[Cites 15, Cited by 0]

Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

Narendra Meghwal vs The State Of Rajasthan on 30 April, 2026

Author: Anand Sharma

Bench: Anand Sharma

[2026:RJ-JD:20267]

      HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                       JODHPUR
                 S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4036/2026

PETITIONERS:

1.       Narendra Meghwal S/o Nana Lal Meghwal, Aged About 39
         Years, Resident Of 11-12, Nakoda Nagar Bedwas (Rural),
         Debari, District Udaipur.
2.       Ahari Shailesh S/o Devi Lal, Aged About 33 Years,
         Resident Of Falla Kalawat Valdar, Bilakh Rishabhdeo,
         District Udaipur.
3.       Moti Singh S/o Rana Ram, Aged About 29 Years, Resident
         Of Godaro Ki Dhani, Khokhar West, Tehsil Gida, District
         Barmer.
4.       Ganesh Kumar S/o Chutar Singh, Aged About 24 Years,
         Resident Of Bhimda, Tehsil Baytu, District Barmer.
5.       Manohar Singh S/o Narpat Singh, Aged About 28 Years,
         Resident Of VPO Doodwa, Tehsil Pachpadra, Via Baytu,
         District Barmer.
6.       Rinku Panchal S/o Hashmukh Panchal, Aged About 36
         Years, Resident Of Subhash Marg, Kushalgarh, District
         Banswara.
7.       Rohit Ahari S/o Laxman Lal Ahari, Aged About 24 Years,
         Resident Of VPO Bildi, District Dungarpur, Pin Code
         314001.
8.       Ran Singh S/o Hab Singh, Aged About 33 Years, Resident
         Of Uttarba, Tehsil Gadraroad, District Barmer.
9.       Teekma Ram S/o Jaisa Ram, Aged About 33 Years,
         Resident Of Nehron Ka Tala, Nokhara, Tehsil Gudamalani,
         District Barmer.
10.      Bhajan Lal S/o Bhagirath Ram, Aged About 33 Years,
         Resident Of VPO Danta, Sarnau, Tehsil Sanchore, District
         Jalore.
11.      Deepak Kumar Damor S/o Basu Damor, Aged About 34
         Years, Resident Of 35, Vageri Ka Vela Mukam, Post
         Surata, Tehsil Jhotri, District Dungarpur.
12.      Lalita Kumari Meena D/o Bhagwati Lal Meena, Aged About
         30 Years, Resident Of VPO Khandi Obri, Tehsil Kherwara,
         District Udaipur.



                       (Uploaded on 30/04/2026 at 09:28:52 AM)
                      (Downloaded on 30/04/2026 at 10:49:40 PM)
 [2026:RJ-JD:20267]                   (2 of 20)                       [CW-4036/2026]


13.      Vishesh Kumar S/o Sardar Singh, Aged About 46 Years,
         Resident Of X178, Ganesh Vihar, Post Nangal Purohithan,
         Amer, District Jaipur.
14.      Nanu Lal Damore S/o Deva, Aged About 45 Years,
         Resident    Of   Ojariya,       Metwala,        Tehsil   Garhi,   District
         Banswara.
15.      Paras S/o Gopa Ram, Aged About 46 Years, Resident Of
         Village Rawniyana, Tehsil Pipar City, District Jodhpur.
16.      Dinesh Kumar S/o Aidan Ram, Aged About 22 Years,
         Resident Of Rohila, Tehsil Sedwa, District Barmer.
17.      Ramesh Kumar S/o Hari Ram, Aged About 27 Years,
         Resident Of Bhatip Pamana, District Jalore.
18.      Mithun Kumar Kalal S/o Banshi Lal, Aged About 33 Years,
         Resident Of VPO Jhonswa, District Dungarpur. Pin Code
         314035.
19.      Bhupesh Patidar S/o Sukhlal Patidar, Aged About 40
         Years, Resident Of Diwara Chhota, Tehsil Sangwara,
         District Dungarpur.
20.      Kartik Choubisa S/o Kamlesh Choubisa, Aged About 23
         Years, Resident Of VPO Mowai, Tehsil Aspur, District
         Dungarpur.
21.      Bhavesh Patidar S/o Meghaji Patidar, Aged About 24
         Years, Resident Of VPO Chitri, District Dungarpur. Pin
         Code 314035.


