State Of Rajasthan vs Sukhram (2026:Rj-Jd:8231-Db)
2026 Latest Caselaw 2421 Raj

Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

State Of Rajasthan vs Sukhram (2026:Rj-Jd:8231-Db) on 13 February, 2026

Author: Yogendra Kumar Purohit

Bench: Yogendra Kumar Purohit

[2026:RJ-JD:8231-DB]

      HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                       JODHPUR
                  D.B. Spl. Appl. Writ No. 1710/2025

1.       State Of Rajasthan, Through The Secretary, Department
         Of Home Affairs, Govt. Of Rajasthan, Secretariat, Jaipur.
2.       Director General Of Police, Police Headquarters, Jaipur.
3.       Inspector General Of Police, Range Kota, Kota.
4.       Superintendent Of Police, Jhalawar.
                                                                    ----Appellants
                                      Versus
Sukhram S/o Arjun Ram, Aged About 31 Years, Village Dhaddhu,
Tehsil Phalodi, District Jodhpur.
                                                                   ----Respondent


For Appellant(s)            :     Mr. Deepak Chandak for
                                  Mr. B.L. Bhati, AAG
For Respondent(s)           :



              HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MONGA

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE YOGENDRA KUMAR PUROHIT

Order (Oral)

13/02/2026 Per : Arun Monga,J

1. Applicant seeks condonation of delay of 335 days in filing the

accompanied appeal. For the reasons stated hereinafter, this is not

a fit case where discretion to condone the delay ought to be

exercised.

2. The explanation for seeking condonation is totally mechanical

and there seems to be no application of mind. No specific details

or day to day explanation have been given as to why the matter

remained pending.

3. For ready reference paras No.1 to 8 of the application are as

below:

(Uploaded on 20/02/2026 at 11:00:11 AM)

[2026:RJ-JD:8231-DB] (2 of 7) [SAW-1710/2025]

"1. That the annexed Appeal has been preferred against the impugned order dated 01.10.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5433/2020 (Dinesh Vs. State of Raj. & Ors.).

2. That the above Special Appeal has been preferred on cogent grounds, and the appellants have full hope of success in the same.

3. That after the aforesaid exercise, the office of the competent officer of the appellants sought an opinion from the office of the Addl.

Advocate General / Government Counsel, upon which the Additional Advocate General / Government Counsel sent his opinion to the officer of the appellants' department.

4. That thereafter, a proposal for filing an appeal against the impugned order dated 01.10.2024 was sent by the competent authority of the Home Department. Subsequently, a meeting of the permanent / standing committee was called at the Government / State level for filing a DB Appeal against the impugned order dated 01.10.2024.

5. That thereafter, an officer-in-charge was appointed to do the needful by the competent authority of the Home Department, while conveying the order of the standing committee to file the Special Appeal (Writ) against the impugned order.

6. That thereafter, the officer-in-charge contacted the office of the Additional Advocate General to file the SAW.

7. That thereafter, the office of the Additional Advocate General prepared the Special Appeal (Writ) and filed the same without any further delay.

8.That the appeal has been preferred without any further delay. The delay in filing the appeal is neither deliberate nor mala fide and is due to the time taken in the administrative process. If the delay is not condoned, the appellants will suffer irreparable loss which cannot be compensated in any manner."

4. Learned counsel for the appellant-State argues that the

present appeal against the order dated 01.10.2024 could not be

filed within the prescribed period of limitation due to bona fide

administrative procedures and official formalities required at

various levels of the Government. After receipt of the impugned

order, the matter was examined by the competent authority, legal

opinion was sought from the office of the Additional Advocate

General/Government Counsel, and a proposal for filing the appeal

was placed before the Permanent/Standing Committee at the

State level, which resolved to prefer the appeal. Thereafter, an

officer-in-charge was appointed to coordinate with the office of the

(Uploaded on 20/02/2026 at 11:00:11 AM)

[2026:RJ-JD:8231-DB] (3 of 7) [SAW-1710/2025]

Additional Advocate General for drafting and filing the appeal. The

time consumed in obtaining approvals, seeking opinion, and

completing inter-departmental formalities resulted in the delay.

