The Superintending Engineer vs M. Ramulu
2022 Latest Caselaw 3958 Tel

          THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE UJJAL BHUYAN
                                       AND
           THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE SUREPALLI NANDA
                   I.A.No.1 of 2019 in/& W.A.No. 923 of 2019
COMMON JUDGMENT: (Per the Hon'ble the Chief Justice Ujjal Bhuyan)


       Heard Mr. N.Ramesh, learned Government Pleader for

Services appearing for the appellants and Ms. K.Udaya Sri, learned

counsel for respondent No.1.

2. The interlocutory application being I.A.No.1 of 2019 has

been filed to condone the delay of 412 days in filing the related

appeal.

3. The related appeal has been filed assailing the legality and

validity of the order dated 25.09.2018 passed by the learned Single

Judge dismissing W.P.No.3893 of 2004 filed by the appellants as

the writ petitioners.

4. Be it stated that respondent No.1 was engaged as a

watchman-cum-sweeper on part-time basis in the establishment of

the appellants on a monthly salary of Rs.350/- in the month of ::2::

January, 1994 and continued upto November, 1997. Thereafter,

respondent No.1 was continued to be engaged as watchman-cum-

sweeper with intermittent breaks upto 07.07.2000 when his

services were terminated. Assailing such action of the appellants,

respondent No.1 initiated an industrial dispute under the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947, before the Labour Court-II, Hyderabad (briefly

'the Labour Court' hereinafter), which was registered as I.D.No.131

of 2000. Labour Court passed award dated 28.06.2003 setting aside

the order of termination and directing the appellants to reinstate

respondent No.1 in service with full backwages. Against this order,

appellants filed the related writ petition.

5. On due consideration, learned Single Judge held that Labour

Court had rightly passed the award in favour of respondent No.1-

workman by exercising power under Section 11-A of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947. Therefore, learned Single Judge declined to

interfere with the award dated 28.06.2003 passed by the Labour

Court in I.D.No.131 of 2000.

::3::

6. Learned counsel for the appellants has assailed the findings

of the Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge. He has

also referred to the averments made in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the

interlocutory application to justify the delay in filing the related

appeal.

7. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No.1 has

supported the award passed by the Labour Court and the decision

of the learned Single Judge. She submits that no interference is

called for in the award passed by the Labour Court and the order

passed by the learned Single Judge in the related writ petition.

8. Submissions of learned counsel for the parties have received

the due consideration of the Court.

9. Labour Court, on consideration of the pleadings and

evidence, framed the following questions for consideration:

1. Whether the petitioner is a workman within the definition of Industrial Disputes Act, and whether the present petition is maintainable ?

::4::

2. Whether the first respondent is justified in terminating the services of the petitioner ?

3. If not, to what relief the petitioner is entitled to ?"

10. Thereafter, the questions so framed were answered by the

Labour Court in the following manner:

POINT: 1 The first and second respondents are the Superintending Engineer and Executive Engineer, Panchayat Raj division in Medak District and both these officers are concerned with public works and maintenance of NMRs. The 3rd respondent is the controlling authority for respondents 1 and 2. The fact that the petitioner was appointed as Temporary Part Time Sweeper on 05.01.1994 is not denied and the same is clear from Ex.W.1. In the first instance, the petitioner was paid a consolidated pay of Rs.350/-, which was increased to Rs.500/- w.e.f. 23.12.1994 as is clear from Ex.W.2. Ex.W.4 shows that the petitioner was appointed as sweeper-cum- watchman on consolidated pay of Rs.500/- and was posted to the office of the Dy. Executive Engineer, Panchayat Raj, Medak Sub-Division-II and no time limit is prescribed in the said order. It may be that the subsequent orders passed from time to time, which ::5::

are marked as Exs.W.7 to W.14 reads as if the services of the petitioner were extended from time to time for every three months. All these orders would go to prove that right from 05.01.1994 till the petitioner was terminated from service on 07.07.2000 he continuously worked in the office of the second respondent and there was absolutely no break in service and moreover, the pay of the petitioner was also enhanced from Rs.500/- to Rs.625/- as per the order marked as ExW.15. Though the respondents contended as if they are the sovereign functionaries and therefore, the Industrial Disputes Act would not apply, no authority is placed before this court on this point. In the counter filed by the respondents judgment of Supreme Court was also referred but the same is not placed before this court to see whether the same is applicable in the case of the respondents. The respondents admittedly are involved in getting the public works done and belonged to Panchayat Raj department and are also entitled to engage workmen on nominal muster rolls. Therefore, the respondents 1 and 2 are practically running an industry in getting the works done and therefore, the petitioner would not seize to be a workman within the meaning of I.D.Act. This point is accordingly answered.

