[Cites 11, Cited by 0]

Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

Chandu vs State Of Rajasthan (2026:Rj-Jd:20015) on 27 April, 2026

Author: Farjand Ali

Bench: Farjand Ali

[2026:RJ-JD:20015]

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JODHPUR
        S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 596/2025

Chandu S/o Shri Sujaram Seervi, Aged About 50 Years, Bilawash,
Sojat City, Distt. Pali, Raj.
                                                                        ----Petitioner
                                         Versus
1.       State Of Rajasthan, Pp
2.       Chunnilal S/o Shri Jalam Singh, Marudhar Kesari Road,
         Sojat City, District Pali, Rajasthan
3.       Mohanlal S/o Shri Jasaram, Sirviyo Ka Bas, Near Glr
         Tanki, Mandla, Tehsil Sojat, District Pali, At Present
         Residing In Bangaluru.
4.       Mohan Lal S/o Shri Kalu Ram Ji, 27-A, Kumaran Nagar,
         Main        Road,      Thuraipakkam.             Seevaram,       Perungudi,
         Kancheepuram, Tamil Nadu
5.       Kalu Ram S/o Shri Late Joraram, 1695, Ward No. 11,
         Cotten Pete, Gudibanda, Chikkaballanpur, Karanataka
6.       Hemraj S/o Shri Ramalal, Melawas, Sojat City, District
         Pali, Raj. At Present D No. 9, Opp. Sub-Jail, Railway
         Station Road, Housr, Krishnanagari, Tamil Nadu.
7.       Ramlal S/o Shri Pukharam, 120, 6Th Block, Mahaveera
         Road,       Bellur,   Nagamanagala             Talluku,     Bellur,   Mandya
         Karnataka
                                                                     ----Respondents


For Petitioner(s)              :    Mr. S.K. Verma
                                    Ms. Sarika Bishnoi
For Respondent(s)              :    Mr. Surendra Bishnoi,AGA
For Respondent No.2            :    Mr. Akshay Sharma
For Respondent No.             :    Mr. Divakar Sharma
3,6,7



                HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FARJAND ALI

Order

27/04/2026

1. The instant miscellaneous application under Section 482

Cr.P.C. (corresponding to Section 528 of the BNSS) has been

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preferred on behalf of the applicant seeking recall of the order

dated 30.05.2024 passed by this Court in S.B. Criminal Misc.

Petition No. 3684/2024, whereby the petition was allowed and FIR

No. 279/2023 registered at Police Station Sojat City, District Pali,

for offences under Sections 420 and 406 of the IPC, was quashed

on the basis of a compromise.

2. The grievance of the applicant is that the impugned order

dated 30.05.2024 was obtained by the accused persons and the

informant Chunni Lal by suppressing material facts from this

Court, particularly the fact that the present petitioner is also an

aggrieved party who had invested substantial amounts in the

alleged transaction. The compromise was entered into without the

knowledge or consent of the petitioner, thereby prejudicially

affecting his rights. It is contended that the petitioner, being the

actual victim, was neither heard nor impleaded in the proceedings,

and therefore, the quashing of the FIR on the basis of such

compromise has resulted in grave miscarriage of justice, rendering

the said order liable to be recalled.

3. The present matter arises out of S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition

No. 3684/2024, wherein the FIR came to be quashed by this Court

vide order dated 30.05.2024 on the premise of a compromise

arrived at between the complainant and the accused persons.

3.1 At the time of passing of the said order, learned counsel

appearing for the respective parties jointly submitted that the

dispute had been amicably resolved and the complainant did not

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wish to pursue the matter any further. Placing reliance upon such

submissions and the compromise so presented, this Court

proceeded to quash the FIR in entirety. However, it has now been

brought to the notice of this Court that the present applicant,

namely Chandu, who is also an aggrieved person/victim in the

same transaction, had not entered into any compromise with the

accused persons. This material aspect was not brought to the

notice of the Court at the relevant point of time. Thus, the order

dated 30.05.2024 came to be passed without complete disclosure

of the factual matrix.

