Telangana High Court

Pitla Satyanarayana, Secbad vs P.P., Hyd Ano on 21 November, 2022

Bench: G.Radha Rani

          THE HON'BLE Dr. JUSTICE G. RADHA RANI

          CRIMINAL REVISION CASE No.2092 OF 2016

ORDER:

This Criminal Revision Case is filed by the petitioner-accused

aggrieved by the judgment dated 12.05.2016 passed in Crl.A. No.494

of 2012 by the Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge for Trial of

Communal Offence Cases cum VII Additional Metropolitan Sessions

Judge, Hyderabad, in reversing the judgment of acquittal and

convicting him for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable

Instruments Act (for short 'NI Act') and sentencing him to rigorous

imprisonment for a period of one year and fine of Rs.3,25,000/- and in

default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for three

months and out of the said fine amount, directing him to pay

Rs.3,23,000/- as compensation to the respondent - complainant under

Section 357 Cr.P.C.

2. The parties are hereinafter referred as per their array before the

trial court.

3. The case of the complainant was that the accused approached

him for a hand loan of Rs.3,25,000/- for his daughter's marriage and Dr.GRR,J

the complainant paid the same to the accused by way of cash. The

accused executed promissory note and receipt for the said amount and

promised to clear the loan amount within one year. After repeated

demands by the complainant, the accused issued a cheque bearing

No.583903 dated 13.08.2007 for Rs.3,25,000/- in favour of the

complainant. The said cheque was deposited by the complainant and

the same was returned with memo dated 31.08.2007, he issued a

notice dated 03.09.2007 to the accused demanding payment of cheque

amount within fifteen (15) days. The accused received the notice on

07.09.2007 and also gave a reply, but failed to pay the cheque amount,

as such, filed complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act.

4. The said case was tried by the XII Special Magistrate,

Secunderabad vide CC No.91 of 2011 (old CC No.941 of 2010). The

complainant examined himself as PW.1 and got marked Exs.P1 to P5.

The accused was examined as DW.1 and Exs.D1 to D3 were marked

on his behalf. On considering the oral and documentary evidence on

record, the trial court observed that Ex.P2 cheque pertained to ICICI

Bank, Kharkhana Branch, it was presented by PW.1 in his SBI,

Mudfort Branch account for clearance and the same was returned with Dr.GRR,J

memo and if that was the case, the cheque had to be sent to ICICI

Bank and the said bank had to issue memo returning the cheque with

reason, but there was no signature of issuing authority and no reason

was mentioned. The cheque return memo had to be issued by ICICI

Bank whereas it was returned by SBI Bank to ICICI Bank. PW.1

admitted in his evidence that Ex.P3 did not bear the signature of the

issuing authority and he did not file any proof of presenting the

cheque in branch. In view of the said evidence, PW.1 ought to have

taken steps to examine the bank officials to prove presentation of

cheque and authenticate its return for specific reason, as such, opined

that there was no legally recoverable debt from the accused to PW1

and Ex.P2 cheque was not issued by the accused in discharge of the

said debt and dismissed the complaint acquitting the accused.

5. Aggrieved by the said acquittal of the accused, the complainant

preferred an appeal. The appeal was heard by the Additional

Metropolitan Sessions Judge for Trial of Communal Offence Cases

cum VII Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad vide

Criminal Appeal No.494 of 2012. During pendency of the appeal, the

complainant filed a petition under Section 391 Cr.P.C. for adducing Dr.GRR,J

additional evidence to examine the Assistant Manager of SBI on his

behalf. The said petition was allowed. Aggrieved by allowing the

said petition, the accused preferred criminal revision case before this

Court and the same was confirmed by this Court vide Crl.R.C.

No.2292 of 2013. The Assistant Manager of SBI was examined as

PW.2. The lower appellate court on considering the said evidence as

well as re-appreciating the evidence which was already on record,

found the accused guilty for the offence under Section 138 of NI Act

and sentenced him as above.

