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Yadaram Laxminarayana, vs State Of A.P., Rep By Pp.,
2022 Latest Caselaw 4023 Tel

Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 4023 Tel
Judgement Date : 3 August, 2022

Telangana High Court
Yadaram Laxminarayana, vs State Of A.P., Rep By Pp., on 3 August, 2022
Bench: K.Surender
            HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.SURENDER

            CRIMINAL APPEAL No.419 OF 2009
JUDGMENT:

1. The appellant is convicted for the offence under Section

306 of IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment

for a period of five years and to pay fine of Rs.2,000/-, in

default, to suffer simple imprisonment for three months vide

judgment in S.C.No.237 of 2008, dated 09.04.2009 passed by

the VI Additional District & Sessions Judge, Medak at

Siddipet. Aggrieved by the same, present appeal is filed.

2. Initially A1 to A3 were charged for the offence under

Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC and Section 4 of the

Dowry Prohibition Act. A4 was charged for the offence under

Section 302 r/w Section 109 of IPC. A1 to A3 were acquitted

for the charge under Section 302 R/W section 34 of IPC and

under Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. However, the Court

alternatively framed charge under Section 306 of IPC, for

which A1 alone was convicted.

3. The case of the prosecution is that P.W.1 is the father of

the deceased. His deceased daughter was married to one

Yadagiri (P.W.8) on 15.05.2003 and they lead happy marital

life for one year. However, A1 called the deceased on telephone

and went to Maddikunta village. One month thereafter, the

appellant/accused called the deceased and asked her to come

to Kotilingala temple of Siddipet, but the appellant/accused

did not go there as per his promise. Thereafter, in-laws of the

deceased called P.W.1 and informed that she was missing.

Having come to know that daughter was at Kotilingala Temple,

they went there and brought the deceased to their house.

Thereafter, she stayed there for two or three days and again

went to her matrimonial house. There, the in-laws refused to

take the deceased daughter stating that she was having love

affair with the accused. Subsequently, the deceased took

divorce from P.W.8 Ydagiri. After divorce, when the accused

was asked to marry the deceased, the accused/ A1 to A3

allegedly demanded an amount of Rs.2.00 lakhs and a motor

cycle towards dowry. As P.W.1 expressed that he cannot give

the demanded dowry, A1/accused did not marry her. This

issue went to the notice of the naxalites (Annalu). On

01.03.2005, the said naxalites came to the village and

performed the marriage of the deceased with A1 in Hanuman

Temple, but P.W.1 was not present on the said day. After

marriage, the deceased stayed in the house of the accused for

27 days and on the 28th day, she was taken to the hospital for

pesticide poisoning. Initially, she was taken to RMP Doctor,

who advised to take her to Dubbak Hospital and at the said

hospital, she was declared as brought dead.

4. After the death of the deceased, P.W.1 lodged complaint

Ex.P1 narrating all the facts and suspected that A1 to A3

forcibly administered poison, for which reason, the First

Information Report was registered under Section 302 of IPC.

After conclusion of investigation, the police filed charge sheet

for the offence under Section 302 r/w Section 34 of IPC

against A1 to A3 and A4 for instigating A1 to A3 to murder

the deceased for the charge under Section 302 r/w 109 of IPC

5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the

prosecution case cannot be believed for the reason of there

being several discrepancies in between the statements of

witnesses. Though the case was registered for the offence

under Section 302 of IPC and the charge sheet was also filed

under Section 302 of IPC, the trial Court came to the

conclusion that it was an offence under Section 306 of IPC. He

further submits that the very basis for the prosecution case

was that the appellant was calling on telephone. However, as

per the evidence of investigating officer, P.W.14, he had stated

that he has not examined the owner of the telephone booth

from where the accused called the deceased to go to

Kotilingala temple. Further, the accused has also not

examined any one at Kotilingala temple nor did examine one

Chakali Srinu who had gone to the village of the former

husband of the deceased along with A1. Since there is no proof

that the appellant had nothing to do with calling the deceased

after her marriage to P.W.8, the entire case of the prosecution

appears to have been built on the premise of the appellant

harassing the deceased.

6. On the other hand, learned Public Prosecutor submits

that the incident of death took place within 28 days of the

marriage, for which reason, the presumption has to be drawn

that the said death was on account of the harassment meted

out by the accused.

