Itc Limited vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh, ...
2022 Latest Caselaw 4093 Tel

      THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE UJJAL BHUYAN
                         AND
       THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE SUREPALLI NANDA

                WRIT PETITION No.7155 OF 2017

JUDGMENT AND ORDER: (Per the Hon'ble the Chief Justice Ujjal Bhuyan)

      Heard Mr. M.V.K.Moorthy, learned counsel for the

writ petitioner; Mr. P.Govind Reddy, learned counsel for

respondent Nos.1, 2 and 4; and Mr. K.Raji Reddy, learned

counsel for respondent No.3.

2. By filing this petition under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India petitioner seeks quashing of

recovery proceedings dated 04.02.2017 passed by the

second respondent.

3. It may be mentioned that second respondent in the

writ proceeding is Commercial Tax Officer, Kurupam

Market Circle, Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh, who had

passed the order dated 04.02.2017. On the other hand,

fourth respondent is the Appellate Deputy Commissioner

(CT), Vijayawada, Andhra Pradesh who had passed the

order dated 31.05.2019 dismissing the appeal of the

petitioner and upholding the order dated 04.02.2017

passed by the second respondent.

4. Petitioner in this proceeding is ITC Limited, Indian

Tobacco Division, Visakhapatnam. It is a company

registered under the Companies Act, 2013 having its

registered office at Kolkata and divisions in different

States across the country including at Visakhapatnam in

the State of Andhra Pradesh and at Secunderabad,

Telangana State.

5. Andhra Pradesh Tax on Luxuries Act, 1987

(referred to hereinafter as 'the Luxuries Tax Act') was

enacted for the purpose of levying tax on services

provided in the hotels. Subsequently, by way of

amendment Section 3A was inserted in the Luxuries Tax

Act with effect from 01.08.1996 bringing tobacco and

tobacco products within the tax net of the Luxuries Tax

Act with effect from 01.08.1996.

6. It is stated that petitioner is engaged in the

business of marketing cigarettes. It has branches at

Visakhapatnam in the State of Andhra Pradesh and

Secunderabad in the State of Telangana. Petitioner got

itself registered as a dealer under the Luxuries Tax Act in

both the States and thereafter filed monthly returns.

7. Petitioner filed W.P.No.16909 of 1996 before the

then combined High Court of Andhra Pradesh at

Hyderabad challenging the levy of luxuries tax on tobacco

i.e., questioning the constitutionality of Section 3A of the

Luxuries Tax Act. However by the judgment and order

dated 12.11.1998, W.P.No.16909 of 1996 was dismissed

by this Court.

8. The aforesaid judgment and order dated 12.11.1998

was challenged by the petitioner by filing Special Leave

Petition (C) No.4846 of 1999. Identical petitions were filed

having similar grievance. On 01.04.1999 after civil

appeals were registered, Supreme Court passed an

interim order directing the dealers to file their returns

before the computing authority but the authorities were

restrained from taking any action on the returns so filed

for recovery of any amount from the dealers during

pendency of the appeals. However it was clarified that if

the challenge failed, the dealers would be liable to pay the

due luxury tax in accordance with the assessments made

on the basis of the returns, so filed. It is stated that

pursuant to the interim stay granted on 01.04.1999

petitioner stopped paying luxury tax to the State

Government since it had stopped collecting such tax from

its customers though it continued to file returns before

the assessing authority.

9. As stated above, similar petitions were filed before

the Supreme Court challenging levy of luxury tax on

tobacco. Challenge was more particularly to inserting

Section 3A in the statute book. By a common judgment

and order dated 20.01.2005, Supreme Court disposed of

the batch of cases by declaring Section 3A of the Luxuries

Tax Act levying luxury tax on tobacco as

unconstitutional. However in view of the submission

made on behalf of the State Governments, Supreme

Court directed that if the appellants therein had collected

any amount towards luxury tax from consumers/

customers after obtaining interim orders from the

Supreme Court, they would pay the said amounts to the

respective State Governments.

