Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 5009 Tel
Judgement Date : 11 October, 2022
HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE G. ANUPAMA CHAKRAVARTHY
SECOND APPEAL No.20 of 2011
JUDGMENT :
This Second Appeal is arising out of the judgment and
decree in A.S.Nos.15 of 2003, dated 05.07.2010 on the file of II
Additional District Judge (FTC), Mahbubnagar against the
judgment in O.S.No.573 of 1996 dated 10.01.2003 on the file of
Junior Civil Judge, Mahbubnagar.
2. For the sake of convenience, the parties herein are
refered as arrayed in the suit.
3. Initially, the plaintiff filed a suit for perpetual
injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the
peaceful possession of the plaintiff over the suit schedule land
admeasuring 1500 sq.yards out of the land of Ac.0.39 gts in Plot
No.(Sy.No.44) situated at Mahbubnagar, Boyapally gate. During
the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff died and the legal
representatives of the plaintiff were brought on record.
4. The case of the plaintiffs is that the 1st plaintiff
purchased the suit schedule property from one Mohammed Sherief
in the year 1945 for a valuable consideration and took possession
of the said land. The defendants 1 to 3 and 4 to 6 are the brothers
and sisters of the 1st plaintiff respectively. D-7 to D-9 are the
wives of D-1 to D-3 respectively. D-10 and D-11 are the daughter
and son of the 5th defendant. D-12 is the son of the 4th defendant.
All the defendants who are relatives of the 1st plaintiff with a
malafide intention colluded together to grab the property for which
the 1st plaintiff is constrained to issue paper publication declaring
his rightful ownership over the property and further directing not to
purchase the property from any others. As the defendants are
trying to alienate the suit schedule property, the plaintiff filed
O.S.No.57 of 1986, seeking relief for declaration and injunction.
Inspite of it, 8th defendant sold some property to one Satyanandam,
who started constructing a house. The 1st plaintiff also filed
another suit against the said Satyanandam for declaration of title
and recovery of property which was transferred to Sub-Court and
renumbered as O.S.No.104 of 1990 and it was decreed in favour of
the plaintiff against D-5 and D-8 and the said defendants also
preferred appeals which are pending. It is the further case of the
plaintiffs that some third parties by name Md.Abdul Jabbar, his
brothers and others encroached some portion of the property and
made temporary constructions in the plaint schedule property in the
year, 1990 for which the 1st plaintiff is constrained to file
O.S.No.90 of 1996 before the Sub-Court of Mahbubnagar for relief
of declaration of title and for recovery of possession and the same
is pending. Out of Ac.0.39 gts purchased by the 1st plaintiff, an
area of 1500 sq.yards is the suit schedule open land consisting of
small temporary house fenced with stone pillars. As the defendants
are trying to interfere with the peaceful possession of the property,
the present suit was filed seeking decree for perpetual injunction.
5. On the other hand, a common written statement was
filed by defendants 1, 4, 5, 7 and 11. Defendants 2, 3, 8 and 9
adopted the written statement of other defendants. Defendant
Nos.6, 10 and 12 were set ex-parte. All the averments in the plaint
are denied including the rights of the 1st plaintiff over the suit
schedule land.
6. It is the specific case of the defendants that one
Md.Ismail, the father of the 1st plaintiff purchased the suit schedule
land in the year 1945 for the benefit of the family members and the
1st plaintiff was aged about 15-16 years at the time of the said
purchase. Md.Ismail was a rich man with a large family and
purchased several properties in the name of his children and
similarly, purchased the suit schedule property in the name of the
1st plaintiff. During the lifetime of Md.Ismail, there was a family
settlement of those properties at different times with mutual
adjustments and transfers to one another in the division of
properties acquired by him. Accordingly, the plaintiff became the
owner of Green Lodge and in the same way, Plot No.44 and the
adjacent land put together was partitioned in early 70's before
registration of the said settlement. In all the registered partition
deeds, the 1st plaintiff signed and therefore, cannot deny those
registered sale deeds. The plaintiff right from 1945 till 1986 i.e.,
filing of the suit, never by his word, conduct or anything, pay any
such claim over any part of Survey No.44 of which the extents of
the land is part and that the suit filed by the plaintiff is barred by
limitation. As per the family settlement registration in the year,
1976 all the defendants have become the absolute owners of plot
No.44 with exclusive enjoyment and possession of the shares and
further the plaintiff is not possession of the suit schedule property
from the year, 1976 and therefore, prayed to dismiss the suit with
costs.