The delay is neither deliberate nor mala fide, but purely

procedural, and if not condoned, the appellants shall suffer

irreparable loss and prejudice; hence, it deserves to be condoned

in the interest of justice.

5. No doubt in deserving case, Courts are liberal to grant

indulgence but instant is not a case of such kind.

6. It is a settled position in law that delay confers crystallized

rights in favour of a litigant by virtue of law of limitation. Delay

and latches since result in freezing of the vested rights in a party,

which seeks enforcement of the same, the said right cannot be

taken away unless there is a sufficient cause shown by the party

seeking condonation of delay.

7. Having gone through the contents of the application under

Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay, it

transpires that not only a completely beaten up stand has been

taken therein justifying the delay in the most mechanical and

nonchalant manner, but, even otherwise, its lacks the necessary

particulars.

8. Qua the law applicable on condonation of delay, reference

may be had to Apex Court judgment in Ramlal and others Vs.

Rewa Coalfields Ltd.1 Relevant extract of the same is

reproduced hereinbelow:-

"7. In construing Section 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the

1 1962 AIR (SC) 361

(Uploaded on 20/02/2026 at 11:00:11 AM)

[2026:RJ-JD:8231-DB] (4 of 7) [SAW-1710/2025]

expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of decree holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge and this legal right which has accrued to the decree holder by lapse of time should not be light heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in trial behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice."

9. Reference may also be had to another Apex Court judgment

in Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v. State of Gujarat,2 wherein it is

observed thus:-

".....it is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal, but when it allows limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal, but that the limitations has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. In the present case, there was no such cause, and the High Court erred in condoning the delay."

10. In Government of Maharashtra (Water Resource

Department) Vs. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors

Private Limited3. Hon'ble the Supreme Court once again held as

under:-

"59. Likewise, merely because the Government is involved, a different yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down. This was felicitously stated in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd.70 "Postmaster General"], as follows: (SCC pp. 573-74. paras 27-29).

27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

2 AIR 1981 SC 733 3 2021 SCC OnLine SC 233

(Uploaded on 20/02/2026 at 11:00:11 AM)

[2026:RJ-JD:8231-DB] (5 of 7) [SAW-1710/2025]

28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances. the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.

29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few."

11. In another recent Apex Court judgment in Shivamma

(dead) by Lrs Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors.4, it is

observed thus:-

"xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx

261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High Court deserves to be set aside. Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.

262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult 4 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969

(Uploaded on 20/02/2026 at 11:00:11 AM)

[2026:RJ-JD:8231-DB] (6 of 7) [SAW-1710/2025]

to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law.

263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries us is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice.

264. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law."

12. Aforesaid position in law dissuades us to grant any judicial

latitude to the appellant/State.

13. In the premise, since the appeal is not maintainable on the

ground of delay, no ground to hear the main appeal on merits is

made out.

14. In the parting, we may hasten to add that though the appeal

is being dismissed on the ground of limitation, but perusal of the

impugned order reflects that even the impugned order passed by

learned Single Judge was on the consent of the appellant-State

and it was thus, fully aware of the consequences of giving such a

consent. Further, the statement was made after going through the

judgment rendered in Civil Writ Petition No. 1428/2023

Satyanarayan Saran Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. which has

attained finality.

15. Moreover, if there were any doubts about applicability of the

said judgment, it would have been rather prudent to go before the

learned Single Judge to seek modification of the order either by

withdrawing the consent or otherwise, seeking review. On the

other hand, the appellant-State chose to sit over it for almost a

year and as an afterthought, they preferred the instant appeal.

(Uploaded on 20/02/2026 at 11:00:11 AM)

[2026:RJ-JD:8231-DB] (7 of 7) [SAW-1710/2025]

16. Both, the application for condonation of delay as well as

main appeal are dismissed.

17. Any other application, if pending, shall also stand disposed

of.

                                   (YOGENDRA KUMAR PUROHIT),J                                       (ARUN MONGA),J
                                    9-Devanshi/- KP Singh Dewasi/-




                                                             (Uploaded on 20/02/2026 at 11:00:11 AM)




Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)