6. Aggrieved by the said conviction and sentence, the accused

preferred this revision contending that the appellate court erred in

coming to the conclusion that the signatures on Exs.P1 and P2 were

that of the accused. The observation of the Sessions Judge was

without any supporting evidence, DW.1 denied in his evidence that

the cheque and promissory note were given to the complainant. The

appellate court should have confirmed the judgment of acquittal by

dismissing the appeal in the absence of expert opinion with regard to

the signatures on Exs.P1 and P2. The appellate court failed to consider

the plea of the accused that he never borrowed any amount from the Dr.GRR,J

complainant and that he never issued any cheque or promissory note

to the complainant. The appellate court ought to have taken into

consideration the contention of the accused that he lost the cheque and

directed the bank authorities to stop payment. The appellate court

received additional evidence during the course of proceedings. It

ought to have considered that the provisions of the Bankers Books

Evidence Act, 1894 (for short 'the Act') were applicable for

adjudication of the appeal. For unexplained reasons, the appellate

court had not considered the provisions of the Act though relied upon

the additional evidence in convicting the accused. The appellate court

ought to have considered the contention of the accused that the

complainant got issued two notices on 03.09.2007 from the Advocate

office i.e. Exs.P4 and D3. Ex.P4 did not bear the signature of the

Advocate. Ex.D3 did not disclose issuing of cheque. There was no

reference of issue of cheque in discharge of debt though the

complainant claimed to be in possession of the cheque by that date

and presented the cheque and return of cheque with memo. On receipt

of notice, the accused gave reply through Advocate informing the

complainant that the cheque in question was lost by him from his

house along with another cheque No.583904 in the first week of Dr.GRR,J

August 2007 and he immediately informed to his bank and filed a

photostat copy of the letter addressed to the bank officials on

08.08.2007 containing the seal and signature of the officials of the

bank and prayed to set aside the impugned judgment.

7. Heard Sri B.Arjun Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner -

accused and Sri K. Sai Babu, learned counsel for the 2nd respondent -

complainant.

8. The learned counsel for the petitioner-accused argued on the

same lines as raised in the grounds of revision.

9. Learned counsel for the respondent-complainant submitted that

the petitioner-accused had to infact prefer an appeal within (30) days

from the date of the judgment of the lower appellate court, but

preferred revision after (90) days. When there was a provision for

appeal, filing of revision itself was not proper. He further supported

the judgment of the lower appellate court and contended that the same

was in accordance with law and there was no need to interfere with the

same and relied upon various judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court

and High Courts.

Dr.GRR,J

10. Now the point for consideration is:

Whether the judgment of the lower appellate court in reversing the judgment of the trial court and convicting the accused for the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act and sentencing him as such, is in accordance with law or needs any interference by this Court?

11. This Court had no authority to appreciate the evidence in

revision in the manner as the trial court and the appellate court were

required to do and could exercise its power of appreciation of

evidence only in exceptional cases which would require interference

for correction of manifest illegality or for prevention of gross

miscarriage of justice. The scope of interference in a revision is

extremely narrow. This Court in revision would only consider the

material to satisfy itself about the legality and propriety of findings,

sentence or order and would not dwell at length upon the facts and

evidence of the case. However, as the revision petitioner-accused was

contending that though he denied borrowing any amount from the

complainant and that he never issued the promissory note or cheque,

the appellate court erred in coming to the conclusion that the

signatures on Exs.P1 and P2 were that of him and that the additional Dr.GRR,J

evidence was received during the hearing of the appeal, it is

considered necessary to go through the evidence.

12. The case of the complainant was that the accused had

approached him and requested for an amount of Rs.3,25,000/- for his

daughter's marriage and executed a promissory note and on his

demand, issued a cheque bearing No.583903 dated 13.08.2007 for

Rs.3,25,000/-. The said cheque, when deposited for realization, was

returned on the ground that 'payment stopped by the drawer' vide

banker's memo dated 31.08.2007. He got issued a legal notice. The

said notice was received by the accused, but he gave a reply with false

allegations.

