Cyber City Computers vs The State Of Telangana
2021 Latest Caselaw 4465 Tel

THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA
                         AND
     THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A.RAJASHEKER REDDY

          WRIT PETITION Nos.40775 and 40962 OF 2018

COMMON ORDER:      (Per the Hon'ble the Chief Justice Satish Chandra Sharma)


     Both the writ petitions were heard together and are

being disposed of by this common order as the issue

involved in both the writ petitions is one and the same.


     The petitioners before this Court have filed the

present     writ   petitions      challenging           the      validity      of

G.O.Ms.No.99, dated 05.09.2018 issued by the State of

Telangana amending Rule 5(2) of the Telangana Protection

of Depositors of Financial Establishment Rules, 1999 (for

short, the Rules) validating with retrospective effect in

respect of all prosecutions launched under the provisions

of the Telangana Protection of Depositors of Financial

Establishment Act, 1999 (for short, Act No.17 of 1999) to

the effect of empowering any Police Officer not below the

rank of Inspector of Police to launch prosecution under

the Act No.17 of 1999 and the Rules framed thereunder.


     The petitioners' contention is that the amendment,

which has been made with retrospective effect, is

arbitrary, illegal and ultra vires the Act No.17 of 1999

offending Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It has

been further contended that the erstwhile State of Andhra
                               2




Pradesh enacted the Act No.17 of 1999 to protect the

deposits made by the public in financial establishments

and matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.

The State of Telangana after its formation in exercise of

powers conferred under Section 101 of the Andhra

Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014 issued a G.O.Ms.No.81,

Home (Legal) Department, dated 21.05.2016 adapting the

aforesaid Act without any modifications. It has been

further contended that in the year 2002, Sri Bhale Rao,

IAS, Registrar of Cooperative Societies, lodged a complaint

before   the    Deputy   Superintendent   of   Police,   Crime

Investigation    Department    (CID)/third     respondent   in

respect of irregularities relating to disbursement of loans

by the elected board officials of Charminar Cooperative

Urban Bank Limited. It was alleged that the Management

has played fraud and has committed misappropriation

and consequently, a crime was registered vide F.I.R.No.3

of 2002, dated 25.02.2002 under Section 5 of the Act

No.17 of 1999 read with Sections 420 and 409 of Indian

Penal Code (IPC). It has been further stated that initially

the Sub Inspector of Police registered the crime and later

on the Deputy Superintendent of Police (City Zone), Crime

Investigation Department, Hyderabad has carried out the

investigation and filed charge sheet and the Metropolitan
                               3




Sessions Judge took cognizance under Section 5 of the

Act No.17 of 1999 read with Sections 120B, 420, 409 IPC

registering a case vide Calendar Case No.6 of 2002.


     The petitioners have further stated that as per the

definition clause as contained under Section 2(a) of the

Act No.17 of 1999, the 'competent authority' means the

authority appointed under Section 4 of the Act and

Section 4 of the Act empowers the Government to appoint

an authority to perform the functions of the competent

authority for the purposes of the Act and the Rules framed

thereunder. The petitioners further stated that the

Government      appointed     and     designated     District

Magistrates of all the Districts and the Commissioners of

Police in respect of the cities Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam

and Vijayawada as 'competent authority' for the purposes

of various functions under the Act and the Rules. The

petitioners further stated that the investigation relating to

such offences were also being handed over to the Crime

Investigation Department and the State Government

issued G.O.Ms.No.193, dated 23.08.2001 designating

Additional Director General of Police, CID or Inspector

General of Police, CID as competent authority in respect of

cases investigated by CID. The petitioners further stated

that the Additional Director General of Police, CID, which
                                4




is the competent authority to initiate further steps under

the Act No.17 of 1999 and the Rules, is also vested with

powers of control in respect of properties sought to be

attached under the Act as well as to initiate prosecutions

before the Special Court for the offences under the Act

No.17 of 1999 upon its satisfaction about the entity's

violation of the provisions of the Act No.17 of 1999.


      The petitioners further stated that the petitioner

No.1 is accused No.89 being a company involved in the

activities of software and hardware in computers of which

the petitioner No.2 is a partner of the petitioner No.1 firm.

The petitioners participated in the investigation. It has

been further stated that the petitioner No.1 is a loanee

and the petitioner No.2 is the partner of the firm. It has

been stated that the petitioner No.2 was arrested on

03.07.2002 and was released on bail on 19.07.2003.


      The petitioners further stated that the charge sheet

was   filed   before   the   Metropolitan   Sessions    Judge,

Hyderabad (Special Court under Act No.17 of 1999) on

12.06.2002 and the Special Court took cognizance on

22.06.2002 and the petitioners preferred a criminal

petition under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure

(CrPC) for quashment of the charge sheet vide Criminal
                                   5




Petition No.4253 of 2015 and the same is pending for

adjudication before this Court. The petitioners even

though have preferred a criminal petition for quashment

of the proceedings have preferred the present writ petition

also. It has been further stated that the petitioners

preferred an application i.e., CrlPMP No.9 of 2018 for

discharge and the said application for discharge came up

for hearing on 02.11.2018 and the prosecution has placed

on   record    G.O.Ms.No.44,          dated      24.03.2017    and

G.O.Ms.No.99, dated 05.09.2018. It was argued before the

Special Court that the Special Judge does not have the

power to declare the amendment as ultra vires and

therefore, the petitioners were left with no other choice

except   to   file   the   writ       petition   challenging   the

constitutional validity of G.O.Ms.No.99, dated 05.09.2018

as ultra vires the Act No.17 of 1999. It has been contended

by the petitioners that the Act No.17 of 1999 itself does

not have its applicability with retrospective effect and the

amendment done by the State Government makes the

pending proceedings infructuous before the Special Court

including the petitioners' application for discharge filed in

January, 2019.