                                     Versus
RESPONDENTS:
1.       The State of Rajasthan, through the Secretary to the
         Government, Rajasthan, Jaipur.
2.       The Rural Development and Panchayati Raj Department,
         through the Secretary to the Government, Rajasthan,
         Jaipur.
3.       The Rural Development and Panchayati Raj Department,
         through the Secretary and Commissioner, Rajasthan,
         Jaipur.
4.       The Rural Development and Panchayati Raj Department,
         through the Additional Commissioner and Joint Secretary,
         Rajasthan, Jaipur.


                       (Uploaded on 30/04/2026 at 09:28:52 AM)
                      (Downloaded on 30/04/2026 at 10:49:40 PM)
 [2026:RJ-JD:20267]                   (3 of 20)                          [CW-4036/2026]


5.       The    Rajasthan      Staff     Selection        Board,    through      the
         Chairman of The Board, Jaipur.
6.       The Secretary of The Rajasthan Staff Selection Board,
         Jaipur.




For Petitioners            :     Mr. Mahaveer Bhanwariya Advocate.
For Respondents            :     Mr. I.R. Choudhary Additional
                                 Advocate General assisted by Mr.
                                 Pawan Bharti Advocate and Mr.
                                 Manish Patel Advocate.



               HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA

Judgment

Date of conclusion of arguments :: 20.04.2026 Date on which judgment was reserved :: 20.04.2026 Whether the full judgment or only the operative part is pronounced :: Full Judgment Date of pronouncement :: 30.04.2026

1. By way of filing of the present writ petition under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have laid

challenge to order dated 23.04.2025 whereby the vacant posts of

Village Development Officer (VDO) pursuant to advertisement

dated 06.09.2021 have been merged into the subsequent

recruitment years 2024-25 and 2025-26. The petitioners have

further prayed for issuance and operation of waiting/reserve list

against the unfilled posts arising out of the said recruitment

pursuant to advertisement dated 06.09.2021.

2. The facts, in brief, as pleaded by the petitioners are

that an advertisement dated 06.09.2021 was issued by Rajasthan

Staff Selection Board inviting applications from all eligible persons

for recruitment on 3896 vacancies of Village Development Officer

(for short 'VDO'), which were later increased to 5396 posts vide

(Uploaded on 30/04/2026 at 09:28:52 AM)

[2026:RJ-JD:20267] (4 of 20) [CW-4036/2026]

corrigendum dated 24.02.2022. The petitioners, being eligible,

participated in the selection process and appeared in both

preliminary and main examinations. However, they could not

secure marks above the cut-off marks of their respective category

and were not included in the final select list.

3. It is averred that results were declared in phases

between 25.11.2022 and 18.05.2023. Certain candidates

challenged the answer key before this Court in a batch of writ

petitions led by S. B. Civil Writ Petition no. 11616/2022 which

were disposed of vide judgment dated 07.06.2023 and directions

were issued for re-evaluation of specific questions no. 132 and

144 and for preparation of revised merit lists without disturbing

already appointed candidates.

4. Above judgment dated 07.06.2023 was challenged

before the Division Bench by way of filing different intra-court

Appeals, including D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No. 677/2024. It is

further stated that during pendency of intra-court appeals, an

interim order dated 05.01.2024 was passed directing the

respondents to maintain status quo and not to proceed with

further appointments. Ultimately, the Division Bench, vide

judgment dated 13.10.2025, set aside judgment dated

07.06.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge.

5. According to the petitioners, despite availability of large

number of vacant posts due to non-joining of selected candidates,

the respondents failed to issue waiting list. Instead, vide

impugned order dated 23.04.2025, such vacancies were merged

into subsequent recruitment cycles. The petitioners contend that

(Uploaded on 30/04/2026 at 09:28:52 AM)

[2026:RJ-JD:20267] (5 of 20) [CW-4036/2026]

such action is arbitrary, contrary to statutory rules and circulars,

as also violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

6. The respondents have opposed the writ petition by

raising preliminary objections regarding its maintainability. It is

contended that the writ petition suffers from gross delay and

laches, having been filed nearly ten months after passing of the

impugned order and after culmination of the subsequent

recruitment process.

