Telangana High Court

Chief Commissioner, vs P. Govind Reddy on 17 August, 2022

Bench: Ujjal Bhuyan, Surepalli Nanda

         * THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE UJJAL BHUYAN
                              AND
            THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE SUREPALLI NANDA

         + WRIT APPEAL Nos.1105 OF 2018 AND 23 OF 2022


% Date: 17-08-2022


# Chief Commissioner, Land Administration,
  Government of Telangana (previously shown as
  Andhra Pradesh), Abids, Hyderabad,
  and others.
                                              ... Appellants
                                 v.

$ P.Govind Reddy and others.
                                                     ... Respondents

! Counsel for the appellants : Mr. J.Rama Chandra Rao Additional Advocate General

^ Counsel for respondents : Mr. P.Sri Raghu Ram Senior Counsel for the Respondents

< GIST:

        HEAD NOTE:

? CASES REFERRED:


    1.   2010 (6) ALD 748
    2.   (2015) 3 SCC 695
    3.   (2007) 4 SCC 221
    4.   (1994) 1 SCC 1
    5.   (1994) 1 SCC 502
    6.   1948 AIR (Madras) 320
    7.   (2012) 12 SCC 133

THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE UJJAL BHUYAN AND THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE SUREPALLI NANDA

WRIT APPEAL Nos.1105 OF 2018 AND 23 OF 2022

COMMON JUDGMENT: (Per the Hon'ble the Chief Justice Ujjal Bhuyan)

This common judgment and order will dispose of

both writ appeal Nos.1105 of 2018 and 23 of 2022.

2. We have heard Mr. J.Ramachandra Rao, learned

Senior Counsel and Additional Advocate General,

Telangana, for the appellants and Mr. P.Sri Raghu Ram,

learned Senior Counsel for the respondents.

3. Writ appeal No.1105 of 2018 arises out of writ

petition No.9707 of 2009, whereas writ appeal No.23 of

2022 arises out of writ petition No.23913 of 2010. Both

the writ petitions were disposed of by the common

judgment and order dated 14.02.2017.

4. Be it stated that W.P.No.9707 of 2009 was filed to

quash order dated 09.04.2008 passed by the

Commissioner (Appeals) according permission to Joint

Collector, Ranga Reddy District to initiate proceedings for

cancellation of supplementary sethwar in respect of lands

admeasuring Acs.26.16 guntas in survey Nos.4, 5, 8, 9,

10 and 14/9-12 of Khanamet Village, Serilingampally

Mandal, Ranga Reddy District (briefly 'the subject land'

hereinafter) in terms of Section 166-B (3) of the Andhra

Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317F.

5. Second writ petition i.e., W.P.No.23913 of 2010 was

filed seeking a direction to interdict the action of the

revenue authorities in creating a dispute of location and

enjoyment and thus unlawfully dispossessing the writ

petitioners from part of the subject land; further seeking

a direction to the revenue authorities not to interfere with

the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the subject

land by the writ petitioners.

6. Order dated 09.04.2008 was passed by the Director

(Appeals), also referred to as the Commissioner (Appeals),

in the office of the Chief Commissioner of Land

Administration in proceedings No.T2/1001/2005. The

said proceedings were initiated as per request of the

District Collector, Ranga Reddy District for according

permission under Section 166-B (3) of the Andhra

Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317F

(briefly, 'the Land Revenue Act' hereinafter) for

cancellation of supplementary sethwar in respect of the

subject land. By the aforesaid order, permission was

accorded to the District Collector, Ranga Reddy District

for initiation of proceedings for cancellation of

supplementary sethwar dated 24.07.1993 in respect of

the subject land, further directing him to verify the two

points mentioned thereunder which we will advert to at a

subsequent stage of this judgment.

7.    By    the    common      judgment         and    order    dated

14.02.2017,        learned    Single     Judge        quashed     the

proceedings        No.TS/1001/2005         dated        09.04.2008.

Learned Single Judge also noted the statement of the

Chief Commissioner of Land Administration that the

revenue authorities would not be interfering with the

possession of the writ petitioners over the subject land.

Both the writ petitions were accordingly allowed.

8. Against the aforesaid judgment and order dated

14.02.2017 passed by the learned Single Judge in

W.P.No.23913 of 2010, Hyderabad Metropolitan

Development Authority filed W.A.No.52 of 2018. By the

judgment dated 21.09.2021 a Division Bench of this

Court opined that Hyderabad Metropolitan Development

Authority could not be construed to be a party aggrieved.

Accordingly the writ appeal was dismissed. In the

meanwhile, writ appeal No.1105 of 2018 was filed.

Therefore, while dismissing writ appeal No.52 of 2018

Division Bench clarified that the said decision would have

no bearing on writ appeal No.1105 of 2018 which shall be

decided on its own merit.

9. Writ appeal No.1105 of 2018 was initially filed by

the following appellants:

(1) Chief Commissioner, Land Administration, Government of Telangana (previously Government of Andhra Pradesh);

(2) Commissioner (Appeals), Office of Chief Commissioner, Land Administration, Government of Telangana (previously Government of Andhra Pradesh);

(3) Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District; and (4) Mandal Revenue Officer, Serilingampally Mandal, Ranga Reddy District.

10. In the proceedings held on 21.09.2021, an objection

was raised that Commissioner (Appeals) could not have

been joined as an appellant he being the adjudicating

authority. This Court held that Commissioner (Appeals)

was not competent to file the appeal and accordingly he

was struck off from the array of appellants. However,

observing that since State of Telangana represented by

the Principal Secretary, Revenue was a necessary party,

this Court suo motu impleaded State of Telangana as the

second appellant in the writ appeal in the place of

Commissioner (Appeals). Order dated 21.09.2021 reads

as under:

When this Appeal is taken up, it is pointed out that the Commissioner (Appeals) could not have been joined as an appellant, since his order was challenged in W.P.No.9707 of 2009 and the said order had been set aside on 14.02.2017 in the said writ petition.

Prima facie, we find force in this contention. Therefore, we hold that the 2nd appellant cannot file this Appeal and the Appeal insofar as he is concerned is not maintainable and he is struck off from the array of appellants.

Since the State of Telangana, represented by its Principal Secretary, Revenue, is a necessary party, we suo motu implead the said party as the 2nd appellant in this Appeal.

