Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 2341 Tel
Judgement Date : 6 June, 2022
THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE P. MADHAVI DEVI
I.A.NO.1 OF 2020 IN W.P.NO.21822 OF 2017
AND
WRIT PETITION NO.21822 OF 2017
COMMON ORDER
This Writ Petition has been filed by the petitioner Corporation
seeking a Writ of Certiorari calling for the records relating to and
connected with the award dt.06.04.2017 passed in I.D.No.56 of 2011 on
the file of the Labour Court-I, Hyderabad and to quash the same and
pass such other order or orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and
proper in the circumstances of the case.
2. Brief facts leading to the filing of this Writ Petition are that the
petitioner Corporation was formed as a joint venture company for
captive consumption of the power generated by it by its shareholders.
The power generated by the power generating units established by the
petitioner Corporation at Vijjeshwaram, Rajahmundry will be shared
among the shareholders in accordance with the Memorandum of
Understandings I and II. The power generated by the petitioner
Corporation is consumed by its shareholders at the rate of Rs.1.50 ps.
W.P.No.21822 of 2017
2
per unit. The power shared by the shareholders from the petitioner
Corporation would be deducted from the total consumption and
thereafter, the balance power drawn from the Discoms would be charged
at the rate of Rs.4/- per unit by the respective Discoms. Therefore, the
role of the employee of the petitioner Corporation, who is coordinating
with the petitioner Corporation and the shareholders, with regard to the
consumption of the power generated by the Unit of the petitioner
Corporation and also from the Discoms is very important.
3. The 2nd respondent individual, was initially appointed as a Typist
on temporary basis vide proceedings dt.28.02.1991 and was later
confirmed vide proceedings dt.29.08.1991. Apart from typing work, the
2nd respondent was also assisting the Company Secretary-cum-Finance
Manager in secretarial as well as administrative works. On 11.08.1994,
the 2nd respondent was promoted to the post of 'Accounts Supervisor'. It
is submitted that preparation of the monthly electricity consumption
bills of the shareholders is the most important and essential function in
the petitioner Corporation as it was the only source of income to the
petitioner Corporation. Therefore, if the billing is not properly done and
on time, it would suffer irretrievable loss. Since the 2nd respondent had W.P.No.21822 of 2017
gained sufficient exposure in this regard in the year 2000, the
preparation of the monthly electricity consumption bills of the
shareholders was entrusted to the 2nd respondent. Thus, the 2nd
respondent was carrying on multifarious and very crucial activities. It is
further submitted that the bills for the electricity consumed by the
shareholders are usually prepared around 23rd and 24th of every month.
4. It is submitted that in view of the crucial duties being performed
by him, the 2nd respondent would pester the management from time to
time for promotion and monetary benefits and used to threaten the
petitioner Corporation with taking leave. On 22.06.2009, the 2nd
respondent threatened to go on leave for 110 days with effect from
23.06.2009 to 10.10.2009 on the ground that his case was not considered
for promotion or for monetary benefits. Vide representation
dt.23.08.2010, the 2nd respondent made a demand for revision of his pay
scale and some other demands.
5. Further, on 16.04.2011, the 2nd respondent had submitted a leave
letter requesting the Corporation to grant one month earned leave from
16.04.2011 to 15.05.2011 to enable him to attend to his personal works.