     The petitioners further contended that the impugned

amendment seeks to validate the prosecution which
                                 6




otherwise   is   incompetently      launched   and       was   not

maintainable in law and therefore, as retrospective effect

has been given to the amendment amending the statute,

the same deserves to be declared as ultra vires. Another

ground has been raised by the petitioners that the

amendment is violative of the Article 20(1) and Article 21

of the Constitution of India as it infringes the fundamental

right of a fair trial. The petitioners further stated that this

Court in its Judgment delivered on 01.04.2015 in

Criminal Appeal No.1576 of 2005 and batch held that any

amendment to the charges implicating Section 5 of the Act

No.17 of 1999 can only be by the competent authority

named and designated under the statutory rules against

an accused and set aside the convictions against the

accused under Section 5 of the Act No.17 of 1999. The

petitioners further stated that the S.L.P., was preferred by

the State of Telangana before the Hon'ble Supreme Court,

i.e., S.L.P.No.4633-4646 of 2017 and the same were

dismissed on the ground of delay as well as on merits vide

Order    dated    24.03.2017.       The   petitioners'    further

contention is that the impugned amendment has the

effect of nullifying the said Judgment and therefore, the

same is impermissible in law. Therefore, the petitioners

prayed for the following relief:-
                                            7




                  "For the reasons stated in the accompanying
        affidavit, it is hereby prayed that this Hon'ble Court may
        be    pleased   to   issue   a     writ,   order,   direction   more
        particularly one in the nature of writ of mandamus,
        declaring the second proviso to Rule 5(2) of Telangana
        Protection of Depositors Financial Establishment Rules,
        1999, introduced vide the impugned G.O.Ms.No.99, dated
        5.9.2018 as ultra vires Act 17 of 1999 as illegal, arbitrary,
        offending Article 14 and Article 21 of the Constitution and
        consequently     quash       the       same   as    such   with    a
        consequential direction to the respondents not to give
        effect to the said proviso in respect of the prosecutions
        initiated prior to 24.3.2017, i.e., the date on which
        Officers not below the rank of Inspector of Police were
        notified as competent authority under Act 17 of 1999 and
        to pass such other order or orders as this Hon'ble Court
        may deem fit just proper in the circumstances of the
        case."


          The learned counsel for the petitioners has placed

reliance upon a Judgment delivered in the case of State of

Karnataka v. Karnataka Pawn Brokers Association1. Heavy

reliance has been placed upon paragraph 25 of the

aforesaid Judgment and it has been argued that the

Legislature cannot set at naught the Judgment, which has

been pronounced, by amending the law.

          A counter affidavit has been filed by the State

Government stating that the writ petition has been filed

only with a view to protract the litigation and to save white

collar offenders. It has been stated that the petitioners


1
    (2018) 6 SCC 363
                                    8




have not been able to point out the prejudice caused to

them on account of the amendment. It has been stated

that under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC),

when a complaint is received by the police, it is

investigated and a final report under Section 173 CrPC is

filed and thereafter, the Magistrate concerned having

jurisdiction takes the cognizance of the matter. It has

been further stated that whether a person is guilty or not

has to be looked into only after the trial and on account of

alleged        procedural   irregularity,   as   pleaded   by   the

petitioners, the entire scam cannot be quashed by giving a

clean chit to the petitioners.


          Reliance has been placed by the Judgment delivered

in the case of T.Barai v. Hentry Ah Hoe2 and it has been

contended that the act, which is subject matter of the

crime was certainly an offence earlier also and is an

offence under the amendment also and it is nobody's case

that by amending the Act, the act committed by the

petitioners has been made an offence by amending the law

retrospectively. It has also been contended that any law

relating to retrospective nature of procedural aspects

would not create any vested right to the litigant as it does

not affect the rights guaranteed under the Constitution of

2
    AIR 1983 SC 150
                                 9




India either under Article 20(1) or under Article 21 of the

Constitution of India. It has been stated that a procedural

law should not ordinarily be construed as mandatory. The

procedural law is always subservient to and is an aid to

justice. Any interpretation which eludes or frustrates the

recipient of justice is not to be followed. It has been

further stated that procedural law is not a tyrant but a

servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice.

Procedural prescription is the handmaid and not the

mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the administration

of justice. The amendment in the procedural law has been

done with retrospective effect to remove the difficulties in

implementation of a statute whose objects would get

defeated in the absence of such amendment of procedural

provisions. It has been further stated that in the case on

hand, the investigation is done by the officer of the

Competent     Authority    as       contemplated   under   the

provisions of the Act No.17 of 1999, not below the rank of

an Inspector of Police, namely the Deputy Superintendent

of Police of the CID and the final report is also filed by him

and therefore, the amendment done by the State would

not in any way alter the situation of the factual matrix of

the case on hand and the entire exercise by the petitioners
                              10




is to ensure that they are not subjected to trial on some

pretext or the other.


     The State Government further stated that the

present case is a case of criminal conspiracy entered

among the Chairman and Board of Directors, Managing

Director and the staff of Charminar Cooperative Urban

Bank dealing with sanction of loans. Valuators and legal

professionals in connivance with borrowers have siphoned

huge amounts of the bank and the properties mortgaged

with the Bank were grossly overvalued by the valuators of

the Bank and the same was accepted by the Bank. The

accused persons have misappropriated the amount and

cheated the Bank and it is a large scale fraud. The

petitioners want to get away with the misdeeds by taking

technical objections. It has been further stated that as per

Rule 9 of the Rules, 1999 the Government has been

empowered to remove the difficulties if arise and since the

difficulty has arisen, G.O.Ms.No.347, dated 29.10.1999

has been replaced by G.O.Ms.No.44, dated 24.03.2017

wherein as per Rule 5(2) of the Rules, 1999 the competent

authority is any police officer not below the rank of

Inspector of Police to launch prosecution before the

Special Court against the financial establishments and

any person responsible for the Management of the affairs
                                11




of the financial establishment including the promoter,

Manager or member of financial establishment for levy of

penalty under Section 5 of the Act No.17 of 1999.


     It has been further stated by the State Government

that the first petitioner is a company of which the second

petitioner is the partner and the first petitioner is the

loanee and they have submitted fictitious and fake

documents     fraudulently     and     obtained    a   loan   for

Rs.65,00,000/- (Rupees sixty five lakhs only) from the

Charminar Cooperative Urban Bank by affixing a photo of

late Sri Janardhan Rao. The petitioners were accused

persons in this case, they were arrested and after they

were released on bail, they repaid the entire loan amount

to the Bank. However, the criminal deeds under the law

by no stretch of imagination can be ignored. It has been

further   stated   that   as     per     G.O.Ms.No.44,    dated

24.03.2017, any police officer not below the rank of

Inspector of Police has been authorised to launch

prosecution   before   the     Special    Court.   The   Deputy

Superintendent of Police is the officer, above rank of

Inspector of Police who has filed the charge sheet and

therefore, the question of interference in a criminal case at

the stage of trial on the ground raised by the petitioners

does not arise.
                                  12




     It has been further stated that under Rule 9 of the

Rules, 1999 the Government is empowered to remove

difficulties if arise and as difficulty has been arisen to

implement the G.O.Ms.No.44, dated 24.03.2017, the

Government has carefully examined the matter and

accordingly issued G.O.Ms.No.99, dated 05.09.2018 to

protect the interest of the depositors (victims) and the

same reads as under:-

          "G.O.Ms.No.99, dated 05.09.2018, wherein two
    provisos are added to Rule 5(2) and the second proviso,
    the   proviso   herein   provided   further   that    all   the
    prosecutions launched under this Act shall be deemed to
    be launched by the competent authority or any police
    officer not below the rank of Inspector of Police".