Liberty is given to the State Government and the Additional Advocate General to file fresh affidavit of the competent authority in this matter.

Delete from the caption 'for dismissal' and list on 18.10.2021.

It is open to the private respondents to take all defences available to them in law in the Writ Appeal as well as in the counter affidavits to be filed by them to the affidavit to be filed on behalf of the appellants seeking condonation of delay or suspension of the impugned order.

11. Respondents herein i.e., writ petitioners in

W.P.No.9707 of 2009 filed S.L.P. (C) No.3223 of 2022

before the Supreme Court against the aforesaid order

dated 21.09.2021. On admission the same was registered

as civil appeal No.3632 of 2022 (P.Govind Reddy v. Chief

Commissioner). Supreme Court vide order dated

04.05.2022 disposed of the civil appeal. It was noted that

Commissioner (Appeals) was the authority that had

passed the order dated 09.04.2008. It was challenged in

the writ petitions. Supreme Court observed that it was

not aware of such an anomalous situation where the

authority which passes the order impugned subsequently

files an appeal against the judgment of the High Court

setting aside the order. Holding that the High Court had

rightly struck off Commissioner (Appeals) as an

appellant, Supreme Court observed that deletion of said

appellant does not necessarily mean that the writ appeal

before the High Court could be dismissed as non-

maintainable on that ground but suo motu impleadment

of the State as an appellant by the High Court was not

proper. Therefore, Supreme Court set aside the order

dated 21.09.2021 to the extent that it had suo motu

impleaded State of Telangana as the second appellant in

the writ appeal. The High Court was requested to dispose

of the appeal proceedings expeditiously.

12. We will refer to the parties to the proceedings as

appellants (who were respondents in the writ petitions)

and writ petitioners (who are respondents in the writ

appeals).

13. Case projected by the writ petitioners as the

petitioners in W.P.No.9707 of 2009 is that they are the

owners and possessors of the subject land having

purchased the same through various sale deeds during

the period 23.05.1996 to 04.06.1996 from Smt

K.Kousalya and others. Smt K.Kousalya and others in

turn had purchased the subject land from the original

pattadars in the year 1995. Original pattadars were

assigned the subject land on 08.04.1961 by the

Tahsildar, Hyderabad West. It is stated that writ

petitioners are bona fide purchasers having purchased

the subject land for consideration and after investigating

the title and revenue records of their vendors. On

25.08.1997, writ petitioners applied for mutation of their

names to the Mandal Revenue Officer, Serilingampally

Mandal, Ranga Reddy District (referred to hereinafter as

'Mandal Revenue Officer'). Mandal Revenue Officer after

obtaining permission from the Joint Collector, Ranga

Reddy District (referred to hereinafter as 'Joint Collector')

issued pattadar pass books and title deeds to the writ

petitioners. On 27.02.2002, District Collector, Ranga

Reddy District (referred to hereinafter as 'District

Collector') gave permission for mutation and accordingly

mutation was effected in the name of the writ petitioners.

14. Writ petitioners wanted to develop the subject land.

Therefore, they prepared layout and applied for approval

of layout to Hyderabad Urban Development Authority

(HUDA) who in turn advised them to obtain 'No Objection

Certificate' (NOC) from the Joint Collector. It is in that

context, writ petitioners approached Joint Collector for

issuance of NOC. Joint Collector vide memo dated

29.04.2004 declined to grant NOC on the ground that

there was status quo order granted by this Court in

respect of the subject land in C.M.P.No.15294 of 2000 in

A.S.No.2731 of 1996. According to the writ petitioners,

they had filed A.S.M.P.No.312 of 2005 for impleadment in

A.S.No.2731 of 1996 to seek clarification that subject

land had nothing to do with the dispute in A.S.No.2731 of

1996.

15. At that stage, District Collector wrote letter dated

18.01.2005 to the Chief Commissioner of Land

Administration seeking permission for cancellation of

supplementary sethwar issued by him in the year 1993 in

respect of the subject land.

16. On 02.02.2006, Chief Commissioner of Land

Administration held that the request of the District

Collector for according permission to initiate action for

cancellation of supplementary sethwar under Section

166-B of the Land Revenue Act could not be considered

but it was observed that if the matter warranted review it

can be taken up suo motu by the revisional authority

above the rank of District Collector, i.e., Commissioner

(Appeals).

17. Notwithstanding the same, Joint Collector again

made a similar request to the Commissioner of Land

Administration under Section 166-B (3) of the Land

Revenue Act. On that basis, proceedings No.T2/1001/

2005 were initiated, whereafter Director (Appeals), also

referred to as Commissioner (Appeals), passed order

dated 09.04.2008 according permission as sought for.

But the District Collector was directed to verify the

following points:

(a) Whether the assignees are ex-servicemen as per the available record? and

(b) District Collector to satisfy himself on the question as to whether it would be justified in cancelling the supplementary sethwar after lapse of fifteen years when third party interests have been created based on orders/clarifications issued by the revenue officials right from Tahsildar to District Collector?

18. The order dated 09.04.2008 came to be challenged

in W.P.No.9707 of 2009.

19. This Court passed order dated 31.12.2010 granting

interim stay. It was extended until further orders vide

order dated 29.01.2011.

20. The writ petition was contested by the appellants

who were arrayed as respondents in writ proceedings.

Mandal Revenue Officer filed counter affidavit on behalf

of all the appellants. It was stated that application

submitted by the writ petitioners for grant of NOC was

examined. In the course of examination, it was found that

patta certificates were issued in favour of the original

assignees Musthaq Hussain and Sri Narsimlu Naik and

others from whom the writ petitioners had allegedly

purchased the subject land. The patta certificates were

found to be not genuine. Accordingly, it was decided to

cancel the supplementary sethwar. In this regard,

Commissioner (Appeals) was requested on 16.04.2006 to

accord permission for initiation of proceedings for

cancellation of supplementary sethwar issued in respect

of the subject land. It was contended that copies of

certificates submitted by the writ petitioners claiming

assignment in the category of ex-servicemen was referred

to handwriting expert to verify authenticity. As per report

of handwriting expert, the patta certificates were not

genuine. Director (Appeals) in the course of the

proceedings observed that District Collector had created

suspicion that fraud was committed by the original

assignees during 1992. Reference was made to

G.O.Ms.No.743 dated 30.04.1963 framing guidelines for

assigning agricultural lands to armed forces personnel

and their dependants. Prior thereto there were no rules to

assign Acs.5.00 of land to ex-servicemen. On due

consideration, Director (Appeals) passed the order dated

09.04.2008.