4. As seen from the finding of the learned Sessions Judge,

the reason for convicting the appellant for the offence under

Section 306 of IPC is that there was no forcible administration

of poison to the deceased, however, for the reason of; i) A1

being a timid person, though he called the deceased to

Kotilingala temple, the accused did not go there; ii) the love

affair of the accused with the deceased was within the

knowledge of the entire village and several panchayats were

held; iii) after divorce, when the appellant failed to marry, the

marriage of the appellant and the deceased was performed by

the naxalites; iv) the only conclusion that could be drawn is

that the accused was responsible for suicidal death of the

deceased for harassing and humiliating the deceased.

5. Having given such reasons for the deceased committing

suicide, the learned Sessions Judge found that the other

accused A2 to A4 had nothing to do with either the

harassment of the deceased or her death, for which reason, A2

to A4 were acquitted. The State did not prefer any appeal

against the acquittal of the accused A2 to A4 or the acquittal

of A1 under Section 302 of IPC.

6. As seen from the evidence of P.W.1 and the other

witnesses, the marriage of the accused was performed by the

naxalites with the deceased. During said period of stay by the

deceased in the house of the accused after marriage, till her

death, there is absolutely no interaction by P.W.1, the father,

and P.W.2, mother of the deceased.

7. To attract an offence under Section 306 of IPC, there has

to be continuous or serious of acts which led to the deceased

committing suicide unable to bear such harassment. Even

according to the investigation, the entire investigation and the

evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 would go to show that there was a

love affair between the deceased and the accused, however,

none of the witnesses including the investigating officer speak

anything about the incident or happenings that have taken

place from the date of marriage till the date of death of the

deceased.

8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of West

Bengal vs Indrajit Kundu and others reported in 2020 (1) ALD

(Crl.) 185 (SC), held as follows:

"12. In the judgment in the case of Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chattisgarh 2001 (2) ALD (Crl.) 873 (SC)=(2001) 9 SCC 618, this Court has considered the scope of Section 306 and the ingredients which are essential for abetment as set out in Section 107 IPC. While interpreting the word "instigation", it is held in paragraph 20 as under:

"20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do "an act". To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The present one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation."

9. In Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Government of

NCT of Delhi)1, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:

"16. Speaking for the three-Judge Bench in Ramesh Kumar case [(2001) 9 SCC 618 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1088] , R.C. Lahoti, J. (as His Lordship then was) said that instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do "an act". To satisfy the requirement of "instigation", though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes "instigation" must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. Where the accused had, by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct, created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide, in which case, an "instigation" may have to be inferred. A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow, cannot be said to be instigation.

17. Thus, to constitute "instigation", a person who instigates another has to provoke, incite, urge or encourage the doing of an act by the other by "goading" or "urging forward". The dictionary meaning of the word "goad" is "a thing that stimulates someone into action; provoke to action or reaction" (see Concise Oxford English Dictionary); "to keep irritating or annoying somebody until he reacts" (see Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 7th Edn.)."

10. In Praveen Pradhan v. State of Uttaranchal2, the

Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:

(2009) 16 Supreme Court Cases 605

(2012) 9 Supreme Court Cases 7334

"17. The offence of abetment by instigation depends upon the intention of the person who abets and not upon the act which is done by the person who has abetted. The abetment may be by instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid as provided under Section 107 IPC. However, the words uttered in a fit of anger or omission without any intention cannot be termed as instigation. (Vide: State of Punjab v. Iqbal Singh [(1991) 3 SCC 1 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 513 : AIR 1991 SC 1532] , Surender v. State of Haryana [(2006) 12 SCC 375 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 210] , Kishori Lal v. State of M.P. [(2007) 10 SCC 797 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 701 : AIR 2007 SC 2457] and Sonti Rama Krishna v. Sonti Shanti Sree [(2009) 1 SCC 554 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 578]."

11. As seen from the evidence and also in the light of the

aforesaid decisions, to constitute instigation, it is necessary for

the prosecution to prove that the accused had in any manner

provoked or encouraged the deceased to commit suicide by

deliberately indulging in acts compelling the deceased to

commit suicide, vexed with such acts. In the entire case,

except stating the background of the case, there is no evidence

as to what transpired in those 28 days of marriage, for which

reason, the offence under Section 306 of IPC cannot be

sustained.

12. For the foregoing discussion, the prosecution has failed

to prove an offence under Section 306 of IPC against the

accused.

13. In the result, the judgment of the trial Court in

S.C.No.237 of 2008 dated 09.04.2009 is set aside and the

accused/A1 is acquitted. Since the accused is on bail, his bail

bonds stand cancelled.

__________________ K.SURENDER, J Date: 03.08.2022 kvs

HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.SURENDER

CRIMINAL APPEAL No.419 OF 2009

Date:03.08.2022.

kvs

 
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