     It has been stated by the State Government that the

High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of

Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh has issued

show cause notice before admission to the respondents

and the interim suspension was granted for a period of six

weeks and thereafter, the interim order was extended.

However, it does not mean that the amendment is illegal

and ultra vires. The respondents have also stated that it

has become the trend of the day to cheat the depositors

and in large number of cases, like Agri Gold, the

Telegraph Traffic Employees Cooperative Credit Society
                                 13




Limited and Mani Kanta Cooperative Bank Limited, a

fraud was played upon depositors and the petitions filed

by them have been dismissed by the High Court. It has

been further stated that because of the interim order

granted by this Court, the State is not able to proceed

ahead in the matter. There are large number of depositors

like senior citizens, persons suffering from terminal

diseases and therefore, the interim order deserves to be

vacated and the writ petitions itself deserve to be

dismissed.


     Heard the learned counsel for the parties at length

and perused the records. The matter is being disposed of

with the consent of the parties at admission stage itself.


     The petitioners before this Court have filed the

present    writ   petitions    challenging    the     validity   of

G.O.Ms.No.99, dated 05.09.2018 issued by the State of

Telangana amending Rule 5(2) of the Telangana Protection

of Depositors of Financial Establishments Rules, 1999

validating with retrospective effect in respect of all the

prosecutions launched under the provisions of Telangana

Protection of Depositors of Financial Establishments Act,

1999 to the effect of empowering any police officer not

below     the   rank   of   Inspector   of   Police   to   launch
                               14




prosecutions under the Act No.17 of 1999 and the Rules

made thereunder.


     The Andhra Pradesh Protection of Depositors of

Financial Establishments Act, 1999 was enacted to

safeguard the interest of depositors who were being

cheated by unscrupulous financial establishments in the

State and were put to grave hardship by losing their hard

earned savings. The aforesaid Act was enacted to curb the

malpractices of unscrupulous financial establishments

and to protect the deposits made by the public in financial

establishments and other matters connected with it.


     After Reorganisation of Andhra Pradesh under the

Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014, the Telangana

State Government adapted the Act No.17 of 1999 for the

State of Telangana and a Notification to this effect has

also been issued vide G.O.Ms.No.81, dated 21.05.2016,

which is reproduced as under:-

               "GOVERNMENT OF TELANGANA
                       ABSTRACT

    ACTS - Adaptation - The Andhra Pradesh Protection of
    Depositors of Financial Establishment Act, 1999 -
    Adaptation to the State of Telangana - Orders - Issued.

                HOME (LEGAL) DEPARTMENT


    G.O.Ms.No.81                       Dated 21.05.2016
                                       Read the following:-
                              15




 1.      The Andhra Pradesh Protection of Depositors of
         Financial Establishment Act, 1999.
 2.      From the Director General of Police, Telangana
         State Lr.Rc.No.211/R6/2015, dt. 30.11.2015.



ORDER:

Whereas by Section 101 of the Andhra Pradesh Reorganization Act, 2014, the appropriate Government i.e., the State of Telangana is empowered by order, to make such adaptations and modifications of any law made before 2.6.2014, whether by way of repeal or amendment as may be necessary or expedient, for the purpose of facilitating the application of such law in relation to the State of Telangana, before expiration of two years from 2.6.2014.

2. And whereas, it has become necessary to adapt and modify/amend the Andhra Pradesh Protection of Depositors of Financial Establishment Act, 1999 for the purpose of facilitating its application in relation to the State of Telangana;

3. Accordingly, the following Notification will be published in the extraordinary issue of the Telangana State Gazette, dated 25.05.2016.

NOTIFICATION In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 101 of the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014 (Central Act No.6 of 2014), the Governor of Telangana hereby makes the following order, namely:-

1. (1) This Order may be called the Andhra Pradesh Protection of Depositors of Financial Establishment Act, 1999 (Telangana Adaptation) Order, 2016.

(2) It shall come into force with effect from 2nd June, 2014.

2. For the purpose of this Order and the Act adapted herein, the expression "the State" shall have the meaning and area as specified in Section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014.

3. In the Andhra Pradesh Protection of Depositors of Financial Establishment Act, 1999:-

Throughout the Act, for the words "Andhra Pradesh" occurring otherwise than in a citation or description or in title of other enactments, the word "Telangana" shall be substituted.

(BY ORDER AND IN THE NAME OF THE GOVERNOR OF TELANGANA)

ADHAR SINHA PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT (FAC)"

The Act No.17 of 1999 provides for attachment of

properties on default in respect of deposits and it also

provides for constitution of Special Courts. Section 18 of

the Act No.17 of 1999 empowers the State Government to

make Rules. Section 18 of the Act No.17 of 1999 reads as

under:-

"18. Power to make Rules:- (1) The Government may, by notification make Rules to carry out the purposes of this Act.

(2) Every rule made under this Act shall immediately after it is made, be laid before the Legislative Assembly of the State, if it is in session and if it is not in session, in the session immediately following for a total period of fourteen days which may be comprised in one session or in two successive sessions, and if, before the expiration of the session in which it is so laid or the season immediately following the Legislative Assembly agrees in making any modification in the rule or in the annulment of the rule, the rule shall, from the date on which the modification or annulment is notified, have effect only in such modified form or shall stand annulled as the case may be so, however, that any such

modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under that rule."

Section 4 of the Act No.17 of 1999 deals with

Competent Authority to be appointed by the State

Government and the same is reproduced as under:-

"4. Competent Authority:- (1) The Government may, by notification, appoint an authority hereinafter called "the competent authority" to exercise control over the properties attached by Government under Section 3.

(2) The Competent authority shall have such other powers and discharge such other functions as may be prescribed, in addition to the powers and functions specified under this Act.

