Telangana High Court
Dr. D. Karunakar Reddy, vs Sri G. Sandeep on 5 June, 2024
THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE T.MADHAVI DEVI
CONTEMPT CASE No.1154 of 2023
ORDER:
This Contempt Case is filed alleging wilful
disobedience and violation of orders of this Court dated
25.04.2023 in W.P.No.10763 of 2023 by the respondents
and in causing serious loss and damage to the petitioners
herein and therefore, to punish the contemnors under the
Section 10 and 12 of Contempt of Courts Act and to pass
such other order or orders in the interest of justice.
2. Brief facts leading to the filing of the Contempt
Case are that the petitioners herein are the petitioners in
the writ petition and vide Interim Order dated 25.04.2023,
this Court has directed the respondents No.1 to 8 therein as
under:
"After hearing both the parties at length, this Court is of
the opinion that the petitioners, being the owners of the
property cannot be denied their right to enter into the
property. Similarly, even though the development agreement
cum GPA is not registered, the respondents No.9 and 10 have
acted upon it and have invested certain money by laying
roads and other developmental activities. Therefore, their
entry into the property also cannot be restricted. The
respondents No.9 and 10 have already invoked Arbitration
Clause of the development agreement cum GPA and under
Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and the
Application is pending before the Civil Court.
In view of the above, this Court deems if fit and proper
to direct the respondents No.1 to I not to interfere with the
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subject property until it is warranted due to any further
physical scuffle between the parties. The writ petitioners
shall continue to enjoy the possession of the property to
protect their farm house and also the mango trees and the
crop therein and the respondents No.9 and 10 shall be
permitted to enter the property to take care of the
development work carried on by them till date.
The petitioners and respondent No.9 and 10 are
accordingly directed to maintain distance from each other
and to maintain law and order. lf the parties do not follow the
above directions and involve themselves in physical scuffles,
the Police are at liberty to take action and seal the premises,
if necessary.
With respect to all other works, status quo as on today
shall be maintained by both the parties till a decision is taken
by the Arbitrator in respect of the dispute between the
parties. The direction to the petitioners to maintain mango
trees is only to safeguard the same and is not a declaration
of their right over the said property and is left open to be
decided in appropriate proceedings.
3. The petitioners were thus given permission to
enjoy the possession of the property not only to protect the
farm house but also to protect the mango trees and crop
therein and the respondents No.9 & 10 were permitted to
enter into the property only to take care of developmental
work carried on by them till the date of the order and till a
decision is taken by the arbitrator in respect of the dispute
between the parties. It is alleged that in spite of the order
being passed on 25.04.2023 in the presence of the parties
and their counsels in the Open Court, the respondents have
violated the order of this Court and respondents No.1 and 2
have not only taken away the entire mango crop but the
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respondents No.3 and 4 have supported their acts.
Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the
petitioners, the respondents No.1 and 2 have acted in clear
violation of order of this Court and therefore, are liable for
punishment under the Contempt of Courts Act. It is further
submitted that when the petitioners have given police
complaint against the illegal actions of the respondents No.1
and 2, the respondents No.3 and 4 have not registered any
case and it was only when the petitioners have submitted
another complaint to the Superintendent of Police and
explained about the order of the Court, that on instructions
of Superintendent of Police, a crime vide FIR No.99/2023,
dated 10.05.2023 was registered against the respondents
No.1 and 2. It is submitted that the respondents No.3 and 4
have shown scant respect for the order of this Court and
have in fact, supported the respondents No.1 and 2 and
have warned the petitioners with dire consequences if they
complained about the respondent No.4 to the higher
authorities. Thus stating this contempt case has been filed.
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4. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
petitioners, relied upon the following judgments in support
of his contentions:
i. Balwantbhai Somabhai Bhandari Vs. Hiralal
Somabhai Contractor (Deceased) rep. by Lrs.
And Others 1;
ii. M/s.Ista Builders and Developers LLP and
Others Vs. The State of Telangana and
Others 2;
iii. European Investment Ltd., Mumbai Vs.