In spite of his leave not being sanctioned, the 2nd respondent stopped W.P.No.21822 of 2017
coming to the petitioner Corporation office from 18.04.2011. On
19.04.2011, the petitioner Corporation intimated the 2nd respondent that
the leave was not granted and he was called upon to join the office
immediately. Another notice dt.20.04.2011 was also issued to the 2nd
respondent intimating that he is continuing on unauthorised leave and
was called upon to handover all the records for the purpose of
completing the power allocation committee agenda and also the billing
for the month of April, 2011. On 20.04.2011, the 2nd respondent
attended the office and thereafter applied for half day leave stating that
he is unable to attend to his duties and requested for granting medical
leave from 18.04.2011 to 26.04.2011. The said request was rejected on
21.04.2011. On the very same day, a notice was issued to the 2nd
respondent requesting him to join duty immediately and hand over the
records. He was also served with a show-cause notice dt.23.04.2011
seeking an explanation that since several important assignments which
are to be completed by the 2nd respondent were not completed, why
disciplinary action should not be taken by way of terminating his
services. The 2nd respondent submitted his written explanation admitting
that there were pending assignments on his table. He attributed the
unauthorised absence and pendency of work, to non-consideration of his W.P.No.21822 of 2017
long pending demand for promotion and revision of his pay scale and
also left the decision of his removal from service to the petitioner
Corporation. After considering the said explanation, vide orders
dt.28.04.2011, the 2nd respondent was terminated from his services.
6. Aggrieved by the same, the 2nd respondent filed I.D.No.56 of
2011 challenging the termination order dt.28.04.2011 and seeking
reinstatement into service with full back wages and continuity of service
with all attendant benefits. On 27.08.2013, the Tribunal allowed the
same by setting aside the termination order with a direction to reinstate
the 2nd respondent into service with continuity of service but without
any back wages. The petitioner Corporation filed W.P.No.36724 of
2013 challenging the award dt.27.08.2013 in I.D.No.56 of 2011.
Initially the High Court granted interim suspension of the award on
16.12.2013. The 2nd respondent also filed W.P.No.16759 of 2014
challenging the award and both the Writ Petitions were disposed of
respectively by setting aside the award dt.27.08.2013. Vide orders
dt.04.01.2017, the High Court remanded the matter to the Tribunal with
a direction to frame an issue to decide whether the 2nd respondent is a
workman under the Industrial Disputes Act and if he is held to be a W.P.No.21822 of 2017
workman, then whether the termination of the employee by the
employer is valid or not. Consequent to the remand by the High Court,
the Labour Court allowed I.D.No.56 of 2011 by orders dt.06.04.2017
and directed reinstatement of the 2nd respondent into service with back
wages, continuity of service and attendant benefits and it was also held
that the 2nd respondent is also entitled for all notional promotions, for
which he is entitled to as if he was in service for all these years.
Challenging the said award, the present Writ Petition is filed.
7. Vide orders dt.04.07.2017, this Court suspended the award subject
to payment of wages under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947. Against the same, W.A.No.993 of 2017 was filed and the said
Writ Appeal was dismissed, against which the petitioner Corporation
filed an SLP in the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court directed the petitioner Corporation to deposit wages under Section
17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act before the concerned Court and
requested this Court to decide W.P.No.21822 of 2017 expeditiously
within a period of three months. The 2nd respondent filed an application
to modify the earlier order dt.18.08.2017 and vide orders dt.13.04.2018,
the same was disposed of by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The 2nd W.P.No.21822 of 2017
respondent again approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court to modify the
above orders and the Hon'ble Supreme Court left it open to the 2nd
respondent to make an application for interim order including the release
of amount, if any, deposited under Section 17-B of the Industrial
Disputes Act in the event the petition is not disposed of at an early date.
Accordingly, the 2nd respondent filed I.A.No.1 of 2020 for release of
Section 17-B wages. Thus, the Writ Petition has come up for hearing
today to hear both I.A.No.1 of 2020 for release of wages deposited by
the petitioner Corporation under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes
Act and also for final hearing of the Writ Petition. This matter is
therefore heard finally for a decision on merits.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner, M/s. Indus Law Firm, argued
the matter extensively with regard to the nature of the work of the
petitioner Corporation and also the nature of duties and responsibilities
of the 2nd respondent. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the
petitioner Corporation, the 2nd respondent cannot be considered as a
workman under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the
Labour Court ought not to have entertained the dispute under the
Industrial Disputes Act. As regards the setting aside of the impugned W.P.No.21822 of 2017
order, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner
Corporation has issued a show-cause notice to the 2nd respondent and
after considering his explanation, (wherein the 2nd respondent admitted
the pendency of work and unauthorised absence and also agreed for
termination of services), the petitioner Corporation had terminated the
services of the 2nd respondent. He submitted that the Tribunal had set
aside the termination order on an erroneous finding that there was
violation of principles of natural justice. With regard to allowing of back
wages and other reliefs, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted
that the 2nd respondent has not set out any facts in support of the same
that he was not gainfully employed elsewhere for the period after
termination and therefore the learned Judge has not given any basis for
awarding the same. In support of the above contentions, he placed
reliance upon various case law and copies of the said judgments are also
filed in the form of a paper book.
