Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Seva Singh vs The State Of Rajasthan on 8 October, 2025
Author: Kuldeep Mathur
Bench: Kuldeep Mathur
[2025:RJ-JD:43548]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 18416/2025
Seva Singh S/o Indra Singh, Aged About 64 Years, Resident Of
Chahuwali, Tehsil Tibbi, District Hanumangarh.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. The State Of Rajasthan, Through Secretary Revenue
Department Govt. Secretariat, Rajasthan. Jaipur.
2. Board Of Revenue, For Rajasthan At Ajmer.
3. Amar Singh S/o Chatar Singh R/o Chahuwali, Tehsil Tibbi,
District Hanumangarh.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Deepak Sharma
For Respondent(s) : Mr. A.R. Godara
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KULDEEP MATHUR
Order
Reserved on:- 24/09/2025
Pronounced on: 08/10/2025
Uploaded on: 08/10/2025
1. The present writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India by the petitioner being aggrieved by the
order dated 10.09.2025 passed by the learned Board of Revenue,
Ajmer in Appeal No.T.A./1261/2019 whereby the order passed by
the learned Revenue Appellate Authority (RAA) dated 15.03.2019
remanding the matter back to learned Assistant Collector, Tibbi
has been maintained.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the present
petitioner filed a suit for declaration of his tenancy rights before
the learned Assistant Collector, Tibbi under Sections 88 and 53 of
the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. Learned counsel submitted that during
pendency of the revenue suit, both the parties had entered into a
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compromise. On the basis of the written compromise produced
before the learned Assistant Collector, Tibbi, the suit was decreed
vide order dated 13.02.2012.
3. Learned counsel submitted that the respondent No.3 against
the compromise deed dated 13.02.2012 preferred an appeal
before the learned RAA. The appeal was contested by the
petitioner on the ground that appeal against the compromise
decree passed by the learned Assistant Collector, Tibbi is not
maintainable in view of the express bar contained in Section 96(3)
of CPC. However, the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner
was not accepted by the learned RAA on ground that the
compromise decree was obtained on the basis of blank signed
papers of the respondent No.3 available with the petitioner.
Further, the signatures of the respondent No.3 were not obtained
on the order sheet before passing the compromise decree by the
learned Assistant Collector, Tibbi. The judgment/order passed by
the learned RAA has been further maintained by the learned Board
of Revenue, Rajasthan Ajmer.
4. Learned counsel submitted that the respondent No.3 had
also filed an FIR No.188/2012 under Sections 406, 420, 417, 465,
466, 471 and 120-B of IPC against petitioner and other co-
accused alleging inter alia that they have obtained a consent
decree from the Court of Assistant Collector, Tibbi by using the
blank papers containing his signatures and vakalatnama which
was given to the petitioner for using the same in the ceiling
proceedings before the learned Divisional Commissioner, Bikaner.
Learned counsel contended that the police after making thorough
investigation in the matter has filed a negative final report in
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relation to FIR No.188/2012 which was accepted by the competent
criminal Court. According to the learned counsel, the civil and
criminal proceedings have been initiated by the respondent No.3
in the present case after consent decree being passed by the
Court of Assistant Collector, Tibbi only with a view to keep the
dispute alive and pressurize the present petitioner to enter into re-
settlement with the present petitioner. It was further urged that
appeal against the compromise decree should not have been
entertained being barred by Section 96(3) of CPC. On these
grounds, learned counsel for the petitioner prayed that impugned
orders passed by the learned RAA and learned Board of Revenue,
Ajmer may be quashed and set aside. He has placed reliance on
the precedent set by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the
case of "Pushpa Devi Bhagat (D) Th. Lr. Smt. vs. Rajinder
Singh & Ors." reported in (2006) 5 SCC 566 so also this Court
in the case of "Smt. Basanti Devi & Ors. vs. State: S.B. C.W.P.
No.2479/2006" decided on 22.11.2021.
5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submitted
that a bare perusal of the impugned orders passed by the learned
RAA and the learned Board of Revenue, Ajmer would clearly
indicate that no compromise as alleged by the petitioner has been
entered between the parties. The compromise degree was
obtained by the petitioner by playing fraud with the Court and on
the basis of his signatures on the papers which were handed over
to the petitioner and his father at the time when the ceiling
proceedings were being conducted jointly against them by the
revenue authorities.