7. It is further contended that the petitioners have failed

to implead necessary parties, namely those candidates, who have

been selected in the subsequent recruitment against the merged

vacancies, and therefore, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed

for non-joinder of necessary parties.

8. On merits, it is submitted that the petitioners, being

such candidates who could not secure their names in the main

select list, do not possess any vested right to seek appointment or

issuance of waiting list. The respondents have placed reliance on

circular dated 27.12.2021 issued by the Department of Personnel

to submit that the waiting list could only be operated within a

prescribed period of six months from the date of declaration of the

main result, which period has already expired.

9. It is also contended that almost all advertised posts

(more than 98%) have already been filled and the recruitment

process has attained finality. The respondents further assert that

initiation of a fresh recruitment process is within the domain of the

employer and does not confer any enforceable right upon the

petitioners.

(Uploaded on 30/04/2026 at 09:28:52 AM)

[2026:RJ-JD:20267] (6 of 20) [CW-4036/2026]

10. Learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently argued

that the action of the respondents in merging the unfilled

vacancies of the recruitment process initiated pursuant to

advertisement dated 06.09.2021 into subsequent recruitment

years is wholly arbitrary and illegal as also apparently curtail the

legitimate rights of the petitioners of appointment through

issuance of waiting list.

11. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted

that once a recruitment process is initiated for a definite number

of posts, the respondents are under legal obligation to carry the

process to its logical end by filling up all available vacancies in

accordance with the applicable statutory rules and executive

instructions. Learned counsel submits that admittedly a

substantial number of posts remained vacant due to non-joining of

selected candidates, which fact stands acknowledged by the

respondents themselves in various official communications and

replies furnished under the Right to Information Act, 2005.

Therefore, the respondents could not have abandoned the process

midway or diverted such vacancies to subsequent recruitment

cycles.

12. Learned counsel for the petitioners further argued that

the respondents acted in clear contravention of circulars dated

18.10.2021 and 27.12.2021, which mandate preparation and

operation of a reserve/waiting list. It is contended that the

requirement of maintaining a reserve list is to ensure that

vacancies arising on account of non-joining or disqualification are

duly filled without necessitating a fresh recruitment. The failure of

the respondents to prepare and operate such a list defeats the

(Uploaded on 30/04/2026 at 09:28:52 AM)

[2026:RJ-JD:20267] (7 of 20) [CW-4036/2026]

very purpose of the recruitment process and results in

arbitrariness.

13. It is also argued by the learned counsel that the

respondents themselves treated the recruitment process as

subsisting, as is evident from inter-departmental communications,

correspondence with the Selection Board and the steps taken for

requisitioning waiting lists. Having consistently taken a stand that

the process for issuance of a waiting list was under consideration,

the respondents are now estopped from taking a contrary stand

by merging the vacancies into future recruitments.

14. Learned counsel further submitted that the impugned

order dated 23.04.2025 has been passed during the subsistence

of interim order dated 05.01.2024 passed by the Division Bench,

whereby the respondents were directed to keep the posts vacant

and not to proceed further in the matter. It is argued that merging

the vacancies into future recruitment amounts to altering the

status of the vacancies and thereby, constitutes a clear violation of

the judicial order. Such action, according to the learned counsel, is

not only illegal but also undermines the authority of the Court.

15. It is also urged that the petitioners had a legitimate

expectation that the vacancies arising out of the recruitment

process in question would be filled from amongst the candidates,

who participated therein, particularly when the process was kept

alive due to pendency of litigation. The abrupt decision to merge

the vacancies into future recruitment has frustrated such

legitimate expectation and has resulted in grave prejudice to the

petitioners.

(Uploaded on 30/04/2026 at 09:28:52 AM)

[2026:RJ-JD:20267] (8 of 20) [CW-4036/2026]

16. Learned counsel further argued that the delay in

approaching this Court cannot be held against the petitioners, as

the cause of action is continuing in nature. It is submitted that the

respondents themselves kept representing that the process of

issuing a waiting list was under consideration, and it is only upon

issuance of the impugned order and subsequent developments

that the petitioners were compelled to approach this Court.

17. Learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance upon

judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajasthan

Public Service Commission, Ajmer Vs. Yati Jain & Others,

2026 SCC OnLine SC 80 and judgment of Co-ordinate Bench of

this Court in the case of Mohd. Asalam Vs. State of Rajasthan

& Others (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11505/2019 decided

on 09.01.2020).

18. Per contra, learned Additional Advocate General

appearing on behalf of the respondents has controverted the

submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioners and submitted

that the entire foundation of the petitioners' case is misconceived

both on facts as well as in law. At the outset, it is contended that

the petitioners, having admittedly failed to secure a place in the

final merit list, do not possess any vested or enforceable right to

seek appointment or even to claim consideration against alleged

vacant posts. It is submitted that the claim of the petitioners is

based on a mere expectation, which does not ripen into a legally

enforceable right under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

19. Learned Additional Advocate General further submitted

that the contention regarding an alleged obligation on the part of

the respondents to fill all advertised vacancies is contrary to

(Uploaded on 30/04/2026 at 09:28:52 AM)

[2026:RJ-JD:20267] (9 of 20) [CW-4036/2026]

settled law. It is well established that even where vacancies exist,

the State is not bound to fill all or any of them, and the decision in

this regard falls within the exclusive domain of the employer,

subject only to the test of arbitrariness, which is wholly absent in

the present case.

20. In counter to the argument regarding mandatory

operation of a waiting list, learned Additional Advocate General

submitted that the applicable circulars dated 18.10.2021 and

27.12.2021 did not create any indefeasible right in favour of

candidates. The preparation and operation of a reserve list is

contingent upon administrative exigencies and is further regulated

by a definite time frame. In the present case, the main result was

declared on 25.11.2022 and subsequent lists were issued up to

18.05.2023. The permissible period of six months for operation of

any waiting list stood exhausted thereafter. Once the life of the

waiting list expired, no direction can be issued to revive or operate

the same.

21. It is further submitted that the petitioners have

deliberately ignored the fact that almost the entire recruitment

process stood concluded, with more than 98% of the advertised

posts having already been filled. The marginal number of

vacancies arising due to non-joining cannot be treated as

conferring a right upon unsuccessful candidates to seek revival of

the recruitment process.

22. Learned Additional Advocate General has also strongly

opposed the contention regarding violation of the interim order

dated 05.01.2024. It is submitted that the said interim order

merely restrained further appointments during pendency of the

(Uploaded on 30/04/2026 at 09:28:52 AM)

[2026:RJ-JD:20267] (10 of 20) [CW-4036/2026]

appeal and did not create any right in favour of the petitioners to

claim continuation of the recruitment process indefinitely.

Moreover, upon final disposal of the appeals on 13.10.2025, the

interim order automatically stood vacated. The administrative

decision taken thereafter, including restructuring and merging of

vacancies, cannot be said to be in violation of any subsisting

judicial direction.

23. Addressing the plea of legitimate expectation, learned

Additional Advocate General submitted that such expectation, if

any, must be founded on a legal right or consistent past practice,

which is absent in the present case. Mere internal correspondence

or inter-departmental communications cannot create any

enforceable right in favour of the petitioners, particularly when the

statutory framework does not mandate issuance of a waiting list

beyond the prescribed period.

24. It is further contended that the writ petition suffers

from gross delay and laches. The impugned order was passed on

23.04.2025, whereas the present writ petition has been filed in

February, 2026, after the subsequent recruitment process had not

only commenced but had substantially progressed. Entertaining

the writ petition at such a belated stage would unsettle the entire

selection process and cause serious prejudice to candidates who

have already been selected.

25. Learned Additional Advocate General also submits that

the writ petition is liable to be dismissed for non-joinder of

necessary parties, as the petitioners have failed to implead

candidates who have been selected against the posts in the

subsequent recruitment. Any order passed in the present writ

(Uploaded on 30/04/2026 at 09:28:52 AM)

[2026:RJ-JD:20267] (11 of 20) [CW-4036/2026]

petition would directly affect their rights, and in their absence, no

effective adjudication can be made.