9. Sri B. Chandrasen Reddy, learned Senior Counsel representing
Sri Yogeshwar Raj Saxena, learned counsel for the 2nd respondent, also
filed counter affidavit and also written arguments. It is stated that the
fact that the 2nd respondent was allotted very crucial and multifarious W.P.No.21822 of 2017
duties only shows that he is not in any skilled or technical or manual or
supervisory cadre and that he was entrusted with various multifarious
activities as a worker and therefore he was a workman as defined under
Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. He submitted that the nature
of activities carried on by the worker would determine the status of the
employee and not the designation. He also placed reliance upon various
case law in support of his contentions and also filed copies of the same
in the form of a paper book.
10. For proper appreciation of the legal position and the application
of the same to the case on hand, it is necessary to go into the definition
of 'workman' under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. For the sake of
ready reference, Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is
reproduced hereunder:
"2. In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,-
.... .... .... ....
(s) "workman" means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an W.P.No.21822 of 2017
industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person-
(i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957); or
(ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison, or
(iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity, or
(iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding one thousand six hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature."
11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.K. Maini Vs.
M/s. Carona Sahu Company Limited and others1 has held that
it is not only the monetary benefits received by the workman
which determine the status of the workman but also the nature of
the work carried out by him. It was held that if the employee is
mainly doing supervisory work but incidentally or for a fraction of
(1994) 3 SCC 510 W.P.No.21822 of 2017
time also does some manual or clerical work, the employee should
be held to be doing supervisory works and conversely, if the main
work is of manual, clerical or of technical nature, the mere fact
that some supervisory or other work is also done by the employee
incidentally or only a small fraction of working time is devoted to
some supervisory works, the employee will come within the
purview of 'workman' as defined in Section 2(s) of the Industrial
Disputes Act.
12. In the case of Sonepat Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs.
Ajit Singh2 also, while considering the meaning and purport of the
word 'workman' mentioned in Section 2(s) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that a
person who performs one or the other jobs mentioned in the
provisions of the Act only would come within the purview of the
definition of workman. It was held that the job of a clerk
ordinarily implies stereotype work without power of control or
dignity or initiative or creativeness and the question as to whether
the employee has been performing a clerical work or not is
(2005) 3 SCC 232 W.P.No.21822 of 2017
required to be determined upon arriving at a finding as regards the
dominant nature thereof. It was held that with a view to give effect
to the expression to do "any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical,
operational, clerical or supervisory work", the job of the employee
concerned must fall within one or the other category thereof and
therefore it would not be correct to contend that merely because
the employee had not been performing any managerial or
supervisory duties, ipso facto he would be a workman. It was held
that the issue was as to whether the employee answers the
description of a workman has to be determined on the basis of
conclusive evidence which would require full consideration of all
aspects of the matter.
13. In the case of C.Gupta Vs. Glaxo-Smithkline
Pharmaceuticals Ltd.3, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that
whether a particular employee comes within the definition of
'workman' has to be decided factually. It was further held that
while deciding the status of a person, nature of work is relevant.
(2007) 7 SCC 171 W.P.No.21822 of 2017
14. In the case of Chinnabasappa Basappa Happali Vs. The
State of Mysore4 and other decisions relied upon by the learned
counsel for the petitioner, the test to determine the status of an
employee has been to examine the nature of the work carried on
by the employee.