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7. Learned counsel submitted that no doubt it is true that
Section 93(3) of the CPC says that no appeal shall lie from a
decree passed by the Court with the consent of the parties.
However, when the compromise decree has been obtained by
playing fraud then such decree shall not be valid and binding on
the parties. Learned counsel submitted that Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India in the case of "Banwari Lal vs. Chando Devi
(SMT) (THROUGH LRS.) & Anr." reported in (1993) 1 SCC
581 has been pleased to hold that when it is alleged by one of the
parties to the alleged compromise that no such compromise has
been entered between the parties, then the Court before which
the alleged compromise took place has to decide whether the
agreement or compromise in question was lawful and not void or
voidable under the Indian Contract Act. If the agreement or the
compromise itself is fraudulent, then it shall be deemed to be void
within the meaning of explanation to the proviso to Rule 3 of
Order 23 and as such, is not lawful.
8. Learned counsel submitted that in the present case, since
the learned RAA and the learned Board of Revenue, Ajmer after
considering the material available on record, have come to the
conclusion that the compromise degree appears to be doubtful or
in other words, has been prima facie obtained by playing fraud
then it has committed no illegality in remanding the matter back
to the Court before which the alleged compromise had been
entered between the parties.
9. Heard learned counsel for the parties. Perused the material
available on record.
10. Section 96 of CPC is reproduced below for ready reference:-
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"96. Appeal from original decree.
(1) Save where otherwise expressly provided in the body
of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force,
an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by any Court
exercising original jurisdiction to the Court authorized to
hear appeals from the decisions of such Court.
(2) An appeal may lie from an original decree passed ex
parte.
(3) No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court
with the consent of parties.
(4) No appeal shall lie, except on a question of law, from a
decree in any suit of the nature cognizable by Courts of
Small Causes, when the amount or value of the subject-
matter of the original suit does not exceed ten thousand
rupees."
11. The relevant portion of the order dated 13.02.2012 passed
by the learned Assistant Collector, Tibbi wherein the factum with
regard to compromise between the parties was noticed is
reproduced below for ready reference:-
"वादी का वाद प्रस्तुत होने पर दर्ज रजिस्ट्रर किया जाकर प्रतिवादी को
जरिये सम्मन तलब किया गया प्रतिवादी जरिये अधिवक्ता न्यायालय मे
उपस्थित होकर वादी के वाद को स्वीकार कर राजीनामा पेश कर निवेदन
किया प्रतिवादी ने अपने हक व हिस्सा की भमि
ू वादी के पक्ष मे त्याग
किया हुआ है जिसे वादी के नाम राजस्व रिकार्ड मे दर्ज की जाती है तो
किसी प्रकार का ऐतराज नहीं है "
11. The relevant portion of the order dated 15.03.2019 passed
by the Court of learned RAA, Hanumangarh wherein reasons for
remanding the matter back to the Court of learned Assistant
Collector, Tibbi have been noticed is reproduced below ready
reference:-
"5. उभयपक्ष अभिभाषकगण की बहस पर मनन किया व पत्रावली का
