Telangana High Court
Raghavender Rao, vs Damodhara Chary, on 3 June, 2024
Author: G. Radha Rani
Bench: G. Radha Rani
HONOURABLE DR.JUSTICE G. RADHA RANI
SECOND APPEAL Nos.1197 and 1188 of 2006
COMMON JUDGMENT:
S.A.No.1197 of 2006 is filed by the appellant - appellant - plaintiff
aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 14.07.2006 passed in A.S.No.13 of
2005 by the Senior Civil Judge, Narayanpet, Mahabubnagar District, confirming
the judgment and decree dated 19.04.2005 passed in O.S.No.43 of 1997 by the
Junior Civil Judge, Narayanpet, Mahabubnagar District.
2. The appellant died during the pendency of the appeal and his legal
representatives were brought on record as appellants 2 to 9.
3. S.A.No.1188 of 2006 is filed by the appellant - appellant - plaintiff
(appellant No.3 in S.A.No.1197 of 2006 - one of the sons of appellant)
aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 14.07.2006 passed in A.S.No.12 of
2005 by the Senior Civil Judge, Narayanpet, Mahabubnagar District, confirming
the judgment and decree dated 19.04.2005 passed in O.S.No.41 of 1997 by the
Junior Civil Judge, Narayanpet, Mahabubnagar District.
4. The parties are hereinafter referred as arrayed before the trial court as
plaintiff and defendants.
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5. The plaintiff in O.S.No.43 of 1997 (pertaining to S.A.No.1197 of 2006)
filed the suit for declaration of his title and confirmation of possession in
respect of suit lands bearing Sy.Nos.216/paiki, 262, 262/paiki in all measuring
Acs.8-22 gts. situated at Mudumal village.
6. The plaintiff in O.S.No.41 of 1997 (pertaining to S.A.No.1188 of 2006),
the son of the plaintiff in O.S.No.43 of 1997 filed the suit for declaration of title
and confirmation of possession and perpetual injunction in respect of suit lands
bearing Sy.No.216 measuring Acs.9-10 gts. situated at Mudumal village.
7. The contention of both the plaintiffs was that originally one Smt.
Narsmma Pujari was the owner of the above suit schedule properties. After her
demise, her adopted son, one Jaya Rao succeeded to the same. The said Jaya
Rao, to meet his family requirements sold the suit lands to plaintiffs for valuable
sale consideration under registered sale deeds dated 22.07.1993 and since then,
the plaintiffs were enjoying the lands as pattedars and possessors. Earlier to it,
the plaintiff in O.S.No.43 of 1997 was enjoying both the suit lands as bataidar
for several years. The defendants having no claim or right over the said lands
tried to cause interference in their possession and enjoyment. As such, Sri
Kishan Rao (the plaintiff in O.S.No.43 of 1997) filed the suit for perpetual
injunction vide O.S.No.31 of 1993 and the said suit was decreed in his favour.
Thereafter, the defendants filed a land grabbing case vide O.P.No.247 of 1994
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alleging that Jaya Rao and Kishan Rao illegally encroached the land and sought
for recovery of possession. However, the said case was dismissed as
withdrawn. Later, Kishan Rao filed execution petition vide E.P.No.6 of 1995
for punishment of defendants for committing contempt of court. The
defendants denied the title of the plaintiffs necessitating the plaintiffs to file the
above suits for declaration of title and confirmation of possession.
8. The defendants filed written statement contending that late Narsamma
Pujari was the mother of defendant No.3 and she gifted the suit schedule
properties to defendant No.3 at the time of her marriage towards pasupu-
kumkuma. The husband of defendant No.3 by name, Kamalanabha Chary
cultivated the suit land. After the death of husband of defendant No.3, all the
defendants 1 to 3 were in possession of the suit schedule properties and they
being absolute owners, sold the suit schedule properties to Makala Anjaneyulu
and Makala Laxmanna (sons of defendant No.4) vide registered sale deed dated
18.05.1993.