10. After the aforesaid judgment and order dated

20.01.2005, the second respondent issued notice dated

24.11.2005 calling upon the petitioner to pay certain

amounts together with interest alleging that petitioner

had continued to collect luxury tax after obtaining

interim order dated 01.04.1999. Though this was denied

by the petitioner, without taking any decision thereon,

second respondent filed Contempt Petition (C) No.40 of

2006 against the petitioner before the Supreme Court

alleging that petitioner had continued to collect luxury

tax from its customers after obtaining interim order on

01.04.1999 but did not pay the same to the State

Government in violation of the judgment and order dated

20.01.2005. Petitioner contested the contempt petition.

Supreme Court appointed, by consent, M/s.Anandam

and Company, Chartered Accountants, as auditors to

audit the accounts of the petitioner for the purpose of

verifying as to whether petitioner had collected any

amount towards luxury tax from its customers after

01.04.1999 till 20.01.2005. Auditor submitted report to

Supreme Court on 25.03.2013 opining that petitioner

had not collected any luxury tax from its customers. After

considering the report of the Chartered Accountants,

Supreme Court disposed of the contempt petition on

06.02.2014 observing that there was no reason for any

proceeding to be initiated, muchless contempt. However

on the request of the second respondent, who was one of

the petitioners in the contempt petition, Supreme Court

vide the order dated 06.02.2014 permitted the second

respondent to issue appropriate show cause notice

bringing to the notice of the dealers including the

petitioner that they had collected luxury tax from its

consumers/customers after obtaining interim orders

from Supreme Court but had not paid the same to the

State Government. However it was clarified that second

respondent and other authorities should furnish all the

particulars available with them to enable the dealers to

file appropriate reply including on the point of

maintainability. Dealers were given liberty that if they felt

aggrieved by any order(s) that may be passed by the

second respondent and other revenue officials, they could

question the same before the appropriate forum.

11. Thereafter second respondent issued show cause

notice dated 07.08.2015 to the petitioner claiming an

amount of Rs.62.80 crores as allegedly collected by the

petitioner towards luxury tax and illegally retaining it.

Petitioner denied the allegation vide reply dated

14.09.2015.

12. It may be mentioned that the third respondent had

also issued a show cause notice dated 04.09.2014,

whereafter revised show cause notice dated 08.12.2016

was issued. In the revised show cause notice, third

respondent contended that in view of Section 50 of the

Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014, third

respondent had the authority to issue notice covering the

period and transactions for which second respondent had

issued notice on 07.08.2015.

13. Petitioner filed W.P.No.210 of 2017 before this

Court questioning the legality and correctness of the

revised show cause notice of third respondent dated

08.12.2016. W.P.No.210 of 2017 was dismissed by this

Court vide order dated 23.01.2017, whereafter third

respondent immediately passed the order on 24.01.2017,

which compelled the petitioner to file W.P.No.2905 of

2017 challenging the order dated 24.01.2017. This Court

by order dated 30.01.2017 set aside the order dated

24.01.2017 directing third respondent to receive the reply

from the petitioner and grant personal hearing.

14. Faced with such a situation, petitioner wrote to

second respondent vide letter dated 23.12.2016 to defer

the proceedings as similar proceedings had been initiated

by the third respondent. Post letter dated 23.12.2016 no

communication was received by the petitioner. In the

meanwhile, second respondent proceeded and passed the

impugned order dated 04.02.2017 affirming the demand

raised in the show cause notice dated 07.08.2015.

15. According to the petitioner, the amount demanded

by the second respondent is covered in the show cause

notice dated 08.12.2016 issued by the third respondent.

16. It is alleged that the show cause notice and the

impugned order have been issued and passed after more

than eleven years from the date the Luxuries Tax Act was

struck down by Supreme Court.

17. Assailing the legality and validity of the order dated

04.02.2017 passed by the second respondent, the

present writ petition came to be filed.

18. Petitioner also filed an interlocutory application to

stay the demand. By the order dated 18.04.2017, a

Division Bench of this Court took the view that since the

second respondent had passed an order, the third

respondent should refrain from passing any order until

two issues were resolved, namely, (1) the very liability of

the petitioner and (ii) who is entitled to collect.