4. This Court is of the considered view that in cases involving

multiple victims, an FIR cannot be quashed in toto on the basis of

a compromise entered into only between some of the parties,

leaving out other affected persons who have neither consented to

nor been part of such compromise.

4.1 The omission to apprise the Court of the victimisation of the

present applicant and his non-participation in the compromise has

resulted in an error apparent on the face of the record. The

quashing of the FIR in its entirety, therefore, suffers from a patent

infirmity to that extent and is liable to be corrected.

5. Coming to the case of the present applicant, Chandu, it is

evident that he has also been subjected to victimisation and was

not a party to the compromise in question. In such circumstances,

the proceedings could not have been quashed qua him in absence

of his consent. This Court, while passing the earlier order,

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proceeded to quash the FIR in its entirety, whereas it ought to

have confined the quashing only to the extent of the parties who

had entered into the compromise. The said aspect, though

material, inadvertently escaped the attention of this Court at the

relevant time. The omission constitutes a slip of mind and gives

rise to an error apparent on the face of the record.

6. This Court has elaborately dealt with an identical situation in

Supriya vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (S.B. Criminal Misc.

Application No. 147/2024), decided on 18.03.2026, wherein there

was lack of full and candid disclosure on the part of the learned

counsel, and in such circumstances, this Court deemed it

appropriate to recall its earlier order. For ready reference, the

relevant part of the order is reproduced herein below:-

3. During the hearing of the said petition, the complainant-applicant Supriya D/o Manish Choudhary, who was arrayed as respondent No.2, appeared before this Court along with her counsel and unequivocally acknowledged that a compromise had been amicably effected between herself and the petitioner Jay Gehlot. She further categorically stated before the Court that she did not wish to pursue any criminal proceedings against the petitioner in light of the compromise.

4. In view of the aforesaid compromise and relying upon the authoritative pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, this Court deemed it appropriate to exercise its inherent jurisdiction and accordingly passed an order dated 07.03.2024 quashing the FIR and subsequent proceedings. However, it has subsequently come to the notice of this Court that due to a slip of mind or inadvertent error, the language employed in paragraph No.7 of the said order resulted in quashing of the entire FIR, whereas the compromise was confined only to the petitioner Jay Gehlot and one Kaushal Sankhla.

5. The complainant-applicant Supriya has therefore filed the present application asserting that the compromise was

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entered into exclusively with Jay Gehlot and Kaushal Sankhla, and not with the other accused persons named in the FIR. She has contended that her consent for compromise and consequent quashing was limited only to the said two individuals, and the proceedings against the remaining accused were never intended to be terminated.

6. Notice of the instant application was issued by this Court vide order dated 19.05.2025, and the matter was thereafter heard at length. This Court has also carefully perused the written compromise placed on record.

7. A scrutiny of the compromise document reveals that the complainant Supriya, along with her family members Manish Choudhary, Sushila Choudhary and Anil Choudhary, acknowledged settlement of the dispute with Kaushal Sankhla. The compromise appears to have arisen out of a property dispute relating to certain plots, which the parties resolved through mutual understanding and in the larger interest of maintaining harmony.

8. In the compromise, particularly Clause No.3, it is recorded that the possession of the disputed plots had been handed over to the second party, thereby resolving the underlying dispute. Furthermore, Clause No.4 explicitly mentions that in relation to Case No.390/2023, the parties no longer wish to pursue any further proceedings.

9. Considering the submissions advanced before the Court, this Court directed the learned AGA to place a factual report on record. In compliance thereof, the learned AGA submitted a report dated 18.08.2025.

10. Upon perusal of the said factual report, it transpires that the investigation revealed involvement of fifteen persons, namely: Deendayal Choudhary, Kaushal Sankhla, Pintu Rajnat, Suresh Goyal, Rakesh Lohar, Shaitan Singh, Ajay Dawara, Kana Ram, Praveen Singh, Smt. Tara, Smt. Saraswati, Smt. Laxmi, Smt. Rekha, Smt. Balam Smt. Kamla and offences were found to be prima facie established against them under Sections 143, 323, 354, 382, 427, 440 and 455 IPC.