8.1. They further contended that suit lands were Inam lands. The defendants
applied to Revenue Divisional Officer, Narayanpet for issuance of Occupancy
Rights Certificate in their favour. The civil courts had no jurisdiction to issue
perpetual injunction in respect of Inam lands. Late Jaya Rao had no right, title
or interest in the suit schedule properties. The name of Jaya Rao was recorded
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in revenue records with a dishonest intention without following due course of
law by the Revenue Authorities. The alienations made by Jaya Rao to the
plaintiffs would not transfer any rights. The said instruments were null and void
and not binding on them. The payment of land revenue by the plaintiffs or Jaya
Rao would not create any right over the properties. The entries in revenue
records not supported by valid source of title would not create any interest or
title and denied that Jaya Rao was the adopted son of late Narsamma Pujari
Malkeid or that he was owner of the suit schedule properties.
8.2. They further contended that O.P.No.247 of 1994 filed under A.P. Land
Grabbing Act was withdrawn by them as during the year 1993-1994 the
plaintiffs were in possession of the suit lands and on filing the land grabbing
case by defendants 1 to 3, they left the land and allowed the defendnats to
occupy the same. Their possession was only for a short period of few months
and contended that the plaintiffs were not in possession of the suit schedule
properties as on the date of filing the suits. They contended that the payment of
court fee under Section 24(b) of the Andhra Pradesh Court Fees and Suits
Valuation Act, 1956 (for short, 'APCF and SV Act') was improper.
9. Basing on the said pleadings, the trial court framed the issues in
O.S.No.43 of 1997 as follows:
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i. Whether Jaya Rao is the adopted son of Smt. Narsamma
Pujari Malkaid?
ii. Whether the suit property is gifted to defendant No.3
towards "PasupuKumkuma"?
iii. Whether the defendants 1 to 3 sold away the suit property in
favour of son of defendant No.4?
iv. Whether the plaintiff is in possession as on the date of filing
of the suit?
v. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration of title over
the suit schedule property and after perpetual injunction?
vi. To what relief?
10. The plaintiff was examined as PW.1 and got examined another witness as
PW.2 and got marked Exs.A1 to A29 on his behalf. The defendant No.2 was
examined as DW.1 and they got examined two other witnesses as DWs.2 and 3
on their behalf and got marked Exs.B1 to B16.
11. The trial court framed the issues in O.S.No.41 of 1997 as follows:
i. Whether Jaya Rao is the adopted son of Smt. Narsamma
Pujari Malkaid and succeeded to her property?
ii. Whether the plaintiff was put into the possession of the suit
property by his Vendor Jaya Rao?
iii. Whether the late Narsamma gifted the suit property to her
daughter defendant No.3 towards PasupuKumkuma at the
time of her marriage?
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iv. Whether the suit property has been sold in favour of the
sons of defendant No.4 and put them into the possession by
defendants 1 to 3?
v. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration of his right
and for perpetual injunction over the suit property?
vi. To what relief?
12. The plaintiff in O.S.No.41 of 1997 was examined as PW.1 and got
examined the attestor of the sale deed as PW.2 and another witness as PW.3 and
got marked Exs.A1 to A12 on his behalf. On behalf of defendants, DWs.1 to 3
were examined and got marked Exs.B1 to B16.
13. On considering the oral and documentary evidence on record, the trial
court dismissed both the suits on 19.04.2005 holding that the plaintiffs failed to
prove the adoption of Jaya Rao by Smt. Narsamma Pujari and further held that
Smt. Narsamma Pujari had given the suit schedule properties to her daughter,
defendant No.3 towards Pusupu-Kumkuma by oral gift at the time of her
marriage and the said oral gift was valid. The trial court further held that the
entries in the revenue records showing the name of the plaintiff would not
confer any title and the plaintiff would not acquire any title over the suit
schedule properties as the sale deeds executed by Jaya Rao were not valid and
he had no authority to sell the same and held that the plaintiffs were not in
lawful possession over the suit lands and dismissed both the suits.