अवलोकन किया व न्यायिक दृष्टांतो का ससम्मान अध्ययन किया।
6. अपीलाधीन निर्णय दिनांक 13.02.2012 को पारित किया गया है
जिसकी अपील राज अपीलान्ट ने 19.04.2012 को प्रस्तुत की है एवं
आवेदन पत्र दफा 5 मियाद अधिनियम सशपथ प्रस्तत
ु कर प्रश्नगत भमि
ू
के खाता विभाजन हे तू नकल जमाबंदी प्राप्त करने पर रे स्पोडेन्ट ने
अपीलाधीन निर्णय से प्रश्नगत भमि
ू अपने नाम दर्ज करवाने का जिक
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किया जिस पर अपीलान्ट ने अधिनस्थ न्यायालय की प्रमाणित प्रतिलिपि
प्राप्त कर अपील प्रस्तुत करने का कथन किया है एवं अधिनस्थ न्यायालय
ने स्वयं उपस्थित नहीं होने का भी कथन किया है उक्त कथनो के समर्थन
में शपथ-पत्र अपीलान्ट ने प्रस्तुत किया है इस प्रकार आवेदन पत्र में
अंकित कथनो पर विश्वास न किया जाने का हमारे समक्ष कोई कारण नहीं
होने एवं अपील का निस्तारण गण
ु ावगण
ु पर श्रेयस्कर होने के कारण अपील
भीतर मियाद मानी जाती है एवं अपील प्रस्तत
ु ी में हुई दे री कन्डोन की
जाती है ।
7. अपीलान्ट ने आवेदन पत्र आदे श 41 नियम 27 के साथ दस्तावेज
प्रस्तत
ु किये है जो प्रश्नगत प्रकरण से संबंधित दस्तावेज होने से प्रकरण
के निस्तारण में सस
ु ंगत होने के कारण आवेदन पत्र आदे श 41 नियम 27
सी पी सी अपीलान्ट स्वीकार किया जाता है । आवेदन पत्र के साथ प्रस्तत
ु
दस्तावेज को अभिलेख पर लिये जाते है ।
8. जहां तक गुणावगुण का प्रश्त है वादी ने अधिनस्थ न्यायालय में
रे स्पोडेन्ट के करवाया है एवं इसके समर्थन मे राजीनामा प्रतिवादी/
अपीलान्ट द्वारा प्रस्तुत नाम दर्ज 1/2 हिस्सा भमि
ू को अपने नाम की
उदघोषणा करकर याद डिकी किया जाना बताया है परन्तु अपीलार का यह
कहना है कि वह विचारण न्यायालय के समक्ष उपस्थित नहीं हुआ ना ही
उसके द्वारा कोई राजीनामा प्रस्तुत किया गया। विधारण न्यायालय में
प्रस्तत
ु राजीनामा दिनांक 13.02.2012 का अवलोकन करने से स्पष्ट है
कि राजीनामा जो तस्दीक किया है तस्दीक इबास्त पर किसी व्यक्ति के
हस्ताक्षर नहीं है ना ही अधिनस्थ न्यायालय की ऑर्डरशीट दिनांक
13.02.2012 पर ही अपीलान्ट के हस्ताक्षर है । वाद प्रस्तत
ु होने पर
रे स्पोडेन्ट को जरिये नोटिस तलब किये जाने का आदे श है परन्तु पत्रावली
पर नोटिस प्रतिवादी के तामिल होकर आना नहीं पाया जाता है ।
9. इस प्रकरण में अपीलाण्ट द्वारा राजीनामा स्वयं द्वारा नही पेश करना
अकित किया है । उन्होने ये भी बताया हे कि कोरे कागज पर पर्व
ू से किए
हुए हस्ताक्षरित कागज का दरू
ु पयोग कर कुटरचित तरीके से राजीनामा
तैयार किया गया है । राजीनामें की इबारत तस्दीक करते समय अपीलाण्ट
के हस्ताक्षर नहीं है ना ही आर्डरशीट पर हस्ताक्षर है । यह दस्तावेज /
राजीनामा कुटरचित तरीके से तैयार किया जाना बताया है । वकील
अपीलाण्ट द्वारा की गई बहस के अनुसार राजस्थान काश्त० अधिनियम के
तहत इस तरह के प्रकरणों में अपील सुनने का प्रावधान होना बताया है ।
जहां तक सहमति के आधार पर पारित डिक्री के विरूद्ध अपील प्रस्तत
ु
नहीं हो सकने का प्रश्न है इस संबध में अधीनवक्ता अपीलाण्ट द्वारा
प्रस्तुत न्यायिक दृष्टान्त 2006 आरआरटी पेज 1112 के अनुसार अपील
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अपीलाण्ट राजस्थान काश्तकारी अधिनियम के तहत सहमति के आधार पर
पारित डिक्री के विरूद्ध अपील प्रस्तुती हे तु कोई बाधा नहीं है । इसी प्रकार
अपीलाण्ट द्वारा किये कथनों के सम्बन्ध में 2006 आरबीजे पेज 400 व
2008 आरबीजे पेज 447 भी अपीलाण्ट के कथनों को बल प्रदान करते हैं।
यहाँ यह विशेष रूप से उल्लेखनीय तथ्य है कि प्रकरण में राजीनामा फर्जी
तरीके से खाली कागज पर पर्व
ू से हस्ताक्षरित कागज का दरु
ु पयोग कर
फर्जी तरीके से तैयार किया प्रतीत होता है । इसलिए कन्सेन्ट डिक्री
सदे हास्पद /फर्जी तरीके से प्राप्त की गई प्रतीत होती है , जिसके सबंध में
विचारण न्यायलय के स्तर पर पुनः परीक्षण किया जाना आवश्यक है एवं
पक्षकाराण के मध्य विवाद को नए सिरे से निर्धारण किया जाना आवश्यक
है ।