Accordingly the following order came to be passed:

(i) There will be a direction to the petitioner, without prejudice to their contentions in the writ petition,

to avail the remedy of a statutory appeal under Section 11(1) of the A.P. Tax on Luxuries Act, 1987 as against the impugned order, within two (2) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. If an appeal is so filed, the Appellate Authority may condone the delay, entertain the appeal subject to compliance with the prescriptions contained in Section 11(2) and dispose it of in accordance with law, uninfluenced by any observation contained in this order. However, the filing of the appeal will not be taken to be an act on the part of the petitioner subjecting themselves to the jurisdiction of the authorities under the Act. The filing of the appeal will be without prejudice to the contentions of the petitioner in the main writ petition. Until a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, the impugned demand shall not be enforced, so that the petitioner is able to file an appeal and also seek a stay before the Appellate Authority under Section 11(1) of the Act; and

(ii) till the issue is finally decided, the 3rdr respondent is refrained from passing any order.

19. From the above, it is seen that a direction was

issued to the petitioner to avail the remedy of appeal

under Section 11(1) of the Luxuries Tax Act against the

impugned order dated 04.02.2017. The appellate

authority was directed to decide the said appeal on merit.

It was clarified that filing of the appeal would be without

prejudice to the contentions of the petitioner in the writ

petition and also would not be taken to be an act on the

part of the petitioner subjecting itself to the jurisdiction of

the authorities under the Luxuries Tax Act. For a period

of two weeks, it was directed that the impugned demand

should not be enforced to enable the petitioner to file

appeal to seek stay before the appellate authority. Till the

issue was finally decided, the third respondent is

refrained from passing any order.

20. Third respondent has filed counter affidavit as well

as interlocutory application for vacating the stay.

According to the third respondent, petitioner's unit at

Visakhapatnam and its other unit at Hyderabad got

amalgamated with ITC, Bhadrachalam, Khammam

District with effect from 01.04.2004 as per orders of this

Court dated 08.02.2002 in Company Petition No.197 of

2001.

20.1. Petitioner had challenged the vires of Section 3A of

the Luxuries Tax Act in so far levy of luxury tax on

cigarettes was concerned in W.P.No.16909 of 1996. The

said writ petition was heard along with other writ

petitions raising similar challenge. By the judgment and

order dated 12.11.1998 this Court dismissed all the writ

petitions upholding constitutional validity of Section 3A

of the Luxuries Tax Act.

20.2. Against the aforesaid judgment and order,

petitioner and others approached the Supreme Court by

filing Special Leave Petitions which were thereafter

converted to civil appeals. It is stated that on 01.04.1999

Supreme Court while issuing notice had passed an

interim order to the effect that petitioner and others

should register themselves before the authorities under

the Luxuries Tax Act and on disposal of the civil appeals

if it was found that petitioner and others had collected

luxury tax after obtaining interim order from the

Supreme Court, they should pay the said amount to the

State Government.

20.3. Petitioner and the Hyderabad unit filed monthly

returns before the assessing authorities at

Visakhapatnam and at Hyderabad for the assessment

years 1999-2000 to 2004-2005 disclosing the turnovers

relating to supply of cigarettes.

20.4. Subsequently Supreme Court allowed the civil

appeals by the judgment and decree dated 20.01.2005

declaring Section 3A as unconstitutional. Judgment and

order of this Court was set aside. However, Supreme

Court observed that if the petitioner and others had

charged luxury tax from customers after obtaining

interim orders on 01.04.1999, they would have to pay the

said amount to the State Government.

20.5. According to the third respondent, petitioner had

collected luxury tax post 01.04.1999. Therefore, notices

were issued by the respective assessing authorities

seeking payment of tax by the petitioner. Assessing

authorities of Visakhapatnam and Hyderabad filed

contempt petition before Supreme Court alleging violation

of the judgment and order dated 20.01.2005 by the

petitioner. However, the contempt petition was disposed

of on 06.02.2014 permitting the assessing authorities to

issue show cause notice to the petitioner of having

collected luxury tax from its consumers/customers but

not paying the same to the State Government. All

particulars were directed to be furnished in the show

cause notice.

20.6. In the meanwhile, State of Andhra Pradesh was

bifurcated on 02.06.2014 and the new State of Telangana

was carved out in terms of the Andhra Pradesh

Reorganization Act, 2014. It is contended that in terms of

Section 50 of the aforesaid Act, third respondent is

entitled to take steps for recovery of luxury tax collected

within the State of Telangana. Consequently on and from

02.06.2014 third respondent has got territorial

jurisdiction to proceed against the petitioner. Accordingly

notice was issued on 04.09.2014 to which petitioner filed

objection that third respondent would have jurisdiction

only under the Telangana Value Added Tax Act, 2005 but

not under the Luxuries Tax Act. In the light of the

objection, the matter was re-examined and upon coming

to the conclusion that the third respondent would be the

assessing authority, revised show cause notice dated

08.12.2016 was issued proposing recovery of luxury tax

of Rs.314,39,51,958.00 collected after 01.04.1999.

