Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Bhima vs State Of Raj on 9 October, 2025
Author: Farjand Ali
Bench: Farjand Ali
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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 729/2000
1. Bhima S/o Hemaji B/c Mooghiya R/o village Pipala, P.S. Rohira
District Sirohi
2. Ukiya S/o Sonaji B/c Mooghiya R/o Mansarowar Palanpur at
present Swaroopganj District Sirohi.
----Appellant
Versus
State Of Raj.
----Respondent
For Appellant(s) : Mr. B.S. Rathore
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Rajesh Bhari
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FARJAND ALI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANUROOP SINGHI
Judgment
Reportable
Judgment Pronounced On : 09/10/2025
Judgment Reserved On : 30/07/2025
BY THE COURT:-( Per Hon'ble MR. FARJAND ALI, J.)
1. The appellants Bhima and Ukiya have been convicted and
sentenced vide the impugned judgment dated 24.11.2000
passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Abu Road in
Sessions Case No.146/1996 whereby the learned Judge
convicted both the appellants as under:-
Name of Offence for Substantive Fine and default
the accused which sentence sentence
convicted
1. Bhima Section 302 IPC Life Imprisonment Rs.2,000/- and in
2. Ukiya default to further
undergo three months'
RI
Section 201 IPC One year RI Rs.500/- and in default
to further undergo one
months RI
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Both the sentences were ordered to run concurrently.
2. Being aggrieved of their conviction and the sentences
awarded to them, the appellants have preferred the instant
appeal under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C.
3. In nutshell, the prosecution story, as unfolded during the
course of investigation is that on 31.01.1996, one Kankarji
S/o Munshiji R/o Excise Mohalla, Abu Road, appeared before
Police Station Swaroopganj and lodged a verbal report. He
stated that he was illiterate and his father, Munshi S/o
Kishandas had left his residence on the previous afternoon
but did not return home until the following morning. Alarmed
by his absence, Kankarji, along with his brothers Salim
Matamji, Chhotu Matamji, Ghughri, and his cousin Kheemji
initiated a search for him. During their inquiry, one Chuniya
Jogi of Swarooppganj, residing near the Rohingha Road
railway crossing, informed them that on previous evening, at
about 6:00 PM, he had seen Munshi consuming liquor at the
residence of Tulsi.
4. Thereafter, the family members proceeded to Tulsi's house
and questioned him about Munshi's whereabouts, but Tulsi
denied having seen him. Dissatisfied and apprehensive, they
continued their search and, in due course, discovered
Munshi's dead body abandoned in a deserted field near Thori
hills. The body bore visible injuries, with bruises on the face,
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chest, and thighs, and blood was oozing from his nose. The
body was thereafter shifted to Indira Colony by the
complainant and his relatives, who promptly informed the
police. It was further disclosed that his family has
longstanding enmity with Uttamji, Shravan, Jagdish, and
Punamchand, with whom civil litigation was pending, and
who had allegedly issued threats to the complainant's
mother and grandmother a few days earlier. However, the
complainant expressed inability to identify the actual
perpetrators of his father's murder. On the basis of this
information, a case under Sections 302 and 201 IPC was
registered vide FIR No.15/96 registered at Police Station
Swaroopganj and investigation was commenced. Accused-
appellants were arrested and after conclusion of
investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against them in the
Court of the Judicial Magistrate, Pindwara for the offences
under Sections 302 and 201 of the IPC. As the offences
under Sections 302 & 201 IPC were exclusively triable by
the Court of Sessions, the case was committed to the Court
of Sessions Judge, Sirohi from where it was transferred to
the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Abu Road, Sirohi for
trial. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
5. The prosecution examined as many as 14 witnesses and
exhibited 27 documents to prove its case. The accused were
questioned under Section 313 CrPC and were confronted
with the circumstances appearing against them in the
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prosecution evidence. They denied the same and claimed to
be innocent. No evidence was tendered into evidence by
them. After hearing the arguments advanced by the Public
Prosecutor and the defence counsel and appreciating the
evidence available on record, the learned trial Court
proceeded to convict and sentence the accused-appellants as
above. Hence, this appeal.
6. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the
prosecution case is wholly fabricated, inconsistent, and
unsupported by reliable evidence. It was urged that there is
no eyewitness to the occurrence and the alleged "last seen"
witness, Chuniya Jogi, was never examined. The entire
prosecution rests on weak circumstantial evidence, doubtful
recoveries made months after the incident from open places,
and an uncorroborated extra-judicial confession allegedly
made by accused Ukiya before PW-7 Gopal, who is an
interested relative of the deceased. It is further argued that
vital witnesses were withheld, recoveries were not properly
proved, and the investigation was biased, ignoring other
persons named in the FIR. The prosecution thus failed to
establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the conviction
rests on conjecture rather than cogent proof. Hence, it was
prayed that the impugned judgment dated 24.11.2000 be
set aside and the appellants be acquitted.
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7. Conversely, learned Public Prosecutor supported the
impugned judgment, asserting that the trial court's findings
are based on proper appreciation of circumstantial evidence
forming a complete chain pointing towards the appellants'
guilt. It was argued that though no eyewitness was
examined, the last-seen circumstance, corroborative
testimony of PW-5 Kankarji, recovery of articles at the
instance of accused Bhima under Section 27 of the Evidence
Act, and the extra-judicial confession of accused Ukiya
before PW-7 Gopal collectively prove the case beyond doubt.
Minor lapses in investigation, it is submitted, do not affect
the core of the prosecution story, which is consistent with
medical and circumstantial evidence. Hence, dismissal of the
appeal and affirmation of the conviction have been sought.
8. We have heard and given thoughtful consideration to the
submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties,
have gone through the impugned judgment and have
minutely re-appreciated the evidence available on record.
9. Upon a meticulous scrutiny of the record, this Court finds
that PW-5 Kankarji, the first informant, is admittedly not an
eyewitness to the incident. The report lodged by him, as well
as his deposition before the Court, rests entirely upon
information conveyed by Chuniya Jogi, and as such, his
testimony cannot assume the character of substantive or
reliable evidence capable of establishing culpability of the
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appellants. At best, his statement amounts to hearsay, which
is inadmissible in the eyes of law and thus cannot be pressed
into service to sustain a conviction. Furthermore, a deeper
analysis of his testimony discloses that there existed no
animosity, prior enmity, or other underlying hostility between
the appellants and the deceased. The absence of such motive
assumes critical importance, for it undermines the very
substratum of the prosecution's case, which sought to
predicate guilt upon the existence of motive as a connecting
link in the chain of circumstances. It is trite that motive,
though relevant, cannot by itself establish guilt unless
fortified by cogent, credible, and corroborative evidence; in
its absence, the evidentiary foundation of the prosecution's
case becomes tenuous and incapable of sustaining a
conviction. This dual infirmity the inadmissibility of his
hearsay evidence coupled with the absence of motive strikes
at the very root of the prosecution's case and renders the
testimony of PW-5 Kankarji wholly unreliable for fastening
criminal liability upon the appellants. Upon a careful scrutiny
of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the
prosecution, this Court proceeds to assess its probative worth
and credibility.
