Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Padmaram @ Devaram vs State Of Rajasthan (2025:Rj-Jd:22537) on 9 May, 2025
Author: Manoj Kumar Garg
Bench: Manoj Kumar Garg
[2025:RJ-JD:22537] (1 of 11) [CRLR-446/2023]
[2025:RJ-JD:22537]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 446/2023
1. Padmaram @ Devaram S/o Manglaram, Aged About 30
Years, B/c Jat, R/o Vill. Kishor Nagar, Teh. Shergarh, Dist.
Jodhpur.
2. Hukmaram S/o Manglaram, Aged About 25 Years, B/c Jat,
R/o Vill. Kishor Nagar, Teh. Shergarh, Dist. Jodhpur.
----Petitioners
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Pp
2. Rajuram Choudhary S/o Gajaram, Aged About 27 Years,
B/c Jat, R/o Vill. Kishor Nagar, Teh. Shergarh, Dist.
Jodhpur.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Devendra Khatri
For Respondent(s) : Mrs. Sonu Manawat, PP
Mr. Shrawan Kumar for respondent
No.2
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR GARG
Order
09/05/2025
The present criminal revision petition filed by the petitioners
against the order dated 14.02.2023 passed by the learned
Sessions Judge, Jodhpur in Sessions Case No.16/2020, by which
the learned trial Court has framed the charges against the
petitioners for offence under Sections 341, 427, 307 and 307/34
of IPC.
Brief facts of the case are that complainant Rajuram filed an
FIR No.196/2019 at Police Station Shergarh, District Jodhpur to
the effect that he was going to his village in his car bearing
registration No.RJ-19-CF-2067. Upon reaching near Urajnagar,
[2025:RJ-JD:22537] (2 of 11) [CRLR-446/2023]
accused petitioner No.1-Padmaram was standing with his tractor
bearing registration No.RJ-43-RA-0136 and petitioner No.2
Hukmaram alongwith Hadmanram approached from behind the
respondent No.2 in his vehicle bearing registration No.RJ-23-GA-
9507 and hit the complainant's vehicle. It was further alleged that
accused petitioners hit the complainant's vehicle repeatedly, due
to which the car was completely broken, thereafter they assaulted
him with sticks and iron rod. It was further alleged that accused
persons often abuse the complainant and his father whenever they
see him and threaten to kill him. On this report, a case was
registered against the petitioners.
After investigation, Police submitted charge-sheet against
the present petitioners and thereafter the case is committed for
trial before the District & Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, where the
charges of the case have been framed against the accused
petitioners.
Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that according to
the MTO report received from the Police Station Shergarh, Jodhpur
Rural, it is explicitly mentioned that only the bumper of the
complainant's vehicle was damaged and no evidence of accident
was found on the tractor involved in the incident. Counsel further
contends that this case pertains to a mere accident, in which no
injuries was caused to individual. Therefore, offence under Section
307 IPC is not made out against the present petitioners. Counsel
has placed reliance upon the judgments passed by the co-ordinate
Bench of this Court in the case of Sunil Kumar & Ors. Vs. State
of Rajasthan & Anr. in S.B. Criminal Revision Petition
No.681/2017 decided on 09.07.2021 and Karan Gambhiri &
[2025:RJ-JD:22537] (3 of 11) [CRLR-446/2023]
Anr. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. in S.B. Criminal Revision
Petition NO.539/2022 decided on 21.07.2023.
Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent No.2
vehemently opposed the prayer made by the counsel for the
petitioners and submits that the learned trial Court after
considering each and every aspect of the matter and investigation,
framed the charges against the petitioners. Hence, there is no
illegality and perversity in the order passed by the learned trial
Court while framing the charges against the petitioners, therefore,
the present revision petition filed by the petitioner is hereby
dismissed. Counsel for the respondent No.2 has relied upon the
judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State
of Orissa Vs. Pratima Behera reported in AIR 2025 SC 218.
I have considered the arguments advanced before me and
carefully gone through the material available on record.