13. The defence taken by the accused was that he lost the said

cheque along with another cheque and informed the bank officials

about the said fact and requested them to stop payment and he

informed the same to the complainant in his reply legal notice, he had

not executed any promissory note in favour of the complainant. The

promissory note was marked as Ex.P1 and the cheque bearing

No.583903 dated 13.08.2007 for Rs.3,25,000/- was marked as Ex.P2.

Dr.GRR,J

14. The petitioner-accused was examined as DW1 and he admitted

in his cross examination that Ex.P2 cheque belonged to his account

and it bore his signature. Ex.P1 promissory note and receipt also

contained his signatures. He also admitted that he had not lodged any

complaint to the police about the cheque being lost. He also admitted

in his cross examination that the postal acknowledgment bore his

daughter's signature and he did not state anything about the

promissory note in his reply notice under Ex.D1.

15. From the cross-examination, it would disclose that he admitted

his signatures on the promissory note as well as on the cheque. When

the signature on the cheque was admitted by the accused, presumption

shall be drawn that the cheque was issued in discharge of a legally

enforceable debt or liability as per Section 139 of NI Act.

16. Section 139 of NI Act provides for presumption in favour of the

holder. It says that:

"139. Presumption in favour of holder.-- It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability."

Dr.GRR,J

17. When once the signature on the promissory note was admitted,

the presumption under Section 118 (a) of NI Act also would arise that

it is supported by consideration. As per Section 118 of the NI Act,

which deals with presumptions as to negotiable instruments: until the

contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be made:--

(a) of consideration --that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument, when it has been accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration;

(b) as to date --that every negotiable instrument bearing a date was made or drawn on such date;

18. Both these presumptions are rebuttable presumptions. The

accused can prove the non-existence of consideration or that there was

no legally enforceable debt or liability by raising a probable defence.

19. Learned counsel for the petitioner-accused relied upon the

judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in M.S. Narayana Menon @

Mani v. State of Kerala and another1 on the aspect that the onus of

proof on accused was not a heavy as that of the prosecution. For

rebutting presumption what was needed was to raise a probable

defence. Even for the said purpose, the evidence adduced on behalf of

(2006) 6 SCC 39 Dr.GRR,J

the complainant could be relied upon. The standard of proof evidently

was preponderance of probabilities. The accused would not be

required to prove the prosecution case in its entirety. Interference of

preponderance of probabilities could be drawn not only from the

material on record but also by reference to the circumstances upon

which the accused relied. It could be compared with that of a

defendant in civil proceedings.

20. The learned counsel for the respondent-complainant, on the

other hand, relied upon the judgment of the High Court of A.P. in M.

Vidyavathi v. Chandraiah @ Chandra Babu and another2, on the

aspect that the word "unless contrary is proved" in Section 139 of the

NI Act would mean that there must be a pleading and evidence to

substantiate the same and mere explanation was not sufficient for

discharging the burden placed on record.

21. A three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Rangappa

v. Sri Mohan3, while examining the presumption under Section 139

of the NI Act held that:

2010 (1) ALT (Cri.)347 (S.B.)

AIR 2010 SC 1898 Dr.GRR,J

"In the event, the accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail.

Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies a strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. However, it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the accused/defendant cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard or proof."

22. The defence taken by the accused in the reply notice given by

him marked under Ex.D1 was that the cheque in question was

misplaced along with another cheque from the house of the accused

and the same came to the notice of the accused in the first week of

August, 2007 and the same was immediately intimated by him to his

bank and the complainant got hold of the cheque by unlawful means.