10.At this stage, when the evidence of PW-1 Salim, PW-2
Aatmanji and PW-5 Kankarji is scrutinized in depth, it
becomes apparent that none of these witnesses had actually
seen the deceased in the company of the appellants. Their
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entire version that the deceased was allegedly last seen at
Tulsi's house consuming liquor with the accused persons rests
solely upon the information allegedly given by one Chuniya
Jogi. However, strikingly, Chuniya Jogi himself was never
produced before the Court as a witness, thereby depriving
the prosecution case of its most vital link. It is a settled
principle that discovery of facts already within the knowledge
of the investigating agency carries no evidentiary value; only
the disclosure of a genuinely new fact lends credence to such
discovery. Moreover, under Section 60 of the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872, oral evidence must, as a rule, be direct, that is to
say, if the fact refers to something seen, it must be proved by
the person who saw it; if it refers to something heard, it must
be proved by the person who heard it; and if it refers to an
opinion or to the grounds on which such opinion is held, it
must be proved by the person who holds that opinion on
those grounds. In other words, hearsay is inadmissible save
for the limited statutory exceptions such as dying declarations
under Section 32(1) or spontaneous statements forming part
of the res gestae under Section 6 of the Indian Evidence
Act,1872. In the present case, the testimonies of PW-1, PW-
2, and PW-5 do not fall within any such exception and remain
purely hearsay, resting upon the unexamined account of
Chuniya Jogi.
11.The witnesses candidly admitted in cross-examination that
they had no enmity or prior hostility with the appellants and
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that their suspicion was generated only because of what
Chuniya Jogi had told them. Further, there are glaring
contradictions in their depositions for instance, while PW-1
stated that the dead body was recovered on the second day
of the disappearance, he elsewhere admitted that it was on
the third day that the police came and prepared documents.
Similar inconsistencies appear in the testimony of PW-2, who
also conceded ignorance regarding the exact residence of
Tulsi and other accused persons, thereby casting doubt on
the correctness of their assertion that the deceased was seen
in their house. PW-5 Kankarji too, in his cross-examination,
admitted that his father's death was only a matter of
suspicion against the accused, and several material facts
which he claimed to have stated were not found recorded in
his police statement. These omissions, improvements, and
contradictions strike at the root of the credibility of these
witnesses. In absence of direct evidence, and in the face of
such shaky and hearsay testimonies, it would be highly
unsafe to treat their statements as sufficient to conclusively
establish the involvement of the appellants in the crime.
Suspicion, however grave it may be, cannot take the place of
legal proof and, in the absence of credible and consistent
evidence, the benefit of doubt must necessarily go to the
appellants.
12.PW-3 Ratanlal Agarwal and PW-4 Dhanraj are formal
witnesses who merely attested the preparation of certain
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memos, while PW-6 Babu speaks about the post-mortem
and recoveries effected after a considerable delay.
13.The evidence of PW-7 Gopal assumes significance. He has
deposed regarding an extra-judicial confession allegedly
made by accused Ukiya, wherein the latter admitted his
involvement in the assault upon the deceased at the behest
of co-accused Bhima.
14.At this stage, it becomes necessary to evaluate the
evidentiary worth of the extra-judicial confession allegedly
made by accused Ukiya before PW-7 Gopal. The statement of
this witness under Section 161 CrPC was recorded belatedly
on 11.05.1996, i.e., nearly four months after the incident. In
his said statement, Gopal stated that two days earlier, while
he was at Palanpur near the RTO Naka, accused Ukiya and his
elder brother, who belonged to his community, came to meet
him. At that time, Ukiya allegedly told him that at the
instance of Bhima and Tulsi, he had consumed liquor with
Munshi Kaka (the deceased) at Tulsi's house, and that when
Bhima insisted on more liquor, a quarrel ensued between
Bhima and Munshi. Under the influence of alcohol, Ukiya and
Tulsi allegedly supported Bhima and jointly assaulted Munshi,
who succumbed to injuries, and thereafter, out of fear, they
threw the body into the forest. Ukiya purportedly added that
he had committed a mistake and sought help from Gopal,
stating that the sons of Munshi were after him.
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15.The Court finds it highly improbable in the ordinary course of
human affairs that an accused, who had not disclosed his
guilt to anyone for nearly four months after the incident,
would suddenly, on the roadside, make a detailed confession
before a relative of the deceased without any prior contact or
reason, merely upon meeting him by chance. Such conduct is
inherently incongruous and inconsistent with the normal
behaviour expected of a person facing such grave
consequences. It also appears unnatural that the accused, if
he were genuinely seeking refuge or assistance, would
attempt to approach the witness in such an unplanned and
coincidental manner. The fact that they allegedly met
suddenly on a roadside in Gujarat raises serious doubts about
the spontaneity and credibility of the encounter. This has
persuaded the Court to critically examine the testimony of
this witness, especially considering that the accused may face
punishment as severe as the death penalty or life
imprisonment based on such evidence.