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14. Aggrieved by the said judgments and decrees passed by the learned
Junior Civil Judge, Narayanpet, Mahabubnagar District dated 19.04.2005, the
plaintiffs in both the suits preferred the first appeals. The appeals were heard by
the Senior Civil Judge, Narayanpet, Mahabubnagar District. Vide judgments
and decrees in A.S.Nos.12 and 13 of 2005 dated 14.07.2006, the first appellate
court dismissed both the appeals confirming the judgments and decrees passed
by the trial court. The first appellate court reappreciated the evidence on record
and held that as the plaintiffs were claiming their title through Jaya Rao as
adopted son of Narsamma Pujari, they need to prove the factum of adoption of
Jaya Rao by Late Narsamma Pujari but failed to prove the same. However, the
defendants also failed to prove that the suit lands were gifted by Narsamma
Pujari to defendant No.3. Oral gift was not valid under law. No document was
filed by the defendants to show that defendants 1 to 3 had transferred the suit
lands to the sons of defendant No.4. However, in a suit for declaration of title,
the plaintiffs should succeed on the strength of their own case, but not on the
weaknesses of the case of the defendants and were not entitled to seek the relief
of declaration of title over the suit schedule properties.
15. Both the courts below also held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the
relief of perpetual injunction as they were seeking the same as a consequential
relief in a suit for declaration of title.
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16. Aggrieved further, the plaintiffs preferred these second appeals raising
the following substantial questions of law:
1. Whether the appellate court having held that defendant No.3 did
not acquire any title to the suit land on the strength of the alleged
oral gift was justified in dismissing the suit of plaintiff who
purchased the same from the adopted son of Late Smt. Narsamma
Pujari.
2. Whether the courts below were justified in brushing aside the
revenue records prepared under the ROR Act showing the
plaintiff's vendor as pattedar for several years and the plaintiffs as
cultivators for the last more than 20 years and thereafter the
plaintiff as pattedar on the strength of sale deed without there
being any rebuttal evidence denying the statutory presumption.
3. Whether the courts below were justified in holding that the
plaintiff's possession were unlawful ignoring the fact that the
plaintiff was found to be in possession of land for the last more
than 20 years and enjoying the decree of perpetual injunction
granted by a competent court.
4. Whether the court below was justified in negativing the adoption
of Jaya Rao by Smt. Narsamma Pujari when the said fact had
come for adjudication after more then 50 years and all the
surrounding circumstances proved the said adoption.
17. This Court on 08.12.2006 admitted both the Second Appeals on the
following substantial question of law:
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Whether the courts below were justified in refusing to grant
the relief of decree for perpetual injunction in favour of the
plaintiff restraining the defendants from causing interference
in his peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit land on
the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish his lawful
title over the suit land though he was found to be in possession
of land.
18. Heard Sri Vijay Kumar Heroor, the learned counsel for the appellants and
Sri Gujjari Naveen Kumar, the learned counsel for the respondents.
19. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the courts below
disbelieved the theory of adoption of Jaya Rao by Narsamma Pujari for not
adducing satisfactory evidence and considered that there was no basis for
granting the relief of declaration of title. But, however, committed an error in
considering that the relief of perpetual injunction was sought as consequential to
the relief of declaration. The relief of injunction was claimed as an independent
relief and court fee was also paid separately. Even if the same was not paid,
they were ready to pay the same within the time fixed by the Court. The
respondents-defendants 1 to 3 admitted in their written statement itself that they
sold the suit schedule properties to the sons of defendant No.4 and that they
were not in possession of the schedule properties and that they had no interest in
the same. The defendant No.4 had not contested the suit. The appellants were
uninterruptedly in possession for the past 50 years. Injunction could be granted
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against all the persons other than the true owner, the owners were not interest to
contest the suit and relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in
Rame Gowda (dead) by LRs. Vs. M. Varadappa Naidu (dead) by LRs. and
Anr. 1. He relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Tajender
Singh Ghambhir and Anr. Vs. Gurpreet Singh and Ors.2 on the aspect that
even if there was any deficiency in payment of court fee, the same could be
made good during the appellate stage and of the judgment in Ravinder Kaur
Grewal and Ors. Vs. Manjit Kaur and Ors.3on the aspect that there was no
bar under Article 65 or any of the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 as
against the plaintiff who had perfected his title by virtue of adverse possession
to sue or to evict a person or to protect his possession. He also relied upon the
judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Ramavath Hasala Naik Vs.
Sabahavath Gomli Bai4.
20. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand contended that both
the courts below concurrently held that the plaintiffs were not entitled for
declaration of title as they failed to prove the adoption of their vendor Jaya Rao
by Narsamma Pujari. The only substantial question of law formulated by this
Court was with regard to possession. The plaintiff in O.S.No.43 of 1997 being
(2004) 1 SCC 769
(2014) 10 SCC 702
(2019) 8 SCC 729
S.A.No.576 of 1999 decided on 09.09.2010 reported in MANU/AP/0783/2010
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the Village Administrative Officer or Patwari and resident of Mudumal village
since 1960, managed the revenue records. On the basis of an ex-parte decree
obtained in his favour, the plaintiff got his name mutated in the revenue records.
The said mutation also took place subsequent to the institution of the suit as
observed by the courts below, but not as on the date of filing of the suit. Hence,
the plaintiff was not entitled even for the relief of possession and prayed to
dismiss the Second Appeals.
21. As a general rule, the High Court would not interfere with the concurrent
findings of the courts below, except when,
(i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on
no evidence;
(ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by
applying the law erroneously; or
(iii) the courts have wrongly casted the burden of proof.
22. The only substantial question of law, which was admitted for
determination in these Second Appeals is:
Whether the courts below were justified in refusing to grant the relief of
decree for perpetual injunction in favour of the plaintiff restraining the
defendants from causing interference in his peaceful possession and
enjoyment of the suit land on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to
establish his lawful title over the suit land though he was found to be in
possession of land.
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23. On a perusal of the plaint and the reliefs sought by the plaintiffs, the
plaintiffs sought the relief of (i) declaration that they were owners and
possessors of the suit lands, (ii) to decree the suit for perpetual injunction
restraining the defendants, their men and servants from interfering with their
peaceful possession and enjoyment over the suit lands. Both the plaintiffs
valued the suits under Section 24(b) of the APCF and SV Act.
24. Section 24(b) of APCF and SV Act reads as follows:
"(b) where the prayer is for a declaration and for consequential
injunction and the relief sought is with reference to any immovable
property, fee shall be computed on one-half of the market value of
the property or on rupees three hundred, whichever is higher."
25. The plaintiffs valued the suit on one-half of the market value of the
property. Though the plaintiffs had not used the word 'consequential' for
seeking the relief of perpetual injunction, they paid the court fee for the relief
under Section 24(b) of APCF and SV Act. This itself would disclose that they
were seeking for the consequential relief of injunction, but not as an
independent relief. They had not paid the court fee independently for the relief
of perpetual injunction under Section 26(a) of the APCF and SV Act.
26. The judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court relied by the learned counsel
for the appellants in Tajender Singh Ghambhir and Anr. Vs. Gurpreet
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Singh and Ors.(2 supra) had no relevance to the facts of the presence case as
the point involved in the said case is whether the appellate court can direct the
party to make up deficit court fee in the plaint at the appellate stage and it was
reiterated that the power of the appellate court is co-extensive with that of the
trial court and the appellate court in the interest of justice can do that which
could be done by the trial court in the suit proceedings. It was held therein that
it was the duty of the court to determine as to whether or not court fee paid on
the plaint was deficient. On finding court fee to be deficient, court must first
grant time to the plaintiff to pay the deficient court fee. If despite the said order
of court, the deficient court fee is not paid, it is only then the consequence as
provided in Sections 6, 2 and 3 of APCF and VS Act must follow.
27. The appellants-plaintiffs filed the suit for declaration and injunction and
paid the court fee under Section 24(b) of APCF and SV Act. The respondents-
defendants stated in their written statement that they need to pay the court fee
under Section 24(a) of the APCF and SV Act, contending that the plaintiff was
not in possession of the property. The trial court specifically held that the main
relief sought by the plaintiff was for declaration of title for which the plaintiff
was not entitled, therefore, he was not entitled for the consequential relief also.
Even during the stage of first appeal, the plaintiffs had not sought for any
amendment of the plaint and had not asked for the relief of perpetual injunction
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independently nor paid any court fee on the said aspect. Their contention now,
at the stage of second appeal that they had sought for perpetual injunction as an
independent relief, without paying any court fee on the said aspect could not be
taken into consideration. The citation relied by the learned counsel for the
appellants has no application to the facts of the present case.
28. The other contention taken by the learned counsel for the appellants was
that though the plaintiffs failed to establish their title over the suit schedule
properties, as they were found to be in possession of the suit lands, as such, the
courts committed an error in refusing to grant the relief of the decree for
perpetual injunction and relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in
Rame Gowda (dead) by LRs. Vs. M. Varadappa Naidu (dead) by LRs. and
Anr. (1 supra).
29. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Rame Gowda (dead) by LRs. Vs. M.
Varadappa Naidu (dead) by LRs. and Anr. (1 supra) held that:
"8. It is thus clear that so far as the Indian law is concerned
the person in peaceful possession is entitled to retain his
possession and in order to protect such possession he may
even use reasonable force to keep out a trespasser. A
rightful owner who has been wrongfully dispossessed of
land may retake possession if he can do so peacefully and
without the use of unreasonable force. If the trespasser is in
settled possession of the property belonging to the rightful
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owner, the rightful owner shall have to take recourse to law;
he cannot take the law in his own hands and evict the
trespasser or interfere with his possession. The law will
come to the aid of a person in peaceful and settled
possession by injuncting even a rightful owner from using
force or taking law in his own hands, and also by restoring
him in possession even from the rightful owner (of course
subject to the law of limitation), if the latter has
dispossessed the prior possessor by use of force. In the
absence of proof of better title, possession or prior peaceful
settled possession is itself evidence of title. Law presumes
the possession to go with the title unless rebutted. The
owner of any property may prevent even by using
reasonable force a trespasser from an attempted trespass,
when it is in the process of being committed, or is of a
flimsy character, or recurring, intermittent, stray or casual
in nature, or has just been committed, while the rightful
owner did not have enough time to have recourse to law. In
the last of he cases, the possession of the trespasser, just
entered into would not be called as one acquiesced to by the
true owner.
9. It is the settled possession or effective possession of a
person without title which would entitle him to protect his
possession even as against the true owner. The concept of
settled possession and the right of the possessor to protect
his possession against the owner has come to be settled by a
catena of decisions. Illustratively, we may refer to Munshi
Ram and Ors. Vs. Delhi Administration [(1968) 2 SCR
455], Puran Singh and Ors. Vs. The State of Punjab [(1975)
4 SCC 518] and Ram Rattan and Ors. Vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh [(1977) 1 SCC 188]. The authorities need not be
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multiplied. In Munshi Ram &Ors.'s case (supra), it was held
that no one, including the true owner, has a right to
dispossess the trespasser by force if the trespasser is in
settled possession of the land and in such a case unless he is
evicted in the due course of law, he is entitled to defend his
possession even against the rightful owner. But merely
stray or even intermittent acts of trespass do not give such a
right against the true owner. The possession which a
trespasser is entitled to defend against the rightful owner
must be settled possession, extending over a sufficiently
long period of time and acquiesced to by the true owner. A
casual act of possession would not have the effect of
interrupting the possession of the rightful owner. The
rightful owner may re-enter and re- instate himself provided
he does not use more force than is necessary. Such entry
will be viewed only as resistance to an intrusion upon his
possession which has never been lost. A stray act of
trespass, or a possession which has not matured into settled
possession, can be obstructed or removed by the true owner
even by using necessary force. In Puran Singh and Ors.'s
case (supra), the Court clarified that it is difficult to lay
down any hard and fast rule as to when the possession of a
trespasser can mature into settled possession. The 'settled
possession' must be (i) effective, (ii) undisturbed, and (iii)
to the knowledge of the owner or without any attempt at
concealment by the trespasser. The phrase 'settled
possession' does not carry any special charm or magic in it;
nor is it a ritualistic formula which can be confined in a
strait-jacket. An occupation of the property by a person as
an agent or a servant acting at the instance of the owner will
not amount to actual physical possession. The court laid
down the following tests which may be adopted as a
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working rule for determining the attributes of 'settled
possession':
i) that the trespasser must be in actual physical
possession of the property over a sufficiently long
period;
ii) that the possession must be to the knowledge
(either express or implied) of the owner or without
any attempt at concealment by the trespasser and
which contains an element of animus possidendi.
The nature of possession of the trespasser would,
however, be a matter to be decided on the facts and
circumstances of each case;
iii) the process of dispossession of the true owner by
the trespasser must be complete and final and must
be acquiesced to by the true owner;and
iv) that one of the usual tests to determine the quality
of settled possession, in the case of culturable land,
would be whether or not the trespasser, after having
taken possession, had grown any crop. If the crop
had been grown by the trespasser, then even the true
owner has no right to destroy the crop grown by the
trespasser and take forcible possession."