20.7. This was challenged by the petitioner before this

Court in W.P.No.210 of 2017. The same was dismissed on

23.01.2017. Petitioner was directed to file objection to the

revised show cause notice dated 08.12.2016, whereafter

third respondent was directed to pass appropriate

order(s) in accordance with law. However, third

respondent had already passed final orders on

24.01.2017 because the dismissal order dated

23.01.2017 was received only on 23.02.2017. Petitioner

again filed a writ petition i.e., W.P.No.2905 of 2017

wherein this Court vide order dated 30.01.2017 set aside

the order dated 24.01.2017 directing the third

respondent to follow the directions contained in the order

dated 23.01.2017 in W.P.No.210 of 2017.

20.8. While the matter stood thus, second respondent

pursuant to his notice dated 07.08.2015 passed final

orders on 04.02.2017 for recovery of Rs.62.80 crores

from the petitioner. This has been impugned in the

present proceedings, wherein interim order was passed

on 18.04.2017 as already extracted above.

20.9. Third respondent has contended that interim order

dated 18.04.2017 is contrary to the order dated

23.01.2017 passed in W.P.No.210 of 2017 and reiterated

vide order dated 30.01.2017 in W.P.No.2905 of 2017. It is

stated that it is the third respondent who is the assessing

officer of the petitioner and not the second respondent

who ought not to have passed the order dated

04.02.2017. Thereafter third respondent has made

averments relating to its entitlement to collect luxury tax.

21. Fourth respondent i.e., the Appellate Deputy

Commissioner (CT), Vijayawada has filed counter

affidavit. From the aforesaid affidavit, it appears that

against the recovery order dated 04.02.2017 passed by

the second respondent, petitioner had preferred appeal

before the fourth respondent in terms of the order of this

Court dated 18.04.2017 under Section 11(1) of the

Luxuries Tax Act. It further appears that the appeal was

dismissed vide the order dated 31.05.2019 by affirming

the recovery order.

22. Rejoinder affidavit has been filed by the petitioner.

Petitioner has questioned the appellate order dated

31.05.2019 as a mere reproduction of the order passed

by the second respondent. There is no independent

application of mind. Thereafter the rejoinder affidavit

deals with the merit of petitioner's contention that it did

not collect any luxury tax post 01.04.1999 and therefore

it is not liable to pay any amount to the respondents.

23. On the basis of the pleadings and other materials

on record, the short point which arises for consideration

is whether this Court would have the territorial

jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition assailing the

order dated 04.02.2017 passed by the second

respondent?

23.1. Corollary to the above the question would be as to

whether this Court would have the territorial jurisdiction

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the

appellate order dated 31.05.2019 passed by the fourth

respondent upholding the order dated 04.02.2017 passed

by the second respondent?

24. Submissions made by learned counsel for the

parties are on pleaded lines. However, those have been

duly considered.

25. We have already noted that constitutionality of

Section 3A of the Luxuries Tax Act was questioned before

this Court in a writ proceeding. The challenge was

repelled vide the judgment and order dated 12.11.1998,

whereafter the matter travelled to the Supreme Court.

Supreme Court had passed an interim order on

01.04.1999 directing the dealers including the petitioner

to file their returns under the Luxuries Tax Act but the

authorities were restrained from taking any action on the

returns so filed during pendency of the appeals before

Supreme Court. However it was clarified that if the

appeals were dismissed the dealers would be liable to pay

the due luxury tax in accordance with assessments made

on the basis of the returns so filed.

26. By a common judgment and order dated

20.01.2005 Supreme Court declared Section 3A of the

Luxuries Tax Act levying luxury tax on tobacco as

unconstitutional. However Supreme Court clarified that if

the appellants had collected any amount towards luxury

tax from the consumers/customers after the interim

order was passed by the Supreme Court on 01.04.1999,

they would have to pay the said amounts to the

respective State Governments.

