Telangana High Court
V. Suresh, vs The State Of Ap Rep By Its Pp Hyd., on 30 April, 2024
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE E.V.VENUGOPAL
CRIMINAL REVISION CASE No.2603 OF 2012
ORDER:
1 Aggrieved by the order dated 22.12.2012 passed in C.C.No.2 of
2012 on the file of the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate at
Warangal wherein and whereby the Court below observed that prima
facie case is made out against the petitioner for the offence punishable
under Section 188 IPC and took cognizance thereof, the petitioner filed
the present criminal revision case.
2 The facts in brief are that on 21.12.2012 at 5.00 pm, the S.I. of
Police, Subedari P.S lodged a written complaint stating that on the
same day while he was performing route bandobusth duty from
Haritha hotel to DPO centre, in view of the visit of the Chief Minister of
A.P, Hyderabad to Warangal, to inaugurate Kaktiya Utsavalu, and
when they were on that duty, at 3.20 p.m, when the convoy reached
Haritha hotel, in the meantime, Jorika Ramesh, Vasudeva Reddy,
Dharshan Singh, Anil, Sanku Narsinga Rao, Yellavula Rajendra Yadav
and some others who are the TRS party sympathisers have formed
themselves into unlawful assembly with conspiracy and wrongfully
restrained the convoy, hurled slogans and pelted stones on the bus in
which the Chief Minister was travelling resulting breaking of wind
screens of the bus. In that connection a case in Cr.No.469 of 2012
under Sections 143, 120(B), 341, 427 r/w 149 IPC and Section 3 of
Prevention of Damage to Public Property and under Section 7 (1) of
Criminal Law Amendment Act, was registered. Consequent upon the
registration of the said crime, the police apprehended A.1 to A.6
connected to that case and brought them to police station at 6.00 p.m.
on the same day.
3 Be that as it may, apprehending that the police may use third
degree upon A.1 to A.6 in the above crime, one Mr. Sk.Abdul Nabi,
advocate filed a petition under Section 97 Cr.P.C. before the learned
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Warangal requesting the Court to issue
warrant of search to search whether his clients, whose names as
stated supra, were in the premises of the police station Subedari and
also to appoint an advocate commissioner to search the police station
and if the said persons were found in the premises of the police
station, they may be directed to be produced before the Court of law
and also to take appropriate steps against the police who are
responsible for illegal custody of the said persons.
4 On filing of such an application, the learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Warangal, ordered that application for search of the police
station, Subedari and accordingly two advocates by name K.Ramesh
and M.Ravinder were appointed as advocate commissioners for
conducting search, who after conducting the search have filed report
before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Warangal on 9.25 p.m. on
the same day i.e. 21.12.2012 to the effect that they found A2 to A.6 in
Cr.No.469 of 2012 in the police station Subedari. When they searched
the police station in pursuance of the warrant of search, the C.I. of
Police and other police men obstructed them from discharging their
duty and instructed them to leave the police station, Subedari stating
that they themselves would produce A.2 to A.6 before the Court. As a
result, the Advocate Commissioners have not produced A.2 to A.6
before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate though they stated to have
found the detenue in the police station, Subedari.
5 Thereafter, at about 10.55 pm, the police produced A.2 to A.6
before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, by which time, the
Advocate Commissioners have already filed their report. Hence the
C.I. of police by name V.Suresh (petitioner herein) appeared before
the open court by producing A.2 to A.6. A copy of the report submitted
by the Advocate Commissioner was furnished to him and he also
acknowledged the same.
6 The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate recorded the sworn
statements of the Advocate Commissioner Sri M.Ramesh and also
sworn statement of A.2 in Cr.No.469 of 2012. On perusal of the report
submitted by the Advocate Commissioners and the sworn statements
of the accused, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate opined that the
very fact that A.2 to A.6 were produced before the said court instead
of producing them before the jurisdictional Magistrate, without there
being any such direction, goes to show that the Advocate
Commissioners conducted search in the police station, Subedari as per
the search warrant issued by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Warangal, and found the A.2 to A.6 in the police station and the C.I. of
police (petitioner herein) has wilfully disobeyed the orders of the
learned Chief Judicial Magistrate by obstructing the Advocate
Commissioners from producing A.2 to A.6 before the learned Chief
Judicial Magistrate in pursuance of the search warrant.