He further contended that the complainant was totally a stranger to the

accused and did not have any acquaintance and he created a false

story. But, however, he failed to explain as to how the promissory

note marked under Ex.P1 and the blank signed cheque marked under

Ex.P2 came into possession of the complainant. He failed to lodge Dr.GRR,J

any police report about the loss of cheques as contended by him in his

reply notice or failed to initiate any criminal action against the

complainant even after receipt of notice from him demanding payment

under the said cheque. He failed to give any explanation with regard

to the promissory note. He filed Ex.D2 - photostat copy of the letter

addressed by him to the Manager of ICICI Bank dated 08.08.2007

stating that he was a Government Teacher and due to his employment

he had to reside away from home and was in the habit of keeping few

signed blank cheques in his residence for facilitating his family

members to meet unforeseen expenditure in his absence. He noticed

that two blank signed cheques bearing Nos.D583903 and 583904 were

missing and he could not trace them anywhere in his house and

requested to stop payment of those cheques and not to clear them.

23. The learned counsel for the complainant contended that the

photostat copy marked under Ex.P2 could not be relied upon, and

relied on the judgment of the High Court of A.P. in Sama Venkata

Subba Rao, Managing Partner of Babu and Company,

Machilipatnam and another v. Pillarisetti Venkata Venugoala Dr.GRR,J

Jagannadha Rao4 on the aspect that Xerox copies of documents were

not admissible in evidence. He also relied upon the judgment of the

Hon'ble Apex Court in Ram Suresh Singh v. Prabhat Singh @

Chhotu Singh and another5 on the aspect that photostat copy in the

absence of original was not admissible in evidence.

24. The learned counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand,

contended that this was only a summary proceeding and photostat

copies also could be marked. But, even in summary proceedings, the

inadmissible evidence cannot be permitted to be adduced. As such, no

reliance can be placed upon Ex.D2.

25. The learned counsel for the petitioner-accused filed Ex.D3-legal

notice issued by the counsel for the complainant to show that he

received Ex.P4 as well as Ex.D3, which were issued on the same date

i.e. 03.09.2007 and in Ex.P4 there was no signature of the counsel and

without the signature of the counsel, the same could not be considered

as a legal notice and that Ex.D3 was not signed by the counsel, the

same would not have any reference to the issuance of the cheque or

1995 (2) ALT 651 (S.B.)

(2009) 6 SCC 681 Dr.GRR,J

bouncing of it, as such, they could not be considered as proper

issuance of legal notice.

26. The counsel for the complainant appeared to have issued two

notices, one under Ex.P4 for cheque bouncing case under Section 138

of NI Act and another under Ex.D3 calling upon the accused to pay

the loan amount or else to initiate civil proceedings against him for

recovery of the amount basing on the promissory note.

27. The learned counsel for the respondent-complainant relied upon

the judgment of the High Court of Karnataka in Sukumara Pillai S/o.

Krishna Pillai v. Baburaj S/o. Vasudevan6 on the aspect whether a

lawyer notice issued without signature of the lawyer can be treated as

a defective notice. The Court held that:

"[7] There is no form of notice is prescribed under Clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The proviso only says that "the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque". There is nothing in clause

(b) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act to show that, it should be a lawyer notice and the notice should be a signed notice. The literal meaning of intimation: announcement: information: warning: a writing, placard, board etc conveying an intimation or warning." As per the Oxford Advance Learners Dictionary, New 9th edition, the 'notice' is interpreted as "paying attention, giving information, announcing, warning etc.." P.Ramanatha Aiyar's Concise Law Dictionary

2020 Lawsuit (Ker) 1113 Dr.GRR,J

defines 'notice in writing' like this: "The word 'notice' denotes merely an intimation to the party concerned of a particular fact. It cannot be limited to a letter. Notice may take several forms. It must, to be sufficient, be in writing and must intimate quite clearly that the award has been made and signed."

[8] From the above literal meaning of 'notice', it is clear that, nowhere it is stated that, a notice should be in a signed form. As stated above, Clause (b) of proviso to section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act also not stipulates a signed notice in writing. What is stated in the proviso is "giving a notice in writing" and not "by giving a notice in writing with signature." For this simple reason, the finding of the learned Magistrate that Ext.P5 notice issued by the complainant is defective cannot be accepted."