(3) Upon receipt of the orders of the Government under Section 3, the Competent Authority shall apply within fifteen days to the Special Court constituted under this Act for making the ad-interim order of attachment absolute.

(4) An application under sub-section (3) shall be accompanied by one or more affidavits, stating the grounds on which the belief that the financial establishment has committed any default or is likely to defraud, is founded, the amount of money or value of other property believed to have been procured by means of the deposits, and the details, if any, of persons in whose names such property is believed to have been invested or purchased out of the deposits or any other property attached under Section 3."

The Government of Telangana vide Notification dated

29.10.1999 appointed District Magistrates of all Districts

and Commissioner of Police Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam

and Vijayawada as competent authority to discharge

functions under Section 4(2) of the Act No.17 of 1999. The

State Government in exercise of powers conferred under

Section 18 read with Rule 9 of the Rules has amended

Rule 5 of the Rules, 1999 vide G.O.Ms.No.99, dated

05.09.2018 issued by the State Government and the said

G.O., is reproduced as under:-

"GOVERNMENT OF TELANGANA ABSTRACT Rules - Amendment to Telangana State Protection of Depositors of Financial Establishments Rules, 1999 - Notification - Orders - Issued.

              HOME (PASSPORTS) DEPARTMENT
    G.O.Ms.No.99                           Dated: 05.09.2018
                                           Read the following:-

 1. G.O.Ms.No.347,      Home     (General.B) Dept,    dated
    29.10.1999.

2. G.O.Ms.No.44, Home (Passports) Dept, dated 24.03.2017.

3. From the Director General of Police, T.S., Hyderabad, Lr.Rc.No.779/R6/2016, dated 20.11.2017 and further letter even No. dated 11.05.2018.

*** ORDER:

In the G.O. 1st read above, the Andhra Pradesh Protection of Depositors of Financial Establishment Rules, 1999 have been issued.

2. The Director General of Police, Telangana State, Hyderabad in the letter 3rd read above, for the reasons mentioned therein, has submitted a proposal to the Government for making an amendment to Sub-rule (2) of Rule-5 of the Telangana Protection of Depositors of Financial Establishment Rules, 1999.

3. Government after careful examination of the matter, have decided to further amend and to add proviso to sub-rule 2 of Rule (5) of the Telangana State Protection of Depositors of Financial Establishment Rules, 1999, in continuation to the orders issued in the G.O. 2nd read

above so as to safeguard the interests of the Depositors and Victims, in the interest of public.

4. Accordingly, the following notification will be published in the Extra-Ordinary issue of Telangana Gazette, dated 06.09.2018;

NOTIFICATION In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Telangana Protection of Depositors of financial Establishments Act, 1999 (Act No.17 of 1999), the Government of Telangana hereby makes the following amendment to sub-rule (2) of Rule-5 of the "Telangana State Protection of Depositors of Financial Establishment Rules, 1999" as follows:-

AMENDMENT In the said rules, in rule 5, after sub-rule (2) the following provisos shall be added, namely:

"Provided that no prosecution can be launched under the Telangana Protection of Depositors of Financial Establishment Act, 1999 in cases which have been registered earlier than the date of commencement of this Act.

Provided further that, all the prosecutions launched under this Act, shall be deemed to be launched by the Competent Authority or any Police Officer not below the rank of Inspector of Police".

(BY ORDER AND IN THE NAME OF THE GOVERNOR OF TELANGANA)

RAJIV TRIVEDI PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT"

Rule 9 of the Rules, 1999 empowers the State

Government to remove difficulty if arisen and Section 18

of the Act No.17 of 1999 empowers the State Government

to make Rules and to amend the Rules. The amendment

makes it very clear that all prosecutions launched under

the Act shall be deemed to be launched by the competent

authority or any police officer not below the rank of

Inspector. The aforesaid amendment does not make any

penal statute applicable with retrospective effect. It only

makes procedural law applicable to the cases with

retrospective effect. This Court really fails to understand

the prejudice caused in the matter and misdeeds of the

financial establishments have been thoroughly

investigated and prosecution of persons like the

petitioners is going on before Special Courts. Whether the

person is guilty or not has to be proved during the trial

based upon the evidence adduced by the prosecution and

merely because the matter has been launched by the

competent authority or any police officer not below the

rank of Inspector of Police, it does not mean that the

principles of natural justice and fair play have been

violated.

Hon'ble Justice G.P.Singh in 'Principles of Statutory

Interpretation', 15th Edition, (page No.405) under Chapter

6 'Operation of Statutes' has dealt with retrospective

operation of statutes. Difference has been carved out in

respect of 'Statutes dealing with Substantive Rights' and

'Statutes dealing with Procedure'.

Paragraph 6.2.1.2 deals with 'Statutes dealing with

Substantive Rights' and the same is reproduced as under:-

"It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation3. There is a presumption of prospectivity articulated in the legal maxis "nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis", i.e. "a new law ought to regulate what is to follow, not the past", and this presumption operates unless shown to the contrary by express provision in the statute or is otherwise discernible by necessary implication4. But the rule in general is applicable where the object of the statute is to affect vested rights or to impose new burdens or to impair existing obligations. Unless there are words in the statute sufficient to show the intention of the Legislature to affect existing rights, it is "deemed to be prospective only - "nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis"5. [2 c. Int. 392]".6 In the words of Lord Blanesburg, "provisions which touch a right in

Keshvan v. State of Bombay, AIR 1951 SC 128, p 130 : (1951) SCR 228; Janardan Reddy v State, AIR 1951 SC 124, p 127 : (1950) SCR 940; Mahadeolal Kanodia v Administrator General of West Bengal, AIR 1960 SC 936, p 939 : (1960) 3 SCR 578; State of Bombay v Vishnu Ramchandra, AIR 1961 SC 307, p 309 : (1961) 2 SCR 924; Rafiquennessa (Mst) v Lal Bahadur Chetri, AIR 1964 SC 1511, p 1514 : (1964) 6 SCR 876; Arjan Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1970 SC 703, p 705 : (1969) 2 SCR 347; KC Arora v State of Haryana, AIR 1984 SC 1 : (1984) 3 SCC 281, pp 288, 289;

