Telangana High Court

The Government Of Andhra Pradesh ... vs Dr.V.Vasumathi Reddy, on 1 December, 2022

Bench: Ujjal Bhuyan, C.V. Bhaskar Reddy

               THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE UJJAL BHUYAN
                                           AND
                  THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V.BHASKAR REDDY


                            WRIT APPEAL No. 375 of 2012


JUDGMENT: (Per the Hon'ble Sri Justice C.V.Bhaskar Reddy)


       Heard Ms. P. Bhavana Rao, learned Government Pleader for

Land Acquisition appearing for the appellants and Mr. K. Sunil,

learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.1 to 5.

2. This writ appeal, under Clause 15 of Letters Patent, is directed

against the orders passed by the learned Single Judge in

W.P.No.22165 of 2006 dated 13.06.2011 in allowing the writ petition

filed seeking to quash the notification issued in G.O.Ms.No.721 dated

19.06.2006 under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894

(briefly "the Act", hereinafter) and published in the A.P. Gazette dated

06.07.2006 and the declaration made in Government Memo

No.40870/LA/A2/2005-1 dated 19.06.2006 under Section 6 of the

Land Acquisition Act published in the A.P.Gazette dated 07.07.2006 to

an extent of Ac.1.31 guntas in Survey No.149/4 of Jillelaguda Village,

Saroornagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District.

3. Respondent Nos.1, 2 and 3 in the writ petition are the appellants

herein and respondent Nos.1 to 5 herein are the writ petitioners. For

the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as arrayed in the

writ petition.

4. The brief facts leading to filing of this appeal, as summed up in

the writ petition, are stated as under:

The petitioners claim to be the owners of land admeasuring

Ac.11.21 guntas in Survey No.149 of Jillelaguda Village, Saroornagar

Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. The respondents issued notification

dated 27.11.1991 published in A.P.Gazette dated 05.12.1991

acquiring an extent of Ac.7.16 guntas for Defence Metallurgical

Research Laboratories (DMRL) purpose and an extent of Ac.1.17

guntas was acquired by Hyderabad Urban Development Authority

(HUDA) for laying inner ring road and compensation was also paid to

the land owners. The balance extent of land available in Survey

No.149 i.e., Ac.1.31 guntas is now proposed to be acquired under the

impugned notification for the same purpose of DMRL.

4.1. It is the case of the petitioners that their land was subjected to

repeated acquisitions causing immense loss to them and by the

impugned notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act, further

extent of Ac.1.31 guntas of land was proposed to be acquired. While

issuing the notification, the respondents dispensed with the enquiry

under Section 5-A of the Act, by invoking urgency clause contained in

Section 17(4) of the Act. The main contention raised in the related

writ petition was that taking their property "for defence purpose,

'DMRL' " cannot be justified, as the said notification sought to deprive

the petitioners of their lands thus violating the fundamental rights, as

such prayed for allowing the writ petition.

5. Respondent Nos.1 to 3 (appellants herein) filed a counter

affidavit in the writ petition stating that Survey No.149 of Jillelaguda

Village is consisting of a total extent of Ac.11.21 guntas and out of the

same, an extent of Ac.1.17 guntas was acquired by the Hyderabad

Urban Development Authority (HUDA) for the purpose of laying inner

ring road vide proceedings No.LA/268/82 dated 22.09.1986, an

extent of Ac.7.16 guntas was acquired earlier for DMRL vide

proceedings No.K/2136/1990 dated 19.05.1994 and an extent of

Ac.0.36 guntas is covered by passage leading to the graveyard existing

in Survey No.150. The balance extent of Ac.1.31 guntas is proposed

for acquisition by issuing notification dated 19.06.2006 under Section

4(1) of the Act published in the A.P.Gazette dated 06.07.2006. The

Special Deputy Collector also paid the rentals for the subject land

under the RAIP. It is further stated that the DMRL is covered all over

the lands except the subject piece of land and there is a threat to the

security of DMRL. It is also contended that the impugned notification

issued under Section 4(1) of the Act and declaration issued under

Section 6 of the Act were approved by the Government and published

in the A.P. Gazette dated 06.07.2006 and 07.07.2006 and the same

were also published in the local newspapers as well as in the offices of

the local jurisdiction and were also served to all interested persons.

