Telangana High Court

G.D. Babu Rao vs The State Of Telangana on 7 June, 2024

Author: T. Vinod Kumar

Bench: T. Vinod Kumar

       THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE T. VINOD KUMAR

               WRIT PETITION No.10086 OF 2024

ORDER:

Heard Learned Counsel for the petitioner, learned

Government Pleader for Housing appearing for the1st respondent

and Sri K. Buchi Babu, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the

2nd& 3rdrespondents and with the consent of counsel appearing for

the parties the writ petition is taken up for hearing and disposal at

admission stage.

2. Having regard to the manner of disposal and the lis involved,

notice to unofficial respondents is not necessary.

3. Shorn of unnecessary details, the case of the petitioner in

brief is that the 2ndrespondent Board by its proceedings dt.

09.02.1974 had allotted a 'C' type house bearing No. 43 at Sanjeeva

Reddy Nagar Colony, to Smt. G.D. Ratnamma, who is his mother,

on hire purchase basis; that the 2ndrespondent thereafter had entered

into a deed of lease-cum-agreement for sale with Smt. G.D.

Ratnamma on 12.01.1977; that the 2ndrespondent thereafter

delivered the possession of the house / quarter to the allottee, who

had occupied the same; and that the said allottee viz., the

petitioner's mother had deceased on 09.12.2001 even before getting

the house registered on her name.

4. It is the further case of the petitioner that Smt. G.D.

Ratnamma, at the time of allotment of the quarter, has executed a

nomination in favour of her elder son viz., the petitioner herein in

Form - 10 as the person to whom the said house shall be transferred

in the event of her death; and that on the death of his mother, the

subject property is required to be registered in his name as per the

Regulation No. 27, of G.O. Ms. No. 67 Housing (HB.II)

Department, dated 08.09.2001, being the nominee so nominated by

the original allottee Smt. G.D. Ratnamma.

5. The petitioner further contends that his brothers i.e., the

unofficial respondents in this Writ Petition had hatched a plan to

grab his mother's house by creating a purported unregistered Will

Deed stated to have been executed by his mother on 15.07.1992;

and that through the said Will Deed dated 15.07.1992, the unofficial

respondents have laid their claim to the subject quarter; that the

respondent authorities despite acknowledging that the petitioner's

name is shown as 'nominee' in the records are not registering the

house / quarter allotted to his mother in his name by considering his

letter dt. 04.01.2010; and that the respondent authorities are not

competent authorities to go into rival claims and are required to act

as per the nomination made by considering the subsequent

representations made by the petitioner.

6. The petitioner further contends that mere pendency of a suit

filed by the unofficial respondents cannot be used a ruse by the

respondents to deny his right to seek registration of the subject

house in his name by virtue of being a nominee of Smt. G.D.

Ratnamma; and that the reasons indicated by the respondents by the

communication dt. 25.09.2018 are not valid in the eye of law.

7. Per contra, learned Standing Counsel appearing for

respondents on the other hand submits, though the original allotee

i.e., the Smt. G.D. Ratnamma, while submitting her application for

allotment of quarter under the 'Low Income Group Housing

Scheme' in the year 1974 on payment of 20% had mentioned the

name of the petitioner as nominee, the unofficial respondents also

made a claim on the basis of the Will Deed dt. 15.07.1992; that the

said Will Deed has been executed subsequent to the nomination;

and that as petitioner himself had executed "No Objection

Affidavit" in favour of the unofficial respondent and withdrawing

the same thereafter and accepting later more than once, the

respondent authorities have called upon the petitioner and unofficial

respondents to obtain Succession Certificate from the Court.

8. Learned Standing Counsel further submits that since the

unofficial respondents have already filed a suit vide O.S. No. 46 of

2017 on the file of XX Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court,

Hyderabad, to declare the said Will Deed as the last Will and

testament and as true; and since the issue is sub-judice, the

authorities have issued letter dated 25.09.2018 informing the

petitioner of the same.

9. Learned Standing counsel further submits that the petitioner

having received the above letter had remained silent for six long

years and filed the present writ petition now; and that the reasons

mentioned for delay in approaching this court against the aforesaid

communication are not valid reasons for entertaining the present

writ petition after such long lapse of time.

10. I have taken note of the respective submissions.

11. Firstly, though the petitioner admits to the fact of the

respondent authorities issuing him the letter dated 25.09.2018, the

explanation offered for the delay in impugning the same by filing

present Writ Petition after a lapse of over 5 years, does not impress

this Court for accepting the same as a valid reason for not

approaching this court at the earliest point of time.

12. Further, the ground of petitioner having to undergo medical

treatment, it is to be noted that the treatment which the petitioner

has undergone was in the year 2010 and thereafter petitioner, who

was in Government employment working as Administrative officer

had discharged his duties and was superannuated in July, 2016. In

so far as the explanation offered by the petitioner for not calling in

question the letter dated 25.09.2018 post September, 2018 of him

requiring to travel to United States of America to attend certain

events of his three daughters and on his return having affected with

Corona, are not reasons valid enough for the petitioner to file the

writ petition after a lapse of five (5) years of the impugned

proceeding having been issued. It is trite law that the Courts would

come to the rescue of the diligent and not indolent litigant. In a

recent judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court had echoed that delay

defeats equity and the High Courts ought not to invoke its

extraordinary powers if there is laxity on the part of the applicant.