Mithilesh Kumari v Prem Bahadur Khare, AIR 1989 SC 1247, pp 1253, 1254 : (1989) 2 SCC 95; State of Madhya Pradesh v Rameshwar Rathod, AIR 1990 SC 1849 : (1990) 4 SCC 21; Shyam Sunder v Ram Kumar, AIR 2001 SC 2472, pp 2481, 2482 : (2001) 8 SCC 24; Zile Singh v State of Haryana, AIR 2004 SC 5100, p 5103 : (2004) 8 SCC 1, p 8 (9th Edn, p 438 of this book is referred); Gem Granites v CIT, (2005) 1 SCC 229, p 296; C Gupta v Glaxo-Smithkline Pharmaceuticals Ltd, (2007) 7 SCC 171 (Broadening of the definition of "Workman" by amendment in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is not retrospective to affect the dismissal of an employee who was not a workman on the date of his dismissal). JS Yadav v State of Uttar Pradesh, (2011) 6 SCC 570 (para 24), Working Friends Co-op House Building Society Ltd v State of Punjab, (2016) 15 SCC 464 : (2016) SCC OnLine SC 937 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cr) 193 [Rajiv Choudhrie HUF v UoI, AIR 2015 SC 614 : (2015) 3 SCC 541 : 2014 (13) Scale 710, followed]

Monnet Ispat & Energy Ltd v UoI, (2012) 11 SCC 1, p 90. Applying the presumption of prospectivity, the Supreme Court held that as there is no indication in section 17-A of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, or in the Amending Act of 1987, which inserted section 17-A, that Parliament intended to undo the state of affairs prior to 1987 by virtue of the same. Therefore, the provision was effective from 1987 and had no retrospective operation.

Osborn, "A new law ought to regulate what is to follow, not the past", Concise Law Dictionary, p

224.

Doolubdass Pettamberdass v. Ramloll Thackoorseydass, (1850) 5 MIA 109, pp 126, 127 (Baron Parke Mr); KC Arora v State of Haryana, supra; Zile Singh v State of Haryana, supra. See further KS Paripoornan v State of Kerala, AIR 1995 SC 1012, p 1034 : (1994) 5 SCC 593 : JT 1994 (6) SC 182, pp 213, 214; Shakti Tubes Ltd v State of Bihar, (2009) 7 SCC 673, para 24: (2009) 9 JT 386.

existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment"7. "Every statute, it has been said", observed Lopes LJ, "which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation or imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect of transactions already past, must be presumed to be intended not to have a retrospective effect"8.

If rights created in favour of any person, whether they are property rights or rights arising from a transaction in the nature of a contract or rights protected under a statute, are to be taken away by any legislation, then that legislation will have to say so specifically by giving its provisions a retrospective effect. This principle was applied by the Supreme Court to protect a "deemed tenant" under Section 15A of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947, from eviction as an "unauthorised occupant" under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. The Supreme Court held that a "deemed tenant" under the 1947 Act continued to be protected under its succeeding Act, being the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, in view of the definition of "tenant" under section 7(15)(a)(ii) thereof, and he therefore cannot be said to be in "unauthorised occupation" of the premises. His right as a "deemed tenant" cannot be destroyed by giving retrospective effect to the

Delhi Cloth Mills & General Co Ltd v CIT, Delhi, AIR 1927 PC 242, p 244; citing Colonial Sugar Refining Co v Irving, (1905) AC 369 (PC); Jose De Costa v Bascora Sadasiva Sinai Narcornim, AIR 1975 SC 1843, p 1849 : (1976) 2 SCC 917; KC Arora v State of Haryana, supra.

Re, Pulborough Parish School Board Election, Bourke v Nutt, (1894) 1 QB 725, p 737. See further Amireddi Raja Gopala Rao v Amireddi Sitharamamma, AIR 1965 SC 1970, p 1973 : (1965) 3 SCC 122. (A construction that affects vested rights "should never be adopted if the words are open to another construction".) Shri Vijayalakshmi Rice Mills v State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1976 SC 1471, p 1473 : (1976) 3 SCC 37; K Kapen Chaco v Provident Investment Co (Pvt) Ltd, AIR 1976 SC 2610, p 2617 : (1977) 1 SCC 593; Govinddas v Income-tax Officer, AIR 1977 SC 552, p 558 : (1976) 1 SCC 906; Punjab Tin Supply Co v Central Government, AIR 1984 SC 87 : (1984) 1 SCC 206, p 219; Mithilesh Kumari v Prem Bahadur Khare, AIR 1989 SC 1247, pp 1253, 1254 : (1989) 2 SCC 95; Pearce v Secretary of State for Defence, (1988) 2 All ER 348, p 372 (HL); Yew Bon Tew v Kenderancen Bas Mara, (1982) 3 All ER 833, p 836 : 1983 AC 553 : (1982) 2 WLR 1026 (PC); Plewa v Chief Adjudication Officer, (1994) 3 All ER 323, p 328 (HL); R Rajgopal Reddy v Padminichandra, 1995 AIR SCW 1422 : (1955) 2 SCC 630 : 1995 (1) Scale 692, pp 702, 703; K Gopinathan Nair v State of Kerala, AIR 1997 SC 1925, p 1939 : 1997 (4) JT

369.

provisions of the Public Premises Act since there is neither such express provision therein, nor is it warranted by any implication.9 As a logical corollary of the general rule, that retrospective operation is not taken to be intended unless that intention is manifested by express words or necessary implication, there is a subordinate rule to the effect that a statute or a section in it is not to be construed so as to have larger retrospective operation than its language renders necessary10. In other words close attention must be paid to the language of the statutory provision for determining the scope of the retrospectivity intended by Parliament.11 But if the literal reading of the provision giving retrospectivity produces absurdities and anomalies, a case not prima facie within the words may be taken to be covered, if the purpose of the provision indicates that the intention was to cover it.12 The inhibition against retrospective construction is not a rigid rule and must vary secundum materium.13 It has been said that "the

Suhas H Pophale v Orinetal Insurance Co Ltd, (2014) 4 SCC 657, pp 681 to 685.