7 The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, vide her order dated
22.12.2012, further opined that the C.I. of police, with a view to buy
time to register a case against A.2 to A.6, did not allow the Advocate
Commissioners to produce A.2 to A.6 before the learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate as per the search warrant and accordingly requested the
Superintendent of Police, and DIG of Police, Warangal to proceed
against the petitioner herein for obstructing the execution of the
search warrant issued by the said court. Consequent upon such
findings being given, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate took
cognizance of the offence under Section 188 IPC against the petitioner
and registered a case in C.C.No.2 of 2012. As stated supra, aggrieved
thereby, the petitioner filed the present criminal revision case.
8 Section 2 (d) CPC defines as follows:
Every officer of a court of Justice whose duty it is, as such
officer, to investigate or report on any matter of law or fact, or to make,
authenticate or keep any document, or to take charge or dispose of any
property, or to execute any judicial process, or to administer any oath,
or to interpret, or to preserve order, in the Court, and every person
especially authorised by a court of Justice to perform any of such duties.
9 Section 21 IPC also says as follows:
Any officer commissioned under the Military, Naval, and Air
forces of the country; Any judge or designated person who is lawfully
empowered to discharge any adjudicatory functions, whether by himself
or as a member of the bodies of the persons; Any officer of a court of
justice whose duty is to investigate any matter of law or to report the
matter. The officer who is allowed to keep the record of the matter, or
to take the charge to dispose of any property or to execute any judicial
process or who can administrate any oath-taking, or preserve any order
of the court, any person who is appointed by the court with the
authority to perform these duties.
10 So from the above definition, it can safely be concluded that
Advocate Commissioners are public servant.
11 Section 188 IPC defines as follows:
188. Disobedience to order duly promulgated by public servant.--
Whoever, knowing that, by an order promulgated by a public
servant lawfully empowered to promulgate such order, he is directed to
abstain from a certain act, or to take certain order with certain property
in his possession or under his management, disobeys such direction,
shall, if such disobedience causes or tends to cause obstruction,
annoyance or injury, or risk of obstruction, annoyance or injury, to any
person lawfully employed, be punished with simple imprisonment for a
term which may extend to one month or with fine which may extend to
two hundred rupees, or with both and if such disobedience causes or
trends to cause danger to human life, health or safety, or causes or
tends to cause a riot or affray, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with
fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
Explanation.-- It is not necessary that the offender should intend to
produce harm, or contemplate his disobedience as likely to produce
harm. It is sufficient that he knows of the order which he disobeys, and
that his disobedience produces, or is likely to produce, harm.
12 To put it simply the essential ingredients of this offence are: i)
Promulgation of a legal order, ii) its communication to the accused, iii)
its disobedience by him, and iv) the injurious consequence as
described in the section.
13 In the instant case, upon the application filed under Section 97
Cr.P.C., the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Warangal, had issued an
order appointing two advocates as commissioners to search and report
whether the accused persons concerned with Cr.No.469 of 2012 were
lodged in the police station, Subedari or not and if so to produce them
before the Court.
14 In due obedience to the above warrant of appointment as
commissioners, the learned advocate commissioners have visited the
police station Subedari and showed the warrant of search to the
petitioner stating that they visited the police station in that regard.
15 Though the petitioner was aware of the warrant of search, he
obstructed the advocate commissioners from executing the warrant
and stated that he would produce the accused persons in the Court
and accordingly he disobeyed the order of the Court.
16 The advocate commissioners though found the accused persons
in the police station, Subedari, in view of the obstruction caused by the
petitioner they could not produce the accused before the Court of law.
17 Hence to that extent, it is established about the promulgation of
the order, appointment of advocate commissioners who are public
servants in the eye of law as per Section 21 IPC and Section 2 (d) CPC,
disobedience of the said order by the petitioner and the failure of the
advocate commissioners in executing the warrant due to the
obstruction caused by the petitioner.
