[Cites 10, Cited by 0]

Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

Gulab vs State on 30 March, 2026

Author: Vinit Kumar Mathur

Bench: Vinit Kumar Mathur

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      HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                       JODHPUR
                  D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 564/2016

Gulab S/o Shri Ram Bhagat, Aged about 30 years, R/o Ward
No.12,      Hanumangarh              Junction,          District     Hanumangarh
(Rajasthan).
                                                                      ----Appellant
                                       Versus
The State of Rajasthan, through Public Prosecutor.
                                                                    ----Respondent


For Appellant(s)             :     Mr. Lokendra Singh for
                                   Mr. Trilok Joshi
For Respondent(s)            :     Mr. C.S. Ojha, PP



         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINIT KUMAR MATHUR
     HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE CHANDRA SHEKHAR SHARMA

                                    Judgment

BY THE COURT [Per Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vinit Kumar Mathur]

1. Date of conclusion of arguments 28.3.2026

2. Date on which the judgment was reserved 28.3.2026

3. Whether the full judgment or only operative Full judgment part is pronounced

4. Date of pronouncement 30.03.2026

1. The instant D.B. Criminal Appeal has been preferred by the

accused-appellant Gulab S/o Shri Ram Bhagat under Section

374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure assailing the validity of

the judgment and order dated 19.03.2016 passed by learned

Additional Sessions Judge Sangaria, Hanumangarh (hereinafter

referred to as "the learned trial court") in Sessions Case No.

10/2014 (C.I.S. No. 54/14), whereby the learned trial court

convicted the accused-appellant for the offence punishable under

Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced for life

imprisonment along with a fine of Rs. 500/- and in default of

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payment of fine further to undergo three months additional

imprisonment.

2. Briefly stated, the prosecution case originated from a written

report (Ex.P.1) submitted on 18.01.2014 by the complainant

Vakilchand at Police Station Sangaria. In the said report, it was

alleged that his niece Sunita had been married to accused Gulab

about six years prior to the incident. According to the

complainant, after the marriage, the accused-appellant developed

a habit of consuming alcohol and under its influence frequently

subjected Sunita to physical assault. It was further alleged that

the accused persistently compelled Sunita to procure money from

her mother for the purpose of purchasing liquor. On several

occasions, the matter was placed before the village Panchayat and

the accused-appellant was counseled and admonished by the

elders of the community. However, despite such intervention, no

improvement was made in his behavior. About a year prior to the

occurrence, the accused-appellant shifted his residence to

Sangaria along with Sunita, but even thereafter, his behaviour

towards her remained unchanged and he continued to ill-treat and

assault her. On 17.01.2014, the accused-appellant Gulab, after

subjecting Sunita to violence, strangulated her, resulting her

death.

3. On the basis of the said written report (Ex.P.1), a formal FIR

No. 23/2014 (Ex.P.2) was registered at Police Station Sangaria,

District Hanumangarh for the offences under Sections 498A, 304B

& 302 IPC and investigation was commenced.

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4. After completion of investigation, the police filed a charge-

sheet against the accused-appellant for the offences under

Sections 498A, 304B & 302 IPC before the Court of Additional

Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sangaria from where the case was

committed to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge Sangaria,

Hanumangarh for trial.

5. The learned trial court, after hearing arguments on charge,

framed, read over and explained the charges under Sections

498A, 304B, 302 IPC to the accused-appellant, who denied the

same and claimed trial.

6. During the course of trial, the prosecution examined as many

as 13 witnesses, exhibited documents from Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.27, in

support of its case; whereafter the prosecution evidence was

closed.

7. After the prosecution evidence was concluded, the accused-

appellant was examined under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, wherein he denied all the allegations, claimed false

implication due to ulterior motives, and asserted his innocence. In

his statement, the accused-appellant took the plea that their

landlord, Dharampal, harboured an improper interest in his

deceased wife Sunita. According to the accused-appellant, on the

day of the occurrence, he had left the house at about 9:00 a.m.

and had gone from Sangaria to Hanumangarh. He alleged that

during his absence, Dharampal might have executed a pre-

conceived plan and caused the death of Sunita. The accused-

appellant further stated that his in-laws bore animosity towards

him on account of his habit of consuming liquor and, owing to

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such resentment, they had falsely implicated him in the present

case. Maintaining his innocence, the accused-appellant asserted

that he had not committed the murder of his wife. No evidence in

defence was led by the accused-appellant.