26. Lastly, it is submitted that the decision to merge the

unfilled vacancies into subsequent recruitment cycles is a decision

taken in administrative wisdom, keeping in view the overall

requirements of the department and the need for efficient public

administration. Such decisions are not amenable to judicial review

unless shown to be arbitrary, mala fide or contrary to statutory

provisions, none of which has been demonstrated by the

petitioners. Hence, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed as

being devoid of merit. Learned Additional Advocate General relied

upon judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Hari

Om Meena & Another Vs. State of Rajasthan & Others (D.B.

Special Appeal (Writ) No. 251/2025 & other connected

appeals decided on 16.05.2025).

27. This Court has given its thoughtful consideration to the

rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and

has meticulously examined the pleadings and material placed on

record.

28. At the outset, it is not in dispute that the petitioners

participated in the recruitment process pursuant to advertisement

dated 06.09.2021 but failed to secure their place in the final select

list. The foundation of the petitioners' claim rests upon the

assertion that certain vacancies remained unfilled due to non-

joining of selected candidates and, therefore, the respondents

were under an obligation to operate waiting/reserve list and fill

such vacancies from amongst the candidates of the same

recruitment.

(Uploaded on 30/04/2026 at 09:28:52 AM)

[2026:RJ-JD:20267] (12 of 20) [CW-4036/2026]

29. However, the aforesaid contention cannot be accepted

in view of the settled legal position governing recruitment matters.

It is trite law that mere participation in a selection process does

not confer any vested or enforceable right to appointment. Even

inclusion of a candidate in a select list or waiting list does not

create an indefeasible right to be appointed. The Constitution

Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shankarsan Dash vs.

Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 47, authoritatively held that a

candidate whose name appears in the select list/ waiting list

acquires no indefeasible right to appointment and the State is not

bound to fill up all the vacancies. The said principle has been

consistently reiterated in Asha Kaul (Mrs) & Another vs. State

of Jammu & Kashmir & Others, (1993) 2 SCC 573, wherein it

was held that inclusion in a select list merely confers a right to be

considered and not a right to appointment.

30. In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncements,

it is clear that even a candidate included in a select list does not

acquire an absolute right to appointment, much less a candidate

who has not been selected at all. The petitioners, therefore, stand

on a much weaker footing and cannot claim any enforceable right

to seek issuance or operation of a waiting list.

31. The argument of the petitioners that the respondents

were under mandatory obligation to fill all advertised vacancies

also does not merit acceptance. It is well settled that the State, as

an employer, retains the discretion to decide as to how many

posts are to be filled and even if vacancies exist, there is no

corresponding legal duty cast upon the employer to fill all such

vacancies. The scope of judicial review in such matters is limited

(Uploaded on 30/04/2026 at 09:28:52 AM)

[2026:RJ-JD:20267] (13 of 20) [CW-4036/2026]

and does not extend to directing the employer to fill vacancies in a

particular manner, unless the action is shown to be arbitrary or

contrary to statutory provisions.

32. The reliance placed by the petitioners on circulars dated

18.10.2021 and 27.12.2021 is also misconceived. A perusal of the

said circulars indicates that the operation of a waiting/reserve list

is subject to a prescribed time frame. In the present case, the

main result was declared on 25.11.2022 and subsequent lists were

issued up to 18.05.2023. The respondents have satisfactorily

demonstrated that the permissible period of six months for

operation of the waiting list stood exhausted thereafter. Once the

validity period of the waiting list has expired, no direction can be

issued for its revival operation thereafter.

33. The contention that the recruitment process was

subsisting and that the respondents were estopped from merging

the vacancies into subsequent recruitment cycles is also without

substance. Mere internal correspondence or inter-departmental

communications indicating that the matter was under

consideration cannot confer any legal right upon the petitioners.

Administrative deliberations do not crystallise into enforceable

rights unless culminated into a binding decision in accordance with

law.

34. The plea regarding violation of interim order dated

05.01.2024 also does not impress this Court. The said interim

order merely restrained the respondents from proceeding with

appointments during pendency of the appeal. It neither directed

continuation of the recruitment process indefinitely, nor created

any right in favour of the petitioners. Moreover, upon final disposal

(Uploaded on 30/04/2026 at 09:28:52 AM)

[2026:RJ-JD:20267] (14 of 20) [CW-4036/2026]

of appeals on 13.10.2025, the interim order stood vacated and

thereafter, the respondents were well within their authority to take

appropriate administrative decisions, including restructuring or

merging of vacancies.

