[Cites 16, Cited by 0]
Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Lrs Of Late Sh. Takhat Singh Kothari vs State Of Rajasthan on 7 March, 2026
Author: Nupur Bhati
Bench: Nupur Bhati
[2026:RJ-JD:8657-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 1452/2025
Lrs. of Late Sh. Takhat Singh Kothari, son of Shri Nana Lal Ji
Kothari through Legal Heir Prashant Kothari son of Late Sh.
Takhat Singh Kothari, aged about 37 Years, resident of 432,
Bhopalpura Main Road, Udaipur.
----Appellant
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan, through the Secretary, Urban
Development and Housing Department, Govt. of
Rajasthan, Jaipur.
2. The Urban Improvement Trust Udaipur, through the
Secretary.
3. The Land Acquisition Officer, Urban Improvement Trust,
Udaipur.
----Respondents
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Narendra Thanvi
Mr. Mahendra Thanvi
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Vijay Purohit
Mr. Ayush Gehlot
HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE MR. SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE NUPUR BHATI
Judgment
Date of conclusion of arguments : 16th February, 2026
Date on which judgment was reserved : 16th February, 2026
Whether the full judgment or only
the operative part is pronounced : Full judgment
Date of pronouncement : 7th March, 2026
(Per Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice)
1. The present special appeal assails the judgment passed by
the learned Single Judge dated 12.07.2025, whereby the writ
petition was dismissed and the prayers made by the appellant-writ
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petitioner were rejected. The learned Single Judge has relied upon
the judgment passed by the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in "Indore Development Authority vs. Manoharlal
& Ors."1, holding that the plea of lapsing of the acquisition
proceedings does not stand. Learned counsel for the appellant
has, however, submitted that it is an erroneous interpretation
taken by the learned Single Judge of the judgment passed in
Indore Development Authority (Supra) and infact as per the
judgment, the acquisition would lapse. It is stated that an award
was passed for acquiring the land in-question on 16.01.2002 and
the compensation amount was deposited in the Court on
24.03.2007 and paper possession was taken of the property,
actual possession was never taken and the appellant continue to
remain in possession of the property.
2. In the year 2007, he filed the writ petition challenging the
acquisition proceedings which were disposed of and the acquisition
was upheld vide order dated 18.03.2008 in S.B. Civil Writ Petition
No.1796/2007 thereafter he filed D.B. Civil Special Appeal (W)
No.351/2008 and the same was also dismissed on 09.02.2009.
Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 17499/2009 against the said
judgment was filed which came to be dismissed on 14.09.2009.
Learned counsel submits that after the said acquisition
proceedings were attained finality, the new Act known as the Right
to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (in short 'the Act of
2013') came into force with effect from 01.01.20214 and as per
the provisions of Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013, since the
1 (2020) 8 SCC 129
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possession had not been taken nor the compensation had been
paid, the petitioner preferred S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.6347/2014
on 16.09.2014 for declaring the land acquisition proceedings to
have lapsed in terms of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. Interim
order had been passed in his favour however, the learned Single
Judge in terms of Indore Development Authority (Supra) has
dismissed his writ petition. Hence, aggrieved thereto he has
preferred this appeal.
3. Learned counsel submits that even as per the judgment
passed in Indore Development Authority (Supra), the rights of the
appellant-writ petitioner stand protected and then the land
acquisition proceedings have shall be treated to have lapsed. In
support of his contention he has invited our attention to the
various paragraphs of the judgment to submit that more than 5
years 2 months and 8 days had lapsed between the date of award
and the date when the amount was deposited in the Court and
paper possession taken. Hence, in terms of the provisions of
Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013 and the law laid down in Indore
Indore Development Authority (Supra), the acquisition
proceedings would stand lapsed after period of 5 years counting
from the date of award. However, the learned Single Judge has
not dwelt into this aspect relating to the Section 24 (2) of the Act
of 2013 and the observations of the Indore Development
Authority (Supra).
4. We however, are conscious that the Single Judge of the High
Court is not sub-ordinate to the Division Bench and, therefore, this
Court while sitting in the Division Bench would not remand the
matter back to the Single Judge as the special appeal (writ) would
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only be in continuation of exercise of powers under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India.
5. The Apex Court in "Roma Sonkar v. M.P. State Public Service
Commission2" has also held as under :-
"3. We have very serious reservations whether the
Division Bench in an intra court appeal could have
remitted a writ petition in the matter of moulding the
relief. It is the exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The learned
Single Judge as well as the Division Bench exercised the
same jurisdiction. Only to avoid inconvenience to the
litigants, another tier of screening by the Division Bench
is provided in terms of the power of the High Court but
that does not mean that the Single Judge is subordinate
to the Division Bench. Being a writ proceeding, the
Division Bench was called upon, in the intra court appeal,
primarily and mostly to consider the correctness or
otherwise of the view taken by the learned Single Judge.
Hence, in our view, the Division Bench needs to consider
the appeal(s) on merits by deciding on the correctness of
the judgment of the learned Single Judge, instead or
remitting the matter to the learned Single Judge."