::6::

POINT: 2 Admittedly, the petitioner services were terminated w.e.f. 07.07.2000 by the first Respondent as per the directions of the 3rd respondent. However, the petitioner was neither retrenched nor his services were terminated on the ground of any misconduct. The reason assigned for terminating the services of the petitioner is that the appointment is against the provisions of Act 2 of 1994. But the said Act 2 of 1994 is not placed before this court and it is not known whether the said Act is a Central Act or a State Enactment and whether the said Act over rides the Provisions of 1.D. Act. Therefore, the order of the first respondent in terminating the services of the petitioner is unjust and improper and as such, the first respondent is not at all justified in removing the petitioner from service. This point is accordingly answered.

POINT: 3 In view of my findings on Point Nos.1 and 2, the petitioner is entitled for reinstatement into service with full backwages. This point is accordingly answered.

In the result, the petition is allowed. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner into service as sweeper-cum-watchman with ::7::

backwages. The award is passed accordingly. The award shall come into force u/s.17-A of I.D.Act after 30 days of its publication.

11. When the appellants challenged the above award in the

related writ petition, learned Single Judge found that the award was

passed by the Labour Court in due exercise of power under Section

11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and that there was no

illegality in the said award to warrant interference. Learned Single

Judge accordingly held as follows:

Having considered the rival submissions made by the parties, this Court is of the view that the Labour Court has rightly passed the award in favour of the 1st respondent-workman by exercising its powers under Section 11-A of the Act and no illegality has been pointed by the petitioners to reverse the finding of the Labour Court. Therefore, there are no merits in the writ petition and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.

12. On due consideration, we are also of the view that no case

for interference is made out. The finding of the Labour Court has

been affirmed by the learned Single Judge. We do not find any

good reason to interfere with or dislodge such concurrent finding.

::8::

13. In so far the delay in filing the appeal is concerned, the

explanation of the appellants in their affidavit is reproduced

hereunder:

It is submitted that immediately after dismissal of the writ petition, appellants have approached the Government through its Head of Department (Head of the Department & 2nd Petitioner/Appellants) vide Superintending Engineer PR Medak Letter No. A1/1578/04, dt.26.11.2018 and Engineer- in-Chief, PR Hyderabad letter No.Ser-I(3)/3042/2017 dt 22/06/2019, for further instructions. In turn, the Government has called for the discussions vide its Memo No.5341/PR-II/2019-1 dt. 15.07.2019 and in discussion, it is concluded to file an appeal against the orders of the Hon'ble Single Judge as the 1st respondent was appointed on consolidated pay and his appointment was against Act 2 of 1994.

It is submitted that based on the copy of orders passed by Hon'ble Single Judge, submitted by the respondents to the appellant for compliance, the correspondence was made for obtaining necessary instructions from the Government. But the delay in filing the appeal caused due to delay happened in correspondence in between with Government owing to the unforeseen assignment of election duties to staff of the state for pre-scheduled general elections to the House of Assembly for the Telangana State and subsequent general elections scheduled to the House of Parliament. And it is also due to the relocation of Secretariat Building. Thereafter, as per ::9::

conclusion in the discussions held with the Government, this appeal is filed.

14. Respondent No.1 has filed objection to the prayer for

condonation of delay. It is contended that not to speak of any

sufficient cause, there is hardly any good reason or explanation

given by the appellants to explain the delay of 412 days in filing the

appeal. In support of such contention, she has relied upon a

decision of the Supreme Court rendered in Basava Raju v.

Special Land Investigation Officer1 wherein it was held as

follows:

"The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In

(2013) 14 SCC 81 ::10::

case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time, condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamount to showing utter disregard to the legislature."

15. On due consideration, we are not inclined to condone the

delay of 412 days in filing the writ appeal, more so, having regard to

the decision rendered by the Labour Court as confirmed by the

learned Single Judge. There is hardly any reason given, not to speak

of sufficient cause, to explain the delay of 412 days. The averments

are bald and devoid of any specifics.

16. In view of above, both I.A.No.1 of 2019 as well as the writ

appeal are dismissed. No costs.

As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, pending if any, stand

closed.

__________________ UJJAL BHUYAN, CJ

_____________________ SUREPALLI NANDA, J Date: 29.07.2022 LUR