35. The argument of legitimate expectation, as advanced

on behalf of the petitioners, is equally untenable. Legitimate

expectation cannot be invoked in the absence of a legal right or a

consistent and enforceable practice. In the present case, neither

the statutory framework nor the governing circulars confer any

right upon the petitioners to demand issuance or operation of a

waiting list beyond the prescribed period.

36. Another significant aspect which cannot be overlooked

is the delay and laches on the part of the petitioners. The

impugned order is dated 23.04.2025, whereas the present writ

petition has been filed after a lapse of considerable time, by which

stage the subsequent recruitment process had already been

initiated and had substantially progressed. Entertaining the writ

petition at such a belated stage would not only unsettle the entire

selection process, but would also adversely affect the rights of

third-party candidates who have already been selected. The law is

well settled that writ jurisdiction being discretionary, relief can be

declined on the ground of delay alone where such delay results in

prejudice to others.

37. In this regard, the legal position stands reinforced by

authoritative pronouncements. In Rajasthan Public Service

Commission, Ajmer Vs. Yati Jain & Others (supra), the

Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that a wait-listed candidate does

not have any vested or indefeasible right to appointment and no

(Uploaded on 30/04/2026 at 09:28:52 AM)

[2026:RJ-JD:20267] (15 of 20) [CW-4036/2026]

mandamus can be issued in absence of a requisition by the

appointing authority. In the present case, the petitioners are not

even wait-listed candidates and seek a direction for issuance and

operation of a reserve list, which is impermissible in law. Relevant

part of the above judgment is quoted hereunder:

"81. What is a waiting list? What is the extent of right that could be claimed by a wait-listed candidate for securing an appointment? For answering this question, one may immediately read the decision of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Gujarat State Dy. Executive Engineers' Assn. v. State of Gujarat32. Relevant extracts from it read as follows:

8. Coming to the next issue, the first question is what is a waiting list?; can it be treated as a source of recruitment from which candidates may be drawn as and when necessary?; and lastly how long can it operate? These are some important questions which do arise as a result of direction issued by the High Court.

A waiting list prepared in service matters by the competent authority is a list of eligible and qualified candidates who in order of merit are placed below the last selected candidate. How it should operate and what is its nature may be governed by the rules. Usually it is linked with the selection or examination for which it is prepared. For instance, if an examination is held say for selecting 10 candidates for 1990 and the competent authority prepares a waiting list then it is in respect of those 10 seats only for which selection or competition was held. Reason for it is that whenever selection is held, except where it is for single post, it is normally held by taking into account not only the number of vacancies existing on the date when advertisement is issued or applications are invited but even those which are likely to arise in future within one year or so due to retirement etc. It is more so where selections are held regularly by the Commission. Such lists are prepared either under the rules or even otherwise mainly to ensure that the working in the office does not suffer if the selected candidates do not join for one or the other reason or the next selection or examination is not held soon. A candidate in the waiting list in the order of merit has a right to claim that he may be appointed if one or the other selected candidate does not join. But once the selected candidates join and no vacancy arises due to resignation etc. or for any other reason within the period the list is to operate under the rules or within reasonable period where no specific period is provided then candidate from the waiting list has no right to claim appointment to any future vacancy which may arise unless the selection was held for it. He has no vested right except to the limited extent, indicated above, or when the appointing authority acts arbitrarily and makes appointment from the waiting list by picking and choosing for extraneous reasons.

(Uploaded on 30/04/2026 at 09:28:52 AM)

[2026:RJ-JD:20267] (16 of 20) [CW-4036/2026]

9. A waiting list prepared in an examination conducted by the Commission does not furnish a source of recruitment. It is operative only for the contingency that if any of the selected candidates does not join then the person from the waiting list may be pushed up and be appointed in the vacancy so caused or if there is some extreme exigency the Government may as a matter of policy decision pick up persons in order of merit from the waiting list. But the view taken by the High Court that since the vacancies have not been worked out properly, therefore, the candidates from the waiting list were liable to be appointed does not appear to be sound. This practice, may result in depriving those candidates who become eligible for competing for the vacancies available in future. If the waiting list in one examination was to operate as an infinite stock for appointments, there is a danger that the State Government may resort to the device of not holding an examination for years together and pick up candidates from the waiting list as and when required. The constitutional discipline requires that this Court should not permit such improper exercise of power which may result in creating a vested interest and perpetrate waiting list for the candidates of one examination at the cost of entire set of fresh candidates either from the open or even from service.