18 The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that as per
Section 195 Cr.P.C, which specifically says that no court shall take
cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 188 IPC except on
a complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or by some
public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate. The
learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the judgment of the apex
Court in Shamim Khan vs. Debashish Chakrabarty {Special
Leave to Appeal (crl.) No(s). 3567-3568/2017}.
19 In the instant case, a written complaint was lodged by the
advocate commissioner, being a public servant, bringing the
obstruction caused by the petitioner, in execution of the warrant, to
the notice of the Court. Hence the above contention of the learned
counsel for the petitioner cannot be countenanced. Therefore, the bar
contained in Section under Section 195(1) (a) of the Cr.P.C., does not
apply to the case on hand.
20 The predominant contention of the learned counsel for the
petitioner is that Section 197 Cr.P.C. stipulates that no Court shall take
cognizance of any offence by a public servant in discharge of his
official duties except with the previous sanction of the State
Government and in the instant case no such sanction has been given
and as such the proceedings impugned are liable to be set aside. The
learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Sankaran Moitra vs. Sadhna Das 1.
21 It is not every offence committed by a public servant that
requires sanction for prosecution under Section 197 (1) Cr.P.C.
(2006) 4 SCC 584
Whether sanction is required under Section 197 (1) Cr.P.C. will depend
upon the facts of the each case. If the acts complained of are so
integrally connected with the duties attaching to the office as to the
inseparable from them, then sanction under Section 197 (1) Cr.P.C.
would be necessary. But if there was no necessary connection between
them and the performance of those duties, the official status furnishing
only the occasion or opportunity for the acts, then no sanction would
be required. The offence alleged to have been committed must have
something to do or must be related in some manner, with the
discharge of official duty.
22 A constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Matajog
Dobey vs. H.C.Bhari 2, after holding that Section 197 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure was not violative of the fundamental rights
conferred on a citizen under Article 14 of the Constitution of India,
observed on the test to be adopted for finding out whether Section 197
of the Code was attracted or not and to ascertain the scope and
meaning of that Section, stated:
{1955} 28ITR 941 (SC)
....No question of sanction can arise under Section 197 Cr.P.C
unless the act complained of is an offence. The only point to determine
is whether it was committed in the discharge of official duty. There must
be a reasonable connection between the act and the official duty. It
does not matter even if the act exceeds what is strictly necessary for
the discharge of the duty, as this question will arise only at a later stage
when the trial proceeds on the merit. What the Court must fund out is
whether the act and the official duty are so inter-related that one can
postulate reasonably that it was done by the accused in the
performance of the official duty, through possibly in excess of the needs
and requirements of the situation.
.........The complaint may not disclose that the act constituting
the offence was done or purported to be done in the discharge of
official duty; but facts subsequently coming to light on a police or
judicial inquiry or even in the course of the prosecution evidence at the
trial, may establish the necessity for sanction. Whether sanction is
necessary or not may have to be determined from state to stage. The
necessity may reveal itself in the course of the progress of the case."
Their lordships summed up the position as follows:
"There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the
discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty
that the accused could lay a reasonable, but not a pretended or fanciful
claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty."
23 Though the petitioner contends that whatever done by him was
done while he was on official duty and in discharge of his official duty
and hence he is cloaked with Section 197 Cr.P.C. In Sankaran Moitra
case (1 supra), Sri C.K.Thakker, J, while quoting the observations
made by the Federal Court in Dr.Hori R am Singh vs. Em peror 3,
observed as follows:
1939 FCR 159
35. So far as the provisions of the Section 197 are concerned,
they came up for judicial interpretation in several cases. One of the
leading cases which has been referred to in several decisions thereafter
was of Dr. Hori Ram Singh v. . Emperor MANU/FE/0001/1939 Their
Lordships of the Federal Court in Dr. Hori Ram Singh were called upon
to consider Section 270 of the Government of India Act, 1935 which was
similar to Section 197 of the present Code. Sulaiman, J., interpreting the
said section, observed that the question of good faith or bad faith would
not strictly arise in interpreting the provision inasmuch as the words
used in the section were not only "any act done in the execution of his
duty" but also "any act purporting to be done in the execution of duty".