8. The learned trial court after hearing the arguments advanced

by both sides and upon appreciation of the evidence available on

record, convicted the accused-appellant for the offence under

Section 302 IPC and sentenced him vide judgment dated

19.03.2016, as mentioned hereinabove.

9. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned

judgment dated 19.03.2016 passed by the learned trial court, the

accused-appellant has preferred the present appeal before this

Court.

10. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused-

appellant assailed the judgment of conviction and sentence dated

19.03.2016 passed by the learned trial court contending that the

same suffers from serious infirmities and is liable to be set aside.

11. Learned counsel for the accused-appellant further submitted

that the impugned judgment dated 19.03.2016 is erroneous,

perverse and contrary to the settled principles of criminal

jurisprudence as well as the material available on record. The

learned trial court failed to properly appreciate the evidence

placed before it and has recorded the conviction of the appellant

on conjectures and surmises.

12. Learned counsel for the accused-appellant submitted that

the prosecution case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence and

admittedly there is no eyewitness to the alleged occurrence. He

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submitted that the entire story put-forth by the prosecution is

based upon testimonies, which suffer from material contradictions

and inconsistencies. In the absence of any direct evidence, the

learned trial court ought to have exercised greater caution while

evaluating the evidence, but instead, relied upon manipulated and

unreliable version of events.

13. Learned counsel for the accused-appellant further submitted

that no independent witness was examined by the prosecution to

substantiate the allegation that the accused-appellant was

addicted to liquor or that he used to subject the deceased- Sunita

to cruelty on that account. He further submitted that neither any

expert opinion was produced nor any medical examination of the

appellant was conducted to support such allegations. He further

submitted that the prosecution witnesses are closely related to the

deceased and, therefore, interested in securing conviction of the

accused-appellant, yet the learned trial court placed implicit

reliance upon their testimony without seeking corroboration from

independent evidences available on record.

14. Learned counsel further drew attention to the post-mortem

report and the testimony of PW-9 Dr. Balwant Gupta, who

conducted the post-mortem (Ex.P.25). He submitted that the

medical evidence merely indicates that the cause of death was

asphyxia resulting from strangulation. However, no external

injuries were noted on the body of the deceased, which could

indicate that she had been subjected to regular physical assault.

This belies the prosecution allegation that the deceased- Sunita

was habitually beaten by the appellant.

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15. Learned counsel for the accused-appellant submitted that

the prosecution has failed to establish any demand of dowry or

cruelty connected therewith. He further submitted that no prior

complaint was ever lodged by the deceased- Sunita or her family

members alleging such conduct on the part of the accused-

appellant. In the absence of any previous complaint or supporting

evidence, the allegations regarding demand of dowry or

harassment remain unsubstantiated.

16. Emphasizing further, the learned counsel for the accused-

appellant submitted that the conviction recorded by the learned

trial court is founded solely upon circumstantial evidence, but the

prosecution has failed to establish a complete and unbroken chain

of circumstances leading to the guilt of the accused-appellant. He

submitted that the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution

are neither conclusive nor do they exclude every hypothesis

consistent with the innocence of the accused-appellant.

17. Lastly, the learned counsel for the accused-appellant

submitted that the alleged motive sought to be attributed to the

accused-appellant is vague and insufficient to sustain a conviction

for a grave offence like murder. He further submitted that the

prosecution has not been able to establish a convincing motive

and the same appears to have been artificially introduced during

investigation. On these grounds, it was urged that the conviction

and sentence recorded by the learned trial court deserve to be set

aside and the appellant be acquitted of the charges.

18. Per Contra, learned Public Prosecutor has opposed the

submissions made by the learned Counsel for the accused-

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appellant and has supported the prosecution case set out before

the learned trial court and he submitted that there is no infirmity

in the judgment passed by the learned trial court convicting the

accused-appellant under Sections 302 IPC vide judgment dated

19.03.2016.

19. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellant-accused

and the learned Public Prosecutor for the State, and upon a

thorough and meticulous re-appreciation of the entire evidence

available on record, including the impugned judgment dated

19.03.2016, this Court proceeds to examine the correctness,

legality, and propriety of the findings recorded by learned trial

court.