15. Learned counsel for the 2nd respondent employee has also
filed a paper book along with case law and these decisions also lay
emphasis on the nature of the work carried out by the employee to
determine his status.
16. It is therefore necessary to go into the nature of the work
carried out by the 2nd respondent herein.
17. The Labour Court has set out the nature of the work carried
out by the employee at page 17 of its order. From the said data, it
is seen that the petitioner therein used to collect data as a Data
Operator, feed data as a Typist, distribute the data as a Courier and
maintain accounts as an Accountant and prepare agenda of the
meeting as a Personal Secretary of Board of Governors and
1971(1) SCC 1 W.P.No.21822 of 2017
prepare accounts as a Typist and act as a Coordinator between the
shareholders and the company. From all these duties, it is nowhere
seen that the employee is working in the capacity of a Supervisor
or a Manager. Even the management has not filed any documents
before this Court to show the nature of the work of the respondent
employee that he is carrying on managerial or supervisory
functions. It may be that the respondent employee is carrying on
duties of great importance to the organisation, but the importance
of the duties would by itself not determine or cannot be said to be
determining the nature of activities of the respondent employee. In
view of the same, this Court does not see any reason to interfere
with the award of the Labour Court, wherein it has held that
respondent No.2 is a workman under Section 2(s) of the Industrial
Disputes Act. In view thereof, the first issue decided in favour of
the employee is upheld.
18. As regards the issue of termination of services of the
employee without issuing any notice and that it is violation of the
principles of natural justice also, this Court finds that there is no
evidence placed before this Court by the petitioner that other than W.P.No.21822 of 2017
the notice issued to the employee to report for duty and also that
he would be terminated from service if he does not report for duty,
there is any other notice issued to the employee. The notice issued
on 23.04.2011 is a show-cause notice for removal from service for
indiscipline and the 2nd respondent had submitted his reply on
25.04.2011 pointing out his difficulties and also his grievance with
regard to non-consideration of his request for enhancement of his
pay. At the end of the said reply, the 2nd respondent had requested
the management to withdraw the show-cause notice dt.23.04.2011
and if the explanation is not found to be satisfactory to the
management and the management thought that the employee
deserves to be removed from service, the decision of the
management will be honoured. He also requested the management
to take decision on terminal benefits sympathetically keeping in
view his 20 years of service. As seen from the order dt.28.04.2011,
the management has considered only the last para of the 2nd
respondent's explanation agreeing to termination of services if the
written explanation of the 2nd respondent was not found
satisfactory. However, the Corporation has not discussed as to
why the explanation of the 2nd respondent was not acceptable. It is W.P.No.21822 of 2017
also evident from the conciliation application filed by the 2nd
respondent on 04.05.2011 that the 2nd respondent had not agreed
for termination willingly. It was conditional that if the explanation
of the 2nd respondent was not satisfactory, then only it was
agreeable to termination. It appears to be a decision taken in haste
to agree for termination of services. As the management has not
given any reasons for not accepting the explanation of the 2nd
respondent, the order of termination is clearly in violation of the
principles of natural justice. Though this Court does not agree with
the reasons given by the Labour Court for setting aside the
termination order, this Court upholds the finding that the employee
has to be reinstated into service as the punishment of termination
is highly excessive and the Corporation has not given any reasons
for not accepting the explanation of the 2nd respondent. However,
the 2nd respondent shall be eligible only for 50% of the back wages
and continuity of service and other attendant benefits for terminal
benefits only.
19. In view of the same, no further orders are necessary in
I.A.No.1 of 2020 and it is accordingly closed as infructuous.
W.P.No.21822 of 2017
20. In the result,--
(i) The Writ Petition filed by the Corporation is partly
allowed.
(ii) I.A.No.1 of 2020 is closed as infructuous.
21. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, in this Writ Petition shall
stand closed. No order as to costs.
___________________________ JUSTICE P. MADHAVI DEVI Date: 06.06.2022 Svv
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