7. Basing on the pleadings, the trial Court had framed the
following issues:-
"1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for perpetual injunction as prayed for?
2. To what relief?"
8. On behalf of the plaintiffs, PWs-1 and 2 are examined
and Exs.A-1 and A-2 were got marked. On behalf of the
defendants, DW-1 was examined and Ex.B-1 and B-6 were got
marked.
9. The trial Court after considering the oral and
documentary evidence on record have come to a conclusion that
the plaintiffs have failed to prove that they are in continuous
possession of the suit schedule property and therefore, dismissed
the suit.
10. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree in
O.S.No.573 of 1996, dated 10.01.2003, the plaintiffs have
preferred the 1st appeal i.e., A.S.No.15 of 2003 on the file of II
Additional District Judge (FTC) Mahbubnagar. The 1st appellate
Court, after hearing the arguments of both the parties have framed
the following points for consideration:-
"1. Whether the appellants/plaintiffs are entitled to seek relief for perpetual injunction against respondents/defendants as prayed for in the suit i.e., O.S.No.573 of 1996 on the file of Junior Civil Judge, Mahbubnagar?
2. Whether there are any grounds to interfere with the judgment and decree of the Junior Civil
Judge at Mahbubnagar dated 10.01.2003 in O.S.No.573 of 1996?
3. To what relief?"
11. Considering the entire oral and documentary evidence,
the 1st appellate Court has dismissed the appeal with a specific
finding that the plaintiffs/appellants failed to establish by placing
any iota of evidence showing their possession atleast prima facie
over the suit schedule property as on the date of filing of the suit.
It is the further finding of the 1st appellate Court that though the
true owner is always deemed to be in possession of the property,
the facts and circumstances of the case indicate that the said
principles are not applicable to the present facts of the case and
further the plaintiffs have no title over the suit schedule property
and they are not possession of the property.
12. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the 1st
appellate Court, the plaintiffs/appellants have preferred the Second
Appeal with the following grounds:-
"1. Whether the lower appellate court was right in law in saying that the plaintiff cannot have any absolute rights over the suit schedule property eventhough, there is no concept of joint property in Muslims and the concept of coparcenary does not arise and the concept of family existence has no resistance in Muslims?
2. Whether the property purchased with the money taken from father's estate would make the property the common property of the family and create an interest for all the other members of the family?
3. Whether the findings of the lower appellate court on facts are contrary to the evidence on record and perverse?
4. Whether the non-examination of the party to the suit as witness was fatal?
5. Whether the suit filed by the appellants was barred by limitation, while the suit was filed within 3 years from the date of knowledge?
6. Whether the lower appellate courts conclusions are vitiated by non-consideration of the evidence on record, interpretation of Muslim law?"
13. Heard counsel for the appellants and counsel for the
respondents. Perused the record.
14. It is pertinent to mention that the grounds of the
appeal do not contain any substantial question of law. No
substantial question of law is raised by the appellant.
15. As per Section 100 of CPC, an appeal shall lie to the
High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any court
subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the
case involves a substantial question of law.
"Section 100 (3) of CPC envisages that the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal."
"Section 100 (4) of CPC envisages that where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate the question."
"Section 100 (5) of CPC envisages that the appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and
the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question."
16. In the present case, the memorandum of grounds do
not contain any substantial question of law and even the grounds
do not reveal any substantial question. Though the ground No.5
deal with limitation, the plaintiffs/appellants cannot plead at this
stage with respect to limitation as the trial Court as well as the
appellate Court have dealt the matter on merits i.e., considering the
oral and the documentary evidence and the suit was not dismissed
on the ground of limitation, though pleaded by the defendants.
17. Both the Courts have given concurrent findings basing
on the oral and documentary evidence on record. In a suit for
perpetual injunction, the plaintiffs have to establish that they were
in possession of the property as on the date of filing of the suit.
There is not even a scrap of paper or document filed before the
courts below to prove that the plaintiffs were in possession of the
property as on the date of filing of the suit. Therefore, this Court is
of the considerable view that there is no irregularity or error in the
findings of the Courts below so as to interfere with the same.
Further more, there is no substantial question of law involved so as
to formulate a question of law. Therefore, the Second appeal is
dismissed at the stage of admission as devoid of merits. No order
as to costs.
18. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous applications, if
any, shall stand closed.
_______________________________ G. ANUPAMA CHAKRAVARTHY, J Date:11.10.2022
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