21. Writ Petition No.23913 of 2010 was filed by the writ

petitioners to declare the action of the appellants in

trying to forcibly dispossess them from the subject land

as unlawful, praying for further direction to the

appellants not to interfere with their possession over the

subject land.

22. As already pointed out above, learned Single Judge

held that the assignments in favour of the predecessors-

in-title of the vendors of the writ petitioners were granted

in the year 1961. Supplementary sethwar was granted in

the year 1993. After adverting to Section 166-B (3) of the

Land Revenue Act and the interpretation given thereto by

this Court in Joint Collector v. D.Narasing Rao1, which was

confirmed by the Supreme Court in Joint Collector v.

D.Narasing Rao2, learned Single Judge held that exercise of

revisional power by the Joint Collector after long lapse of

fifteen years for cancellation of supplementary sethwar

was erroneous, that too, without seeking cancellation of

original assignments made in favour of the predecessors-

2010 (6) ALD 748

(2015) 3 SCC 695

in-title of the vendors of the writ petitioners in the year

1961. Further, learned Single Judge held that such suo

motu revisional power has to be exercised within a

reasonable period. Seeking to exercise revisional powers

after lapse of fifteen years could not be permitted.

Accordingly, impugned proceedings were quashed.

22.1. In so far the second writ petition is concerned,

learned Single Judge noted that on 27.09.2010 interim

directions were issued to the revenue authorities not to

dispossess the writ petitioners until further orders.

Alleging that revenue authorities were trying to

dispossess the writ petitioners in violation of order dated

27.09.2010 a contempt case was filed being C.C.No.1498

of 2010. In the said contempt case, an affidavit was filed

by Chief Commissioner of Land Administration stating

that the revenue authorities were not interfering with the

possession of the subject land by the writ petitioners.

Contempt case was closed on 26.11.2010. Thus, taking

note of the above both the writ petitions were allowed in

the above terms.

23. Mr. J.Ramachandra Rao, learned Additional

Advocate General has assailed the order of learned Single

Judge on the ground that the subject land is Government

land. The same was never assigned either to the writ

petitioners or to their vendors. Files relating to

assignments were fraudulently created in connivance

with the lower revenue officials. He further submits that

learned Single Judge overlooked the fact that the order

dated 09.04.2008 was passed under Section 166-B(3) of

the Land Revenue Act was a valid and legitimate order

which did not suffer from any legal infirmity. Under

Section 166-B of the Land Revenue Act, Joint Collector is

competent to call for the record from a subordinate

authority to satisfy himself that the order or decision

passed in proceedings of assignments of lands in favour

of the vendors of writ petitioners were proper, legal and

valid. Having found that vendors of writ petitioners had

manipulated the record and had created fraudulent

documents to substantiate their claim of assignment,

Joint Collector had sought for permission from the Chief

Commissioner to cancel the supplementary sethwar

which was rightly granted. Therefore, order dated

09.04.2008 cannot be faulted. Learned Single Judge

erred in interfering with such a valid order.

23.1. Reverting back to his initial submission of fraud,

learned Additional Advocate General submits that in view

of the serious dispute with regard to assignment and

genuineness of the pattas issued in favour of the vendors,

learned Single Judge ought not to have invoked the

extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article

226 of the Constitution of India.

23.2. Learned Additional Advocate General has also

referred to and relied upon G.O.Ms.No.743 dated

30.04.1963 which provided for assigning lands to ex-

servicemen coming into force with effect from

30.04.1963. Claim of the writ petitioners that their

vendors were ex-servicemen who were assigned land to

an extent of Acs.5.00 in survey No.41 of Khanamet

Village in File No.E1/11993/1960 dated 08.04.1961 is on

the face of the record falsifies the claim of assignment.

Therefore, Commissioner (Appeals) had rightly accorded

permission to the Joint Collector. The assignments could

not have been made in 1961 to any ex-servicemen prior

to issuance of G.O.Ms.No.743 dated 30.04.1963.

23.3. In the course of the hearing, learned Additional

Advocate General produced the original record and

submitted therefrom that the subject land was recorded

as 'Kharij Katha Sarkari; the entries were manipulated by

creating assignment certificates and relying on the same

Bandobust Izafa was sanctioned by the Assistant Director

by issuing supplementary sethwar in File

No.G8/2567/93 without verifying the record. He further

submits that assignment files maintained and issued by

the revenue authorities upto the year 1961 were in

Telugu language whereas the patta certificates relied

upon by the writ petitioners are in English language. This

itself creates grave doubts about the genuineness of the

claim. In view of such grave doubts, a full-fledged enquiry

is required.

23.4. Writ petitioners have not produced the patta

certificates granted in favour of their predecessors-in-

interest. Alleged vendors are not ex-servicemen. The fact

that patta certificates relied upon by the writ petitioners

are forged documents has been buttressed by the expert

opinion.

23.5. According to him, if the vendors of the writ

petitioners are genuine, they ought not to have remained

silent from 1961 to 1993 without inclusion of their

names in the revenue records i.e., pahanies. During that

period, names of the writ petitioners were not recorded in

the revenue records.

23.6. Learned Additional Advocate General further

submits that father of the writ petitioners was a Member

of Parliament during the period 1999-2004. He had used

his influence, whereafter writ petitioners had obtained

supplementary sethwar and got their names mutated in

revenue records and also obtained pattadar pass books.

23.7. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants has

referred to and relied upon the decision rendered by the

Supreme Court in A.V.Papayya Sastry v. Government of

Andhra Pradesh3, wherein it was held that when fraud was

alleged, State was justified in exercising suo motu

revisional power under Section 34 of the Urban Land

Ceiling Act, 1976 after lapse of ten years. Though no

period of limitation is prescribed for exercising revisional

jurisdiction under Section 34, in the facts of that case,

Supreme Court upheld the exercise of suo motu power of

revision after lapse of ten years.

23.8. He further asserts that this is a case which is

vitiated by fraudulent acts and therefore, all benefits

accruing out of such fraudulent acts are required to be

set at naught. Question of limitation would not arise

when it is a case of fraud. Delay cannot be a ground to

defeat fraud. Fraud vitiates all proceedings,

administrative as well as judicial. Reference has been

(2007) 4 SCC 221

made to a decision of the Supreme Court in

S.P.Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath4.