It was, therefore, held that when the act is not done in the execution of
the duty, but is purported to be done in the execution of the duty, it
would be covered.
36. The learned Judge stated; "Obviously the section does not
mean that the very act which is the gravamen of the charge and
constitutes the offence should be official duty of the servant of the
Crown. Such an interpretation would involve a contradiction in terms,
because an offence can never be an official duty. The words as used in
the Section are not "in respect of any official duty" but "in respect of
any act done or purporting to be done in the execution of his duty". The
two expressions are obviously not identical. The offence should have
been committed when an act is done in the execution of duty or when
an act purports to be done in the execution of the duty. The reference is
obviously to an offence committed in the course of an action, which is
taken or purports to be taken in compliance with an official duty, and is
in fact connected with it. The test appears to be not that the offence is
capable of being committed only by a public servant and not by any one
else, but that it is committed by a public servant in an act done or
purporting to be done in the execution of his duty. The section cannot
be confined to only such acts as are done by a public servant directly in
pursuance of his public office, though in excess of the duty or under a
mistaken belief as to the existence of such duty. Nor is it necessary to
go to the length of saying that the act constituting the offence should
be so inseparably connected with the official duty as to form part and
parcel of the same transaction. If the act complained of is an offence, it
must necessarily be not an execution of duty, but a dereliction of it.
What is necessary is that the offence must be in respect of an act done
or purported to be done in execution of duty, that is, in the discharge of
an official duty. It must purport to be done in the official capacity with
which he pretends to be clothed at the time, that is to say under the
cloak of an ostensibly official act, though of course, the offence would
really amount to a breach of duty. An act cannot purport to be done in
execution of duty unless the offender professes to be acting in
pursuance of his official duty and means to convey to the mind of
another, the impression that he is so acting."
24 In the very same judgment, it was further observed as follows:
39. Again, in Amrik Singh v. State of Pepsu {1955 CriLJ 865} this Court
held that it is not every offence committed by a public servant that
requires sanction for prosecution under Section 197(1) of the Code, nor
every act done by him while he is actually engaged in the performance
of his official duties, so that, if questioned, it could be claimed to have
been done by virtue of the office. It is only when the act complained of
is directly connected with his official duties that sanction is necessary.
40. Speaking for the Court, Venkatarama Ayyar, J. referring to the
relevant decisions on the point, formulated the principle:
The result of the authorities may thus be summed up: It is not every
offence committed by a public servant that requires sanction for
prosecution under Section 197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure;
nor even every act done by him while he is actually engaged in the
performance of his official duties; but if the act complained of is directly
concerned with his official duties so that, if questioned, it could be
claimed to have been done by virtue of the office, then sanction would
be necessary; and that would be so, irrespective of whether it was, in
fact, a proper discharge of his duties, because that would really be a
matter of defence on the merits, which would have to be investigated at
the trial, and could not arise at the stage of the grant of sanction, which
must precede the institution of the prosecution.
43.4 In P.K. Pradhan v. State of Sikkim 2001 CriLJ 3505, after referring
to relevant case law on the point, it was observed that different tests
have been laid down to ascertain the scope and meaning of the relevant
words occurring in Section 197 "any offence alleged to have been
committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of
his official duty". It was then stated that the offence alleged to have
been committed must have something to do, or must relate in some
manner, with the discharge of official duty of a public servant. No
question of sanction would arise under Section 197, unless the act
complained of is an offence; the only point for determination is whether
it was committed in the discharge of official duty. There must be a
reasonable connection between the act and the official duty. It does not
matter even if the act exceeds what is strictly necessary for the
discharge of the duty, as that question would arise only at a later stage
when the trial proceeds on the merits. What a court must consider is
whether the act and the official duty are so interrelated that one can
postulate reasonably that it was done by the accused in the
performance of official duty. If the answer to the said question is in
affirmative, Section 197 will be attracted, but not otherwise. This Court
reiterated that the question as to applicability of Section 197 of the
Code can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. In order to come to
the conclusion, whether the claim of the accused that the act he had
committed was in the course of performance of his duty was a
reasonable one and neither pretended nor fanciful can be examined
during the course of trial by giving opportunity to the defence to
establish it and the question of sanction would be left to be decided in
the main judgment which may be delivered upon at the conclusion of
the trial.