16.The very circumstance that the alleged disclosure occurred
accidentally, nearly four months after the death, and that too
before a person connected with the victim's family,
significantly undermines the plausibility of the prosecution
version. The prosecution story further loses credibility in view
of the admitted fact that until 11.05.1996, accused Ukiya was
neither named nor suspected in connection with the crime.
The investigating officer did not indicate any material,
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documentary or oral, to suggest that between January and
May 1996, there was any effort to apprehend or even suspect
the appellant. There was not an iota of evidence prior to
11.05.1996 linking the accused with the offence. If the
accused was neither booked nor under suspicion, the
suggestion that he was under pressure or being chased by
the police or the deceased's family, and therefore sought help
from PW-7, is wholly inconsistent with the prosecution case.
17.When viewed in this backdrop, the version of PW-7 becomes
doubtful and unconvincing. The sudden, unprompted
confession, allegedly made to a relative of the deceased at a
public place after a gap of several months, does not inspire
confidence. The very setting and timing of the confession
appear contrived and artificial, thereby casting a serious
shadow on its voluntariness and truthfulness.
18.Further, the credibility of PW-7 Gopal suffers an additional
dent due to the subsequent improvement made by him
during his deposition before the Court. In his examination, he
introduced a new fact, stating that after returning to Abu
Road, he narrated the alleged confession of Ukiya to one
Kankarji. Interestingly, Kankarji was examined as PW-5
during trial, yet nowhere in his testimony, neither in
examination-in-chief nor in cross-examination, does he
whisper that Gopal had ever met him or disclosed such a
confession. The absence of any corroboration from PW-5 on
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this material aspect exposes the improvement made by PW-7
as an embellishment and renders his statement further
doubtful. Such omission by PW-5, when juxtaposed with the
belated disclosure by PW-7, gravely undermines the
reliability of the alleged confession and suggests that this
part of the testimony was a later concoction introduced to
lend artificial support to the prosecution story.
19.By its very nature, an extra-judicial confession may be a
substantive piece of evidence, but it is also recognised as a
weak type of evidence, requiring cautious scrutiny and
corroboration from other independent material, particularly
when made before a private individual. Judicial prudence
dictates that a true and voluntary confession should ideally be
recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
before a Magistrate. When such confession is made before a
private person especially to a relative of the victim, it
becomes inherently suspect and must be tested on the
touchstone of natural human conduct, inherent probabilities,
and supporting evidence.
20.It is improbable that an accused would voluntarily confess
his guilt before a person aligned with the opposite side,
particularly one related to the victim. The credibility of the
witness before whom the confession is alleged to have been
made is therefore of paramount importance. A person who is
not a witness of fact and merely conveys information
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allegedly supplied to him by the accused cannot by himself
provide a safe evidentiary foundation unless the disclosure is
independently corroborated. The unexplained delay of nearly
four months in recording such an important statement,
despite the case being under investigation, further casts
serious doubt on its reliability and authenticity.
21.The Court must also examine whether such conduct on the
part of both the witness and the accused appears natural and
convincing. In this case, the alleged confession made in an
accidental roadside meeting, long after the occurrence,
without any pretext or established reason for confidence
between the two, appears highly implausible and contrary to
ordinary human behaviour.
22.Though this Court refrains from making any conclusive
pronouncement on the conduct of investigation, lest it
prejudices either side, the cautionary principle remains that
extra-judicial confessions must be approached with utmost
circumspection. Absent contemporaneous disclosure, the
element of spontaneity and voluntariness, which alone lend
credence to such confessions stands gravely compromised.