Triumph International Finance India Ltd., and
Others 3;
iv. Tayabbhai M.Bagasarwalla and Another Vs.
Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd., and Others 4;
v. Prithawi Nath Ram v. State of Jharkhand and
others 5;
vi. Patten Suryaprakash Rao v. Amarender Rao 6;
vii. M/s.Mile Stone Soft. Tech. Pvt. Ltd., Vs. Nidhi
Chibber 7;
viii. Tapan Kumar Hazra and Others Vs. State of
West Bengal and Others 8;
2023 SCC OnLine SC 1139
W.P.Nos.8764 & 10763 of 2023, dt.13.10.202
2004(3) Mh.L.J. 59
(1997) 3 SCC 443
(2004) 7 SCC 261
2007 SCC OnLine AP 662
2015 SCC OnLine Chh 39
2014 SCC OnLine Cal 18852
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ix. M/s.G.L.K.Grants Vs. Smt.Ranjeev R. Acharya
and Others 9.
5. Learned counsel for the respondents No.1 and 2,
on the other hand, submitted that the respondents have
entered into a development agreement with the petitioners
and have also developed part of the property and the
disputes relating to the agreement have arisen which have
been referred to an arbitrator.
6. It is submitted that the respondents have not
violated any directions of this Court. He submitted that the
interim order dated 25.04.2023 was dispatched by this
Court on 08.05.2023 and as the petitioners were not aware
of detailed order and since they were in possession and
enjoyment of the property along with the mango trees and
its crop in terms of the development agreement dated
19.08.2021, the respondents, however, denied all the
allegations of the writ petitioners in contempt petition. It is
submitted that after receipt of the copy of the interim order
of this Court dated 25.04.2023 on 08.05.2023, the
respondents have not dealt with any mango trees and its
crop and therefore, there is no violation of any orders of this
Copy of order in C.C.No.1736 of 2010, dt.13.07.2012.
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Court. It is further submitted that the writ petition filed by
the petitioners herein and also by the respondents therein
have both been disposed of by this Court and hence the
interim orders of this Court got merged with the final orders
and there is no interim order in force and therefore, there
cannot be any Contempt of Court against the respondents
herein. Learned counsel for the respondents also filed a
synopsis of submissions along with the list of dates and
events and submitted that since the scope of the writ
petition is limited to the alleged illegal actions of the
respondents No.1 to 8 therein in interfering with the
possession and have had not sought any relief against the
respondents No.1 and 2 herein either in the main prayer or
interim prayer, the interim order passed by the Court was
beyond the scope of writ petition and therefore the
respondents No.1 and 2 have filed stay vacate petition and
both the parties have already initiated the arbitration
proceedings for resolving the dispute between them. It is
further submitted that since the main writ petition has
already been disposed of, the interim order has merged with
the final order dated 13.10.2023 and therefore, there cannot
be any cognizance of any contempt proceedings. It is further
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submitted that the petitioners have already availed the
alternative remedy of approaching the arbitrator and
therefore, any claim whatsoever can be made before the
arbitrator and not before this Court.
7. Learned counsel for the respondents No.1 and 2
have placed reliance upon the following decisions in support
of his contentions:
i. State of Jammu and Kashmir Vs.
Mohd.Yaqoob Khan and Others ;
ii. Modern Food Industries (India) Ltd., and
Another Vs. Sachidanand Dass and Another 11;
iii. Kanwar Singh Saini Vs. High Court of Delhi 12;
iv. Steel Authority of India Limited and Another
Vs. R.K.Enterprises 13;
v. U.C.Surendranath Vs. Mambally's Bakery 14.
8. Learned counsel for the respondents No.3 and 4
also has filed a counter affidavit and submitted that they
have not violated any directions of this Court. It is also
(1992) 4 SCC 167
1995 Supp (4) SCC 465
(2012) 4 SCC 307
(2010) 15 SCC 605
(2019) 20 SCC 666
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denied that they have not taken any action on the
complaints given by the writ petitioners.