6. We, therefore, deem it appropriate to examine the claim of
the appellant on merits and for that purpose it would be apposite
to quote the conclusions drawn in Indore Development Authority
(Supra) as under :-
"333. In Mary Angel322 this Court observed as follows: (SCC
pp. 220-22, paras 19-21)
"19. ... the rule of interpretation on the basis of the
maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius",... has been
considered in the decision rendered by the Queen's Bench
in Dean v. Wiesengrund323. The Court considered the said
maxim and held that after all it is more than an aid to
construction and has little, if any, weight where it is
possible to account for the "inclusio unius" on grounds
other than intention to effect the "exclusio alterius".
Thereafter, the Court referred to the following passage
from the case of Colquhoun v. Brooks 324 wherein the
Court called for its approval: (QBD p. 65)
2 (2018) 17 SCC 106
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'The maxim "expressio unius est exclusio
alterius" has been pressed upon us. I agree with what
is said in the court325 below by Wills, J., about this
maxim. It is often a valuable servant, but a dangerous
master to follow in the construction of statutes or
documents. The exclusio is often the result of
inadvertence or accident, and the maxim ought not to
be applied, when its application having regard to the
subject-matter to which it is to be applied, leads to
inconsistency or injustice.'
In my opinion, the application of the maxim here would
lead to inconsistency and injustice, and would make
Section 14(1) of the Act of 1920 uncertain and capricious
in its operation.
20. The aforesaid maxim was referred to by this
Court in CCE v. National Tobacco Co. of India Ltd. 355 The
Court in that case considered the question whether there
was or was not an implied power to hold an inquiry in the
circumstances of the case in view of the provisions of
Section 4 of the Central Excise Act read with Rule 10-A of
the Central Excise Rules and referred to the aforesaid
passage 'the maxim' is often a valuable servant, but a
dangerous master...' and held that the rule is subservient
to the basic principle that courts must endeavour to
ascertain the legislative intent and purpose, and then
adopt a rule of construction which effectuates rather than
one that may defeat these. Moreover, the rule of
prohibition by necessary implication could be applied only
where a specified procedure is laid down for the
performance of a duty. In Parbhani Transport Coop.
Society Ltd. v. RTA357, this Court observed that the maxim
'expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a maxim for
ascertaining the intention of the legislature and where the
statutory language is plain and the meaning clear, there
is no scope for applying. Further, in Harish Chandra
Bajpai v. Triloki Singh358, the Court [at AIR p. 454, para
19(4)] referred to the following passage from Maxwell on
Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edn., pp. 316-17:
'Provisions sometimes found in statutes, enacting
imperfectly or for particular cases only that which was
already and more widely the law, have occasionally
furnished ground for the contention that an intention to
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alter the general law was to be inferred from the partial
or limited enactment, resting on the maxim expressio
unius, exclusio alterius. But that maxim is inapplicable
in such cases. The only inference which a court can
draw from such superfluous provisions (which generally
find a place in Acts to meet unfounded objections and
idle doubts), is that the legislature was either ignorant
or unmindful of the real state of the law, or that it
acted under the influence of excessive caution.'
21. Lastly, we would state that in Pampapathy v. State
of Mysore359, the Court has specifically observed that no
legislative enactment dealing with the procedure can provide
for all cases and that Court should have inherent powers apart
from the express provisions of law which are necessary for the
proper discharge of duties."
366.3. The word "or" used in Section 24(2) between
possession and compensation has to be read as "nor" or as
"and". The deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings
under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act takes place where due
to inaction of authorities for five years or more prior to
commencement of the said Act, the possession of land has
not been taken nor compensation has been paid. In other
words, in case possession has been taken, compensation
has not been paid then there is no lapse. Similarly, if
compensation has been paid, possession has not been
taken then there is no lapse.
366.8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a
deemed lapse of proceedings are applicable in case
authorities have failed due to their inaction to take
possession and pay compensation for five years or more
before the 2013 Act came into force, in a proceeding for
land acquisition pending with the authority concerned as on
1-1-2014. The period of subsistence of interim orders
passed by court has to be excluded in the computation of
five years."
7. Learned counsel submits that in terms of paragraphs 366.3
and 366.8 (Supra), since more than 5 years period had lapsed
between the date of award and the date of amount deposited, the
acquisition proceedings would lapsed.
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8. We are unable to accept the contentions as raised before this
Court. In this respect it would be necessary to quote the following
observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment
passed in Indore Development Authority (Supra) :-
"359. The entire gamut of submissions of the landowners is
based on the misinterpretation of the provisions contained
in Section 24. It does not intend to divest the State of
possession (of the land), title to which has been vested in
the State. It only intends to give higher compensation in
case the obligation of depositing of compensation has not
been fulfilled with regard to the majority of holdings. A fresh
cause of action in Section 24 has been given if for five years
or more possession has not been taken nor compensation
has been paid. In case possession has been taken and
compensation has not been deposited with respect to the
majority of landholdings, higher compensation to all
incumbents follows, as mentioned above. Section 24 does
not confer a new cause of action to challenge the acquisition
proceedings or the methodology adopted for the deposit of
compensation in the treasury instead of Reference Court, in
that case, interest or higher compensation, as the case may
be, can follow. In our considered opinion, Section 24 is
applicable to pending proceedings, not to the concluded
proceedings and the legality of the concluded proceedings,
cannot be questioned. Such a challenge does not lie within
the ambit of the deemed lapse under Section 24. The lapse
under Section 24 (2) is due to inaction or lethargy of
authorities in taking requisite steps as provided therein.