23.The governing principles on the subject are well-settled.
While a free and voluntary confession, if genuine, deserves
the highest credit, an extra-judicial confession is regarded in
law as a weak form of evidence. Courts have consistently
held that--
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(i) such a confession must be voluntary and truthful;
(ii) it must inspire confidence as to the person before whom
and the circumstances in which it is made;
(iii) it gains probative value only when supported by cogent
corroboration; and
(iv) it must be free from inherent improbabilities or material
inconsistencies. Unless these safeguards are satisfied, an
extra-judicial confession cannot safely form the sole basis of
conviction.
24.In the present case, the testimony of PW-7 Gopal does not
inspire such confidence. The circumstances under which the
alleged confession was made appear doubtful, the timing and
setting are unnatural, the improvement regarding
communication to PW-5 is uncorroborated, and the delay in
recording his statement remains unexplained. The version put
forth is inconsistent with human probabilities and the overall
prosecution narrative, rendering reliance upon it wholly
unsafe.
25.The oral evidence of PW-9 Dr. Dau Lal Chauhan, it is
revealing that the cause of death of Munshi was shock and
hemorrhage when examined in its entirety, does not lend
unqualified support to the prosecution. Though in his chief-
examination he opined that the death was on account of
excessive bleeding due to multiple fractures, the cross-
examination discloses several infirmities which seriously
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dilute the certainty of his opinion. The doctor candidly
admitted that death did not occur on account of any single
injury, but was the cumulative result of multiple injuries, and
that even the lung injury alone could have been sufficient to
cause death. Significantly, he did not specify the age of
injuries, nor did he record crucial details such as the colour of
bruises, body temperature, or the condition of rigor mortis in
his post-mortem report, omissions which render his findings
inconclusive. He further conceded that the injuries were not
inconsistent with a fall or accident, though in his opinion a
mere fall from a cycle of 4 feet height may not ordinarily
cause such damage. The absence of signs of dragging, the
omission of nail or viscera examination, and the failure to
preserve samples for forensic analysis leave open various
hypotheses regarding the manner of death. In such
circumstances, the medical evidence cannot be said to
conclusively exclude the possibility of accidental or self-
sustained injuries, nor does it establish beyond reasonable
doubt that the injuries were homicidal in nature. Hence, the
medical testimony, far from corroborating the prosecution,
introduces serious doubt and thereby ensures to the benefit
of the appellants. Even upon liberal construction, it is held
that the death was homicidal in nature; still, this finding does
not help the case of the prosecution in connecting the
appellant to the crime in the absence of corroborative and
supportive evidence.
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26.On a careful scrutiny of the testimonies of PW-10 Poonaram
and PW-14 Arjun Singh (Investigating Officer), this Court
finds that the alleged arrests, disclosures, and consequent
recoveries relied upon by the prosecution suffer from serious
infirmities which erode their evidentiary worth. PW-10
candidly admitted in cross-examination that the place from
where the alleged recovery of the chilli sack was made was
an open and accessible spot, with no lock on the premises,
and no independent verification of ownership of the house
was ever undertaken. The sack itself was of a common jute
variety, devoid of any distinctive marking, and such articles
are easily available in the market, thereby rendering its
alleged identification wholly unreliable. As regards PW-14,
the Investigating Officer, the alleged disclosures and
subsequent recoveries are riddled with inconsistencies,
absence of contemporaneous corroboration, and lack of
independent attestation from credible witnesses. The
recoveries were made after substantial delay and from places
either accessible to others or not proved to be in the
exclusive possession of the accused. In such circumstances,
the protection of Section 27 of the Evidence Act cannot
salvage the prosecution, for the twin requirements of
voluntariness and exclusive knowledge stand unfulfilled.
Cumulatively, these infirmities render the alleged recoveries
unsafe to rely upon, and far from strengthening the
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prosecution, they cast a serious cloud of doubt on its case,
thereby enuring to the benefit of the accused.