Reid v Reid, (1886) 31 Ch D 402, p 408; Lauri v Renad, (1892) 3 Ch 402, p 421; Gardener & Co v Cone, (1928) All ER Rep 458, p 459; United Provinces v Atiqa Begum (Mt), AIR 1941 FC 16, p 47 ; SS Gadgil v Lal & Co, AIR 1965 SC 171, p 177 : (1964) 8 SCR 72; Mohd Idris v Sat Narain, AIR 1966 SC 1499, p 1501 : (1966) 3 SCR 15; Arjan Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1970 SC 703, p 706 : (1969) 2 SCR 347; Ahmedabad Manufacturing & Calico Printing Co Ltd v SG Mehta, AIR 1963 SC 1436, p 1446 : 1963 Supp (2) SCR 92; Sales Tax Officer, Ward II, Moradabad v Oriental Coal Corp Moradabad, AIR 1988 SC 648, p 653 : 1988 Supp SCC 308; Bhagat Ram Sharma v UoI, AIR 1988 SC 740, p 746 : 1988 Supp SCC 30; UoI v Raghubir Singh, AIR 1989 SC 1933, p 1948; KS Paripoornan v State of Kerala, AIR 1992 SC 1488, p 1494 : (1992) 1 SCC 684 Affirmed by Constitution Bench, AIR 1995 SC 1012, p 1038 : JT 1994 (6) SC 182, p 219; R Rajgopal Reddy v Padminichandra, supra; Deputy Collector v S Venkata Ramanaiah, AIR 1996 SC 224, p 232 : 1995 (5) Scale 521, 531, 532; Shyam Sunder v Ram Kumar, AIR 2001 SC 2472, pp 2481, 2482 : (2001) 8 SCC 24; Co-op Co Ltd v Commissioner of Trade Tax, Uttar Pradesh, (2007) 4 SCC 480 (para 29) : (2007) 6 JT 49 : (2007) 5 SLT 400.

UoI v Raghubir Singh, AIR 1989 SC 1933, p 1948 : (1989) 2 SCC 754; KS Paripoornan v State of Kerala, supra. Principles relating to retrospectivity stated above were reiterated and reference was made to pages 474 and 475 of 10th Edn of this book in SL Srinivas Jute Twine Mills (Pvt) Ltd v UoI, (2006) 2 SCC 740 (para 18) : (2006) 2 JT 397 : (2006) 2 LLJ 225; MRF Ltd v Assistant Commissioner (Assessment) Sales Tax, (2006) 8 SCC 702 (para 28) : (2006) 12 JT 244 and Sangam Spinners v Regional Provident Commissioner, AIR 2008 SC 739 : (2008) 1 SCC 391 (para

18); UoI v Glaxo India Ltd (2011) 6 SCC 668 (para 40).

UoI v Filip Tiago De Gama of v edem Vasco De Gama, AIR 1990 SC 981, p 985 : (1990) 1 SCC

Barber v Pigden, (1937) 1 All ER 126 : (1973) 1 KB 664 (CA) Scott LJ); Carson v Carson, (1964) 1 All ER 681, p 687.

basis of the rule is no more than simple fairness which ought to be the basis of every legal rule".14 It is not necessary that an express provision be made to make a statute retrospective and the presumption against retrospectivity may be rebutted by necessary implication especially in a case where the new law is made to cure an acknowledged evil for the benefit of the community as a whole.15 Instead of express words the device of legal fiction may also be used to bring about retrospective operation by implication.16 The rule against retrospective construction is not applicable to a statute merely "because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing".17 If that were not so, every statute will be presumed to apply only to persons born and things come into existence after its operation and the rule may well result in virtual nullification of most of the statutes. An amending Act is, therefore, not retrospective merely because it applies also to those to whom pre-amended Act was applicable if the amended Act has operation from the date of its amendment and not from an anterior date.18 But this does not mean

L'Office Cherifien des Phosphates v Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co Ltd., (1994) 1 All ER 20, p 29 (J) : (1994) 1 AC 486 (HL); United States Government v Montgomery, (2001) 1 All ER 815, p 825 (d) (HL). The doctrine of fairness in the context of retrospectivity was also referred to by Sinha J in Vijay v State of Maharashtra, (2006) 6 SCC 289 : (2006) 7 JT 112. See further pp 583-586, post, for these cases.

Mithilesh Kumari v Prem Bihari Khare, AIR 1989 SC 1247, p 1254 : (1989) 2 SCC 95; Zile Singh v State of Haryana, AIR 2004 SC 32 : (2004) 8 SCC 1, p 9 (9th Edn, p 440 of this book is referred). See further text and notes 40 to 54 (p 542) and 59 to 63 (p 561); Shakti Tubes Ltd v State of Bihar, (2009) 7 SCC 673 para 25 : (2009) 9 JT 386.

Mohd Akram Ansari v Chief Election Officer, (2008) 2 SCC 95 (paras 6 and 7) : (2007) 12 SCR

901.

R v St Mary White Chapels (Inhabitants), (1948) 12 QB 120, p 127; Master Ladies' Tailors' Organisation v Ministry of Labour, (1950) 2 All ER 525, p 527; Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 394, p 398 : (1953) SCR 1188; UoI v Madan Gopal, AIR 1954 SC 158, p 163 : (1954) SCR 541; State of Bombay v Vishnu Ramchandra, AIR 1961 SC 307, p 310 : (1961) 2 SCR 26; Sajjan Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 464, p 468 : (1964) 4 SCR 630; Kapur Chand v BS Grewal, AIR 1965 SC 1491, p 1493 : (1965) 2 SCR 36; Sree Bank Ltd v Sarkar Dutt Roy & Co, AIR 1966 SC 1953, p 1957 : (1965) 3 SCR 708; TK Lakshmana v State of Madras, AIR 1968 SC 1489, p 1494 : (1968) 3 SCR 542; Customs and Excise Commissioner v Thorn Electrical Industries Ltd, (1975) 1 All ER 439, p 447 (QBD); DS Nakara v UoI, AIR 1983 SC 130, p 143 : (1983) 1 SCC 305; RL Marwaha v UoI, (1987) 4 SCC 31, pp 37, 38 : (1987) SCC (L&S) 350; Dilip v Mohd Azizul Haq, AIR 2000 SC 1976, p 1980 : (2000) 3 SCC 607.

Bishun Narain Misra v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1965 SC 1567 : (1965) 1 SCR 693; Punjab University v Subash Chander, AIR 1984 SC 1415 : (1984) 3 SCC 603, pp 611, 612. See further Mohinder Kumar v State of Haryana, AIR 1986 SC 244 : (1985) 4 SCC 221, p 231 ( a validating

that a statute which takes away or impairs any vested right acquired under existing laws or which creates a new obligation or imposes a new burden in respect of past transactions will not be treated as retrospective.19 Thus, to apply an amending Act, which creates a new obligation to pay additional compensation,20 or which reduces the rate of compensation,21 to pending proceedings for determination of compensation for acquisitions already made, will be to construe it retrospectively which cannot be done unless such a construction follows from express words or necessary implication. Similarly, a new law enhancing compensation payable in respect of an accident arising out of use of motor vehicle will not be applicable to accidents taking place before its enforcement and pending proceedings for assessment of compensation will not be affected by such a law unless by express words or necessary implication the new law is retrospective.22 It makes no difference in application of these principles that the amendment is by substitution or otherwise.23 The cases where the principle, that a statute is not retrospective simply because it takes into account past events, has been applied are discussed hereinafter under titles 2(g) and 2(h).