10. अतः उक्त विवेचन एवं विशलेषण के आधार पर अपील अपीलांट
स्वीकार योग्य बनती है तथा अपीलाधीन निर्णय व डिकी दिनांक
13.02.2012 अपास्त किया साकर दावा रे स्पोडेन्ट / प्रतिवादी खारिज
फिको जाता है एवं प्रकरण अधीनस्थ न्यायालय को इस निर्देश के साथ
प्रतिप्रेषित किया जाता है कि पक्षकारान के मध्य विवाद के बिन्दओ
ु ं को
पुनः नए सिरे से सुनवाई करते हुए निस्तारित किया जावे। दौराने वाद
विवादग्रस्त भमि
ू को रहन, बय मुन्तकिल नहीं करें ।
11. निर्णय आज दिनांक 15.03.2019 को मेरे द्वारा लिखवाया जाकर
खल
ु े न्यायालय में सन
ु ाया गया।"
12. The relevant portion of the order dated 10.09.2025 passed
by the learned Board of Revenue, Ajmer giving reasons for
affirming the remand order passed by the learned RAA is
reproduced below for ready reference:-
"10- पत्रावली के अवलोकन से यह भी स्पष्ट है कि विचारण न्यायालय के
समक्ष वाद प्रस्तत
ु होने पर विचारण न्यायालय द्वारा आदे शिका में
प्रतिवादी के नोटिस प्रस्तत
ु होने तथ पेश होने पर जारी करने बाबत ्
आदे शिका में कोई अंकन नहीं है जिससे हस्तगत प्रकरण में विचारण
न्यायालय द्वारा आदे श 5 जा०दी० के प्रावधानों की अनदे खी किया जाना
भी प्रकट होता है । जहां तक अपीलांट का यह कथन कि अपीलीय
न्यायालय के समक्ष अपील मियाद बाहर पेश की गई थी जिसे अपीलीय
न्यायालय ने अंदर मियाद मानने में त्रटि
ु कारित की है । इस संबंध में
अपीलीय न्यायालय की पत्रावली के अवलोकन से स्पष्ट है कि रे स्पो०/
प्रतिवादी द्वारा अपीलीय न्यायालय के समक्ष अपील केवल मात्र पांच दिवस
के विलंब से पेश की गई थी। अपीलांट द्वारा अपीलीय न्यायालय के समक्ष
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प्रार्थना पत्र अंतर्गत धारा 5 मियाद अधि० का खण्डन नहीं किया गया है ।
ऐसी स्थिति में अब अपीलांट द्वितीय अपील के स्तर पर मियाद के बिन्द ु
को नहीं उठा सकता है । विलंब क्षम्य करना अथवा नहीं करना अपीलीय
न्यायालय का विवेकाधिकार है । यह विधि का सुस्थापित सिद्धांत है कि
जहां पक्षकारों के हित निहित हो वहां प्रकरण को तकनीकी आधार पर
निर्णित करने के बजाय गण
ु ावगण
ु पर निर्णित करना चाहिये। इसी तथ्य
को ध्यान में रखकर प्रथम अपीलीय न्यायालय ने पांच के दिवस के विलंब
को क्षम्य कर प्रकरण का गुणावगुण पर निस्तारण किया है जो
विधिसम्मत ् निर्णय है । जहां तक आदे श 41 नियम 27 को स्वीकार करने
का प्रश्न है इस संबंध में अपीलीय न्यायालय की पत्रावली के अवलोकन से
स्पष्ट है कि अपीलीय न्यायालय के समक्ष प्रार्थना पन्त्र आदे श 41 नियम
27 जा०द० दिनांक 30.08.2012 को पेश किया गया था जिसका वर्तमान
अपीलांट ने सशपथ कोई खण्डन नहीं किया गया है और ना ही रिबटल में
कोई दस्तावेज ही पेश किया है जबकि इनके पास निर्णय दिनांक पितक
काफी समय था। इस कारण अपीलांट का इस संबंध में लिया गया उज्ज
उचित प्रतीत नही होता है । जहां तक अपीलांट का यह कथन कि अपीलांट/
वादी के विरूद्ध एफ.आई.आर. भी दर्ज करवाई गई थी जिसमें पुलिस
द्वारा एफ.आर. लगा दी गई है तथा उक्त एफ. आर. के विरूद्ध विद्वान
न्यायिक मजिस्ट्रे ट, टिब्बी के समक्ष प्रस्तुत पीटिशन भी खारिज हो चुकी
है । इस संबंध में उक्त पीटिशन के अवलोकन से यह स्पष्ट है कि उक्त
पीटिशन में माननीय न्यायालय ने प्रकरण सिविल प्रकृति का होना मानकर
खारिज की है । उपरोक्त समस्त तथ्यों को ध्यान में राजस्व अपील
प्राधिकारी, हनुमानगढ़ ने रे स्पो०/ प्रतिवादी की अपील स्वीकार कर प्रकरण
विचारण न्यायालय को गण
ु ावगण
ु पर निर्णित करने हे तु प्रतिप्रेषित किया है
जिसमें हमें कोई विधिक एवं तथ्यात्मक त्रटि
ु प्रतीत नहीं होती है ।
11- परिणामतः अपील अपीलांट खारिज की जाती है । राजस्व अपील
प्राधिकारी, हनुमानगढ़ द्वारा पारित निर्णय दिनांक 15.03.2019 यथावत ्
रखा जाता है ।
निर्णय खल
ु े न्यायालय में सन
ु ाया गया ।"
13. The para 9 and 13 of the judgment passed the Hon'ble
Supreme Court of India in the case of Banwari Lal (supra)