24. Per contra, Mr. P.Sri Raghu Ram, learned Senior

Counsel for the writ petitioners asserts that there is no

fraud or illegality in the assignments, as alleged. Writ

petitioners being bona fide purchasers for consideration

and having exercised due diligence while verifying title

documents are entitled to the protection under Section

41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Statutory power

under Section 166-B of the Land Revenue Act cannot be

exercised after a long lapse of nearly fifteen years. Third

party rights which have accrued or created cannot be

disturbed.

24.1. Learned Senior Counsel has specifically referred to

the letter dated 02.02.2006 of Chief Commissioner of

Land Administration and submits that it was clearly

mentioned therein that patta certificates were issued to

ex-servicemen in 1961; they had sold the lands after

obtaining necessary permission from the competent

(1994) 1 SCC 1

authorities; names of purchasers were entered in the

revenue records as per mutation orders given by the

District Collector after thorough verification of relevant

records and accordingly pattadar pass books and title

deeds were also issued. Seeking for cancellation of

supplementary sethwar on the ground that there was

difference in language and signatures of officers was

untenable and not based on any valid grounds. Learned

Senior Counsel further submits that Chief Commissioner

of Land Administration had informed the Joint Collector

that if the latter was of the opinion that a case for suo

motu revision was made out, he should send a detailed

report justifying the same by furnishing additional

grounds other than the grounds already mentioned. If

such a request was not received within a week, it could

be presumed that there was no case for revision. Learned

Senior Counsel submits that on the face of such clear cut

order dated 02.02.2006, District Collector or Joint

Collector could not have made a further request to the

Commissioner of Land Administration under Section

166-B (3) of the Land Revenue Act for cancellation of

supplementary sethwar on the same grounds. In the

above factual background, order dated 09.04.2008 is

wholly unsustainable in law as well as on facts. The

grounds presently being argued by the appellants alleging

fraud on the ground of difference in language and in

signatures was gone into by the Commissioner of Land

Administration who had thereafter negated the same.

Merely creating a suspicion that fraud was played is not

enough to dislodge bona fide purchasers from their

valuable land.

24.2. Learned Senior Counsel has placed heavy reliance

on the decision of the Supreme Court in Joint Collector v.

D.Narasinga Rao (supra 2) to contend that initiation of suo

motu revisional proceedings after lapse of fifteen years is

unreasonable. Learned Single Judge has recorded a

finding of fact on perusal of the materials on record that

no fraud was played by the predecessors-in-interest of

the vendors of the writ petitioners. As a matter of fact,

even before such findings were recorded by the learned

Single Judge, Commissioner of Land Administration had

recorded categorical findings of fact based on

appreciation of evidence. Such concurrent findings of fact

may not be disturbed in writ appeal.

24.3. That apart, learned Senior Counsel has referred to

and relied upon the order of this Court dated 21.09.2021

dismissing writ appeal No.52 of 2018 filed by the

Hyderabad Metropolitan Development Authority assailing

common judgment and order of learned Single Judge

dated 14.02.2017. He submits that after the said appeal

was dismissed, State of Telangana has filed writ appeal

No.23 of 2022 with a leave application when more than

five years had elapsed after the judgment and order was

delivered by the learned Single Judge. Writ appeal No.23

of 2022 is nothing but an abuse of the process of the

Court. He further submits that after the writ appeal of

Hyderabad Metropolitan Development Authority was

dismissed, it has filed an interlocutory application in

I.A.No.1 of 2021 for getting impleaded in W.A.No.1105 of

2018. This is again nothing but a sheer abuse of the

process of the Court. While writ appeal No.1105 of 2018

is required to be dismissed as there is no infirmity in the

judgment and order of the learned Single Judge, I.A.No.1

of 2021 in W.A. No.1105 of 2018 and W.A.No.23 of 2022

are required to be dismissed as those are nothing but

abuse of the Court process.

24.4. Winding up his submissions, learned Senior

Counsel firstly submits that writ petitioners are bona fide

purchasers for consideration and therefore, their title and

possession are protected by law; secondly, statutory

power - be it under Section 166-B(3) of the Land Revenue

Act or otherwise where no limitation is prescribed, cannot

be exercised after an unreasonable period.

24.5. Learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on the

following decisions:

(1) Svenska Handelsbanken v. M/s.Indian Charge

Chrome5; and

(2) The Catholic Mission Presentation Convent v.

Subbanna Goundan6.

(1994) 1 SCC 502

1948 AIR (Madras) 320

25. Submissions made by learned Senior Counsel for

the parties have received the due consideration of this

Court. We have also perused and considered the

decisions cited at the bar.

26. At the outset, we may recapitulate the undisputed

facts which can be culled out from the pleadings and the

materials on record.

27. The subject lands were assigned to Musthaq

Hussain and Narsimhulu Naik and others on 08.04.1961

by the then Tahsildar of Hyderabad West. From the

assignees Smt K.Kousalya and others had purchased the

subject land. Writ petitioners purchased the subject land

from Smt K.Kousalya and others through registered sale

deeds from 23.05.1996 to 04.06.1996 by paying due

consideration. On application made by the writ

petitioners on 25.08.1997, Mandal Revenue Officer after

obtaining permission from the Joint Collector had issued

pattadar pass books and title deeds to the writ

petitioners. On 27.02.2002 District Collector gave

permission for mutation. Accordingly, names of the writ

petitioners were mutated in the revenue records in

respect of the subject lands.

28. Writ petitioners with an intention to develop the

subject land had applied for approval of layout to HUDA,

who in turn advised them to obtain NOC from Joint

Collector. Joint Collector declined to grant NOC on the

ground that litigation was pending with status quo order.

Though this was clarified by the writ petitioners it did not

have much effect. On the contrary, District Collector on

18.01.2005 wrote to the Chief Commissioner of Land

Administration seeking permission for cancellation of

supplementary sethwar in respect of the subject land. On

02.02.2006, Chief Commissioner of Land Administration

declined to accord permission under Section 166-B of the

Land Revenue Act with the observation that if the

revisional authority wanted to exercise suo motu power of

revision, fresh additional grounds be submitted within a

week for according permission, failing which it would be

construed that there was no case for revision and order

would be passed accordingly. In spite of the said order,

without furnishing additional grounds District Collector

once again requested Chief Commissioner of Land

Administration to accord permission under Section 166-B

(3) of the Land Revenue Act for cancellation of

supplementary sethwar in respect of the subject land

which led to registration of proceedings No.T2/1001/

2005. This culminated in the order dated 09.04.2008,

whereby permission was accorded though District

Collector was directed to verify the two points which we

have already mentioned in the earlier part of this

judgment.

