be called
as unconstitutional. Thus, this ground must also fail.
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Minimum and Maximum Age Limit:
32. A plain reading of different clauses of Rule (5.2)(A) of Rules of
2023 shows that minimum and maximum age is prescribed for
Advocate candidates and for law graduates.
33. Sri Pratap Narayan Sanghi, learned Senior Counsel, submits
that when all such candidates whether Advocates or law graduates
are entering the services as Civil Judge (Junior Division),
prescription of different age for them is unconstitutional and without
there being any justification. We do not see any merit in the said
contention. The quality clause can be enforced amongst equals. A
candidate intending to participate as an Advocate is not similarly
situated qua a candidate who is not an Advocate and merely a law
graduate. Thus, we are unable to persuade ourselves with this line
of argument that age limit for all of them must be the same.
34. A fresh law graduate after attaining the age of 23 years can
prefer his candidature. For practising Advocates, the age limit is
different. Both the set of candidates are from different categories.
Thus, they cannot be equated for all purposes. In this backdrop, the
judgment of the Apex Court in Indravadan H. Shah (supra) cannot
be pressed into service.
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Prescription of age is a policy decision:
35. In catena of judgments, the Courts opined that it is the
prerogative of the employer to decide the eligibility, educational
qualification, age, etc., of the candidates. It is mainly a
managerial/administrative decision which is within the province of
the employer. The Apex Court even called this as 'policy decision'.
36. In Hirandra Kumar vs. High Court of Allahabad 11, while
dealing with the aspect of prescription of age for Judicial Officer, the
Apex Court clearly held that
"21. The legal principles which govern the determination of a
cut-off date are well settled. The power to fix a cut-off date or
age-limit is incidental to the regulatory control which an
authority exercises over the selection process. A certain degree
of arbitrariness may appear on the face of any cut-off or age-
limit which is prescribed, since a candidate on the wrong side
of the line may stand excluded as a consequence. That,
however, is no reason to hold that the cut-off which is
prescribed, is arbitrary. In order to declare that a cut-off is
arbitrary and ultra vires, it must be of such a nature as to lend
to the conclusion that it has been fixed without any rational
basis whatsoever or is manifestly unreasonable so as to lead to
a conclusion of a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.
27. These judgments provide a clear answer to the challenge.
The petitioners and the appellant desire that this Court should
rollback the date with reference to which attainment of the
upper age-limit of 48 years should be considered. Such an
exercise is impermissible. In order to indicate the fallacy in the
submission, it is significant to note that Rule 12 prescribes a
minimum age of 35 years and an upper age-limit of 45 years
(48 years for reserved candidates belonging to the Schedule
Castes and Tribes). Under the Rule, the age limit is prescribed
with reference to the first day of January of the year following
the year in which the notice inviting applications is published.
If the relevant date were to be rolled back, as desired by the
(2020) 17 SCC 401
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petitioners, to an anterior point in time, it is true that some
candidates who have crossed the upper age-limit under Rule 12
may become eligible. But, interestingly, that would affect
candidates who on the anterior date may not have attained the
minimum age of 35 years but would attain that age under the
present Rule. We are adverting to this aspect only to
emphasise that the validity of the Rule cannot be made to
depend on cases of individual hardship which inevitably arise
in applying a principle of general application. Essentially the
determination of cut-off dates lies in the realm of policy. A
Court in the exercise of the power of judicial review does not
take over that function for itself. Plainly, it is for the rule-
making authority to discharge that function while framing the
Rules."
(Emphasis Supplied)
37. The principle laid down in Hirandra Kumar (supra) was
followed with profit in Devina Sharma (supra) and it was held as
under:
"24. The recommendations of the Shetty Commission were
initially followed by an order of a three-Judge Bench of this
Court in All India Judges Assn. v. Union of India [All India Judges
Assn. v. Union of India, (2002) 4 SCC 274] . By the order of this
Court, the States and the Union Territories to whom a copy of
the report had been submitted were directed to submit their
responses to the Union of India expeditiously. Eventually, the
Report of the Shetty Commission resulted in the judgment of a
three-Judge Bench of this Court in All India Judges Assn.
(3) v. Union of India [All India Judges Assn. (3) v. Union of India,
(2002) 4 SCC 247 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 508] . The rules of several
High Courts provide that for recruitment to the Higher Judicial
Service, the candidate should be of a minimum age of 35, with a
maximum age limit of 45 years. For instance, the rules
pertaining to the U.P. Higher Judicial Service were noticed in a
decision of a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Hirandra
Kumar v. High Court of Allahabad [Hirandra Kumar v. High Court
of Allahabad, (2020) 17 SCC 401 : (2021) 2 SCC (L&S) 801]
("Hirandra Kumar"). The prescription of a rule providing for a
minimum age requirement or maximum age for entry into
service is essentially a matter of policy. After noticing the earlier
precedents on the subject, this Court in Hirandra
Kumar [Hirandra Kumar v. High Court of Allahabad, (2020) 17
SCC 401 : (2021) 2 SCC (L&S) 801] observed that the
determination of cut-offs lies in the realm of policy."
SP,J & NTR,J
Wp_12527_2024 & Batch
38. The similar view was taken by Orissa High Court in
Jnyananda Panda (supra) and Himachal Pradesh High Court in
Satish Kumar and others (supra).
39. In view of the ratio decidendi of these judgments, no fault can
be found in the impugned Rules in prescribing different age limits for
different category of candidates.
40. Resultantly, we are unable to hold that there was no intelligible
differentia and objects sought to be achieved while prescribing the
different age for different set of candidates. In other words, it cannot
be held that the said classification in respect of age is an
unreasonable classification.
41. Furthermore, it was argued that when a law graduate can be
enrolled as an Advocate as per Advocates Act, at the age of 21 years,
it is irrational to deprive him to submit his candidature under the
impugned rules till he attains the age of 23 years. At the cost of
repetition, in our view, it is the prerogative of the employer. The
employer is best suited to decide when a category of candidate can
be treated to be matured enough to enter Judicial Service. If such a
decision is taken by employer by prescribing an age, it cannot be
interfered with unless proved to be palpably arbitrary and irrational.
Merely because a law graduate can become an Advocate at the age of
SP,J & NTR,J
Wp_12527_2024 & Batch
21 years, it does not give him any enforceable right to participate at
the same age for Judicial Service. This argument must also fail.
42. In view of foregoing analysis, we do not find any
unconstitutionality in the relevant rules of Telangana State Judicial
Service Rules, 2023 and consequently, notification dated 10.04.2024
issued by respondent No.3 is not bad in law. Therefore, admission of
these Writ Petitions is declined and the Writ Petitions are dismissed.
There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous applications
pending, if any, shall stand closed.
________________
SUJOY PAUL, J
__________________
N. TUKARAMJI, J
Date: 02.05.2024
L.R. to be marked: Yes.
B/o. TJMR