9. Having regard to the rival contentions and the
material on record, this Court finds that this Court had
passed the interim order dated 25.04.2023 in order to
protect the interest of both the parties. This Court had
clearly held that the mango crop shall be enjoyed by the writ
petitioners and the respondents No.1 and 2 shall be entitled
to enter into the property only to look after the
developmental activity carried on by them. The respondents
No.1 and 2 were represented by their counsel and the order
was passed in the Open Court in the presence of all the
parties. Therefore, it cannot be said that the interim order
was not communicated to the parties. When it was clear
that the mango crop was to be enjoyed by the writ
petitioners, the respondents No.1 and 2 could not have
entered the premises and taken away the entire crop. The
ground taken by the respondents that they were not aware
of the detailed order till 08.05.2023 until it was dispatched
by the Court, is not acceptable. In the case of Balwantbhai
Somabhai Bhandari (cited supra), relied upon by the
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learned counsel for the petitioners, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has culled out the principles as under:
"40. The object of the discipline enforced by the court in
case of contempt of court is not to vindicate the dignity of the
court or the person of the Judge, but to prevent undue
interference with the administration of justice.
41. Any interference with the course of justice is an
affront to the majesty of law and the conduct of interference
is punishable as contempt of court. Public interest demands
that there should be no interference with the judicial process,
and the effect of the judicial decision should not be pre-
empted or circumvented. (Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd. v.
Proprietors of Indian Express Newspapers Bombay Pvt. Ltd.
and Others reported in (1988) 4 SCC 592).
42. If a party, who is fully in the know of the
judgment/order of the Court, is conscious and aware of the
consequences and implications of the order of the Court, acts
in violation thereof, it must be held that disobedience is
wilful. To establish contempt of court, it is sufficient to prove
that the conduct was wilful, and that the contemnor knew of
all the facts which made it a breach of the undertaking.
43. The following conditions must be satisfied before a
person can be held to have committed civil contempt: (i) there
must be a judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other
process of a court; (ii) there must be disobedience to such
judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a
court; and (iii) such disobedience of the judgment, decree,
direction, order, writ or other process of a court must be
wilful. [Patel Rajnikant Dhulabhai and Another v. Patel
Chandrakant Dhulabhai and Others, reported in (2008) 14
SCC 561].
44. It behoves the court to act with as great
circumspection as possible, making all allowances for errors
of judgment. It is only when a clear case of contumacious
conduct, not explainable otherwise, arises that the contemnor
must be punished. Punishment under the law of contempt is
called for when the lapse is deliberate and in disregard of
one's duty and in defiance of authority. Contempt
proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, and the standard of
proof is the same as in other criminal cases. The alleged
contemnor is entitled to the protection of all
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safeguards/rights, including benefit of doubt. [Kanwar Singh
Saini v. High Court of Delhi reported in (2012) 4 SCC 307].
45. The sanctity to judicial proceedings is paramount to
a society governed by law. Otherwise, the very edifice of
democracy breaks and anarchy reigns. The Act, 1971 is
intended to correct a person deviating from the norm and
trying to breach the law/assuming law on to himself. It
intends to secure confidence of the people in the
administration of justice by disciplining those erring in
disobeying the orders of the Court/undertaking given to
court.
53. In Ashok Paper Kamgar Union v. Dharam Godha
and Others reported in (2003) 11 SCC 1, the expression
'wilful disobedience' in the context of Section 2(b) of the Act
was read to mean an act or omission done voluntarily and
intentionally with the specific intent to do something, which
the law forbids or with the specific intention to fail to do
something which the law requires to be done. Wilfulness
signifies deliberate action done with evil intent and bad
motive and purpose. It should not be an act, which requires
and is dependent upon, either wholly or partly, any act or
omission by a third party for compliance."