29. Before we advert to Section 166-B (3) of the Land

Revenue Act, it would be apposite to deal with the two

orders dated 02.02.2006 and 09.04.2008.

30. A perusal of the order dated 02.02.2006 which is in

the form of a letter and placed on record by the writ

petitioners by way of memo dated 29.08.2019 would go to

show that the District Collector had written letter dated

18.01.2005 addressed to the Chief Commissioner of Land

Administration seeking permission for cancellation of

supplementary sethwar in respect of the subject land

under Section 166-B(3) of the Land Revenue Act. This

was followed by several internal communications between

the authorities. Ultimately, by the letter/order dated

02.02.2006 Joint Secretary to Chief Commissioner of

Land Administration informed the District Collector that

the proposal was examined with reference to the grounds

raised and connected record furnished. It was stated that

from the connected record and office files there was no

substantial or conclusive evidence to show that the

subject lands were not assigned to ex-servicemen. Patta

certificates were issued to ex-servicemen in the year

1961, whereafter they sold the lands on obtaining

necessary permissions from the competent authorities.

Names of purchasers were entered in the revenue records

as per mutation orders passed by District Collector

following which pattadar pass books and title deeds were

also issued. In the circumstances, Chief Commissioner

took the view that seeking permission for cancellation of

supplementary sethwar on the ground that there is

difference of language and signatures of the officers was

untenable and therefore, the grounds were not valid. In

the circumstances, it was declared that District Collector

could not exercise power under Section 166-B of the

Land Revenue Act. Thus the request to accord permission

to initiate action for cancellation of supplementary

sethwar was not considered. However, it was observed

that if the matter wanted review, it could be taken up suo

motu by the revisional authority above the level of District

Collector i.e., Commissioner (Appeals) exercising

delegated powers of Chief Commissioner of Land

Administration under the statute. Therefore, Collector

was informed that if he was of the opinion that the case

warrants suo motu revision at appeal level, he should

send a detailed report justifying such a revision duly

explaining such additional grounds other than the

grounds already mentioned with supporting materials

within a week. It was clarified that if no reply was

received within the stipulated period (one week), it would

be presumed that there was no case for revision and

order(s) would be passed accordingly. Order/letter dated

02.02.2006 being relevant is extracted in its entirety:

I invite attention to the reference 1st cited. I have been directed to inform you that the proposal for according permission to the Joint collector under Section 166-B(3) of the A.P. (T.A.) Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli for cancellation of supplementary sethwar in respect of lands covered by Sy. Nos.4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 41/9 to 41/14 has been examined with reference to the grounds raised and the connected record furnished. It is evident from the connected record and the office files of the Collector that there is no substantial or conclusive evidence to show that these lands were not assigned to ex-servicemen. The patta certificates were issued to ex-servicemen in the year 1961 and they sold the lands after obtaining necessary permissions from competent authorities. The names of purchasers are entered in revenue records as per the mutation orders given by the District Collector after thorough examination of the relevant record and accordingly Pattadar Pass Books and title deeds were also issued. Now seeking permission for cancellation of supplementary sethwar on the ground that there is difference of language and signatures of the officers is untenable and not based on any valid grounds.

In the above circumstances of the case, statutorily the Collector cannot exercise powers under Section 166-B of A.P. (T.A.) Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli of his own or on permission and thereby interfering with the interests of the third parties. As such, your request for according permission to initiate action for cancellation of supplementary sethwar under Section 166-B of the A.P. (T.A.) Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli cannot be considered. However, if the matter warrants review, it

must be taken up suo motu by the Revisional Authority, above the District Collector level i.e., the Commissioner (Appeals), under delegated powers of Chief Commissioner of Land Administration, A.P., Hyderabad under the said statute.

In view of the above position, if you are of the opinion that this case warrants suomotu revision at appellate level, you are requested to send a detailed report justifying such a revision, duly explaining such additional grounds, other than the grounds already mentioned, with such additional supporting material on record, within a week positively. If no reply is received within the stipulated period, it is presumed that there is no case for revision and orders will be passed accordingly.

31. This order/letter is 02.02.2016. It appears that

without complying with the requirements of the said

order/letter dated 02.02.2006, District Collector once

again approached the office of the Chief Commissioner of

Land Administration to accord permission for

cancellation of supplementary sethwar. Joint Collector in

his letter dated 17.04.2006 which was beyond one week

stated that the assignments appeared to be highly

dubious and submitted the following five grounds as

additional grounds to justify according sanction to cancel

supplementary sethwar. These grounds were as follows:

(1) Original assignment file could not be traced out;

(2) Mandal Revenue Officer had recommended issuance of supplementary sethwar to the writ petitioners on the basis of photocopies of assignment certificates.

(3) Photocopies of certificates of the writ petitioners dated 08.04.1961 were not implemented in the Faisal Patti along with Nukala Mallaiah to whom assignment was made in the same file and on the same date.

(4) The assignments did not come under the category of ex-servicemen as they belonged to Hyderabad State Force.

(5) Certificates issued during the year 1961 were handwritten whereas certificates of the writ petitioners were typed out indicating use of sophisticated typewriter which might not have existed in 1961.

32.   It      is      on    that       basis       that      proceedings

No.T2/1001/2005            were      initiated.     Certificates        were

examined by forensic expert who opined that original

signature of the Tahsildar did not tally with the signature

of the Tahsildar appearing in the certificates of the writ

petitioners. Matter was heard and the records were

perused. Director (Appeals)/Commissioner (Appeals) in

the order dated 09.04.2008 held as follows:

24. Heard the arguments. Perused the grounds and additional grounds for suo-motu enquiry and the reply filed by the respondents and the records placed before me. This case arose on the proposals of the District Collector, Ranga Reddy District, seeking permission

under Section 166-B(3) of the A.P. T.A. (LR) Act, 1317 Fasli to initiate action for cancellation of supplementary sethwar on the following two grounds that:-

i. During 1961, files have been maintained for each assignee and all these files contain patta certificate in Telugu language, while patta certificates stated to be issued and found in AD (S&LRs) Office are in English language with dt. 08.04.1961.

ii. The signature affixed on the certificates do not tally with those certificates issued in the year 1961.