(emphasis ours)

82. Gujarat State Dy. Executive Engineers' Assn. (supra) was cited with approval in Surinder Singh v. State of Punjab33. This Court observed, and we say rightly, that waiting lists are not perennial sources of recruitment and that candidates on the waiting list have no vested right to be appointed except to the limited extent that when a candidate selected does not join and the waiting list is still operative.

83. In Rakhi Roy v. High Court of Delhi34, once again this Court reiterated that a waiting list cannot be used as a reservoir to fill up vacancies which come into existence after issuance of notification/advertisement.

84. The rationale behind preparing fresh select lists and not operating stale lists was considered by this Court in M.P. Electricity Board v. Virendra Kumar Sharma35. While allowing the appeal carried by the employer from the decision of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, this Court had this to say:

5. Any scheme for selection will depend upon the terms on which selections are made. In the present case, there is a scheme as provided in the circular dated 9-12-1968 and that circular also provided for the panel to be valid/current for a particular period namely one year. After that period, the list would lapse and fresh panel has to be prepared. If that is the scheme, none of the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent would be of any assistance.

The High Court is also not justified in relying upon the decision in Shivsingh case [(1988) 1 MPWN 24] inasmuch as the scheme of appointment was entirely different. Moreover the validity/currency of panel was for a particular period; that is a salutary principle, behind that Rule so that after the selections are made

(Uploaded on 30/04/2026 at 09:28:52 AM)

[2026:RJ-JD:20267] (17 of 20) [CW-4036/2026]

and appointments to be made may take long time, it is possible that new candidates may have become available who are better or more qualified than those selected, and if they are appointed it would be in the best interests of the institution. Hence we do not think there was any justification for the High Court to have interfered in the matter and directed appointment of the respondent. The order made by the High Court is set aside and the writ petition filed by the respondent shall stand dismissed.

(emphasis ours)

85. A similar case such as the present is the one decided by this Court in U.P. Public Service Commission v. Surendra Kumar36. It would be useful to reproduce below what was ruled by this Court:

12. Having heard the learned counsel on both sides, we have perused the order dated 18-5-2018 passed by the High Court and other material placed on record.

For the purpose of operating wait-list, the Government of Uttar Pradesh has issued instructions from time to time. It is clear from the various government orders that wait-list period is valid only for a period of one year. Though requisition is made for making selection for 178 number of posts, but the appellant Commission, after declaring results of the examination, has made initial recommendation for substantive number of posts i.e. 156 posts vide letter dated 12-8-2010. It appears that the said list is prepared by including candidates who have submitted all the requisite documents within the period prescribed. Further recommendations were also made, but there is no reason for not computing the period of one year from 12-8-2010. When recommendations were made for substantive number of posts on 12-8- 2010, we are of the view that period of one year for operating wait-list is to be computed from 12-8-2010 but not from the last recommendation made for one post, vide letter dated 28-8-2012. The reason for restricting 156 names in the initial recommendation vide letter dated 12-8-2010, is explained in Para 11 of the counter-affidavit filed before the High Court.

(emphasis ours)

86. The key aspects of a waiting list, in relation to service law disputes, that can be deduced from the aforesaid decisions is this:

(i) a waiting list is normally prepared after the select/merit list is drawn;

(ii) it would include candidates who have qualified the recruitment examination but are not so meritorious such that they can be immediately appointed on the number of vacancies advertised;

(iii) such list would operate like a merit-based queue for vacancies that remain unfilled after offers of appointment given to the candidates in the select/merit list are not accepted;

(iv) a waiting list has a limited validity period;

(Uploaded on 30/04/2026 at 09:28:52 AM)

[2026:RJ-JD:20267] (18 of 20) [CW-4036/2026]

(v) validity period of a waiting list depends on the recruitment rules and should no such period be mentioned, it can bona fide be operated till the next advertisement is issued without, however, violating provisions in such rules, if any, requiring recruitment process to be initiated either semi-annually or annually; and

(vi) an opportunity to a candidate in the waiting list for securing appointment arises only when vacancies remain unfilled after the process of appointing candidates from the select/merit list is over and hence, it is regarded as a procedural outcome which is part of a structured process rather than a fortuitous circumstance.