Another principle flowing from presumption against retrospectivity is that "one does not expect rights conferred by the statute to be destroyed by events which took place before it was passed".24

Act); Dena Bank v Bhikhabhai Prabhudas Parekh & Co, AIR 2000 SC 3654, p 3660 : (2000) 5 SCC 694 (The passage in the text from this book is quoted from 7TH Edn., p 369).

KS Paripoornan v State of Kerala, AIR 1995 SC 1012, pp 1034, 1035 : JT 1994 (6) SC 182, pp 213, 214.

Ibid. See further Land Acquisition Officer-cum-DSWO AP v BV Reddy, AIR 2002 SC 1045 : (2002) 3 SCC 463 (Section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act before amendment in 1984 restricting compensation to not more than claimed was a substantive provision. Amendment removing this bar cannot be construed to be retrospective even to apply to a pending appeal).

Maharaja Chintamani Saran Nath Shahdeo v State of Bihar, AIR 1999 SC 3609, p 3614 : (1999) 8 SCC 16 : JT 1999 (8) SC 45, p 56.

Padma Srinivan v Premier Insurance Co Ltd, AIR 1982 SC 836; Maitri Koley v New India Assurance Co, (2003) 8 SCC 718 : (2003) 9 JT 159; State of Punjab v Bhajan Kaur, AIR 2008 SC 2276 para 9 : (2008) 12 SCC 112 [Amendment increasing compensation for no fault liability in Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act is not retrospective].

Ibid. For effect of "substitution", see text and notes 87 to 89, pp 734-735, post.

Birmingham City Council v Walker, (2007) 3 All ER 445, p 449 (para 11) (HL).

In certain cases, a distinction is drawn between an existing right and a vested right and it is said that the rule against retrospective construction is applied only to save vested rights and not existing rights.25 This distinction, however, has not been maintained in other cases.26 The word "retrospective" has thus been used in different senses causing a certain amount of confusion.27 The real issue in each case is as to the scope of particular enactment having regard to its language and the object discernible from the statute read as a whole.

6.2.1.3 Statutes Dealing with Procedure In contrast to statutes dealing with substantive rights, statutes dealing with merely matters of procedure are presumed to be retrospective unless such a construction is textually inadmissible.28 As stated by Lord Denning:

The rule that an Act of Parliament is not to be given retrospective effect applies only to statutes which affect vested rights. It does not apply to statutes which only alter the form of procedure or the admissibility of evidence, or the effect which the courts give to evidence.29

If the new Act affects matters of procedure only, then, prima facie, "it applies to all actions pending as well as future".30 In stating the principle that "a change in the law of procedure operates retrospectively and unlike the law relating to vested right is not only

West v Gwynne, (1911) 2 Ch 1, p 11, 12; Trimbak Damodhar Raipurkar v Assaram Hiraman Patil, AIR 1966 SC 1758, p 1761. See also Shri Bakul Oil Industries v State of Gujarat, AIR 1987 SC 122 : (1987) 1 SCC 31, p 37 : (1987) 165 ITR 6.

Duke of Devonshire v Barrow Haematite Steel Co Ltd, (1877) 2 QBD 286, p 289; Dr Indramani v WR Natu, AIR 1963 SC 274, p 286 : (1963) 1 SCR 173; Govinddas v Income-tax Officer, AIR 1977 SC 552, p 558 : (1976) 1 SCC 906; Mohd Rashid Ahmad v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1979 SC 592, p 598 : (1979) 1 SCC 596.

Gardner & Co v Cone, (1928) All ER Rep 458, p 461.

Gardner v Lucas, (1878) 3 AC 582, p 603 (HL); Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co Ltd v CIT, Delhi, AIR 1927 PC 242, p 244; Jose De Costa v Bascora Sadashiva Sinai Narcornim, AIR 1975 SC 1843, p 1849 : (1976) 2 SCC 917; Gurbachan Singh v Satpal Singh, AIR 1990 SC 209, p 219 : (1990) 1 SCC 445; Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1994 SC 2623, p 2641 (para 25(i)) : (1994) 4 SCC 602.

Blyth v Blyth, (1966) 1 All ER 524, p 535 : 1966 AC 643 (HL)

AG vv ernazza, (1960) 3 All ER 97, p 100 : 1960 AC 965 : (1960) 3 WLR 466 (HL); K Eapin Chaco v Provident Fund Investment Co, (Pvt) Ltd, AIR 1976 SC 2610, p 2617 : (1977) 1 SCC 583

prospective", 31 the Supreme Court has quoted with approval the reason of the rule as expressed in Maxwell: 32 No person has a vested right in any course of procedure. He has only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner prescribed for the time being by or for the court in which the case is pending, and if, by an Act of Parliament the mode of procedure is altered, he has no other right than to proceed according to the altered mode. 33

Relying upon this principle it has been held that "if a Court has jurisdiction to try the suit, when it comes for disposal, it cannot refuse to assume jurisdiction by reason of the fact that it had no jurisdiction to entertain it at the time when it was instituted". 34 It has been said that law relating to forum and limitation is procedural in nature, whereas law relating to right of action and right of appeal even though remedial is substantive in nature; that a procedural statute should not generally speaking be applied retrospectively where the result would be to create new disabilities or obligations or to impose new duties in respect of transactions already accomplished; that a statute which not only changes the procedure but also creates new rights and obligations shall be construed to be prospective, unless otherwise provided either expressly or by necessary implication. 35

Anant Gopal Sheorey v State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 915, p 917 : (1959) SCR 919. See further UoI v Sukumar Pyne, AIR 1966 SC 1206 : (1966) 2 SCR 34; Tikaram and Sons v Commissioner of Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1968 SC 1286, p 1292 : (1968) 3 SCR 512; State of Madras v Lateef Hamid and Co, AIR 1972 SC 1781, p 1784 : (1971) 3 SCC 560; Balumal Jamnadas Batra v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1975 SC 2083 : (1975) 4 SCC 645. (An enactment relating to burden of proof like Section 123, Customs Act, 1962 would be a matter of procedure); Roy Bahadur Seth Sriram Durgaprasad v Director of Enforcement, AIR 1987 SC 1364 : (1987) 3 SCC 27, pp 33, 34. (Section 113A, Evidence Act, 1872, inserted in the Act by Act 46 of 1983 providing for presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman is a procedural provision and applies to trial of offences committed earlier to the insertion of the Section); Gurbachan Singh v Satpal Singh, AIR 1990 SC 209, p 219 : (1990) 1 SCC 445.

Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn, p 216.

See cases in footnote 31, supra

Sudhir G Angur v M Sajeev, AIR 2006 SC 351 : (2006) 1 SCC 141 (para 1)

Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1994 SC 2623, p 2641 (para 25) : (1994) 4 SCC 602; Maharaja Chintamani Saran Nath Shahdeo v State of Bihar, AIR 1999 SC 3609, p 3614 : (1998) 8 SCC 16 : JT 1999 (8) SC 45, p 56; Shyam Sundar v Ram Kumar, AIR 2001 SC 2472, p 2482 : (2001) 8 SCC 24. For forum see text and notes 36-37; for limitation, see title 2(d); for appeal, see titles 2(j) and 2(k).

A change of forum except in pending proceedings36 in a matter of procedure and, therefore, if a new Act requires certain types of original proceedings to be instituted before a special tribunal constituted under the Act to the exclusion of civil courts, all proceedings of that type whether based on old or new causes of action will have to be instituted before the tribunal. 37 The non-executability of a decree passed by an Indian court against a foreigner at a place in foreign country is also a matter of procedure and the decree becomes executable if the place where it is being executed ceases to be a foreign country and becomes part of India and the Indian Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC, 1908) is extended to that place.

38 On the same principle it was held that an arbitration award made in a foreign state is enforceable in the United Kingdom as a convention award under Section 3 of the Arbitration Act, 1975 if the foreign State is a party to the New York Convention when proceedings for enforcing the award are taken although it was not such a party at the time of making of the award.39 It was pointed out that in so construing the section it was not given a retrospective operation as it merely affected the form of procedure of enforcement in that an award, which at the time it was made, was enforceable by action at common law became enforceable under the Act on the foreign State becoming a party to the convention subsequent to the date of the award. 40 Section 45B the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948, which enables the Employees' State Insurance Corporation to recover arrears of contribution from the employers as arrears of land revenue, has been held to be procedural and applicable to arrears falling due before coming into

See text and notes 38 and 39, pp 630-631.

New India Insurance Co Ltd v Shanti Misra (Smt), AIR 1976 SC 237 : (1975) 2 SCC 840.

B Narhari Shivram Shet Narvekar v Pannalal Umediram, AIR 1977 SC 164 : (1976) 3 SCC 203.

Kuwait Minister of Public v Sir Frederick Snow and Partners, (1984) 1 All ER 733, p 737 (HL).

Ibid

force of the section on 28 January 1968. 41 The reason is that statutes providing for new remedies for enforcement of an existing right are treated as procedural and apply to future as well past causes of action.42"

Keeping in view the aforesaid, it can be safely

gathered that the fundamental rule of law is that no

statute shall be construed to have a retrospective

operation unless such a construction appears from clearly

in the terms of the Act/Rules or arises by necessary and

distinct implication.

In the present case, this Court is dealing with the

amendment in the statute and the statute deals with the

procedure in the matter of investigation.

It is well settled proposition of law that a litigant has

no vested right in the matter of procedural laws or

alternation in procedural laws, which generally are held to

be retrospective in the sense that they apply to future as

well as to pending actions. In the present case, only the

procedural law has been amended. The petitioners with

open eyes participated in the investigation and whether

they are guilty or not has to be proved only after holding a

proper trial. This Court fails to understand the prejudice

Employees' State Insurance Corp v Dwarka Nath Bhargawa, AIR 1997 SC 3518, p 3519 : (1997) 7 SCC 131.

Dilip v Mohd Azizul Haq, AIR 2000 SC 1976, pp 1979, 1980 : (2000) 3 SCC 607

caused to the petitioners on account of amendment, and

therefore, as it is an amendment in procedural law, this

Court does not find any reason to declare it as ultra vires

as prayed for.

The intention of the legislature by amending Rules

with retrospective effect no way intends to regularise any

flaw in respect of the trial. The Special Courts keeping in

view the statutory provisions under the Act No.17 of 1999

and the Rules framed thereunder are proceeding ahead

with the trial on the basis of the material brought before

the Special Courts by the competent authority or by any

police officer and merely because investigation has been

carried by any police officer not below the rank of

Inspector of Police prior to 05.09.2018, it does not mean

that all the misdeeds of the petitioners can be wiped out

as prayed by the petitioners. The petitioners' contention is

that the amendment and the Rules has been done only

with a view to object to nullify the Judgment delivered by

this Court in Criminal Appeal No.1576 of 2005 and batch

decided on 01.04.2015. In the considered opinion of this

Court, the plea canvassed by the petitioners is ill-founded.

It does not nullify any Judgment. The act of the

petitioners was certainly an offence earlier also and it is

an offence under the amendment also and it is nobody's

case that the act committed by the petitioners has been

made an offence by amending the Act retrospectively.

In the considered opinion of this Court, the

amendment does not violate the rights guaranteed to the

petitioners under the Constitution of India either under

Article 20(1) or under Article 21 of the Constitution of

India. The petitioners are the persons who have allegedly

fraudulently siphoned public money who have allegedly

cheated the depositors and are trying to find out technical

flaws that too in respect of pre-trial stage to ensure that

the trial does not proceed. The amendment made under

the Rules is in consonance with the Act No.17 of 1999 and

the petitioners have not been able to establish violation of

any statutory provision of law by the State Government in

amending the Rules nor have been able to establish

violation of any constitutional provisions. The amendment

is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory and it is an

amendment in the procedural law and therefore, this

Court does not find any reason to interfere with the

amendment and the question of declaring it as ultra vires

does not arise.

In the light of the aforesaid, the writ petitions are

dismissed. Miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall

stand dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

_____________________________ SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA, CJ

________________________ A.RAJASHEKER REDDY, J 20.12.2021

Note: LR copy be marked.

(By order) Pln