[Cites 19, Cited by 0]
Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Ramkunwar vs State Of Rajasthan (2026:Rj-Jd:5553) on 29 January, 2026
Author: Farjand Ali
Bench: Farjand Ali
[2026:RJ-JD:5553]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 99/2026
1. Ramkunwar S/o Shri Ramu Ram, Aged About 44 Years,
Residents Of Dugoli, Police Station Jayal Districtnagaur.
2. Virendra Singh S/o Hanuwant Singh, Aged About 40
Years, Residents Of Dugoli, Police Station Jayal
Districtnagaur.
3. Surendra Singh S/o Hanuwant Singh, Aged About 45
Years, Residents Of Dugoli, Police Station Jayal District
Nagaur
4. Paremeshwari Alias Shanti W/o Prem Singh, Aged About
50 Years, Residents Of Dugoli, Police Station Jayal District
Nagaur.
----Petitioners
Versus
State Of Rajasthan, Through Pp
----Respondent
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Bhawani Singh Patel
Mr. R.K. Acharya
For Respondent(s) : Mr. N.S. Chandawat, Dy.G.A.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FARJAND ALI
Order
REPORTABLE
29/01/2026
1. This criminal revision petition, instituted under Sections 438
and 442 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, assails the judgment
dated 05.08.2025 rendered by the learned Additional Sessions
Judge, Jayal, District Nagaur, in Criminal Appeal Nos. 212323
(71/14), 06/15, 129/15 & 22/2023 (72/14), 3515 (242/15),
wherein, while partly allowing the appeals, the appellate court set
aside the order of sentence dated 28.10.2014 and remanded the
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matter to the trial court for reconsideration of the quantum of
sentence after hearing the parties. The petition emanates from the
conviction and sentence imposed by the Judicial Magistrate, First
Class, Jayal, District Nagaur, in Criminal Original Case
No.159/2011, wherein petitioners were convicted and sentenced
as under:-
Name of the Offence for Substantive Fine and default
accused which sentence sentence
convicted
1. Virendra Singh Section 9/15 2 Years RI Rs.10,000/- each
2. Ram Kunwar of the Wild and in default to
Life Protection further one month
Act additional
imprisonment
3. Surendra Singh Section 3/25 2 Years RI Rs.3,000/- each and
of the Arms in default to further
Act 15 days additional
imprisonment
Section 3/25 6 months RI Rs.2,000/- each and
4. Parmeshwari
of the Arms in default to further
Act 10 days additional
imprisonment
All the sentences were ordered to run concurrently.
2. At the threshold, it is noted that the petition is barred by a
period of 78 days. However, an application under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act has been filed, and the delay in presenting the
petition is hereby condoned. With the express consent of the
parties, the petition is being heard and decided at the earliest
opportunity, today itself.
3. The factual backdrop discloses that on the early morning of
29.04.2011, the complainants, Laxminarayan and Bhag Chand
Bishnoi, were proceeding by motorcycle from Rotu to Jayal when,
near a point two kilometers from Dugoli, they were purportedly
alerted by the discharge of firearms. Upon approaching the source
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of the noise, they allegedly observed the accused at a distance,
one of whom was armed, with a deer lying lifeless. Alarmed by the
presence of the armed group, the complainants retreated and
apprised the villagers, following which the SHO, P.S. Jayal,
registered FIR No.41/2011 under Sections 9/51 of the Wildlife
Protection Act and 3/25 of the Arms Act. Subsequent
investigations culminated in the filing of charge sheets against
Petitioners Nos.1 to 3 under Sections 9/51 and 3/25, and against
Petitioner No.4 under Section 3/30 of the Arms Act. The trial court
framed the charges, which the petitioners denied, and upon trial,
twelve witnesses were examined, twenty-four documentary
exhibits and one material exhibit were adduced, and the
petitioners were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. whereafter
they were convicted and sentenced as above. Hence the instant
revision petition.
4. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that the learned
appellate court committed a grave error in setting aside the
sentence and remanding the matter despite the absence of any
appeal by the State challenging the quantum. It is submitted that
the trial court misappreciated critical testimony, particularly that of
P.W.6 and P.W.7, who observed the accused at a distance, and that
no recovery of deer meat from Petitioners Nos.1 to 3 was
established, nor was any evidence adduced to situate them at the
time of such recovery. Further, the Regional Forensic Science
Laboratory did not conclusively identify the meat as belonging to a
deer or chinkara. Petitioner No.4, in possession of a licensed
firearm, was erroneously convicted without proof of involvement.
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The absence of indicia of hunting at the scene, coupled with
contradictions and improbabilities in the prosecution's narrative
including second-hand information, logistical implausibilities
regarding transportation of the deer, and discrepancies concerning
recovered items and firearms cast serious doubt on the veracity of
the prosecution story.
5. Conversely, the State, represented by the Dy. Government
Advocate, contends that the appellate court acted well within its
supervisory jurisdiction in remanding the matter for
reconsideration of the sentence to ensure proportionality and
compliance with statutory mandates. It is submitted that the
convictions are underpinned by credible evidence, including
identification of the accused, recovery of cooked and raw meat,
and possession of firearms. Alleged absences of bloodstains,
forensic ambiguities, or logistical improbabilities go to the weight
of evidence rather than its admissibility. The State further submits
that Petitioner No.4's licensed firearm does not preclude liability if
employed or facilitated in hunting, and that the trial court rightly
evaluated the evidence to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The remand was, therefore, justified to ensure judicial scrutiny of
the sentence in conformity with the law.