25 From the above ratio decidendi what is to be observed is
whether the petitioner herein had in discharge of his official duty has
obstructed the advocate commissioners or whether the act of the
petitioner in obstructing the advocate commissioner is out of the
purview of his official duty.
26 Reverting to the facts of the case, when the advocate
commissioner went to the police station, Subedari, in order to execute
the warrant of search, the petitioner being the Inspector of the said
police station obstructed the commissioner and not allowed the
commissioner to search the police station for the accused concerned
with Crime No.469 of 2012, which act in my considered view is not
connected with his official duty. In obedience to the warrant of search
given to them, the commissioners went to the P.S, Subedari in search
of the accused concerned with the crime stated supra and if they are
found in the said police station, they were under the power and
authority to produce them before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate.
But that lawful duty was obstructed by the petitioner herein, in utter
derogation to the order of the Court. So, in my considered view, the
petitioner cannot seek protection under Section 197 Cr.P.C. because
the act of such obstruction which he caused to the advocate
commissioners cannot be termed as 'while discharging official duty'.
27 The purport of Section 197 Cr.P.C is to accord sanction for
prosecuting a public servant so as to prevent abuse of process of law
and to avoid vexatious litigation as against them and hence public
servant is being privileged under this Section to discharge his / her
duties without any apprehension of being targeted for the actions
taken in furtherance of such duties in accordance with law.
28 The scheme of law is that on a complaint being lodged, the
police register FIR under Section 154 Cr.P.C. and thereafter the
investigating agency will conduct investigation and file a final report
under Section 173 Cr.P.C.
29 Otherwise, a complaint has to be filed under Sections 190 and
200 Cr.P.C and upon reference under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C., the
police has to register a case and conduct investigation into the
allegations made in the complaint and thereafter also they have to file
a final report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. After filing of the final report,
discretionary power is given to the competent criminal Court either to
take it into cognizance or to reject the same. The criminal Court is
vested with the power under Section 202 Cr.P.C. to conduct inquiry
and thereafter the scheme of law would follow.
30 So there are two stages i.e. 1) pre-cognizance stage and 2)
cognizance stage. So far as pre-cognizance stage is concerned,
investigation would come to end the moment the police file final report
under Section 173 Cr.P.C. Thereafter power is vested with the
competent criminal court either to take cognizance or not.
31 Now, so far as claiming protection under Section 197 is
concerned, it is for the investigating agency to obtain sanction before
conducting investigation into the complaint, provided the accused
therein is a public servant, within the meaning of Section 21 IPC in the
absence of which the investigating agency cannot conduct
investigation.
32 In the case on hand, the contention of the petitioner, who is
Inspector of Police, is that previous sanction as contemplated under
Section 197 Cr.P.C., was not obtained before taking cognizance of the
offence under Section 188 IPC alleged against him and hence it is
illegal and against the established principles of law.
33 At this stage, the point that would arise for consideration is
whether the cognizance taken by the Court on the complaint filed by
the advocate commissioners does fall within the ambit of Section 202
Cr.P.C and the power of the Magistrate is sacrosanct and if so whether
sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. would be necessitated.
34 In view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court Amod
Kumar Kanth vs. Association of Victim of Uphaar Tragedy 4,
wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that The State functions
2023 SCC OnLine SC 578
though its officers. Functions of the State may be sovereign or not
sovereign. But each of the functions performed by every public
servant is intended to achieve public good. It may come with
discretion. The exercise of the power cannot be divorced from the
context in which and the time at which the power is exercised or if it is
a case of an omission, when the omission takes place.
