Citation : 2026 Latest Caselaw 7055 Raj
Judgement Date : 30 April, 2026
[2026:RJ-JD:19589]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 111/1998
State of Rajasthan
----Appellant
Versus
Chhagna s/o Amarchand Kumhar, R/o Ummar, P.S. & Tehsil-Begu
, Distt.-Chittorgarh.
----Respondent
For Appellant(s) : Mr. S.R. Chaudhary
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Bajrang Singh
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FARJAND ALI
Judgment
DATE OF CONCLUSION OF ARGUMENTS 08/04/2026
DATE ON WHICH JUDGMENT IS RESERVED 08/04/2026
FULL JUDGMENT OR OPERATIVE PART Full JUDGMENT
DATE Of PRONOUNCEMENT 30/04/2026
BY THE COURT:-
1. The State of Rajasthan initially instituted the present matter
as an application seeking leave to appeal under Section
378(iii) read with Section 378(i) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure against the judgment dated 19.07.1997 passed by
the Special Judge, N.D.P.S. Act, Bhilwara in Sessions Case
No.(138/93)59/97, whereby the accused-respondent came
to be acquitted of the charges under Section 8/18 of the
N.D.P.S. Act, 1985. Leave having already been granted by
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this Court, the matter now stands converted into and is
being considered as a regular criminal appeal against
acquittal.
Facts of the Case
2. Briefly stated, the prosecution case is that on 24.12.1990 at
about 9:00 PM, the Station House Officer, Police Station
Kotwali, Bhilwara received telephonic information from Head
Constable Jagdish, posted at Roadways Bus Stand, that an
unknown person sitting on a bench was suspected to be
carrying opium in a bag. Acting upon the said information,
the SHO along with police staff reached the spot, where the
accused was identified. After apprising him of his right of
search before a Magistrate or Gazetted Officer, the accused
allegedly consented to be searched by the police party.
2.Upon search of the bag, a container was found which
allegedly contained opium. The substance was weighed,
samples were drawn, sealed, and later sent for chemical
examination. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet
was filed against the accused for offence under Section 8/18
of the N.D.P.S. Act.
3.The learned Trial Court, after recording evidence of
prosecution witnesses and hearing the parties, acquitted the
accused by extending benefit of doubt, primarily on account
of procedural lapses, contradictions in evidence, and non-
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[2026:RJ-JD:19589] (3 of 7) [CRLA-111/1998]
compliance of mandatory provisions of the N.D.P.S. Act.
Aggrieved thereby, the state has approached this court.
Submissions of Counsel
4.Learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the learned Trial
Court has erred in acquitting the accused despite cogent
evidence regarding recovery of contraband and that the
findings are contrary to record.
5.Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent supported the
impugned judgment and submitted that the acquittal is
based on proper appreciation of evidence, particularly in
view of serious procedural violations and material
contradictions.
6.Heard learned counsels present for the parties and gone
through the materials available on record.
Observations of the Court
7.At the outset, it is to be noted that the case arises under the
stringent provisions of the N.D.P.S. Act, where strict
compliance of statutory safeguards is not merely procedural
but substantive in nature. Any deviation from such
mandatory provisions goes to the root of the prosecution
case.
8.The learned Trial Court has recorded a categorical finding
that there was non-compliance of Section 42 of the N.D.P.S.
Act. The evidence on record reveals that though the
information regarding possession of contraband was
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allegedly received through a source, the same was neither
reduced into writing nor was its copy sent to superior officers
forthwith. The prosecution has failed to produce any
documentary evidence to establish such compliance. This
omission assumes significance in light of the settled legal
position that compliance of Section 42 is mandatory.
9.Further, the Trial Court has also noticed serious infirmities
regarding the handling of samples and the chain of custody.
Though the prosecution asserted that samples were drawn
and sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory, the "sample
seal" was neither satisfactorily proved nor produced before
the Court. This creates a serious doubt as to whether the
very sample allegedly seized from the accused was the one
examined by the laboratory.
10.The learned Trial Court has rightly relied upon precedents
wherein it has been consistently held that failure to prove
safe custody and proper sealing of samples renders the FSL
report unreliable. In the present case, the absence of the
sample seal and lack of clarity as to which sample was sent
for examination creates a vital gap in the prosecution chain.
11.Additionally, material contradictions have surfaced in the
testimony of prosecution witnesses. There is inconsistency
regarding the weight of the recovered substance, with
different witnesses stating different quantities. Similarly,
contradictions exist regarding preparation of the site plan ,
which was allegedly prepared but not produced on record.
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These inconsistencies are not minor but go to the root of the
prosecution story.
12.The cumulative effect of these discrepancies, procedural
lapses, and contradictions creates a reasonable doubt
regarding the prosecution case. It is trite law that in criminal
jurisprudence, the benefit of doubt must necessarily go to
the accused.
13.At this juncture, it is apposite to refer to the recent
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mallappa & Ors.
v. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 1162/2011
decided on 12.02.2024), wherein the principles governing
interference in an appeal against acquittal have been
reiterated. The Court has emphasized that unless the
findings of the Trial Court are manifestly illegal or perverse,
the appellate Court should not substitute its own view merely
because another view is possible.
14.Paragraph 36 of the said judgment lucidly lays down that
where two views are possible, the one favourable to the
accused must prevail and a plausible view taken by the Trial
Court ought not to be supplanted.
15.Paragraph 36 of the said judgment encapsulates the
doctrine in the following terms:
"36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty...
(i) Appreciation of evidence must be holistic and comprehensive;
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(ii) Selective or truncated evaluation may itself occasion miscarriage of justice;
(iii) If two views are possible, the one favourable to the accused must ordinarily prevail;
(iv) A legally plausible view of the Trial Court cannot be supplanted merely because another view is possible;
(v) In reversing an acquittal, the appellate Court must deal with all reasons assigned by the Trial Court;
(vi) Conversion of acquittal into conviction requires demonstration of manifest illegality, perversity, or patent error in the Trial Court's approach."
16.Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, it is
evident that the view taken by the learned Trial Court is not
only a possible view but a well-reasoned and legally
sustainable one. The Trial Court has meticulously analyzed
the evidence and has assigned cogent reasons for
disbelieving the prosecution case.
17.This Court does not find any perversity, illegality, or
material irregularity in the appreciation of evidence by the
Trial Court. On the contrary, the findings appear to be based
on a comprehensive and judicious evaluation of the record.
18.It is settled that an order of acquittal strengthens the
presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, and such
presumption cannot be lightly disturbed. The prosecution has
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failed to demonstrate any compelling reason warranting
interference with the impugned judgment.
Conclusion
19.In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the judgment of acquittal passed by
the learned Trial Court is just, proper, and in accordance with
law, and does not call for any interference.
19.Consequently, the present criminal appeal fails and is
hereby dismissed. The judgment dated 19.07.1997 passed
by the learned Special Judge, N.D.P.S. Act, Bhilwara is
affirmed.
20.Record be returned forthwith.
(FARJAND ALI),J 89-Mamta/-
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