[See :MrinMaity v. ChhandaKoley1].

13. Reverting to the merits of the matter, though petitioner

claims that in the application submitted by the petitioner's mother

in February, 1974 for allotment of LIG quarter, his name is shown

as nominee and thus, the subject house allotted to his mother

should be registered in his name on her demise in the year 2001, it

is to be noted that the name of the petitioner was shown as Nominee

in the application submitted for allotment of quarter. After

allotment of Quarter No.43 LIGH, the allottee having entered into

Lease-cum-Agreement of sale, the said agreement superseded the

application made for allotment of quarter. Thus, the petitioner

cannot seek to place reliance on the application made for allotment

to claim that he being the nominee is entitled to get the subject

property registered in his name. Atmost the nomination of the

2024 SCC OnLine SC 551

petitioner in the application submitted at the time of allotment

would have effect till the allotment of quarter is made by the

respondent authorities. Upon the allotment of quarter and the

petitioner's mother entering into a separate Lease-cum- Agreement

of Sale, the parties would be bound by the terms of the documents

and the allottee i.e., the petitioner's mother being shown as Lessee,

would include her legal heirs, successors in interest, which are the

usual covenants of the deed. In absence of petitioner placing any

material before this Court to show that even under the Lease-cum-

Agreement of Sale, the petitioner is shown as nominee to succeed to

the property to the exclusion of the legal heirs, the contention of the

petitioner to the contrary is liable to be rejected.

14. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shakti Yezdani&Anr

v. Jayanand Jayant Salgaonkar&Ors 2, while dealing with similar

issue had considered the concept of nomination under various

legislations and held that a nominee would not get absolute title to a

property in exclusion of the legal heirs. The relevant observations

are as under:

(2024) 4 SCC 642

" 26. A consistent view appears to have been taken by the courts, while interpreting the related provisions of nomination under different statutes.

It is clear from the referred judgments that the nomination so made would not lead to the nominee attaining absolute title over the subject property for which such nomination was made.In other words, the usual mode of succession is not to be impacted by such nomination. The legal heirs therefore have not been excluded by virtue of nomination.

27. The presence of the three elements i.e., the term 'vest', the provision excluding others as well as a non-obstante Clause Under Section 109A of the Companies Act, 1956 have not persuaded us in the interpretation to be accorded vis-ï¿½-vis nomination, in any different manner. Different legislations with provisions pertaining to nomination that have been a subject of adjudication earlier before courts, have little or no similarity with respect to the language used or the provisions contained therein. While the Government Savings Certificates Act, 1959, Banking Regulation Act, 1949 and Public Debts Act, 1944 contain a non-obstante clause, the Insurance Act, 1939 and Cooperative Societies Act, 1912 do not.

28. Similarly, there are variations with respect to the word 'vest' being present in some legislations (the Employees Provident Fund Act, 1952) and absent in others (the Insurance Act, 1939, the Cooperative Societies Act, 1912). Looking at the dissimilarities and the fact that uniform definition is not available relating to the rights of 'nominee' and/or whether such 'nomination' bestows absolute ownership over nominees, it is only appropriate that the terms are considered as ordinarily understood by a reasonable person making nominations, with respect to their movable or immovable properties. A reasonable individual arranging for the disposition of his property is expected to undertake any such nomination, bearing in mind the interpretation on the effect of nomination, as given by courts consistently, for a number of years. The concept of nomination if interpreted by departing from the well- established manner would, in our view, cause major ramifications and create significant impact on disposition of properties left behind by deceased nominators.

...

43. Consistent interpretation is given by courts on the question of nomination, i.e., upon the holder's death, the nominee would not get an

absolute title to the subject matter of nomination, and those would apply to the Companies Act, 1956 (parimateria provisions in Companies Act, 2013) and the Depositories Act, 1996 as well.

44. An individual dealing with estate planning or succession laws understands nomination to take effect in a particular manner and expects the implication to be no different for devolution of securities per se. Therefore, an interpretation otherwise would inevitably lead to confusion and possibly complexities, in the succession process, something that ought to be eschewed. At this stage, it would be prudent to note the significance of a settled principle of law. In Shanker Raju v. Union of India MANU/SC/0009/2011 : (2011) 2 SCC 132, the Court held:

10. It is a settled principle of law that a judgment, which has held the field for a long time, should not be unsettled. The doctrine of stare decisis is expressed in the maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere, which means "to stand by decisions and not to disturb what is settled". Lord Coke aptly described this in his classic English version as "those things which have been so often adjudged ought to rest in peace". The underlying logic of this doctrine is to maintain consistency and avoid uncertainty. The guiding philosophy is that a view which has held the field for a long time should not be disturbed only because another view is possible."

(emphasis supplied)

15. Insofar as the application of the Regulation no. 27 as notified

by G.O.Ms. no. 67 dated 08.09.2001 on which heavy reliance is

placed by the petitioner is concerned, it is to be noted that the sub-

regulation (iv) which mandates the respondents to execute

registered sale deed in favour of the nominee is applicable in case

of death of an applicant in harness. The term 'death of an applicant

in harness' is normally associated with person in employment of the

government and his/her deceasing while in service. Admittedly, the

applicant viz., the petitioner mother was not in any employment

when she made an application for allotment of quarter to her in the

quota reserved for persons in service or for that matter when she