27.At this stage, it also becomes apparent that certain material
witnesses such as Chuniya Jogi and Lala, who were alleged to
have seen the deceased in the company of the appellants,
were never produced before the Court. Their absence
assumes significance, as it deprives the prosecution of the
very foundation of its case the "last seen" theory. The lapse is
compounded by the fact that the investigating officer was
admittedly aware that these individuals might have possessed
material knowledge regarding the crime and the identity of its
perpetrators. The failure to examine such witnesses, despite
their evident relevance, reflects not only faulty investigation
but also underscores the deficit nature of the evidence
adduced. The non-examination of these witnesses is fatal to
the prosecution's case, as it leaves a conspicuous gap in the
chain of circumstances sought to be established against the
appellants.
28.Further, PW-13 Shanta, when examined, did not support the
prosecution version and was declared hostile. It is settled law
that while the testimony of a hostile witness may be relied
upon to the extent it supports the prosecution, in the present
case no material portion of her statement advances the case
in any meaningful way. The deliberate withholding of the best
available evidence and the failure to secure support from a
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witness projected as material constitute serious infirmities
which weaken, rather than strengthen, the prosecution's
case.
29.Viewed cumulatively, the alleged circumstances pressed into
service by the prosecution namely the deceased being
allegedly last seen at Tulsi's house, the recovery of the body,
the purported extra-judicial confession, the medical evidence,
and the recoveries do not form a complete chain. Each link is
either missing, unreliable, or rendered doubtful in the course
of cross-examination. The last seen theory collapses for want
of primary witnesses; the medical evidence, as already
discussed, is inconclusive regarding homicidal death; the
extra-judicial confession is inherently weak and surrounded
by suspicious delay; and the alleged recoveries are tainted
with procedural infirmities. In such circumstances, the chain
of circumstances falls short of the standard required in a case
of circumstantial evidence, where every link must point
unerringly towards the guilt of the accused and exclude every
other hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the
projected accused.
30.It is also well settled that lapses in investigation cannot by
themselves be a ground for acquittal; however, when such
lapses strike at the very root of the prosecution case and
generate reasonable doubt, the benefit must necessarily go
to the accused. In the present case, the non-examination of
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the most material witnesses, the contradictions in
depositions, the doubtful recoveries, and the infirmities in
medical evidence cumulatively create serious and reasonable
doubt regarding the prosecution story. In criminal
jurisprudence, where the standard of proof is one of beyond
reasonable doubt, such infirmities cannot be brushed aside as
minor irregularities. The inevitable consequence is that the
evidence falls short of establishing the guilt of the appellants,
thereby entitling them to the benefit of doubt.
31.None of these witnesses, however, deposed anything directly
connecting the appellants with the commission of the offence.
It thus appears that the learned trial Court proceeded to
convict the appellant not on the basis of cogent and
trustworthy evidence, but rather by adopting a hypothetical
and conjectural approach. The findings recorded appear to be
rooted more in surmises than in substantive legal evidence.
32.It is a settled rule of criminal jurisprudence that the standard
of proof required in a criminal trial is of the highest degree.
The age-old maxim that the burden of proving the charge lies
squarely upon the prosecution is not an empty formality but a
fundamental safeguard in criminal law. The prosecution must
prove the charges beyond all reasonable doubt, and any
shadow of doubt, however slight, must necessarily enure to
the benefit of the accused.
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33.Indisputably, there is no eyewitness account of the incident
of murder; the entire prosecution case is premised upon
circumstantial evidence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in a
catena of decisions, has laid down that in cases solely based
on circumstantial evidence, each circumstance must be
proved individually beyond every shadow of reasonable
doubt. Taken cumulatively, the circumstances must lead only
to one inference, namely the guilt of the accused, to the
exclusion of every other hypothesis. The circumstantial
evidence should be like a spider's web, leaving no exit for the
accused to escape. However, when the material on record in
the present case is subjected to close scrutiny, it becomes
evident that the prosecution has failed to discharge this
burden. The circumstances put forth do not unerringly point
towards the guilt of the accused; rather, they present a
perforated web with ample areas of doubt through which the
accused may legitimately slip away. On such shaky
foundations, a conviction would be wholly unsafe and
contrary to the settled principles governing cases based on
circumstantial evidence.