10. Thus, it can be seen that any wilful act done
voluntarily and intentionally would amount to Contempt of
Court. Even if the contention of the respondents No.1 and 2
was to be accepted that they were not aware of the detailed
order of the Court until it was dispatched on 08.05.2023,
the respondents No.1 and 2 were aware of the Status-quo
order passed by this Court and ought to have waited till
receipt of the copy of the order before taking any action. It
was not as though, the season was coming to an end and
the crop would perish if not harvested. It was in fact the
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beginning of the crop season and from the photographs filed
along with the contempt petition, the mangoes were quite
raw. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that the
respondents No.1 and 2 were very much aware of the
directions of this Court and only in order to circumvent the
order and appropriate the crop before they receive the copy
of the order, it is clear that they have proceeded to take
away the mango crop.
11. In respect of the contention of the respondents
Nos.1 and 2 that since the interim order has already merged
with the final order, there is no cause for initiation of any
contempt case proceedings in this case, this Court finds
that the Bombay High Court has held that the Contempt
Case proceedings are independent of the execution
proceedings and are primarily made to ensure the
compliance of the Court's order rather than giving a relief to
the parties and therefore, mere availability of the execution
proceedings cannot be a substitute for contempt
proceedings, as the remedies are not the alternate remedies
and can be invoked simultaneously.
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12. Further, in the case of Tayabbhai
M.Bagasarwalla and Another (cited supra), the Hon'ble
Supreme Court was considering the case of violation of
interim orders and whether such violation is punishable
even if later, the Court order is held to be without
jurisdiction. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed thus:
"8. The learned Judge then referred in extenso to the
elaborate material placed before him and recorded the finding
that all these reports clearly indicate that there is wilful and
blatant breach of order of injunction passed by the City Civil
Court.
"It is clear that in breach of the injunction order, there has
been construction. The breach is wilful and blatant. The
extent to which the Appellants have gone is also
indicated by the fact that, as stated above, inspite of
knowledge of order of this Court, the Commissioner
appointed by this Court was initially obstructed. To the
Court it is very clear that here is a party who has
absolutely no regard for the orders of the Court. Such a
party must be made to bear the consequences of their
own action...... To the Court it is clear that the applicants
have chosen to wilfully and blatantly flout the order of
injunction. It may be that the applicants have a very good
case. However, no matter how good a case a party has,
in my view, it is not open to a party to flout orders of
courts. If a party wilfully flouts an order of the court then
such party can expect no equitable relief from the court.
Such a party must be made to bear the consequences of
his action. Otherwise all parties will ignore or flout orders
of courts. When caught out they would then throw
themselves at the mercy of the court. In my view, in cases
like this, the party in default must not be allowed to enjoy
the benefits of action. To appoint the applicants as the
Agent of the Court Receiver would amount to giving them
benefit of their wrong. In my view, the order dated
28.7.1991 must be and is sustained. The application to
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appoint the Applicants as the agents of the Court
Receiver is rejected."
12. Pursuant to the request of this Court
aforementioned, the Bombay High Court has disposed of the
aforementioned appeal (Appeal from Order No.1407 of 1991)
on November 1, 1996. The High Court has allowed the appeal
holding that inasmuch as the Bombay City Civil Court is
found to have no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, Defendant
1 and 2 cannot be punished for disobeying the interim orders
made in such a suit, for the reason that the said interim order
must equally be held to be without jurisdiction. This appeal is
preferred against the said order of the High Court.