Since the requisition department requested for invoking urgency

clause, the Government has invoked the powers under urgency clause.

Further it is stated that the impugned notification is not vague, since

they followed the procedure contemplated under the Act and the

acquisition will be put to use by DMRL, as such prayed for dismissal

of the writ petition.

6. The learned Single Judge, after considering the submissions of

the learned counsel for the parties and by placing reliance on the

judgments of this Court in Gajjela Narasimha Reddy and others vs.

Collector, Ranga Reddy District1 and D.Ramadevi and others vs.

District Collector, West Godavari District, Eluru and others2, held

that the impugned notification issued by the respondents for acquiring

lands of the petitioners for defence purpose 'DMRL' is too vague, which

does not disclose the precise purpose for which the land is needed,

and as such quashed the impugned notification as well as the

declaration issued for acquiring the subject land of the petitioners.

Aggrieved by the orders of the learned Single Judge, respondent Nos.1

to 3 in the writ petition filed the present appeal.

1 2008(5) ALT 233 2 AIR 2009 AP 15

7. The main ground urged by the appellants (respondent Nos.1 to 3

in the writ petition) in the grounds of appeal, is that the draft

notification was published under Section 4(1) of the Act for acquiring

the land "for public purpose i.e., for defence purpose DMRL" and the

same is not vague. Further the appellants raised a ground stating that

already major extent of land was acquired for the very same public

purpose i.e., DMRL and the small bit of land i.e., Ac.1.31 guntas

situated in the middle of the land already acquired is very much

necessary, since the DMRL is expanding its mission to develop the

advance materials and innovative process technologies for the

research development activities, with an object to be a centre of

excellence for providing total material solutions for defence system. It

is further contended that the learned Single Judge, without taking into

consideration of the above facts, by merely placing reliance on the

judgments of this Court in Gajjela Narasimha Reddy's case (supra)

and D.Ramadevi's case (supra), which have no application to the facts

and circumstances of the present case, has erroneously allowed the

writ petition, as such they prayed to set aside the orders of the learned

Single Judge and declare the impugned notification as a valid one.

8. Respondent No.6 in the writ appeal, in whose favour the land

was acquired, filed a counter affidavit stating that during the period

1978-79, DMRL acquired Ac.99.23 guntas of land in Karmanghat and

Jillelaguda Village, which includes the land to an extent of Ac.9.36

guntas in Survey No.149. As there existed a graveyard in Survey

No.150 of Jillelaguda Village in the midst of Survey No.149, the entire

area of Survey No.150, the grave yard and part of the private land in

Survey No.149 up to the road were left out of the earlier acquisition.

Subsequently, the road was widened into the inner ring road leaving a

pocket of private land to an extent of Ac.1.31 guntas in Survey

No.149/4 between DMRL and inner ring road. This made DMRL

bounded by the inner ring road and MIDHANI with little scope for

further expansion of the Laboratory in the DMRL complex, the

expansion of the DMRL is in the interest of national importance and it

is very much necessary to acquire any available land which can form

part of the present DMRL complex to meet the requirements. The

balance extent of land is proposed to be acquired for expansion of the

DMRL, as the subsequent purchasers sought to construct building in

this pocket of the land adjoining to DMRL and as there is a threat to

the safety and security of the defence laboratories. Respondent No.6

also paid a sum of Rs.57.41 lakhs to the State Government to acquire

the said land and the State Government, duly taking note of the

circumstances which necessitated to acquire the land, has issued the

impugned draft notification dated 06.07.2006 under Section 4(1) of

the Act and declaration dated 07.07.2006 under Section 6 of the Act.

It is also contended that there is no illegality in acquiring the land by

invoking Section 17(4) of Act dispensing with the enquiry under

Section 5-A of the Act. The petitioners, being very well aware of the

fact that this piece of land is very much required to the defence

laboratory, have executed power of attorney in favour of third parties

only to delay the purpose of acquisition and as such prayed for

allowing the writ appeal.

9. We have considered the submissions of the respective counsel

for the parties and perused the record.