wherein the argument with regard to the remedy available to the
party which alleges that the compromise decree has been
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[2025:RJ-JD:43548] (9 of 13) [CW-18416/2025]
obtained by playing fraud has been considered in respect to
Section 96(3) of CPC is reproduced below for ready reference:-
"9. Section 96(3) of the Code says that no appeal shall lie
from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of the
parties. Rule1-A(2) has been introduced saying that against a
decree passed in a suit after recording a compromise, it shall
be open to the appellant to contest the decree on the ground
that the compromise should not have been recorded. When
Section 96(3) bars an appeal against decree passed with the
consent of parties, it implies that such decree is valid and
binding on the parties unless set aside by the procedure
prescribed or available to the parties. One such remedy
available was by filing the appeal under Order 43, Rule 1(m).
If the order recording the compromise was set aside, there
was no necessity or occasion to file an appeal against the
decree. Similarly a suit used to be filed for setting aside such
decree on the ground that the decree is based on an invalid
and illegal compromise not binding on the plaintiff of the
second suit. But after the amendments which have been
introduced, neither an appeal against the order recording the
compromise nor remedy by way of filing a suit is available in
cases covered by Rule 3-A of Order 23. As such a right has
been given under Rule 1-A(2)of Order 43 to a party, who
challenges the recording of the compromise, to question the
validity thereof while preferring an appeal against the decree.
Section 96(3) of the Code shall not be a bar to such an
appeal because Section 96(3) is applicable to cases where
the factum of compromise or agreement is not in dispute.
xx
xx
xx
13. When the amending Act introduced a proviso along with
an explanation to Rule 3 of Order 23 saying that where it is
alleged by one party and denied by the other that an
adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, " the Court
shall decide the question", the Court before which a petition
of compromise is field and which has recorded such
compromise, has to decide the question whether an
adjustment or satisfaction had been arrived at on basis of
any lawful agreement. To make the enquiry in respect of
validity of the agreement or the compromise more
comprehensive, the explanation to the proviso says that an
agreement or compromise "which is void or voidable under
the Indian Contract Act..." shall not be deemed to be lawful
within the meaning of the said Rule. In view of the proviso
read with the explanation, a Court which had entertained the
petition of compromise has to examine whether the
compromise was void or voidable under the Indian Contract
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[2025:RJ-JD:43548] (10 of 13) [CW-18416/2025]
Act. Even Rule 1(m) of Order 43 has been deleted under
which an appeal was maintainable against an order recording
a compromise. As such a party challenging a compromise can
file a petition under proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23, or an
appeal under Section 96(1) of the Code, in which he can now
question the validity of the compromise in view of Rule 1-A of
Order 43 of the Code."