14. The first and foremost question in this appeal is
whether the High Court was right in holding that since it has
been found ultimately that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction
to entertain the suit, the interim orders made therein are non-
est and hence Defendants 1 and 2 cannot be punished for
their violation even if they had flouted and disobeyed the
said interim orders when they were in force. We are of the
considered opinion that the High Court was not right in
saying so. The landlord-plaintiff came forward with the suit
alleging that by virtue of the fire resulting in the destruction of
the suit house, the relationship of landlord and tenant
between the parties has come to an end and, therefore, he
requested the court to injunct the defendants from carrying on
any construction on the suit premises without their
permission and without obtaining sanction from the Municipal
Corporation. The defendants questioned the jurisdiction of the
Civil Court to entertain the suit. According to them, the
building was not totally destroyed and that, in any event, the
relationship of landlord and tenant has not come to an end on
that account. The defendants' plea was rejected by the Civil
Court. It held that it did have the jurisdiction to try the said
suit. On appeal, however, the High Court, disagreeing with
the decision of another High Court, held that relationship of
landlord and tenant has not come to an end for the reason
suggested by the plaintiff and that the Civil Court had no
jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view of Section 28 of
Bombay Rent Act. All this took about six years, i.e., from
1991 to 1996. It is not suggested nor can it be suggested that
the suit was filed by the plaintiff in the City Civil Court only
with a view to avoid the Rent Control Court nor can it be
suggested that they approached the Civil Court knowing full
well that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try that suit. It
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is evident that they approached the Civil Court bona fide,
thinking that it had jurisdiction to try their suit. They were
confirmed in their view by the Civil Court. It is true that
ultimately the High Court found against them but even there,
it must be noticed, they did so disagreeing with a decision of
the Kerala High Court. It, therefore, cannot be said that the
plaintiffs did not approach the Civil Court bona fide.
15. The next thing to be noticed is that certain interim
orders were asked for and were granted by the Civil Court
during this period. Would it be right to say that violation of
and disobedience to the said orders of injunction is not
punishable because it has been found later that the Civil
Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Mr.Sorabjee
suggests that saying so would be subversive of the Rule of
Law and would seriously erode the majesty and dignity of
the courts. It would mean, suggests the learned counsel, that
it would be open to the defendants-respondents to decide for
themselves whether the order was with or without
jurisdiction and act upon that belief. This can never be, says
the learned counsel. He further suggests that if any party
thinks that an order made by the Civil Court is without
jurisdiction or is contrary to law, the appropriate course open
to him is to approach that court with the plea and ask for
vacating the order. But it is not open to him to flout the said
order assuming that the order is without jurisdiction. It is this
principle which has been recognised and incorporation
in Section 9-A of Civil Procedure Code (inserted by
Maharashtra Amendment Act No. 65 of 1977), says
Mr.Sorabjee. Section 9-A reads as follows:
"9-A. Where at the hearing of an application relating to
interim relief is suit, objection to jurisdiction is taken,
such issue to be decided by the Court as preliminary
issue. - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this
Code or any other law for the time being in force, if, at the
hearing of any application of granting or setting aside an
order granted any interim relief, whether by way of stay
injunction, appointment of a receiver or otherwise, made
in any suit, an objection to the jurisdiction of the court to
entertain such suit is taken by any of the parties to the
suit, the Court shall proceed to determine at the hearing
of such application the issue as to the jurisdiction as a
preliminary issue before granting or setting aside the
order granting the interim relief. Any such application
shall be heard and disposed of by the Court as
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expeditiously as possible and shall not in any case be
adjourned to the hearing of suit.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1),
at the hearing of any such application, the court may
grant such interim relief as it may consider necessary,
pending determination by it of the preliminary issue as to
the jurisdiction."