360. We are also of the considered opinion that the
decision in an earlier round of litigation operates as res
judicata where the challenge to the legality of the
proceedings had been negatived and the proceedings of
taking possession were upheld. Section 24 does not intend
to reopen proceedings which have been concluded. The
decision in Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal is of no avail.
Similar is the decision in Anil Kumar Gupta v. State of Bihar.
No doubt about it that proceedings (i.e. the original
acquisitions, or aspects relating to it) can be questioned but
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within a reasonable time; yet once the challenge has been
made and failed or has not been made for a reasonable
time, Section 24 does not provide for reopening thereof.
361. Son far as the proposition laid down in Ram Chand v.
Union of India is concerned, inaction and delay on the part
of acquiring authorities have been taken care of under
Section 24. The mischief rule (or Heydon's Mischief Rule)
was pressed into service on behalf of landowners relying
upon the decision in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of
Bihar, it was submitted that the 1894 Act did not provide for
lapse in the case of inordinate delay on the part of acquiring
authorities to complete the acquisition proceedings. Mischief
has been sought to be cured by the legislature by
introducing the 2013 Act by making provisions in Section 24
of the lapse of proceedings. The submission is untenable.
The provisions made under Section 24 have provided a
window of 5 years to complete the acquisition proceedings,
and if there is a delay of 5 years or more, there is a lapse
and not otherwise. The provision cannot be stretched any
further, otherwise, the entire infrastructure, which has come
up, would have to go and only the litigants would reap the
undeserving fruits of frivolous litigation, having lost in
several rounds of litigation earlier, which can never be the
intendment of the law.
362. We are of the considered opinion that Section 24
cannot be used to revive dead and stale claims and
concluded cases. They cannot be inquired into within the
purview of Section 24 of the 2013 Act. The provisions of
Section 24 do not invalidate the judgments and orders of
the Court, where rights and claims have been lost and
negatived. There is no revival of the barred claims by
operation of law. Thus, stale and dead claims cannot be
permitted to be canvassed on the pretext of enactment of
Section 24. In exceptional cases, when in fact, the payment
has not been made, but possession has been taken, the
remedy lies elsewhere if the case is not covered by the
proviso. It is the Court to consider it independently not
under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act."
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9. Firstly, we notice that the observations made in paras 359
and 360 clearly reflect that the present proceedings are nothing
but misuse of the provisions of Section 24 of the Act of 2013. In
the present case, we have already noticed that earlier challenge to
the acquisition proceedings had failed, therefore, fresh
proceedings under Section 24 of the Act of 2013 could not have
been taken up and a fresh cause of action does not arise merely
because Section 24 having come into force under the new Act of
2013. Secondly, we notice that so far as the observations of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court relating to Section 24 (2) of the Act of
2013, the same are to hold that before coming into force of
Section 24 if there had been no action taken for last 5 years then
the proceedings would lapse in terms of the Section 24 (2).
However, the counting has to be done from the date of coming
into force of the Act of 2013 i.e. with effect from 01.01.2014
backwards. Thus, if the compensation would not have been paid or
possession would not have been taken for any acquisition
proceedings in the previous 5 years i.e. from 2011 to 2014, the
right would accrue for claiming lapse of the acquisition
proceedings. But in the present case, we find that the
compensation was already deposited in the year 2007 and further
the paper possession had also been taken in 2007 itself, therefore,
the claim of the petitioner for benefit of Section 24 (2) of the Act
of 2013 of there being no action taken for 5 years is misconceived.
It is apparent that the petitioner is counting the 5 years from the
date of award till the date of making the compensation whereas,
the provisions of Section 24 (2) contemplate counting the 5 years'
period back from the date of coming into force of Section 24 (2) of
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the Act of 2013. The concept of claiming "Lapse" clause has been
introduced in the Act of 2013 and, therefore, the time period has
to be counted with reference to the Act of 2013 which has come
into force from 01.01.2014. The arguments, therefore, fail.
10. At this stage, the learned counsel also points out, that so far
as other land acquired by the State are concerned, the concerned
land holders were allowed to get their land converted under
Section 19-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. We find that such
prayers are not made in the present appeal and we, therefore,
refrain ourselves from making any such observations in this
appeal.
11. The appeal is accordingly, dismissed. No order as to costs.
12. All pending applications stand disposed of.
(DR.NUPUR BHATI),J (SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA),ACJ
29-KshamaD/-
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