20. Upon an in-depth and holistic appreciation of the entire

prosecution evidence, including the testimonies of PW-1

Vakilchand, PW-2 Vinod Kumar, PW-3 Om Prakash, PW-4 Dula

Ram, PW-7 Ajay Kumar, PW-11 Rani, PW-12 Sheokat Ali and PW-

13 Ms. Sanjana, this Court is required to examine whether the

prosecution has been able to establish the guilt of the accused-

appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

21. PW-1 Vakilchand, an uncle of the deceased, has deposed

that the deceased Sunita was married to the accused-appellant

Gulab and that after about one year of marriage, the accused-

appellant began to harass and assault her for money allegedly

required for alcohol, intoxicants and dowry. He further stated that

on the date of the incident, he was informed that the accused-

appellant had killed Sunita by strangulation. However, it is evident

that this witness is not an eyewitness to the occurrence and his

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statement regarding the cause of death is based on information

received from another person. His testimony, therefore, remains

hearsay insofar as the actual incident is concerned.

22. PW-2 Vinod Kumar, another relative of the deceased, has

also reiterated the allegations of harassment, threats to kill, and

demand of money for dowry and alcohol. He has stated that he

received information regarding the death of Sunita at about 9:00

P.M. and that there were rope marks on her neck. However, this

witness too is not an eyewitness, and his knowledge regarding the

manner of death is derived after the occurrence. Notably, his

version regarding the timing of information materially differs from

that of PW-1, thereby creating doubt about the prosecution's

narrative.

23. PW-3 Om Prakash has similarly deposed about prior cruelty,

alleged demand of dowry, and threats extended by the accused-

appellant. He has stated that the accused-appellant used to

consume alcohol and threaten the deceased to bring money or

face dire consequences. He has also alleged that the deceased

was strangulated on the date of the incident. However, like the

previous witnesses, he is not an eyewitness and his statement

regarding the cause of death is not based on direct observation

but on subsequent inference.

24. PW-7 Ajay Kumar has deposed that the deceased had

informed him about harassment and threats extended by the

accused-appellajnt for dowry. He has also stated that Panchayat

interventions were made but the conduct of the accused-appellant

did not improve. He further alleges that the accused-appellant

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killed Sunita on the date of the incident. However, this witness

also does not claim to have seen the incident and his testimony

remains limited to prior conduct and post-occurrence assumptions.

25. PW-11 Rani, the mother of the deceased, has reiterated the

allegations of harassment, demand of money for alcohol, and prior

incidents where the accused allegedly ill-treated and turned the

deceased out of the matrimonial home. She has also stated that

Panchayats were convened to resolve the disputes. With regard to

the death of her daughter, she has stated that there were injury

marks on the neck of the deceased. However, she too is not an

eyewitness, and her testimony regarding the alleged act of

strangulation is based on what she observed after the death and

what she believes to have occurred, rather than on direct

evidence.

26. Thus, from the collective testimony of PW-1, PW-2, PW-3,

PW-7 and PW-11, it emerges that all these witnesses are closely

related to the deceased and are interested witnesses. Their

statements, though indicative of prior discord and alleged

harassment, do not provide any direct evidence regarding the

commission of the alleged offence. Moreover, their testimonies

suffer from material inconsistencies, particularly with respect to

the timing of the incident, the source of information, and the

manner in which the death allegedly occurred.

27. PW-5 Ramesh Kumar, an independent witness, has deposed

that his house is situated adjacent to the house of Dharampal. He

has categorically stated that he was not aware as to who was

residing as a tenant in Dharampal's house. According to him, on

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17.01.2014, at about 2:00-2:30 p.m., when he had returned

home for meals, he heard the sound of a child crying from the

courtyard of Dharampal's house. Upon noticing, he found that the

gate of the house was locked from outside. Thereafter, he

informed Sheokat Ali about the same. On receiving this

information, Sheokat Ali contacted the house owner Dharampal,

who came to the spot, opened the lock, and went inside the

house.

28. PW-12 Sheokat Ali has stated that the accused Gulab had

been residing with his children in the courtyard of Dharampal's

house for about 10-12 days prior to the incident. He further

deposed that on 17.01.2014, at about 4:30 p.m., he heard a child

crying, whereupon PW-5 Ramesh Kumar approached him and

asked for the contact number of Dharampal. He then informed

Dharampal, who subsequently came and opened the locked

premises. It is only thereafter that the police arrived and it was

found that the wife of the accused-appellanty was lying dead.

However, this witness has not stated that he saw the accused at or

around the time of the incident, nor has he attributed any

incriminating act to him.