27. Second respondent filed contempt petition against

the petitioner before the Supreme Court alleging that

petitioner had continued to collect luxury tax from its

customers after the interim order was passed on

01.04.1999, but that was not paid to the State

Government, which was in violation of the judgment and

order dated 20.01.2005. In the course of the contempt

proceeding, Supreme Court appointed chartered

accountants to audit the accounts of the petitioner to

verify as to whether petitioner had collected any amount

towards luxury tax from its customers after 01.04.1999

till 20.01.2005 when the judgment was delivered

declaring Section 3A of the Luxuries Tax Act as

unconstitutional. The auditors submitted report,

whereafter Supreme Court disposed of the contempt

petition on 06.02.1994. Relevant portion of the order

dated 06.02.2014 reads as under:

In the report filed by the Auditors/Chartered Accountants a clean chit is given to the contemnors/respondents. However, the petitioners dispute the report of the auditors/Chartered Accountants. In the matters of this nature, in our opinion, it may not be appropriate for us to initiate any proceedings, much less proceedings under contempt against the respondents. In that view of the matter, we decline to grant the relief sought for by the petitioners in these contempt petitions. The contempt petitions are disposed of accordingly.

However, we permit the petitioners to issue appropriate show cause notice(s) to the respondents, inter alia, bringing to their notice collected luxury tax from consumers/customers, but have not paid the same to the State Government. We make it clear that in the show cause notice the petitioners will furnish all the particulars available with them to the respondents, so that the respondents can furnish appropriate reply to the petitioners.

After receipt of the show cause notice(s), the respondents are at liberty to take out all such contentions which are available to them, including certain contentions raised in these proceedings apart from maintainability. They are also at liberty to place reliance on the report of the Auditors/Chartered Accountants. After receipt of the reply to the said show

cause notice, the petitioners will consider the same and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law after affording opportunity of hearing to the respondents. If, for any reason, the respondents are aggrieved by the orders that may be passed by the petitioners, they are at liberty to question the same before an appropriate forum.

28. From the above, it is seen that Supreme Court had

permitted the petitioners therein i.e., taxing authorities

including the second respondent to issue appropriate

show cause notices furnishing all the particulars as to

collection of luxury tax etc. Petitioner and others were

granted liberty to raise all contentions available with

them while submitting reply. After receipt of reply, the

taxing authorities were directed to consider the same and

pass appropriate order(s) in accordance with law after

complying with the principles of natural justice. If the

petitioner and others felt aggrieved by the orders that

may be passed by the taxing authorities, they were given

liberty to question the same before the appropriate

forum.

29. When the third respondent issued a revised show

cause notice dated 08.12.2016 the same came to be

challenged by the petitioner before this Court in

W.P.No.210 of 2017. This Court by the order dated

23.01.2017 dismissed the writ petition. It was held as

follows:

18. It appears from the material papers filed before us that the revised show cause notice issued by the 2nd respondent in this writ petition covers two units, one located within the jurisdiction of the CTO, Sarojini Devi Road Circle, Hyderabad, demanding a tax in an amount of Rs.251,59,22,641/- and another relating to the 2nd unit within the jurisdiction of the CTO, Kurupam Market Circle, Visakhapatnam, making a demand to the tune of Rs.62,80,29,344/-. It also remains a matter of record that the CTO, Kurupam Road Circle, who is the 4th respondent herein, has actually issued a separate notice dated 07.08.2015, demanding luxury tax to the tune of Rs.62,80,29,344/-, in relation to the unit at Visakhapatnam.

19. Admittedly, the show cause notice issued by the Commercial Tax officer, Visakhapatnam, dated 07.08.2015, has been challenged separately by way of another writ petition. But it is yet to come up for hearing. Therefore, if the claims of both the Commercial Tax Officers are actually sustainable in law, assuming that they are sustainable, the petitioner can always raise a valid point that there cannot be overlap of the claims. There cannot be two demands by two different authorities in respect of one liability. But that is a matter that does not strike at the root of the issue of jurisdiction of the respondent. Therefore, the second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner also does not appeal to us to entertain the writ petition, especially at the stage of

show cause notice, when the Supreme Court has granted liberty to whoever it is to issue show cause notice and proceed further. Therefore, we find no justification to entertain the writ petition at this stage.