32.1. Thereafter the materials contained in various files

were perused following which it was held as follows:

The Joint Collector requested to accord permission to cancel the Supplementary Sethwar 1) suspecting the Typewriter used in preparing the patta certificates is a sophisticated one which may not be available during 1960's, 2) the assignees will not come under the category of Ex-Servicemen and 3) signatures were not tallied. After perusing the record and submissions made by the respondents and Special Government Pleader the following aspects were critically analyzed as follows:

Regarding the Typewriter:- The District collector expressed suspicion over the typewriter which might not be existing at that time (1961). It was mere suspicion without tangible support. The District Collector should have referred the matter to an authentic authority, private/government to verity whether the type writer was used in the patta certificate, is existing as on 1961 or not.

32.2. Director (Appeals) further examined the contention

of the revenue authorities that the assignees were not ex-

servicemen who belonged to Hyderabad State Force. This

was also nullified as under:

The District Collector has taken a stand that as seen from the discharge certificates, the assignees do not come under the category of Ex-Servicemen as they belongs to 'Hyderabad State Force'. Perusal of the Memo No.8136/89-F2, dated 04.11.1989 of the Directorate of Sainik Welfare, Hyderabad reveals that the ISF units of Hyderabad State Forces personnel are to be considered as Ex-Servicemen.

32.3. Regarding the contention of the revenue authorities

as to limitation vis-a-vis fraud, Director (Appeals)

concluded as follows:

The fact that by the time, the respondents were purchasing the property the revenue records were mutated showing the ostensible owner as vendors of the respondents, the consent of the real owner (Government) appears to have been given by virtue of the letter dated 05.04.1995 which till date has not been withdrawn or commented upon, there is no dispute about the consideration paid by the respondents and that they acted in good faith. Since they have specifically made enquiry in the revenue office and seen the registered documents which are basic requirements for a prospective purchaser, who enquired into, hence the character of the respondent that they are the bonafide purchaser for value cannot be denied. However, since the Joint Collector is able to create reasons for enquiry, the matter has been considered.

33. The Counsel for the respondent argued that the collector has no power to refer the documents to the Forensic authority for a report and referred to Sections 45, 47, 67 and 73 of the Evidence Act. But the Evidence Act is only applicable to all judicial proceedings in or before any court as per Section 1 of the said Act. The Act has no application to quasi judicial authorities and inferior tribunals (vide AIR 1957 SC 882 - Union of India v. T.R.Varma). Further the Apex Court held that a quasi judicial authority can gather evidence from anyone but it should be made known to the person against whom the said evidence was gathered. (vide AIR 1957 SC 232). In this case, all the material was collected by the respondents under Right to Information Act. For these reasons, the Evidence Act is not applicable to the Collector, R.R. District who is a quasi judicial.

34. After considering the averments made by the learned Counsel for the respondent and the learned Special Government Pleader it is concluded that there is no concrete evidence that was filed by the District Collector, Ranga Reddy District in support of the claim.

32.4. Thus Director (Appeals) had concluded that there

was no concrete evidence filed by the District Collector to

support the contention that transactions relied upon by

the writ petitioners were fraudulent. In fact, it has been

held that the character of the writ petitioners that they

are bona fide purchasers for value cannot be denied.

Director (Appeals) in paragraph 35 of his order dated

09.04.2008 took the view that all the grounds urged by

the District Collector for according permission to cancel

supplementary sethwar were not proved logically by the

District Collector. The only aspect which remained was

applicability of G.O.Ms.No.743 dated 30.04.1963 whereby

Government had issued guidelines for assigning

agricultural lands to ex-servicemen and their dependents.

Since the assignments over the subject land were made

to ex-servicemen prior to 19.04.1963, Director (Appeals)

held as follows:

35. The District Collector's grounds for cancellation of supplementary sethwar is based on the points of 1) not tallying of signatures of the Tahsildar, 2) patta files not available, 3) type-writer used is of sophisticated one,

4) patta certificates were in English and 5) assignment of land to Ex-serviceman G.O., was issued during 1963. The points 1 to 4 are not proved logically by the District Collector, as was also discussed at para 27 but he created suspicion that fraud was played in this case by the original assignees during 1992. The only point left is the 5th point. The G.O.Ms.No.743 was issued on 30.04.1963 wherein the Government issued guidelines for assigning agricultural lands to the Armed Forces and their dependents. Prior to this, there are no rules to assign Ac.5.00 to the Ex-serviceman. But perusal of the Xerox copy of the patta shows the assignees name along with his I.D. number and a copy of the patta was also marked to the 'Major Officer Commanding'. The Xerox copies of the pattas establishes that the Assignment was made to the Ex-serviceman only, which establishes fraud

on ground that the G.O., to allot land to the Ex- serviceman is not subsisting as on the date of assignment. It is however, argued by the respondents counsel that assignment for any category need not be spell out by G.O., as it is sovereign power of the State. He has also referred to the Board Standing Orders showing that the assignment were being made even earlier to 1961 to the ex-servicemen. Hence, contended that it cannot be assumed and presumed that the assignment rules were not followed. This item has to be verified with relevant rules.

32.5. Finally Director (Appeals) accorded permission to

the District Collector for initiation of proceedings to

cancel supplementary sethwar dated 24.07.1993 in

respect of the subject land under Section 166-B of the

Land Revenue Act. At the same time, District Collector

was also directed to verify the following:

(a) Whether the assignees are ex-servicemen as per the available record? and

(b) District Collector to satisfy himself on the question as to whether it would be justified in cancelling the supplementary sethwar after lapse of fifteen years when third party interests have been created based on orders/clarifications issued by the revenue officials right from Tahsildar to District Collector?

33. From the above, it is evident that the order dated

09.04.2008 is contradictory. Director (Appeals) clearly

held that all the points urged by the District Collector to

support cancellation of supplementary sethwar could not

be logically proved as there was no concrete evidence.