11. It is therefore manifest that the compromise was confined only between the complainant and two individuals, namely Jay Gehlot and Kaushal Sankhla. Consequently, the intention of this Court while passing the earlier order was to quash the proceedings only to the limited extent of the petitioner before the Court. However, owing to an inadvertent clerical lapse and an accidental slip in drafting, paragraph No.7 of the order dated 07.03.2024 inadvertently resulted in quashing of the FIR in its entirety, which was

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clearly not the contemplation of the Court. At this juncture, it becomes necessary to clarify that the present exercise undertaken by this Court does not amount to a review of the earlier order.

12. At this stage, it becomes apposite for this Court to elucidate, with greater doctrinal precision, the well-

recognized and jurisprudentially entrenched distinction between the exercise of the power of review and that of recall. A review, in its classical legal sense, contemplates a substantive re-consideration of a matter already adjudicated upon, whereby the Court is invited to revisit its earlier determination on the merits. Such jurisdiction is ordinarily circumscribed by statutory limitations and is exercised only upon the demonstration of narrowly defined grounds, such as the discovery of new and material evidence which could not be produced earlier despite due diligence, an error apparent on the face of the record, or other legally recognized contingencies. In essence, the exercise of review entails a re-examination of the correctness or propriety of the conclusions already reached, thereby reopening the adjudicatory process to a limited extent.

13. Contrariwise, the power of recall occupies an altogether distinct doctrinal plane. Recall does not involve a re-evaluation of the merits of the case nor does it amount to a judicial reconsideration of the conclusions previously arrived at. Rather, it is invoked in circumstances where the order of the Court has been affected by an inadvertent procedural irregularity, accidental omission, clerical lapse, or a manifest slip of pen or mind, which has the effect of causing the recorded order to deviate from the true intent and contemplation of the Court at the time of its pronouncement. In such situations, the Court merely undertakes the ministerial act of restoring its order to the form and substance which it had originally intended, thereby aligning the written record with the actual judicial determination.

14. Thus understood, the exercise of recall does not partake of the character of appellate or review jurisdiction; rather, it constitutes a limited corrective authority inherent in every Court of record, enabling it to rectify accidental errors and procedural aberrations so that the judicial record may accurately mirror the true judicial intent. The invocation of such power is guided not by a desire to re-adjudicate the controversy but by the imperative necessity of preventing the perpetuation of an unintended consequence arising from a mere clerical or accidental lapse, and thereby

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safeguarding the purity of the judicial process and securing the overarching ends of justice.

15. In the case at hand, the fifteen accused persons named in the investigation report were never petitioners before this Court, nor had they approached this Court seeking quashing of the FIR. Their cases were never placed for consideration, nor did this Court undertake any adjudication concerning their culpability. Therefore, the quashing of the FIR qua those accused persons was neither prayed for nor examined by this Court, and the inadvertent inclusion of their names within the ambit of the quashing order can only be attributed to a slip of the pen or mind.

16. Consequently, rectifying such an inadvertent error by recalling the relevant portion of the order does not amount to exercising the power of review, but rather constitutes a legitimate exercise of the Court's inherent authority to correct accidental or clerical mistakes in order to prevent miscarriage of justice.

17. In view of the above discussion, paragraph No.7 of the order dated 07.03.2024 passed in S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No.790/2024 is hereby recalled and modified to the extent that the quashing of the FIR shall remain operative only in relation to the petitioner Jay Gehlot (and the compromised party Kaushal Sankhla). It is further clarified that the investigating agency shall remain at liberty to proceed in accordance with law against the remaining accused persons named in the investigation report, and the criminal proceedings against them shall continue unaffected.

7. Accordingly, the earlier order dated 30.05.2024 passed by

this Court is recalled/modified to the limited extent that the FIR

shall stand quashed only qua the parties who had entered into the

compromise.

8. So far as the allegations pertaining to the victimisation of the

present applicant, Chandu, are concerned, the concerned

S.P./S.H.O. shall be at liberty to proceed with the investigation in

accordance with law.

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9. It is made clear that this Court has not ventured into the

merits of such allegations, including whether the same are made