10. A careful examination of the above facts would reveal that out of

the total extent of Ac.11.21 guntas in Survey No.149 of Jillelaguda

Village, the appellants had earlier acquired Ac.9.36 guntas, only a

small portion situated in between the acquired land and the inner ring

road remained unacquired and the said land was sought to be

acquired by issuing the impugned notification for the purpose of

expansion of DMRL. On the earlier occasion also notification was

issued for the same purpose as was notified in the present

notification. The DMRL is a laboratory actively involved in research

and development of important strategic materials for defence system

and systems of national importance under the control of Defence

Ministry of Government of India.

11. The contention of respondent No.6 herein (DMRL) is that the

small portion of land is allowed to be developed by the land owners for

private constructions and the same would definitely be a threat to the

safety and security of the activities of DMRL. Since the land owners

are aware of the acquisition proceedings of the land in the same

survey number, it is open for the land owners to object to the

proposed acquisition only on the ground that the land is not suitable

and it does not serve the public purpose as was notified by the

appellants. The notification under Section 4(1) of the Act issued by

the Government and the declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act

would be considered to be conclusive evidence of the fact that the land

is indeed needed for the public purpose, unless the petitioners

specifically establish mala fides on the part of the acquisition

authority in acquiring the subject property. However, the writ

petitioners failed to point out any infirmity as far as the notification

issued under Section 4(1) of the Act and the consequent declaration

issued under Section 6 of the Act.

12. The notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act is assailed

on the ground of public purpose. Section 3(f) of the Act defines "public

purpose", which reads as under:-

"3(f) the expression "public purpose" includes-

(i) the provision of village-sites, or the extension, planned development or improvement of existing village-sites;

(ii) the provision of land for town or rural planning;

(iii) the provision of land for planned development of land from public funds in pursuance of any scheme or policy of

Government and subsequent disposal thereof in whole or in part by lease, assignment or outright sale with the object of securing further development as planned;

(iv) the provision of land for a corporation owned or controlled by the State;

(v) the provision of land for residential purposes to the poor or landless or to persons residing in areas affected by natural calamities, or to persons displaced or affected by reason of the implementation of any scheme undertaken by Government, any local authority or a corporation owned or controlled by the State;

(vi) the provision of land for carrying out any educational, housing, health or slum clearance scheme sponsored by Government, or by any authority established by Government for carrying out any such scheme, or, with the prior approval of the appropriate Government, by a local authority or a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860), or under any corresponding law for the time being in force in a State, or a co-operative society within the meaning of any law relating to co-operative societies for the time being in force in any State;

(vii) the provision of land for any other scheme of development sponsored by Government or, with the prior approval of the appropriate Government, by a local authority;

(viii) the provision of any premises or building for locating a public office;

but does not include acquisition of land for Companies."

13. In State of Bihar vs. Kameshwar Singh3 , a Constitution Bench

of the Supreme Court considered the expression "public purpose" in

the following manner:-

3 AIR 1952 SC 252

"The expression 'public purpose' is not capable of a precise definition and has not a rigid meaning. It can only be defined by a process of judicial inclusion and exclusion. In other words, the definition of the expression is elastic and takes its colour from the statute in which it occurs, the concept varying with the time and state of society and its needs. The point to be determined in each case is whether the acquisition is in the general interest of the community as distinguished from the private interest of an individual."

14. A Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Somavanti vs. State

of Punjab4, observed that whether in a particular case the purpose for

which land was needed was a public purpose or not was for the

Government to be satisfied about and the declaration of the

Government would be final subject to one exception, namely that

where there was a colourable exercise of the power the declarations

would be open to challenge at the instance of the aggrieved party.

15. In State of Bombay vs. Ali Gulshan5, a Constitution Bench of

the Supreme Court considered vires of the Bombay Land Requisition

Act, 1948 (Act 23 of 1948). Interpreting provisions of the Constitution

and Schedule VII thereof, the Court held that requisition of property

by the Government of Bombay for accommodation of Foreign

Consulate could be said to be "public purpose". It was held that every

State purpose or Union purpose is a public purpose but there may be

acquisition or requisition which is neither for the State nor for the

Union and yet it may be for a "public purpose"; for instance,

4 AIR 1963 SC 151 5 AIR 1955 SC 810

acquisition for construction of hospital or educational institution by a

private individual or institution.