Character of the writ petitioners that they are bona fide

purchasers of the subject land could not be denied. All

that the Joint Collector was trying to do was to create a

sense of suspicion to justify exercise of power under

Section 166-B of the Land Revenue Act. If the above two

points were still required to be verified by the District

Collector and without verifying the same, Director

(Appeals) could not have accorded permission to the

District Collector under Section 166-B of the Land

Revenue Act. This further buttresses our view that the

order dated 09.04.2008 is contradictory.

34. Having discussed the above, we may now turn to

Section 166-B of the Land Revenue Act which is

extracted as under:

166-B. Revision.--(1) Subject to the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Board of Revenue Regulation, 1358 F, the Government or any Revenue Officer not lower in rank to a Collector the Settlement Commissioner of Land Records may call for the record of a case or proceedings from a subordinate department and inspect it in order to satisfy himself that the order or

decision passed or the proceedings taken is regular, legal and proper and may make suitable order in that behalf; Provided that no order or decision affecting the rights of the ryot shall be modified or annulled unless the parties concerned are summoned and heard.

(2) Every Revenue Officer lower in rank to a Collector or Settlement Commissioner may call for the records of a case or proceedings for a subordinate department and satisfy himself that the order or decision passed or the proceedings taken is regular, legal and proper and if, in his opinion, any order or decision or, proceedings should be modified or annulled, he shall put up the file of the case and with his opinion to the Collector or Settlement Commissioner as the case may be. Thereupon the Collector or Settlement Commissioner may pass suitable order under the provisions of sub-section (1).

(3) The original order or decision or an authentic copy of the original order or decision sought to be revised shall be filed along with every application for revision.

35. From a perusal of the above, it is seen that Section

166-B of the Land Revenue Act deals with the power of

revision. Sub-section (1) says that the Government or any

revenue officer not below the rank of Collector or

Settlement Commissioner of Land Records may call for

the record of a case or proceedings from a subordinate

department and inspect it in order to satisfy himself the

order passed or decision taken by the subordinate

authority or the proceedings leading to such order or

decision is regular, legal and proper and thereafter make

suitable order in that behalf. The proviso however says

that no such order or decision affecting the rights of ryots

shall be modified or annulled unless they are notified and

heard. However, as can be seen, no limitation period is

provided for exercise of such suo motu revisional power.

36. This provision came up for consideration before a

Division Bench of this Court in Joint Collector v. D.Narsinga

Rao (supra 1). Exercise of suo motu power of revision

under Section 166-B of the Land Revenue Act was called

in question. This Court opined that even if no period of

limitation is prescribed, the power of revision must be

exercised within a reasonable time which must be

determined by the facts of each case and the nature of

the order being revised. Contention of the State that

Section 166-B of the Land Revenue Act did not prescribe

any limitation and therefore such a power can be

exercised at any point of time was rejected.

37. This matter was carried in appeal to the Supreme

Court and in Joint Collector v. D.Narsinga Rao (supra 2).

Supreme Court upheld the views expressed by the

Division Bench of this Court. In the facts of that case,

Supreme Court was of the opinion that though no time

limit is prescribed in Section 166-B of the Land Revenue

Act for exercise of suo motu power of revision, the same

cannot be exercised after five decades; if it is allowed then

it would lead to an anomalous position creating

uncertainties and complications thereby seriously

affecting the rights of the parties over immovable

properties. Thus Supreme Court concurred with this

Court that suo motu revision undertaken after a long

lapse of time even in the absence of any period of

limitation was arbitrary and opposed to the rule of law.

Justice Thakur (as he then was) in his concurring

opinion held that even when there is no period of

limitation prescribed in the exercise of power, revisional

or otherwise, such power must be exercised within a

reasonable period. This is so even in cases where

allegations of fraud have necessitated the exercise of

such corrective power. It was summed up as under:

31. To sum up, delayed exercise of revisional jurisdiction is frowned upon because if actions or transactions were to remain forever open to challenge, it will mean avoidable and endless uncertainty in human affairs, which is not the policy of law. Because, even when there is no period of limitation prescribed for exercise of such powers, the intervening delay, may have led to creation of third-party rights, that cannot be trampled by a belated exercise of a discretionary power especially when no cogent explanation for the delay is in sight. Rule of law it is said must run closely with the rule of life. Even in cases where the orders sought to be revised are fraudulent, the exercise of power must be within a reasonable period of the discovery of fraud. Simply describing an act or transaction to be fraudulent will not extend the time for its correction to infinity; for otherwise the exercise of revisional power would itself be tantamount to a fraud upon the statute that vests such power in an authority.

32. In the case at hand, while the entry sought to be corrected is described as fraudulent, there is nothing in the notice impugned before the High Court as to when was the alleged fraud discovered by the State. A specific statement in that regard was essential for it was a jurisdictional fact, which ought to be clearly asserted in the notice issued to the respondents. The attempt of the appellant State to demonstrate that the notice was issued within a reasonable period of the discovery of the alleged fraud is, therefore, futile. At any rate, when the Government allowed the land in question for housing sites to be given to government employees in the year

1991, it must be presumed to have known about the record and the revenue entries concerning the parcel of land made in the ordinary course of official business. Inasmuch as, the notice was issued as late as on 31-12- 2004, it was delayed by nearly 13 years. No explanation has been offered even for this delay assuming that the same ought to be counted only from the year 1991. Judged from any angle the notice seeking to reverse the entries made half a century ago, was clearly beyond reasonable time and was rightly quashed.

38. In so far allegation of manipulation of record and

fraud is concerned, we may note that there is no

allegation by the respondents that it is the writ

petitioners who had resorted to manipulation of record

and had created fraudulent documents. The materials on

record do not disclose any such allegation. Though the

allegation is that the original assignments in 1961 were

wrong and could not have been done because the

concerned G.O. dealing with assignment of lands to ex-

servicemen came in the year 1963 and that the assignees

were not ex-servicemen, no steps were taken to cancel

the assignments. It has come on record that the

assignees were members of the State Police Force and by

subsequent G.O., such members of the State Police Force

were treated as ex-servicemen. As Director (Appeals)

himself has stated in the order dated 09.04.2008 that

this aspect is required to be verified, without verification

and without interfering with the assignment, question of

cancellation of supplementary sethwar would not arise.

Appellants had also not taken any steps for cancellation

of sale deeds of the subject land by the assignees to Smt

K.Kousalya and others. Without taking such steps and

without coming to any definitive conclusion that the writ

petitioners had committed any fraud, permission ought

not to have been accorded for cancellation of

supplementary sethwar under Section 166-B of the Land

Revenue Act that too after fifteen years of issuance of

supplementary sethwar and after almost five decades of

assignment of the subject land.