14. The para 12 of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India in Pushpa Devi Bhagat (supra) wherein
legislative intent of the scheme of Order 23 Rule 3 and Rule 3 A of
the CPC has been summarized reads as under:-
"12. The position that emerges from the amended
provisions of Order 23, can be summed up thus:
(i) No appeal is maintainable against a consent decree
having regard to the specific bar contained in section 96(3)
CPC.
(ii) No appeal is maintainable against the order of the court
recording the compromise (or refusing to record a
compromise) in view of the deletion of clause(m) Rule 1
Order 43.
(iii) No independent suit can be filed for setting aside a
compromise decree on the ground that the compromise was
not lawful in view of the bar contained in Rule3A.
(iv) A consent decree operated as an estoppel and is valid
and binding unless it is set aside by the court which passed
the consent decree, by an order on an application under the
proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23."
15. This Court upon perusal of the facts of the case and
precedent law cited at bar by the learned counsel for the
petitioner finds that though Section 96 CPC provides for appeals
from original decrees, Section 96(3) however, provided that no
appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the
consent of the parties. The question which thus arises before this
Court for consideration is that whether the learned RAA and
learned Board of Revenue, Ajmer have committed any illegality
and jurisdictional error in remanding the matter back to the
learned Assistant Collector, Tibbi in appeal against the order dated
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[2025:RJ-JD:43548] (11 of 13) [CW-18416/2025]
13.02.2012 on prima facie finding that the consent decree was
obtained by improper means.
This Court upon perusal of the order dated 13.02.2012
passed by the learned Assistant Collector, Tibbi finds that at the
time of passing of the compromise decree, the respondent No.3
was summoned by the Court. In response thereof, he appeared
before the Court along with his advocate and showed no objection
in case the suit property is entered in the name of plaintiff
(petitioner herein) in the revenue records.
16. The learned RAA in the appeal against the judgment of
learned Assistant Collector, Tibbi after perusing the record of the
case, reached to a conclusion that though the notices were issued
to the respondent No.3 but there is nothing to indicate that the
same were returned after service upon him. Further, neither the
compromise deed bears any attestation nor the order sheets bears
any signature of respondent No.3 to establish that the respondent
No.3 was present before the learned Assistant Collector, Tibbi to
verify the alleged factum of compromise between the parties. The
learned RAA in these circumstances, remanded the matter to the
learned Assistant Collector, Tibbi to decide the question whether
there is a valid compromise or not after hearing both the parties.
The order passed by the learned RAA dated 15.03.2019 has been
affirmed by the learned Board of Revenue, Ajmer.
17. True it is that when a party to the consent decree alleges
that the consent decree has been obtained by playing fraud upon
the Court then that party to the litigation is required to approach
the Court which recorded the compromise and made a decree in
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[2025:RJ-JD:43548] (12 of 13) [CW-18416/2025]
terms of it and establish that there was no compromise. The Court
which recorded the compromise thereupon is required to decide
the question as to whether there was a valid compromise or not.
In other words, the compromise decree cannot be challenged and
entertained by the Appellate Court on merits.
18. As noticed above, in the present case on finding an element
of foul play in obtaining the compromise decree, the Appellate
Court i.e. the Court of learned RAA on its own has not set aside
the compromise decree dated 13.02.2012 passed by the learned
Assistant Collector, Tibbi instead the matter has been remanded
back to the concerned Court to look into the matter from the
angle as to whether there was a valid compromise between the
parties or not. This is for the reason that the validity of a consent
decree depends wholly on the free and willful compromise
between the parties, which as observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the case of Pushpa Devi Bhagat (supra) is nothing but
contract between the parties superimposed with the seal of
approval of the Court. It is a settled principle of law that fraud
vitiates even the most solemn proceedings of the Court and thus,
a decree obtained by fraud or misrepresentation can be set aside
even at the execution stage.
19. In view of aforesaid discussion, and more particularly on
finding that the matter has been remanded back to the learned
Assistant Collector, Tibbi to determine correctness and validity of
the compromise between the parties based on which the
compromise decree dated 13.02.2012 was passed, this Court finds
no merit in the present case.
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20. Consequently, the present writ petition filed by the petitioner
against the order dated 15.03.2019 passed by the learned RAA
and the order dated 10.09.2025 passed by the learned Board of
Revenue, Ajmer is dismissed.
21. No order as to costs.
(KULDEEP MATHUR),J
40-divya/-
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