16. In State of Bombay vs. R.S. Nanji6, land was requisitioned for

accommodating employees of Road Transport Corporation. It was

contended that there was no "public purpose" and hence the action

was illegal. Referring to Hamabai Framjee Petit vs. Secy. of State

for India in Council7, Ali Gulshan's case (supra) and State of

Bombay vs. Bhanji Munji8, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme

Court stated that the expression "public purpose" must be decided

in each case examining closely all the facts and circumstances of the

case. On the facts of the case, it was held that a breakdown in the

organization of the Corporation, leading to dislocation of the road

transport system would create a chaotic condition to the detriment of

the interest of the community. Providing living accommodation for its

employees is a statutory activity of the Corporation and it is essential

for the Corporation to provide such accommodation in order to ensure

an efficient working of the road transport system and it must,

therefore, be held to be "public purpose".

17. In Arnold Rodricks vs. State of Maharashtra9, the Supreme

Court held that the phrase "public purpose" has no static connotation,

6 AIR 1956 SC 294 7 AIR 1914 PC 20 8 AIR 1955 SC 41 9 AIR 1966 SC 1788

which is fixed for all times. It is also not possible to lay down a

definition of what public purpose is, as the concept of public purpose

may change from time to time. It, however, involves in it an element of

general interest of the community which should be regarded as a

public purpose.

18. In Bhim Singhji vs. Union of India10, the Supreme Court held

that the concept of public purpose implies that acquisition or

requisition of property is in the interest of general public and the

purpose for which such acquisition or requisition is made directly and

vitally subserves public interest.

19. In Daulat Singh Surana vs. First Land Acquisition

Collector11, the Supreme Court, while dealing with the validity of the

notifications issued under Sections 4(1) and 6 of the Act for acquiring

the land for construction of an office of Deputy Commissioner of Police

(Security Control), held that the expression "public purpose" includes

a public purpose in which greatest interest of the community as

opposed to a particular interest of an individual is directly concerned.

The concept is not static but changes with the passage of time. Power

of eminent domain can, therefore, be exercised by the State in public

interest.

10 (1981) 1 SCC 166 11 (2007) 1 SCC 641

20. In Scindia Employees' Union vs. State of Maharashtra and

others12, the Supreme Court, in paragraph 3, observed as under:-

"3. Obviously, therefore, the petitioners have contended that the acquisition is not for a public purpose; it is a mala fide acquisition and a vague public purpose of defence and so acquisition is not valid in law. Precedents have been copiously cited in the High Court in that behalf. The learned single Judge and the Division Bench elaborately considered them and held that acquisition for defence purpose is a public purpose. Arnold Rodricks vs. State of Maharashtra's case (AIR 1966 SC 1788) to State of T.N. vs. L.Krishnan's case ((1996) 1 SCC 250) settled the controversy holding that acquisition for housing development is not a vague purpose. Expansion of dockyard for defence purpose is a public purpose. Publication of declaration under Section 6 accords conclusiveness to public purpose. It is for the appropriate Government to take a decision whether a particular land is needed for a public purpose or not and the Court cannot substitute its opinion on the public purpose to that of the appropriate Government. We wholly agree with the view taken by the High Court in that behalf. As regards person interested this Court dealt with the controversy from Himalayan Tiles & Marble (P) Ltd vs. Francis Victor Coutinho's case ((1980) 3 SCC 223) to Neyvely Lignite Corpn Ltd vs. Special Tahsildar (LA)'s case ((1995) 1 SCC 221), and the Constitution Bench decision, per majority. The petitioner, therefore, is not a person interested. Notice and hearing of it under Section 5A(2) is not mandatory."

21. As per the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, it is very

clear that the expression "public purpose" will include a purpose in

which the general interest of community as opposed to the interest of

an individual is directly or indirectly involved. Individual interest must

give way to public interest as far as public purpose in respect of

acquisition of land is concerned.

12 (1996) 10 SCC 150

22. After careful analysis of the various judgments of the Supreme

Court, we are of the view that it must be accepted that in construing

public purpose, a broad and over all view has to be taken in the larger

public interest. As in this case the piece of land which is required is

situated in between the large extent of the land acquired earlier for the