In the above judgment, the High Court of Kerala had also extracted

the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Central Bank of India v.

M/s.Sexons Farms & Ors. [1993 (3) KerLT 484], wherein it was

held that:

"7 Though, no form of notice is prescribed in the above Clause(b) the requirement is that notice shall be given in writing within fifteen days of receipt of information from the bank regarding return of the cheque as unpaid and in the notice a demand for payment of the amount of the cheque had to be made.

8. The object of notice is to give a chance to the drawer of the cheque to rectify his omission and also to protect honest drawer. Service of notice of demand in Clause (b) of the proviso to S.138 is a condition precedent for filing a complaint under S.138 of the Act."

and observed that as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the requirement

of giving notice to the drawer of the cheque is to enable him to avoid

prosecution under Section 138 of NI Act. It also took aid of the Dr.GRR,J

judgment in B. Surendra Das v. State of Kerala [2019 2 KerLT

895], wherein it was held that:

"It is well settled principle of law that the notice has to be read as a whole. A notice must be construed not with a desire to find fault in it which would render it defective. It must not be read in a hyper technical manner. It must be construed strictly but in a sensible manner"

and observed that:

"In the light of the above observations of this Court and the Apex Court, I think, the omission on the part of the lawyer to put his signature in the notice issued under Clause(b) of proviso to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, cannot be treated as defective notice."

28. The learned counsel for the complainant relied upon the

judgment of the Bombay High Court (Goa Bench) in Abdul Rehman

M. Mulgand v. Moham-mad Hashan Mulgand and another7

wherein by placing reliance on another judgment of the Bombay High

Court in Prashant Prabhakarrao Gite v. S.K. Sarkar [2002 (2) Mh

LJ 125], wherein it was held that:

"sub-clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act only requires notice to be given in writing by the payee to the drawer in which there should be a demand made by the payee and that this clause does not prescribe any form or format for such notice. In the absence thereof what has been contemplated by this clause is the communication in writing by the payee to the drawer asking the drawer to pay the amount involved in the cheque which is dishonoured."

2006 Crl.L.J.1159 Dr.GRR,J

29. Thus, the omission on the part of the counsel for the

complainant to put his signature in the notice cannot be considered as

a defective notice, as it was not the technicalities that should be taken

into account but the object of notice and there is no specific stipulation

of clause (b) of Section 138 of NI Act that it should be a signed notice

in writing.

30. As Ex.D3 notice is issued for initiating civil proceedings if the

accused failed to pay the amount due, the absence of the details of the

cheque and the bouncing of it is not necessary to be mentioned in it

and Ex.D3 is not the basis for initiating action against the accused

under Section 138 of NI Act.

31. The accused failed to probabilize his defence to meet the

standard of preponderance of probability. The Hon'ble Apex Court in

Kalamani Tex and another v. P. Balasubramanian8, held that:

"15. No doubt, and as correctly argued by senior counsel for the appellants, the presumptions raised under Section 118 and Section 139 are rebuttable in nature. As held in MS Narayana Menon v. State of Kerala [(2006) 6 SCC 39], which was relied upon in Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa [(2019) 5 SCC 418] a probable defence needs to be raised, which must meet the standard of "preponderance of probability", and not mere possibility. These principles were also affirmed in the case of Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets [(2009) 2 SCC 513] wherein

(2021) 5 SCC 283 Dr.GRR,J

it was further held that a bare denial of passing of consideration would not aid the case of accused.

17. Even if we take the arguments raised by the appellants at face value that only a blank cheque and signed blank stamp papers were given to the respondent, yet the statutory presumption cannot be obliterated. It is useful to cite Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar [(2019) 4 SCC 197], where this court held that:

"Even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and handed over by the accused, which is towards some payment, would attract presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in the absence of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt."