34.In the celebrated judgment in K.M. Nanavati v. State of
Maharashtra, AIR 1962 SC 605 (Criminal Appeal
No.195/1960), Justice K. Subbarao while discussing the
misdirections committed by the Sessions Judge, enunciated:
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"It is like this, take a word, split it up into letters, the
letters may individually mean nothing but when they
are combined they will form a word pregnant with
meaning. That is the way how you have to consider the
circumstantial evidence. You have to take all the
circumstances together and judge for yourself whether
the prosecution have established their case."
35.Before proceeding further, it would be apposite to reiterate
the theory of circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial
evidence means evidence not drawn from direct observation
of the fact in issue, but inferred from relevant facts. In other
words, where there is no direct evidence of the principal fact,
but there exist surrounding circumstances which, though not
facts in issue, are relevant to it, then from their
establishment a safe inference of the principal fact can be
drawn. Hence, it is termed as "inferential evidence."
36.Though there is no straitjacket formula for the appreciation
of circumstantial evidence, the Courts have consistently
prescribed certain cardinal tests. These principles, initially
propounded in Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of
M.P., AIR 1952 SC 343, and followed consistently
thereafter, may be summarized as follows:
(i) Circumstances from which an inference of guilt is
sought to be drawn must be cogently and firmly
established.
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[2025:RJ-JD:42258-DB] (22 of 23) [CRLA-729/2000]
(ii) Those circumstances must unerringly point towards
the guilt of the accused and must be conclusive in
nature.
(iii) The circumstances, taken cumulatively, should
form a chain so complete as to leave no escape from
the conclusion that, within all human probability, the
crime was committed by the accused and none else.
(iv) The circumstances must be wholly inconsistent
with the innocence of the accused and must exclude
every other possible hypothesis except that of guilt.
37. Keeping these settled principles in mind, if one evaluates
the circumstances adduced by the prosecution in the present
case, it was alleged that the appellants bore a motive to
commit the murder of Munshi. However, the evidence in this
regard is tenuous. No substantial proof of such dispute was
placed on record, except a bald and vague allegation by a
witness. Thus, the prosecution miserably failed to establish
the existence of any motive attributable to the appellants.
38.It is a settled proposition of law that there exists a vast
distance between "may be true" and "must be true". This gap
must be bridged only through unimpeachable and trustworthy
evidence. Courts must exercise extreme caution while
traversing this distance, especially in cases of grave offences
like murder, where the punishment may extend to life
imprisonment or even death. Suspicion, however strong,
cannot take the place of proof.
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[2025:RJ-JD:42258-DB] (23 of 23) [CRLA-729/2000]
39.In light of the categorical findings delineated above, we are
of the considered view that the prosecution has failed to
prove the charge beyond suspicion, even a single
incriminating circumstance against the appellants to sustain
the conviction. The impugned judgment of conviction,
therefore, does not withstand judicial scrutiny.
40.Accordingly, the instant appeal is allowed. The impugned
judgment passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Abu Road, in Sessions Case No.146/1996 is hereby set aside.
The appellants stand acquitted of the charge under Sections
302 & 201 IPC. As the appellants are already on bail, their
bail bonds are discharged.
41.However, in compliance with Section 437-A Cr.P.C., the
appellants are directed to furnish a personal bond of
₹40,000/- along with one surety in the like amount before
the trial court. The bond shall remain in force for six months
to ensure the appellants presence before the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the event a Special Leave Petition is filed
against this judgment and notice thereof is received
42.The record be transmitted back forthwith.
(ANUROOP SINGHI),J (FARJAND ALI),J
112-Mamta/-
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