30. The plaintiff must be in settled possession over the suit schedule property
to substantiate his entitlement seeking the relief of perpetual injunction, even if
he failed to prove his title over the suit schedule property. But, both the courts
below held that the plaintiffs were not in possession of the suit schedule
properties by the date of filing of the suit. The trial court as well as the first
appellate court observed that it was not safe to rely on the revenue records filed
by the plaintiff in view of certain suspicious circumstances shrouding the truth
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and genuineness of these entries as pointed out in Ex.B10 order of the Mandal
Revenue Officer, Maganoor. The first appellate court also observed that PW.1
himself was Patwari of Murahari Doddi village for the last several decades and
the possibility of creating a false record by using his office could not be ruled
out. There was no evidence of any of the neighbouring ryots to the suit
schedule lands placed by PW.1 to prove his continuous possession and
enjoyment of the suit schedule lands, more particularly, by the date of filing of
the suits. The first appellate court observed that as per Ex.B16, summoned by
the defendants from the office of the Mandal Revenue Officer, Maganoor, the
Amendment Register of Murahari Doddi village at page No.47, there is an entry
in serial No.95 with regard to sanction of succession in favour of the legal heir
of late Narsamma Pujari. After making a local enquiry by the revenue authority
following the death of late Narsamma Pujari, the endorsement reads as Smt.
Late Narsamma Pujari died 15 days back by then and during the enquiry made
by the revenue enquiries, it was found that she had a son by name Narayana and
accordingly, the patta was transferred in the name of her son Narayana. As per
the endorsement, Narayana was the son of Late Narsamma Pujari, which fact
would disprove the statement of PW.1 that Narayana was the husband of Late
Narsamma Pujari. Furthermore, it was held that the name of Late Jaya Rao
appeared to have been written above the name of Narayana in the parallel
column of that endorsement and he was described as the son of Narayana. In
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the detailed order passed by the M.R.O., Maganoor under Ex.B10 proceedings
dated 29.03.1997, he pointed out this glaring addition and suspected some foul
play in introducing the name of Late Jaya Rao as against the endorsement at
Sl.No.95 of Ex.B16 register. Even if it was taken that Narayana or Narayana
Rao was the husband of late Narsamma Pujari, it was totally incomprehensible
as to what was the necessity to adopt Jaya Rao, as he would become her natural
son. The first appellate Court also observed that the endorsement appearing in
Ex.B16 coupled with the observations in Ex.B10 order would tend to create a
strong preponderance of probability against the case of the plaintiffs and more
particularly, against the evidence of PW.1 that Narayana was the husband of
Late Narsamma.
31. The first appellate Court further observed that:
"Then coming to the revenue records placed by both
sides before the court, PW.1 himself categorically
admitted in his evidence that in pursuance of an
exparte decree passed in the suit on 30.6.1997, the
mutation proceedings were passed under Ex.A.26
and consequently, Exs.A.27 and A.28 were issued in
his favour. As could be seen from the record that the
exparte decree earlier passed in the suit was set
aside and subsequently the defendants 1 to 4 filed
the written statement before the court. As per Ex.B.9
which is the Khasrapahani for the year 1954-55, late
Narsamma Pujari was shown as the pattadar of the
suit schedule lands. In Exs.B.1 and B.2 which are
the pahanies for the year 1971-72 and 1972-73
respectively, late Narsamma Pujari was shown as
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the pattadar in column No.11 and PW.1 was shown
as the cultivator in column no. 16. The same was
continued in Ex.B.3which is the pahani for the year
1973-74. In Ex.B.8 which is the pahani for the year
1982-83, the name of Late Jaya Rao appears as
pattadar and the column meant for recording the
name of the person in possession was kept blank.In
the light of the discussion under Exs.B.16 and B.10
in the foregoing paras, the name of Late Jaya Rao
seemed to have been inserted subsequently before
the name of the Narayana who was recorded as the
legal heir of Late Narsamma Pujari as per the
endorsement in Ex.B.16. Ex. B.4 is the pahani for
the year 1984-85 which shows the name of Late
Jaya Rao in column no. 11 and column no. 16 was