29. PW-4 Dula Ram, another independent witness whose shop is

situated behind the house of Dharampal where the accused-

appellant was allegedly residing on rent, has clearly stated that he

had not seen the accused-appellant.

30. Thus, from the testimonies of these independent witnesses,

it is evident that none of them has seen the accused-appellant at

the place of occurrence at the relevant time, nor have they

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deposed anything connecting the accused-appellant with the

commission of the alleged offence. Their evidence merely

establishes the fact that the deceased was found inside the locked

premises, but fails to establish the presence or involvement of the

accused-appellant. Consequently, no incriminating circumstance

against the accused-appellant emerges from the testimony of

these independent witnesses.

31. PW-13 Ms. Sanjana, who is the sister of the deceased, has

deposed on oath that she was residing with her sister Sunita and

the accused-appellant Gulab at Sangaria. She has stated that on

the day of the incident, the accused-appellant gave her some

money and utensils and asked her to bring milk. When she

returned with the milk, the accused-appellant met her outside the

house, took the milk and money from her, and instructed her to go

and play in the street, assuring her that he would bring her bag.

After some time, the accused-appellant returned and told her that

he would drop her at Hanumangarh. When she expressed her

desire to first meet her sister, the accused-appellant did not

permit her to do so and instead took her to Hanumangarh and left

her there. Her statement was recorded before the learned

Magistrate under law, which has been exhibited as Exhibit-28,

bearing her signatures at places marked A to B.

32. The testimony of PW-13 assumes significance as she is the

only witness who has spoken about the circumstances

immediately preceding the occurrence. However, even this witness

does not claim to have seen the alleged incident of murder. Her

deposition, at best, establishes that on the relevant day, the

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accused-appellant ensured that she was sent away from the house

shortly before the incident. While this may give rise to a degree of

suspicion, it does not, by itself, conclusively establish that the

accused-appellant committed the murder of the deceased.

33. As already discussed, the other prosecution witnesses, who

are family members of the deceased, have consistently alleged

harassment, cruelty, and demand of money by the accused-

appellant; however, none of them is an eyewitness to the

occurrence. Their testimonies, therefore, cannot be treated as

direct evidence of the alleged act of murder.

34. The prosecution case thus hinges substantially upon the

circumstances sought to be proved through PW-13. However, the

law is well settled that in a case based on circumstantial evidence,

each circumstance must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, and

all the circumstances must form a complete chain pointing only

towards the guilt of the accused. In the present case, the

testimony of PW-13, though relevant, does not complete such a

chain, nor does it exclude every hypothesis except that of the guilt

of the accused-appellant.

35. It is also the stand of the accused-appellant that his wife was

murdered by one Dharampal. However, it is true that no complaint

or case has been filed against the said Dharampal, nor has the

accused-appellant led any cogent evidence to substantiate this

plea. Nevertheless, it is a settled principle of criminal law that the

burden of proof lies entirely upon the prosecution, and the

weakness of the defence cannot be a substitute for the proof

required to establish the prosecution case.

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36. This Court is of the firm view that, having regard to the

overall facts and circumstances of the case, the learned trial court

has committed illegality in convicting the accused-appellant of the

charges levelled against him. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in

Ballu & Ors. Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in AIR

2024 SC 1678 has held that even where two views are possible,

and the trial court has taken a view which appears to be more

probable, the High Court should not interfere with the same unless

the view taken by the trial court is perverse or wholly

unreasonable.

37. In Ballu & Ors. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported

in AIR 2024 SC 1678, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as

under:-

8. It is settled law that the suspicion, however strong it may be, cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt. An Accused cannot be convicted on the ground of suspicion, no matter how strong it is. An Accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

9. Apart from that, it is to be noted that the present case is a case of reversal of acquittal. The law with regard to interference by the Appellate Court is very well crystallized. Unless the finding of acquittal is found to be perverse or impossible, interference with the same would not be warranted. Though, there are a catena of judgments on the issue, we will only refer to two judgments which the High Court itself has reproduced in the impugned judgment, which are as reproduced below:-

13. In case of Sadhu Saran Singh v.

State of U.P. (2016) 4 SCC 397, the Supreme Court has held that:- In an appeal against acquittal where the presumption of innocence in favour of the Accused is reinforced, the appellate Court would interfere with the order of acquittal only

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when there is perversity of fact and law.