20. Hence the writ petition is dismissed. It is open to the petitioners to file their objections to the show cause notice within a period of fifteen days, and thereafter, it will be open to the respondent to proceed in accordance with law and in accordance with the order of the Supreme Court. While passing final orders, the concerned authority shall deal with all the issues, uninfluenced by any of the observations made before us, limited for the purpose of disposal of this writ petition.

30. Thus this Court held that the revised show cause

notice was issued on liberty being given by Supreme

Court. Therefore there was no justification to entertain

the challenge to the said show cause notice. In so far the

jurisdiction of the Commercial Tax Officer,

Visakhapatnam or for that matter Assistant

Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Warangal is

concerned, view taken by this Court was that - that is a

matter which does not strike at the root of the issue of

jurisdiction of the taxing authorities.

31. This is the factual backdrop of the case on which

we are called upon to answer the question so framed.

Before we answer the question so framed, we find that by

the impugned order dated 04.02.2017 passed by the

second respondent it has been determined that petitioner

had collected Rs.62,80,29,344.00 as luxury tax during

the period from March, 1999 to December, 2004 but

retained the same taking shelter of the interim order of

the Supreme Court dated 01.04.1999. Therefore,

petitioner was directed to pay the said amount to the

second respondent within 30 days failing which recovery

proceedings would be initiated.

32. This Court passed an interim order dated

18.04.2017 directing the petitioner to avail the remedy of

statutory appeal under Section 11(1) of the Luxuries Tax

Act against the order dated 04.02.2017 without prejudice

to the contentions of the petitioner raised in the writ

petition. Further the third respondent has been

restrained from passing any order.

33. On due consideration we find that the above interim

order of this Court is contrary to the order dated

23.01.2017 passed by this Court in W.P.No.210 of 2017

whereby challenge to the show cause notice issued by the

third respondent was dismissed. This Court had made it

clear that it would be open to the taxing authorities to

proceed in accordance with law and in terms of the order

of Supreme Court.

34. This now brings us to the question framed supra. In

the writ petition the only challenge made is to the order

dated 04.02.2017 passed by the second respondent i.e.,

Commercial Tax Officer, Visakhapatnam. Admittedly the

said officer is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of this

Court. The said order has been affirmed in the appeal by

the fourth respondent vide the order dated 31.05.2019.

Fourth respondent is the Appellate Deputy Commissioner

(CT), Vijayawada, which is also outside the territorial

limits of this Court.

35. Whatever may be the litigation history of the case,

as of now and in so far the present petition is concerned,

the challenge is to the order dated 04.02.2017 passed by

the second respondent. We are afraid we cannot entertain

and continue with the present proceeding against an

authority which is situated outside the territorial

jurisdiction of this Court. Since the order dated

04.02.2017 has been affirmed in appeal it would be open

to the petitioner to make further challenge or to carry

forward the challenge before the higher forum but

certainly not before this Court. It is not for this Court to

take a decision as to whether petitioner had collected any

luxury tax from 01.04.1999 to 20.01.2005 within the

present State of Telangana or within the present State of

Andhra Pradesh. To answer such a question would

require determination of various factual aspects which

the High Court exercising writ jurisdiction would not like

to enter upon. In any case, it is the contention of the

petitioner that it had stopped collecting luxury tax from

its customers post 01.04.1999 and as such it is not liable

to pay any luxury tax either to the second respondent or

to the third respondent. Thus, from the perspective of the

petitioner the stand is the same. Since it has not

collected luxury tax, it is not liable to pay such tax, be it

to the second respondent or to the third respondent. In

the circumstances, to restrain the third respondent to

perform its statutory duties following the liberty granted

by the Supreme Court would not be justified. That apart,

no action of the third respondent is under impugnment

in the present writ proceeding. Therefore, no order

against the third respondent is warranted.

36. That being the position we are not inclined to

continue further with the present writ proceeding.

However, we have not expressed any opinion on merit. It

would be open to the petitioner to challenge the order

dated 04.02.2017 as well as the appellate order dated

31.05.2019 before the appropriate forum having

jurisdiction.

37. Consequently, the writ petition is dismissed.

Interim order passed earlier stands vacated. However,

there shall be no order as to costs.

Miscellaneous applications, pending if any, shall

stand closed.

______________________________________ UJJAL BHUYAN, CJ

______________________________________ SUREPALLI NANDA, J 10.08.2022 Pln