35 In Union of India vs. Pratibha Bonnerjea 5, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that from the scheme of the constitution to which
we have adverted briefly it is obvious that the constitution - makers
were evidently keen to ensure that the judiciary was independent of
the executive. An independent impartial and fearless judiciary is our
constitutional creed. The constitution has tried to insulate the judiciary
from outside influence from both the executive and the legislature.
The provisions of Chapter VI in Part VI of the constitution dealing with
the courts below and the State High Court also show that the
constitution-makers were equally keen to insulate even the subordinate
judiciary.
(1995) 6 SCC 765
36 In Union of India vs. Madras Bar Association 6 the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that impartiality, independence, fairness and
reasonableness in decision-making are the hallmarks of the judiciary. If
"impartiality" is the soul of the judiciary, "independence" is the
lifeblood of the judiciary. Without independence, impartiality cannot
thrive. Independence is not the freedom for Judges to do what they
like. It is the independence of judicial thought. It is the freedom from
interference and pressures which provides the judicial atmosphere
where he can work with absolute commitment to the cause of justice
and constitutional values. It is also the discipline in life, habits and
outlook that enables a Judge to be impartial. Its existence depends
however not only on philosophical, ethical or moral aspects but also
upon several mundane things--security in tenure, freedom from
ordinary monetary worries, freedom from influences and pressures
within (from others in the judiciary) and without (from the executive)
37 In Union of India vs. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth 7, it is to
be seen that Judiciary is not subservient to the executive. Therefore,
(2010) 11 SCC 1
(1977) 4 SCC 193
obtaining sanction to conduct investigation into the allegations made in
the complaint lodged by the advocate commissioners, by the Court,
does not arise at all when the matter is taken cognizance by the court
itself for violation and disobedience to the orders of the court.
38 The entire matter revolves around disobedience of the orders of
the Court; not that the court has taken cognizance to investigate
against the officer rightly or wrongly in Cr.No.469 of 2012 and it is only
in the matter of disobeying the order, whereby the learned trial court,
having prima facie satisfied on the report filed by the Advocate
Commissioner, had to take cognizance by assigning C.C.No.2 of 2012
to adjudicate the matter in accordance with law. Therefore, the stage
of trial has started from the stage of taking cognizance itself.
Questioning of obtaining sanction for investigation under Section 197
Cr.P.C. to register a crime under Section 154 Cr.P.C. or under Section
200 Cr.P.C. does not arise and the mandate as claimed by the
petitioner under Section 197 Cr.P.C is not applicable. Therefore and
under these circumstances this Court does not see any necessity for
invocation of Section 197 Cr.P.C.
39 Moreover, as observed in the judgments referred supra, aspect
of grant of sanction cannot be determined at the threshold of the case.
The concept of Section 197 Cr.P.C. does not get immediately attracted
on institution of the complaint case. Whether sanction is necessary or
not may have to be determined from stage to stage. The necessity
may reveal itself in the course of the progress of the case since
causing obstruction to the advocate commissioners who were
empowered to search the police station cannot be treated as official
duty.
40 In Sankaran Moitra vs. Sadhna Das 8 the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held that shield under Section 197 Cr.P.C. does not extend to
illegal, unlawful and high-handed behavour of public servants. In
Devinder Singh vs. State of Punjab through CBI 9 the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that a public servant is not entitled to indulge in
criminal activities and in such cases sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C
is not required. The principle laid down in Shamim Khan vs.
Debashish Chakrabarty, relied on by the learned counsel for the
(2006) 4 SCC 584
(2016) 12 SCC 87
petitioner has no legs to stand in the facts and circumstances of the
present case.
41 For the foregoing discussion and in the light of the principle
enunciated in the cases cited supra, I find no irregularity or illegality in
the impugned order and accordingly this criminal revision case is
dismissed, leaving it open to the court below to proceed in accordance
with law and procedure during the course of which the necessity of
sanction may be decided.
42 Miscellaneous petitions if any pending in this criminal revision
case shall also stand dismissed.
------------------------------
E.V.VENUGOPAL, J.
Date: 30.04.2024
L.R.Copy
Yes / No
Kvsn