39. There is no dispute to the proposition that fraud

vitiates all proceedings, judicial as well as administrative,

and when it is a case of fraud, limitation cannot be put

up as defence. Nonetheless, Supreme Court has time and

again sounded a note of caution that mere allegation of

fraud or suspicion of fraud is not enough. Fraud must

not only be pleaded but must also be demonstrated and

established. Mere raising of suspicion would not be

adequate to draw any conclusion of fraud. As Director

(Appeals) has pointed out in his letter dated 09.04.2008

that District Collector and Joint Collector have only

created suspicion to justify their request for initiating

proceedings for cancellation of supplementary sethwar.

This is not adequate, more so when several decades have

gone by since the initial assignments which have not

been cancelled; subsequent sale transactions of the

vendors have also not been cancelled; it is the

supplementary sethwar of the writ petitioners which has

been targeted.

40. In the previous order dated 02.02.2006, the Chief

Commissioner while declining permission to cancel

supplementary sethwar had categorically held that on the

ground of difference in language and signature no such

permission could be accorded, being untenable grounds,

that too without cancelling the assignments and

subsequent alienations and when third party rights have

crystallized.

41. This brings us to Section 41 of the Transfer of

Property Act, 1882, which reads as under:

41. Transfer by ostensible owner.- Where, with the consent, express or implied, of the persons interested in immovable property, a person is the ostensible owner of such property and transfers the same for consideration, the transfer shall not be voidable on the ground that the transferor was not authorised to make it:

Provided that the transferee, after taking reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to make the transfer, has acted in good faith.

42. Section 41 says that where with the consent,

express or implied, of the persons interested in

immovable property, a person is the ostensible owner of

such property and transfers the same for consideration,

the transfer shall not be voidable on the ground that the

transferor was not authorised to make it. Of course, as

per the proviso the benefit of Section 41 of the Transfer of

Property Act, 1882 would only be available if the

transferee after taking reasonable care to ascertain that

the transferor had power to make the transfer had acted

in good faith.

43. Section 41 came up for consideration before the

Madras High Court in The Catholic Mission Presentation

Convent (supra). The question considered by the Court

was whether the appellants were entitled as bona fide

transferees for value from an ostensible owner to seek the

protection under Section 41? Madras High Court

analysed Section 41 and held as follows:

5. It is manifest that, in order to invoke successfully the protection of the section, the transferee must establish that (1) the transferor was the ostensible owner of the properties (2) with the consent express or implied of the real owner and (3) that the transferee paid consideration, (4) acted in good faith and (5) after taking reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to transfer. The Courts below have held that the appellants are not entitled to the protection of the section as they failed to satisfy conditions (2) and (5) though they have established the other conditions. The lower appellate Court appears, however, to have proceeded on the assumption that the "consent express or implied" of the real owner was necessary not only to the transferor holding the property as ostensible owner but also to the transfer sought to be protected under the section. Though, as a matter of grammatical construction, the collocation of the words makes such interpretation possible, it is now generally accepted as the better view

that those words have reference only to the transferor holding the property as ostensible owner. This is because, as pointed Out in Fazl Hussain v. Mohamed Khazim (56 ALL. 582), the consent of the true owner to the transfer would by itself estop him under S. 115 of the Evidence Act, and the other requirement of S. 41 as to the transferee taking reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to make the transfer will be rendered nugatory. See also Satyanarayanamurti v. Pydayya (AIR 1943 Madras

459) and Fakruddin Sahib v. Ramayya Setti (AIR 1944 Madras 299). The learned Judge's error is, however of no consequence, as he has found that it was not satisfactorily proved that Palaniappa took any part in the 1931 settlement the only conduct relied on as showing his consent, apart from inaction and silence. The questions that arise for consideration are, accordingly, first, whether Palani Goundan or his sons, the plaintiffs, consented expressly or impliedly to the first defendant holding the property as the ostensible owner and, secondly, whether the appellants took reasonable care to ascertain that the first defendant had the power of transfer.

43.1. Thus, to invoke protection of Section 41, the

transferee must establish the following:

(1) Transferor was the ostensible owner of the properties;

(2) The consent, express or implied, of the real owner; (3) Transferee paid consideration;

(4) Acted in good faith; and (5) After taking reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to transfer.

43.2. In so far reasonable care to ascertain as to whether

the transferor had the power to transfer is concerned,

Madras High Court opined that the same had to be

determined with reference to the circumstances of the

particular case, the test being whether he acted like a

reasonable man of business and with ordinary prudence.

It was further held as follows:

9. The position then is this. There is no hard and fast rule that the transferee, after satisfying himself as to the apparent ownership of the transferor, should, in every case, make some further inquiry as regards his power to make the transfer. Nor is it correct to say broadly that once the transferee proves that he has taken the transfer from an ostensible owner in good faith and for consideration, he need go no further and prove that he made inquiries in regard to that title of his transferor such as a reasonable man of ordinary prudence would make, unless the real owner is able to point to something in the circumstances of the case which should lead an ordinarily prudent person to make further inquiry about the transferor's title. Whether any and what inquiry should be made to ascertain that the ostensible owner was the true owner in any particular case depends on the circumstances of that case.

44. This position has been reiterated by the Supreme

Court in V.Chandrasekaran v. Administrative Officer7 in the

following manner:

32. The general rule of law is undoubted, that no one can transfer a better title than he himself possesses; nemo dat quod non habet. However, this rule has certain exceptions and one of them is, that the transfer must be in good faith for value, and there must be no misrepresentation or fraud, which would render the transactions as void and also that the property is purchased after taking reasonable care to ascertain that the transferee has the requisite power to transfer the said land, and finally that, the parties have acted in good faith, as is required under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

45. Thus, considering all aspects of the matter and in

view of the factual narrative which has emerged from the

record including in the orders dated 02.02.2006 and

09.04.2008 though conclusions reached in the latter

contradicts the findings of fact, we are of the view that

learned Single Judge was justified in interdicting the

order dated 09.04.2008. We do not find any good ground

to reverse such a finding rendered by the learned Single

Judge.

(2012) 12 SCC 133

46. Writ appeals are devoid of any merit and are

accordingly dismissed.