6. This Court has accorded its anxious and deliberate
consideration to the rival submissions advanced by learned
counsel for the parties and has carefully examined the record,
including the judgments impugned herein, with the degree of
scrutiny warranted by the nature of the controversy.
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6.1. Upon an exhaustive appraisal of the material on record, it
emerges with clarity that the offences for which the petitioners
stand convicted prescribe a maximum sentence not exceeding two
years' imprisonment. The findings of guilt recorded by the courts
below are not under challenge before this Court and, upon
independent examination, do not suffer from any infirmity
warranting interference. The convictions, therefore, merit
affirmation. However, the question of sentence stands on a
different footing and calls for a nuanced judicial evaluation,
particularly in light of the mitigating circumstances demonstrably
borne out from the record.
6.2. It is not in dispute that the petitioners are first-time offenders
and possess no prior criminal antecedents. The incident in
question arises out of a localized and personal dispute, devoid of
any element suggestive of broader societal impact or threat to
public order. The complainant, a widow, and the petitioners share
close familial ties and reside within the same vicinity, indicating
that the dispute is essentially interpersonal in nature. These
circumstances, taken cumulatively, substantially dilute the
necessity for a retributive or deterrent custodial sentence.
6.3. Notwithstanding the existence of such compelling mitigating
factors, it is evident that neither the trial court nor the appellate
court extended the benefit of probation or exercised sentencing
discretion with the degree of circumspection mandated by law.
More significantly, the courts below have failed to record any
cogent, convincing, or legally sustainable reasons justifying the
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denial of probation, despite the statutory obligation cast under
Section 361 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which requires
courts to expressly record reasons where the benefit of probation
is declined in cases where it could otherwise be considered.
6.4. The broader factual canvas further fortifies the case for
leniency. The incident dates back more than fifteen years, and the
petitioners have remained entangled in the rigours of criminal
litigation for an unduly prolonged period. During this interregnum,
they have already undergone a measure of incarceration and,
significantly, have not been implicated in any subsequent criminal
activity. At the time of the occurrence, the petitioners were young
and impressionable; today, they stand at an advanced stage of
life, encumbered with familial obligations, socio-economic
responsibilities, and the inexorable burdens of age. To insist upon
further incarceration at this juncture would amount to a rigid and
disproportionate application of penal sanctions, divorced from the
reformative and rehabilitative objectives that underpin modern
sentencing jurisprudence.
6.5. This Court deems it apposite to observe that the learned
appellate court, while exercising jurisdiction under Chapter XXIX
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was vested with ample
statutory authority under Section 386 Cr.P.C. to finally and
effectively adjudicate upon the issue of sentence. The appellate
court, having seized of the entire record and being fully competent
to reappraise the sentencing discretion exercised by the trial
court, could have maintained the conviction and appropriately
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modified the sentence in accordance with law. The power of
remand is neither mechanical nor obligatory; it is an exceptional
recourse to be adopted only where the circumstances of the case
so inexorably demand. In matters pertaining solely to sentencing
particularly where the factual substratum is undisputed and the
conviction stands affirmed, judicial prudence, procedural economy,
and the interests of substantive justice warrant the appellate court
itself to bring the lis to a quietus rather than prolong the litigation
by remitting the matter to the trial court.
6.6. This Court further observes that while determining the
appropriate sentence, the appellate court was under a solemn
obligation to undertake an independent, conscious, and reasoned
consideration of all relevant circumstances, including the
mitigating factors specifically pressed into service by the
petitioners. The plea seeking extension of the benefit of probation
was not a peripheral submission but went to the very heart of the
sentencing exercise. The appellate court was, therefore, required
to apply its judicial mind to the said plea and to record explicit
reasons for either granting or declining such benefit. The absence
of any discernible reasoning as to why probation was denied
despite statutory permissibility and the presence of compelling
mitigating circumstances, betrays a failure to discharge the duty
cast upon the appellate court by law. Such non-consideration
vitiates the sentencing determination and renders it
unsustainable.
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7. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the
considered opinion that while the findings of guilt recorded against
the petitioners are legally sound and warrant no interference, the
sentences imposed upon them are manifestly excessive and
disproportionate to the nature of the offence and the attendant
circumstances. The ends of justice would be adequately served by
limiting the sentence to the period of incarceration already
undergone by the petitioners. The prolonged passage of time,
absence of criminal antecedents, reformative conduct, and the
personal and localized nature of the dispute collectively persuade
this Court that no useful purpose would be served by subjecting
the petitioners to further custodial confinement.
8. Accordingly, the revision petition is partly allowed. The
judgment of conviction dated 28.10.2014, passed by the learned
Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Jayal, District Nagaur, in Criminal
Original Case No. 159/2011, is hereby affirmed and maintained.
However, the order of sentence is modified, and the period of
imprisonment imposed upon the petitioners is reduced to the
period already undergone by them. The sentence of fine, as
imposed by the trial court, shall remain unaltered and shall be
deposited before the learned trial court within a period of ninety
(90) days from the date of this judgment, if not already deposited.
9. The stay petition and all other pending applications, if any,
stand disposed of accordingly.
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10. A copy of this judgment be transmitted forthwith to the
learned trial court for information and for ensuring necessary
compliance.
(FARJAND ALI),J
88-Mamta/-
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