32. Thus, mere taking the defence that he lost two blank signed

cheques is not enough to consider it as a defence to meet the standards

of preponderance of probabilities without adducing any evidence in

proof of the same. The letter issued to the Bank to stop payment is not

sufficient to consider the same as a probable defence and the said

letter also cannot be taken into consideration being a photostat copy.

33. PW.1 was cross-examined on the aspect that the transactions for

more than Rs.20,000/- cannot be in the shape of cash, to countenance

his evidence that he lent the amount of Rs.3,25,000/- by cash. PW.1

also admitted that he was an income tax assessee and stated that he Dr.GRR,J

had shown the lending of said amount in his income tax returns for the

year 2007-2008, but had not filed the said statement.

34. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment

of the High Court of A.P. in M. Vidyavathi's case (2 supra) on the

aspect that capacity to lend the amount was not an ingredient for the

offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. He also relied

upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Rohitbhai Jivanlal

Patel v. State of Gujarat and another9 on the aspect that:

"The Trial Court proceeded to question the want of evidence on the part of the complainant as regards the source of funds for advancing loan to the accused and want of examination of relevant witnesses who allegedly extended him money for advancing it to the accused. This approach of the Trial Court had been at variance with the principles of presumption in law. After such presumption, the onus shifted to the accused and unless the accused had discharged the onus by bringing on record such facts and circumstances as to show the preponderance of probabilities tilting in his favour, any doubt on the complainant's case could not have been raised for want of evidence regarding the source of funds for advancing loan to the accused-appellant. The aspect relevant for consideration had been as to whether the accused-appellant has brought on record such facts/material/circumstances which could be of a reasonably probable defence."

35. Thus, these judgments would disclose that the capacity to lend

the amount cannot be a probable defence to disbelieve the case of the

complainant.

2019 (2) ALD (Crl.) 385 (SC) Dr.GRR,J

36. Some other technicalities were also raised by the revision

petitioner - accused stating that Ex.P3 cheque return memo was not

signed by the banker who issued it. The trial court acquitted the

accused on the said sole ground. As such, the complainant had taken

steps to adduce the additional evidence under Section 391 Cr.P.C.

during the course of appeal and got examined the Assistant Manager

of SBI as PW.2 on his behalf. PW.2 stated in her evidence that the

complainant and his daughter Lavanya had joint savings account in

their branch and the complainant presented a cheque of ICICI Bank

with cheque No.583903 dated 13.08.2007 for an amount of

Rs.3,25,000/-. Ex.P2 was the said cheque and the said cheque was

presented before ICICI Bank and they received the cheque

endorsement as "stop payment by the drawer' and consequently issued

a memo dated 31.08.2007 which was marked as Ex.P3. She stated

that it did not contain the signature but it contained the seal of the

bank and it was also entered in the Cheque Return Register. She

further stated that she had brought the Cheque Return Register with

her and basing on the request of the complainant, the Bank authorities

issued a letter dated 12.02.2013 marked as Ex.P6. Though it was

suggested to her in the cross-examination that as per Section 146 of Dr.GRR,J

the NI Act and Bankers Books Evidence Act, 1891, the cheque return

memo should contain the seal as well as the signature of the

authorities, the witness stated that it was a practice to put stamp and

deliver to the party and Ex.P3 did not contain the signature of the

Bank Manager. She stated that only if party insisted, the Officer

would sign on the return memo. She also stated that Ex.P6 also

contained the seal of their bank and there was difference in between

the seals on Ex.P3 and Ex.P6, but stated that both the seals were

official seals of their bank.

37. The learned counsel for the respondent-complainant had also

relied upon Section 4 of the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891

wherein the mode of proof of entries in bankers' book was stated as

follows:

"4. Mode of proof of entries in bankers' books.- Subject to the provisions of this Act, a certified copy of any entry in a banker's books shall in all legal proceedings be received as prima facie evidence of the existence of such entry, and shall be admitted as evidence of the matters, transactions and accounts therein recorded in every case where, and to the same extent as, the original entry itself now by law admissible, but not further or otherwise.