16. According to this section, if an objection is raised to
the jurisdiction of the court at the hearing of an application for
grant of, or for vacating, interim relief, the court should
determine that issue in the first instance as a preliminary
issue before granting or setting aside the relief already
granted. An application raising objection to the jurisdiction to
the court is directed to be heard with all expedition. Sub-rule
(2), however, says that the command in sub-rule (1) does not
preclude the court from granting such interim relief as it may
consider necessary pending the decision on the question of
jurisdiction. In our opinion, the provision merely states the
obvious. It makes explicit what is implicit in law. Just
because an objection to the jurisdiction is raised, the court
does not become helpless forthwith - nor does it become
incompetent to grant the interim relief. It can. At the same
time, it should also decide the objection to jurisdiction at the
earliest possible moment. This is the general principle and
this is what Section 9-A reiterates. Take this very case. The
plaintiff asked for temporary injunction. An ad-interim
injunction was granted. Then the defendants came forward
objecting to the grant of injunction and also raising an
objection to the jurisdiction of the court. The court over-ruled
the objection as to jurisdiction and made the interim
injunction absolute. The defendants filed an appeal against
the decision on the question of jurisdiction. While that appeal
was pending, several other interim orders were passed both
by the Civil Court as well as by the High Court. Ultimately, no
doubt, High Court has found that the Civil Court had no
jurisdiction to entertain the suit but all this took about six
years. Can it be said that orders passed by the Civil Court
and the High court during this period of six years were all
non-est and that it is open to the defendants to flout them
merrily, without fear of any consequence. Admittedly, this
could not be done until the High Court's decision on the
question of jurisdiction. The question is whether the said
decision of the High Court means that no person can be
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punished for flouting or disobeying the interim/interlocutory
orders while they were in force, i.e., for violations and
disobedience committed prior to the decision of the High Court
on the question of jurisdiction. Holding that by virtue of the
said decision of the High Court [on the question of
jurisdiction], on one can be punished thereafter for
disobedience or violation of the interim orders committed prior
to the said decision of the High Court, would indeed be
subversive of rule of law and would seriously erode the
dignity and the authority of the courts. We must repeat that
this is not even a case where a suit was filed in the wrong
court knowingly or only with a view to snatch an interim
order. As pointed out hereinabove, the suit was filed in the
Civil Court bona fide. We are of the opinion that in such a
case the defendants cannot escape the consequences of their
disobedience and violation of the interim injunction committed
by them prior to the High Court's decision on the question of
jurisdiction.
23. In Hadkinson v. Hadkinson [1952 All. E.R.567] the
Court of Appeal held:
"It is the plain and unqualified obligation of every person
against, or in respect of whom an order is made by a
court of competent jurisdiction to obey it unless and until
that order is discharged. The uncompromising nature of
this obligation is shown by the fact that it extends even to
cases where the person affected by an order believes it to
be irregular or even void. Lord Cottenham, L.C. said in
Chuck v. Cremer: (1) (1 Coop. Temp. Cott.342)(at p.342).
`A party, who knows of an order, whether null or
valid, regular or irregular, cannot be permitted to
disobey it....It would be most dangerous to hold that
the suitors, or their solicitors, could themselves judge
whether an order was null or valid-whether it was
regular or irregular. That they should come to the
court and not take upon themselves to determine
such a question. That the course of a party knowing
of an order, which was null or irregular, and who
might be affected by it, was plain. He should apply
to the court that it might be discharged. As long as it
existed it must not be disobeyed.'
Such being the nature of this obligation, two
consequences will, in general follow from its breach. The first
is that anyone who disobeys an order of the court (and I am
not now considering disobedience of orders relating merely to
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matters of procedure) is in contempt and may be punished by
committal or attachment or otherwise. The second is that no
application to the court by such a person will be entertained
until he has purged himself of his contempt."
13. Further in the case of Prithawi Nath Ram (cited
supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that even if
ultimately the interim order is vacated or relief in the main
proceedings is not granted to a party, the other side cannot
take that as a ground for disobedience of any interim order
passed by the Court. The High Court of Chhattisgarh has
also expressed similar view in the case of M/s.Mile Stone
Soft. Tech. Pvt. Ltd., (cited supra).
14. The learned single judge of this Court in the case
of M/s.G.L.K.Grants (cited supra) has also considered the
case where the contemnor has taken the stand that he was
not aware of the interim order and therefore, there was no
compliance and the Court held that such contention cannot
be accepted having regard to the fact that the status-quo
order was passed in the presence of his counsel and that he
came to know about the order only subsequently.
15. Thus, the judgments relied upon by the learned
counsel for the petitioners support the case of the
petitioners that even if an interim order has finally merged
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with the final order of the Court or even if the interim order
was subsequently vacated, the violation of interim order
when it was in force is Contempt of Court and the
contemnors are punishable for the same.
16. The respondents No.1 and 2, on the other hand,
have also relied upon the following judgments in support of
their contentions:
17. In the case of State of Jammu and Kashmir Vs.
Mohd.Yaqoob Khan and Others (cited supra), the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has held that where there is an allegation of
violation of the interim orders and a stay vacate petition has
already been filed, the Court ought to have taken the stay
vacate petition on merits rather than proceed in the
contempt case petition. However, this judgment is not
applicable to the facts of the case as it is not only
distinguishable on facts but also because the main case has
already been disposed of by the Court. In the case of
Modern Food Industries (India) Ltd., and Another (cited
supra) also similar view is expressed and therefore, it is not
applicable to the facts of the case.