However, we believe that the paramount consideration of the Court is to do substantial justice and avoid miscarriage of justice which can arise by acquitting the Accused who is guilty of an offence. A miscarriage of justice that may occur by the acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. Appellate Court, while enunciating the principles with regard to the scope of powers of the appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal, has no absolute restriction in law to review and relook the entire evidence on which the order of acquittal is founded.

14. Similar, In case of Harljan Bhala Teja v. State of Gujarat (2016) 12 SCC 665, the Supreme Court has held that:- No doubt, where, on appreciation of evidence on record, two views are possible, and the trial court has taken a view of acquittal, the appellate court should not interfere with the same. However, this does not mean that in all the cases where the trial court has recorded acquittal, the same should not be interfered with, even if the view is perverse. Where the view taken by the trial court is against the weight of evidence on record, or perverse, it is always open far the appellate court to express the right conclusion after re- appreciating the evidence If the charge is proved beyond reasonable doubt on record, and convict the Accused

20. The High Court could have interfered in the criminal appeal only if it came to the conclusion that the findings of the trial Judge were either perverse or impossible. As already discussed hereinbefore, no perversity or impossibility could be found in the approach adopted by the learned Trial Judge.

38. In view of the aforesaid analysis the same falls short of the

standard of proof required in criminal jurisprudence. The prosecution

has failed to establish, through reliable and cogent evidence, that the

accused-appellant alone was responsible for the death of the deceased

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or that the circumstances form a complete and unbroken chain leading

to his guilt. Accordingly, the benefit of doubt must go to the accused-

appellant.

39. A question has been raised with regard to the conduct of the

accused, namely, that if he had not committed the murder of the

deceased, there was no apparent reason for him to prevent PW-13 Ms.

Sanjana from meeting her sister, to send her away to play outside, and

thereafter to take her directly to Hanumangarh without permitting her

to return to the house. Such conduct, on the face of it, may appear

suspicious and may give rise to an adverse inference against the

accused-appellant.

40. However, it is a settled principle of law that the conduct of an

accused, though a relevant fact under section 8 of the Indian Evidence

Act, 1872, cannot by itself form the sole basis of conviction, particularly

in cases involving serious charges such as murder. The conduct of the

accused is only one circumstance, which must be considered in

conjunction with other cogent, reliable, and legally admissible evidence.

41. In the present case, apart from the aforesaid conduct attributed

to the accused-appellant, there is no direct evidence on record to

establish that he committed the murder of the deceased. The chain of

circumstantial evidence is not complete, and the prosecution has failed

to produce independent and convincing evidence connecting the

accused-appellant with the commission of the offence. In such

circumstances, mere suspicion arising from the conduct of the accused,

however strong it may be, cannot take the place of proof.

42. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Narayan Yadav v. State of

Chhattisgarh reported in 2025 INSC 927 has cautioned that the

conduct of an accused, though a relevant fact under Section 8 Indian

Evidence Act, 1872, cannot by itself form the sole basis for conviction,

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particularly in serious offence such as murder. The Court held that the

conduct of the accused is only one of the circumstances to be

considered along with other reliable evidence, and in the absence of

cogent and credible supporting evidence, conviction cannot be sustained

merely on the basis of such conduct. The relevant observation reads as

under:-

"36. In this context, we deem it necessary to sound a note of caution. While the conduct of an accused may be a relevant fact under Section 8 of the Act of 1872, it cannot, by itself, serve as the sole basis for conviction, especially in a grave charge such as murder. Like any other piece of evidence, the conduct of the accused is merely one of the circumstances the court may consider, in conjunction with other direct or circumstantial evidence on record. To put it succinctly, although relevant, the accused's conduct alone cannot justify a conviction in the absence of cogent and credible supporting evidence."

43. Accordingly, while the conduct of the accused-appellant may raise

suspicion, in the absence of corroborative and trustworthy evidence, the

same cannot be made the sole foundation for recording a finding of

guilt. The accused-appellant is, therefore, entitled to the benefit of

doubt.

44. In our considered view, the prosecution has failed to discharge its

burden. The conviction recorded by the learned trial court cannot be

sustained. The appeal deserves to be allowed.

45. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of conviction

and sentence dated 19.03.2016 passed by the learned Additional

Sessions Judge Sangaria, Hanumangarh in Sessions Case No.10/2014

is set aside. The accused-appellant is acquitted of all charges. The