89. Having noticed what a waiting list means and to what extent a wait-listed candidate has any right, courts have to bear in mind the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India 37 that a candidate included in a select/merit list does not have an indefeasible right of appointment even if a vacancy exists.

90. On a conspectus of the decisions of this Court governing the field of a select/merit list as well as waiting list, as understood in service jurisprudence, the law seems to be well-settled that when a candidate included in a select/merit list has no indefeasible right of appointment, it would be too far-fetched to think that a candidate in the waiting/reserve list would have a better right than a candidate in the select/ merit list. We, thus, hold that a wait-listed candidate has no right of appointment, much less an indefeasible right, except when the governing recruitment rules permit a small window authorizing appointments therefrom in the specified exceptional circumstances and the appointing authority, for no good reason, denies or refuses an appointment or the reason assigned therefor is found to be arbitrary and/or discriminatory and that too, when the waiting list has not expired. What should be given primacy, therefore, is the nature and extent of right prescribed by the relevant rules."

38. In Mohd. Asalam (supra), as relied upon by learned

counsel for the petitioners, Co-ordinate Bench of this Court was

considering altogether different facts and question of law,

therefore, the above judgment is not applicable in the facts and

circumstances of the present case.

39. In the case of Hari Om Meena & Another (supra),

the Division Bench of this Court has categorically held that mere

participation in the recruitment process does not confer any

enforceable right to appointment and the State retains discretion

to decide the number of posts to be filled. It was further held that

(Uploaded on 30/04/2026 at 09:28:52 AM)

[2026:RJ-JD:20267] (19 of 20) [CW-4036/2026]

even existence of vacancies does not create a corresponding right

in favour of candidates. Para 9 of the above judgment is relevant

and the same is being quoted as under:

"9. In our opinion, the plea of malafide exercise of power by the State-respondents is not available to the appellants to challenge the decision not to fill up all the advertised vacancies. Whatever may be the reason, a recruitment process cannot continue for years together after publication of the result. It shall be clear breach of mandate under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India if a direction is issued to fill up the unfilled advertised vacancies after about 12 years. Any appointment in the Government must be made having due regard to the merit of the candidates and, therefore, we find that the writ Court did not commit any error in law while ordering that the appointment against the vacant 392 posts shall be made by examining the merit position, eligibility and other credentials for the post of L.D.C. This is a well-settled position in the law that a mere participation in the recruitment exercise does not provide a legal right to the candidate to seek appointment. In "Jatendra Kumar v. State of Punjab" (1985) 1 SCC 122, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it is open to the Government to decide how many appointments would be made. In "State of Haryana v. Subhash Chander Marwar"

(1974) 3 SCC 220, the candidates securing less than 55% marks were not selected whereas there was a requirement under the rules to secure only 45% marks. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the existence of vacancies does not give any legal right to a selected candidate to claim appointment. In "Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India" (1991) 3 SCC 47, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that a candidate in the select list shall have no vested right to seek appointment and in a given case the employer can take a decision not to make appointment to a particular post or number of vacancy. Pertinently, the State-respondents have brought to the notice of the Court that a fresh recruitment process has been initiated vide advertisement dated 29th August 2024 after the recruitment process of 2013 came to an end."

40. Applying the aforesaid principles, this Court finds that

the petitioners cannot claim any enforceable right either for

issuance of a waiting list or for appointment against alleged vacant

posts.

41. This court is also of considered view that the decision of

the respondents to merge the unfilled vacancies into subsequent

recruitment cycles is essentially an administrative and policy

decision. Such decisions are taken in the larger interest of efficient

public administration and are not amenable to judicial interference

(Uploaded on 30/04/2026 at 09:28:52 AM)

[2026:RJ-JD:20267] (20 of 20) [CW-4036/2026]

unless shown to be arbitrary, mala fide or in violation of statutory