The State Of Rajasthan vs Lichhma Devi (2026:Rj-Jd:11996-Db)
2026 Latest Caselaw 3879 Raj

Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

The State Of Rajasthan vs Lichhma Devi (2026:Rj-Jd:11996-Db) on 13 March, 2026

[2026:RJ-JD:11996-DB]



      HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                          JODHPUR
           D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No.1055/2024

1.      The State Of Rajasthan, Through The Secretary, Social
        Welfare    Department,     Government     Of     Rajasthan,
        Secretariat, Jaipur.
2.      The   Director,    Social   Justice And     Empowerment
        Department, Directorate Of Social Welfare, Government
        Of Rajasthan, Secretariat, Jaipur.
3.      The    Hostel     Superintendent,   Rajkiya      Ambedkar
        Chhatrawas Chhapar, District Churu.
                                                     ----Appellants
                               Versus
Lichhma Devi W/o Shri Shera Ram, Aged About 38 Years,
Resident of Benathaomji, Tehsil Bidasar, District Churu Presently
Working as Cook, Rajkiya Ambedkar Chhatrawas Chhapar,
District Churu.
                                                   ----Respondent


For Appellant(s)             :     Mr. Piyush Bhandari for
                                   Mr. Praveen Khandelwal, AAG
For Respondent(s)            :     Mr. Hemant Dutt

              HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MONGA

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL BENIWAL Order(Oral)

13/03/2026 Per : Arun Monga,J

1. The applicants seek condonation of a delay of 503 days in

filing the accompanying appeal against the judgment and order

dated 23.01.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge in S.B. Civil

Writ Petition No.15711/2021, whereby the writ petition was

allowed, the order dated 10.09.2021 rejecting the petitioner's

representation was quashed, and the respondents/appellants were

directed to grant the petitioner the benefit of minimum of the

applicable pay scale from the date of filing of the writ petition. For

the reasons recorded hereinafter in the instant order, we find that

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the present case does not warrant exercise of discretion for

condonation of such inordinate delay.

2. The explanation given in the application for seeking

condonation is totally mechanical and there seems to be no

application of mind. No specific details or day to day explanation

have been given as to why the matter remained pending.

3. For ready reference paras No.1 to 6 of the application are as

below:

"1. That it is humbly submitted that the impugned order was passed on 23.01.2023. Upon the receipt of the certified copy of the order, the same was sent to the department for compliance.

2. That thereupon, legal opinion was sought from the concerned Additional Advocate General whether to file an appeal for the said order.

3. That upon receipt of legal opinion to file an appeal from the Additional Advocate General, the Additional Director (Vigilance and Administration) arrived at a decision of filing an appeal against the order dated 23.01.2023 and passed order dated 20.05.2024 for the same. In pursuance thereof, Officer in charge was appointed by the department.

4. That in the month of November and December, Legislative Assembly Elections were held in the state of Rajasthan and it was only after the formation of the government that new counsels for the government were appointed. In addition to the delay because of departmental procedure, delay was also on account of appointments of new Additional Advocate Generals and the respective work allocation.

5. That the Officer in Charge concerned approach in the office of Additional Advocate General for doing the needful. An initial Draft of appeal was forwarded from the office of Additional Advocate General prepared on the basis of material supplied. Subsequently, the department provided some more information regarding the controversy. Upon further discussion regarding the merits of the matter with the authorities and upon procuring the related material like some of the earlier orders passed in regard to the controversy, a final draft of the Special Appeal was prepared and was forwarded to the department for the purpose of signing and swearing the pleading/affidavit.

6. That under these circumstances, the delay occasioned in filing the instant appeal is an inadvertent one and is purely on account of procedural delay."

4. Learned counsel for the appellant/State argues that the

impugned order dated 23.01.2023 was assailed after following due

governmental procedure and that the delay in filing the present

Special Appeal is bonafide. It is submitted that upon receipt of the

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certified copy, the matter was forwarded to the department and

legal opinion was sought from the office of the learned Additional

Advocate General. Pursuant to the opinion recommending an

appeal, the Additional Director (Vigilance and Administration) vide

order dated 20.05.2024 approved filing of the appeal and

appointed the Officer-in-Charge. It is further contended that the

intervening Legislative Assembly Elections in the State of

Rajasthan and subsequent appointment and work allocation of

new Additional Advocate Generals caused administrative delay.

The final draft appeal was thereafter prepared and forwarded for

signing and swearing of the affidavit. Learned counsel for the

appellant/State submits that the delay was neither deliberate nor

intentional and occurred solely due to procedural requirements.

5. No doubt in deserving case, Courts are liberal to grant

indulgence but instant is not a case of such kind.

6. It is a settled position in law that delay confers crystallized

rights in favour of a litigant by virtue of law of limitation. Delay

and latches since result in freezing of the vested rights in a party,

which seeks enforcement of the same, the said right cannot be

taken away unless there is a sufficient cause shown by the party

seeking condonation of delay.

7. Having gone through the contents of the application under

Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay, it

transpires that not only a completely beaten up stand has been

taken therein justifying the delay in the most mechanical and

nonchalant manner, but, even otherwise, its lacks the necessary

particulars.

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8. Qua the law applicable on condonation of delay, reference

may be had to Apex Court judgment in Ramlal and others Vs.

Rewa Coalfields Ltd.1 Relevant extract of the same is

reproduced hereinbelow:-

"7. In construing Section 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of decree holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge and this legal right which has accrued to the decree holder by lapse of time should not be light heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in trial behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice."

9. Reference may also be had to another Apex Court judgment

in Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v. State of Gujarat,2 wherein it is

observed thus:-

".....it is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal, but when it allows limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal, but that the limitations has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. In the present case, there was no such cause, and the High Court erred in condoning the delay."

10. In Government of Maharashtra (Water Resource

Department) Vs. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors

Private Limited3. Hon'ble the Supreme Court once again held as

under:-

"59. Likewise, merely because the Government is involved, a different yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down. This was felicitously stated in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India)

1 1962 AIR (SC) 361 2 AIR 1981 SC 733 3 2021 SCC OnLine SC 233

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Ltd.70 "Postmaster General"], as follows: (SCC pp. 573-74. paras 27-

29).

27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances. the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.

29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few."

11. In another recent Apex Court judgment in Shivamma

(dead) by Lrs Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors.4, it is

observed thus:-

"xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx

261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High Court deserves to be set aside. Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the

4 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969

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bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.

262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law.

263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries us is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice.

264. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law."

12. Aforesaid position in law dissuades us to grant any judicial

latitude to the appellant/State.

13. In the premise, since the appeal is not maintainable on the

ground of delay, no ground to hear the main appeal on merits is

made out.

14. Both, the application for condonation of delay as well as

main appeal are dismissed.

15. Any other application, if pending, shall also stand disposed

of.

                                   (SUNIL BENIWAL),J                                               (ARUN MONGA),J



                                    Ashutosh-26




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