Telangana High Court

The State Of A.P. vs Jeevan Choudary Mohan Singh on 24 March, 2021

Bench: G Sri Devi

                 HONOURABLE JUSTICE G. SRI DEVI

                  CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1785 of 2009

JUDGMENT:

The appellant-State filed the present appeal by invoking the

provision under Section 378(1) and (3) of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, challenging the judgment dated 09.04.2008 in

S.C.No.197 of 2007 on the file of the Metropolitan Sessions Judge,

Hyderabad, wherein and whereby the learned Sessions Judge

acquitted the respondents/A1 and A2 for the offence punishable

under Section 307 IPC.

2. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 06.07.2005 at

about 10.30 AM, when P.W.1 was in his house at Jeevan Choudhary

Street, Jiaguda, Hyderabad, his brother-A1 and his father-A2

quarreled with him due to previous enmity and attempted to kill him

by hanging, and in the meantime, his sister P.W.2 rescued him from

the hands of A1 and A2 and then A1 and A2 left P.W.1. Basing on

the complaint given by P.W.1, a case in Cr.No.92 of 2005 for the

offence under Section 307 IPC was registered against A1 and A2.

3. Heard learned Assistant Public Prosecutor for the appellant-

State, Sri P. Nagendra Reddy, learned counsel for the

respondents/A1 and A2 and perused the record.

4. After appraisal of the evidence of prosecution available on

record, this Court finds that there is absolutely no evidence on

record to show that A1 and A2 have committed any offence on the GSD, J Crl.A.No.1785 of 2009

alleged date of occurrence. There are material contradictions

between the statements as well as veracity of the witnesses i.e.,

P.Ws.1 and 2 on one hand and P.W.5 on the other. According to the

evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2, the occurrence took place at about

10.30 AM on 06.07.2005 in the house of P.W.1. P.W.1 deposed that

on the date of occurrence, while he was about to leave the house to

attend the Court, A1 and A2 came to his house, A1 lifted him from

the ground and A2 tied the hanging rope around his neck.

Thereafter, P.W.1 lost his consciousness. However, his elder sister-

P.W.2 came there and sprinkled water on his face. He further

deposed that after attending the Court on that day, he had gone to a

Doctor, who refused to give any treatment and asked him to go to

Osmania General Hospital, and thereafter, at about

8.45 PM., he gave a written report-Ex.P1 to the police and the police

sent him to Osmania General Hospital. However, according to the

evidence of P.W.2, P.W.1 had his lunch in her house at about 2.00

or 3.00 PM., on that day after returning from the Court. However,

according to P.W.5, the house where the scene of offence is located

was shown as the house of A1 and A2, but not the house of P.W.1.,

as narrated by him. Therefore, A1 and A2 were not the aggressors

and they have also not gone to the house of P.W.1 as alleged by

him in his written report. The trial Court, on proper appreciation of

the evidence, has given its finding that the offence was said to have GSD, J Crl.A.No.1785 of 2009

been taken place at about 10.30 AM., but P.W.1 had gone to the

criminal Court to attend a case and thereafter, he had lunch in his

sister's house. Having regard to his attendance in the Criminal

Court on that day after the alleged occurrence, happening of such an

incident in his house at 10.30 AM is doubtful, and accordingly, the

trial Court disbelieved the same. Hence, I have no hesitation to hold

that there is any perversity in the said findings of the trial Court.

Moreover, the alleged occurrence had taken place at 10.30 AM., but

the complainant/P.W.1 instead of straightaway going to the Police

Station had attended his regular pursuits, such as, he attended the

Court, had taken lunch, gone to the Doctor and thereafter at 8.30

PM, he had gone to the Police Station and lodged a written report,

which goes to show that due to the serious property and money

disputes between him and the accused, the chance of false

implication of the accused, who are none other than the brother and

father of P.W.1, after due deliberations cannot be ruled out. Thus,

as rightly pointed out by the trial Court, there is absolutely no

material on record to show that there was any occurrence on the

alleged date as ventilated by the prosecution. Thus, the trial Court,

after evaluating the entire evidence available on record, has rightly

acquitted the accused for the offence under Section 307 IPC.

Therefore, I do not find any illegality or perversity in the findings of

the trial Court.

GSD, J Crl.A.No.1785 of 2009

5. In Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura1 the Apex Court held as

under:

"It is clear that in an appeal against acquittal in the absence of perversity in the judgment and order, interference by this Court exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction, is not warranted. However, if the appeal is heard by an appellate court, being the final court of fact, is fully competent to re- appreciate, reconsider and review the evidence and take its own decision. In other words, law does not prescribe any limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and the appellate court is free to arrive at its own conclusion keeping in mind that acquittal provides for presumption in favour of the accused. The presumption of innocence is available to the person and in criminal jurisprudence every person is presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by the competent court. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the findings of acquittal. There is no limitation on the part of the appellate court to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is found and to come to its own conclusion. The appellate court can also review the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court with respect to both facts and law. While dealing with the appeal against acquittal preferred by the State, it is the duty of the appellate court to marshal the entire evidence on record and only by giving cogent and adequate reasons set aside the judgment of acquittal. An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are "compelling and substantial reasons" for doing so. If the order is "clearly unreasonable", it is a compelling reason for interference. When the trial Court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declaration/report of ballistic experts etc., the appellate court is competent to reverse the decision of the trial Court depending on the materials placed."

6. In Maloth Somaraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh2 the Apex

Court held that there can be no two opinions that merely because

the acquittal is found to be wrong and another view can be taken,

the judgment of acquittal cannot be upset. The appellate Court has

1 (2011) 9 SCC 479

2 (2011) 8 SCC 635 GSD, J Crl.A.No.1785 of 2009

more and serious responsibility while dealing with the judgment of

acquittal and unless the acquittal is found to be perverse or not at all

supportable and where the appellate Court comes to the conclusion

that conviction is a must, the judgment of acquittal cannot be upset.

The appellate Court has to examine as to whether the trial Court,

while upsetting the acquittal, has taken such care.