kept blank. In Ex.B.5 pahani for the year 1994-95
Ex.B.6 pahani for the year 1995-96 and Ex.B. 7
pahani for the year 1997-98 the name of Late Jaya
Rao is shown as pattadar. In Ex.B.7, PW.1 is shown
as person in possession. Exs.A.3 to A.6 revenue
receipts show the payment of land revenue by PW.1
on behalf of Late Jaya Rao.Exs.A.7 to A.13 and
Exs.A.17 to A.25 are the certified copies of the
original pahani which are marked in 'B' series and
already discussed above. Ex.A.21 which is the
certified copy of the pahani for the year 1996-97
shows the name of Laxmaiah S/o Mallaiah in
Column No.13 as the person in possession.PW.1
deposed in his evidence that said Laxmaiah
cultivated the land on hisbehalf. However, there is
no corresponding plea advanced by PW.1 that
Laxmaiah cultivated his land prior to the filing of
the suit. While dealing with the entries in the
pahanies the fact that PW.1 worked as the village
secretary for the said village should not be lost sight
of. In Ex.B.10 order, the Mandal Revenue Officer,
Maganoor pointed out that Late Jaya Rao was
surprisingly recorded as the pattadar for more extent
of land than the extent over which he was granted
succession in Ex.B.16."
Dr.GRR, J
sa_1197 & 1188_2006
32. The first appellate court further observed that the recording of PW.1 as
the owner of the property arose only after Ex.A26 mutation proceedings which
were admittedly the outcome of the ex-parte decree in the present suit which
was subsequently set aside. In so far as the entries of recording the name of late
Jaya Rao as pattedar a strong suspicion and doubt shrouding the entries
regarding the succession under Ex.B16 mutually lay an eclipse over the truth
and genuineness of these entries and above all, the mere entries in the revenue
records cannot confer title on anybody as per the settled law.
33. The first appellate court also observed that:
"... Another glaring fact is that PW.1 himself
deposed that he sold a part of the suit schedule lands
to Laxmanna S/o. Mallaiah in 1994 itself and the
said Laxmanna has been in possession of that land.
It is totally un-understandable as to how the plaintiff
is entitled to seek a decree for perpetual injunction in
respect of the land which is already sold by him to
some other person."
34. Thus, the first appellate court on appreciating the evidence on record and
also documents marked, held that the plaintiff was not entitled to seek the relief
of perpetual injunction against the defendants.
35. Thus, both the courts below on appreciating the evidence on record held
that the plaintiffs were not in possession of the suit land even as on the date of
Dr.GRR, J
sa_1197 & 1188_2006
filing the suit and the plaintiffs failed to establish that they were in
possession/settled possession of the suit land as on the date of filing the suit for
claiming the relief of injunction. This Court does not find that the courts below
have ignored the material evidence or acted on no evidence or had drawn any
wrong inferences from the proved facts or applied the law erroneously or
wrongly casted the burden of proof to interfere with their concurrent findings in
these Second Appeals.
36. During the pendency of the second appeals, the learned counsel for the
appellants filed I.A.No.1 of 2023 to receive statement of Rythu Bandu amount,
Pahanies, Dharani portal, new pass books as additional evidence for effective
adjudication of matter. However, the documents filed vide I.A.No.1 of 2023 as
additional evidence are not relevant to decide the facts of the present case even
for deciding the aspect of injunction, as it was only required to consider whether
the plaintiffs were in possession of the suit schedule properties as on the date of
filing of the suit, but not subsequent to it. Hence, it is considered not necessary
to refer to these documents.
37. The second appellate court is not a third court on appreciation of facts.
This Court does not find any debatable legal issues involved in this matter or
that the courts acted against the binding precedents or contrary to the legal
principles. As such, this Court does not find any necessity to interfere with the
Dr.GRR, J
sa_1197 & 1188_2006
judgments of the courts below in dismissing the suits filed by the plaintiffs
seeking the relief of declaration of title and the relief of injunction.
38. In the result, the Second Appeals are dismissed confirming the judgments
of the courts below.
As a sequel miscellaneous applications pending in this appeal, if any shall
stand closed.
_____________________
Dr. G. RADHA RANI, J
Date: 03-06-2024.
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