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18. The case of Kanwar Singh Saini (cited supra), is
that an interim order was granted in the suit and during the
pendency of the said order, the final order has been passed
and the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if the case is
ultimately dismissed, the interim order stands nullified
automatically. However, this judgment is factually
distinguishable to the case on hand as in the case before
this Court, the allegations is of violation of interim order
during its currency and not violation of the interim order
after the final order is passed. Therefore, the said judgment
is not applicable to the case on hand.
19. In the case of Steel Authority of India Limited
and Another (cited supra), it is the case where the
communication of the order was belated and hence it was
held that there was no Contempt of Court, whereas in the
case before this Court, the order was passed in Open Court
in the presence of both the parties and therefore, the said
judgment cannot be applied to the case on hand.
20. In the case of U.C.Surendranath (cited supra),
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that for giving a finding
holding person guilty of wilful disobedience of the order
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under Order 39 Rule 2-A of CPC, there has to be not mere
'disobedience', but it should be a 'wilful disobedience' and
the allegation of wilful disobedience being in the nature of
criminal liability, the same has to be proved to the
satisfaction of the Court that the disobedience was not mere
'disobedience' but was 'wilful disobedience'.
21. This Court is satisfied that the respondents No.1
and 2 were very much aware of the order of this Court and
in order to circumvent the order of this Court only, they
proceeded to appropriate/take away the mango crop in a
hurry on the next day of the order and have taken the stand
that they have received the copy of the order on 08.05.2023
and therefore, they were not aware of the directions of this
Court. This is nothing but a wilful disobedience of the order
of this Court and therefore, they are liable for punishment
under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act.
22. The respondents No.3 and 4 being the police
Officers are required to follow the law and the directions of
the Courts and ensure that the orders are complied with. It
is pertinent to mention here that the learned government
pleader for home was also present when the interim order
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was passed by this Court and it is presumed that the same
was orally communicated to the respondents No.3 and 4.
Therefore, they cannot now take the stand that they were
not aware of the interim orders of this Court and instead of
maintaining law and order, they seem to have not only
permitted the respondents No1 and 2 to take away mangos
from the site and not maintained the status-quo as directed
by this Court, but some of the constables have also taken
some of the mangoes with them. Therefore, they are also
liable for punishment under Section 12 of Contempt of
Courts Act.
23. In the result,
i. The respondents No.1 and 2/Contemnors
herein are sentenced to individually undergo
detention in civil prison for a period of One (1)
month each and shall pay a fine of Rs.2,000/-
(Rupees Two Thousand) each and in default of
payment of fine amount, the respondents No.1
and 2/Contemnors herein shall undergo
detention in civil prison for a further period of
Ten (10) days. They shall be entitled to
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subsistence allowance at the rate of Rs.100/-
(Rupees Hundred) per day each in accordance
with Rule 32(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act,
1980 framed by the High Court for the State
of Telangana under the Act of 1971, during
their period of detention which shall be borne
by the petitioners.
ii. The respondents No.1 and 2/Contemnors
herein shall also pay costs of Rs.50,000/-
(Rupees Fifty Thousand) in lumpsum to the
petitioners within a period of Four (4) weeks.
iii. The respondents No.3 & 4/Contemnors herein
are sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/-
(Rupees Two Thousand) each within a period
of Four (4) weeks from today and in default of
payment of fine amount, the respondents No.3
and 4/Contemnors herein shall undergo
detention in civil prison for a period of Ten
(10) days each.
iv. Accordingly, the Contempt Case is allowed
with costs as above.
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v. Miscellaneous applications, if any pending,
shall also stand closed.
____________________________
JUSTICE T.MADHAVI DEVI
Date: 05.06.2024
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