To appreciate the arguments raised by the learned counsel
for the parties, a perusal of Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code
would be required. The same is extracted herein-below:
"307 Attempt to murder.-- Whoever does any act with
such intention or knowledge, and under such
circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he
would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and,
if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender
shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such
punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.
Attempts by Life Convicts: When any person offending
under this section is under sentence of imprisonment for
life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death."
[2025:RJ-JD:22537] (4 of 11) [CRLR-446/2023]
Section 307 IPC has a broad scope, encompassing acts done
with the intention or knowledge of causing death, capable of
causing death if not interrupted. The section's application hinges
on the mental element (mens rea) and the nature of the act,
rather than solely on the severity of injuries inflicted. Courts
emphasize the importance of intent and circumstances over the
actual outcome, making the section a comprehensive provision for
punishing attempts to commit murder.
From a bare perusal of the record of the present case in
hand, it is evident that no individual sustained injuries as a result
of the incident in question. Additionally, according to the Motor
Transport Office (MTO) report submitted by the police, the only
damage incurred was to the bumper of the complainant's vehicle;
there was no damage to the tractor belonging to petitioner No.1.
It is settled view that trial while framing of charges under
Section 228 Cr.P.C., he had to see whether, prima facie, case is
made out. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mauvin
Godinho Vs. State of Goa reported in SCR, [2018] 1 S.C.R.
821 has held that the court, while framing charges under Section
227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, should apply the prima
facie standard. Although the application of this standard depends
on facts and circumstance in each case, a prima-facie case against
the accused is said to be made out when the probative value of
the evidence on all the essential elements in the charge taken as a
whole is such that it is sufficient to induce the court to believe in
the existence of the facts pertaining to such essential elements or
to consider its existence so probable that a prudent man ought to
act upon the supposition that those facts existed or did happen.
However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the
[2025:RJ-JD:22537] (5 of 11) [CRLR-446/2023]
pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he were
conducting a trial. The court has to see is that the material on
record and the facts would be compatible with the innocence of
the accused or not. The final test of guilt is not to be applied at
that stage.
The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Amit Kapoor v.
Ramesh Chander and another reported in (2012) 9 SCC 460,
has held as under:-
"17. Framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by
the trial court in terms of Section 228 of the Code, unless
the accused is discharged under Section 227 of the Code.
Under both these provisions, the court is required to
consider the record of the case and documents submitted
therewith and, after hearing the parties, may either
discharge the accused or where it appears to the court
and in its opinion there is ground for presuming that the
accused has committed an offence, it shall frame the
charge. Once the facts and ingredients of the section
exists, then the court would be right in presuming that
there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame
the charge accordingly. This presumption is not a
presumption of law as such. The satisfaction of the court
in relation to the existence of constituents of an offence
and the facts leading to that offence is a sine qua non for
exercise of such jurisdiction. It may even be weaker than
a prima facie case. There is a fine distinction between the
language of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code. Section
227 is the expression of a definite opinion and judgment
of the Court while Section 228 is tentative. Thus, to say
that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court should
form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of
committing an offence, is an approach which is
impermissible in terms of Section 228 of the Code.
19. At the initial stage of framing of a charge, the court
is concerned not with onproof
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at 09:34:49 a strong suspicion
[2025:RJ-JD:22537] (6 of 11) [CRLR-446/2023]
that the accused has committed an offence, which, if put
to trial, could prove him guilty. All that the court has to
see is that the material on record and the facts would be
compatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The
final test of guilt is not to be applied at that stage. We
may refer to the well-settled law laid down by this Court
in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh. Under Section 226 of
the Code while opening the case for the prosecution the
Prosecutor has got to describe the charge against the
accused and state by what evidence he proposes to prove
the guilt of the accused. Thereafter comes at the initial
stage the duty of the court to consider the record of the
case and the documents submitted therewith and to hear
the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in
that behalf. The Judge has to pass thereafter an order
either under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. If
the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the
accused and record his reasons for so doing, as enjoined
by Section 227. If, on the other hand, the Judge is of
opinion that there is ground for presuming that the
accused has committed an offence which (b) is
exclusively triable by the court, he shall frame in writing
a charge against the accused, as provided in Section 228.
Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as
they have got to be, it would be clear that at the
beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth,
veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor
proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged.
Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence
of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that
stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a
sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be
incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not.
The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally
applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or
otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at
the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or
[2025:RJ-JD:22537] (7 of 11) [CRLR-446/2023]
Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the court is not to
see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of
the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his
conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the
matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take
the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the
trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion
which leads the court to think that there is ground for
presuming that the accused has committed an offence
then it is not open to the court to say that there is no
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The
presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be
drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law
governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the
accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is
proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima
facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or
not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to
adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully
accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or
rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show
that the accused committed the offence, then there will
be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An
exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what
will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible
nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the
law by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the
guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even
at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of
benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if,
on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making
an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such
a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will
have to be made will be one under Section 228 and not
under Section 227"
[2025:RJ-JD:22537] (8 of 11) [CRLR-446/2023]
The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bhawna Bai vs
Ghanshyam and others, reported in (2020) 2 SCC 217, has
held in para 13 and 16, which are as follows:
"13. Though the circumstances alleged in the charge
sheet are to be established during the trial by adducing
the evidence, the allegations in the charge sheet show a
prima facie case against the accused-respondent Nos.1
and 2. The circumstances alleged by the prosecution
indicate that there are sufficient grounds for proceedings
against the accused. At the time of framing the charges,
only prima facie case is to be seen; whether case is
beyond reasonable doubt, is not to be seen at this stage.
At the stage of framing the charge, the court has to see
if there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused. While evaluating the materials, strict standard
of proof is not required; only prima facie case against
the accused is to be seen.
16. After referring to Amit Kapoor, in Dinesh Tiwari v.
State of Uttar Pradesh and another (2014) 13 SCC 137,
the Supreme Court held that for framing charge under
Section 228 Crl.P.C., the judge is not required to record
detailed reasons as to why such charge is framed. On
perusal of record and hearing of parties, if the judge is of
the opinion that there is sufficient ground for presuming
that the accused has committed the offence triable by
the Court of Session, he shall frame the charge against
the accused for such offence."
In the case of State of Orissa (Supra), the Supreme Court
of India while addressed the core issue was whether there was
sufficient prima-facie evidence to charge the accused has
observed that:-
"This observation itself would go against the very scope
of Section 239, Code of Criminal Procedure as at the
stage of consideration of a petition for discharge what is
to be considered whether there is a 'prima facie' case
[2025:RJ-JD:22537] (9 of 11) [CRLR-446/2023]
and certainly, the endeavour cannot be to find whether
'clinching' materials are there or not. In the common
parlance the word 'clinch' means 'point' or circumstance
that settles the issue. We have no hesitation to hold that
such meticulous consideration for presence or absence of
clinching material is beyond the scope of power of the
Court while considering the question of discharge Under
Section 239, Code of Criminal Procedure as also while
considering the question of quashing of charge framed
by the Trial Court, while exercising the revisional
jurisdiction. It is to be noted that at that stage the
materials collected by the prosecution would not mature
into evidence and therefore, beyond the question of
existence or otherwise prima facie case based on
materials, the question whether they are clinching or not
could not be gone into."
Quashing a charge is an exception to the general principle of
allowing continuous prosecution. If the offence, even broadly, is
satisfied, the Court should favor permitting the prosecution to
proceed rather than quashing the proceedings at the initial stage.
The Court's role is limited to forming a prima facie opinion,
without delving into detailed examinations of the record or
evidence. If the allegations are manifestly absurd or inherently
improbable, such that no reasonable person could reasonably
arrive at such a conclusion, and if the essential elements of a
criminal offence are not satisfied, the Court may intervene.
Legal provisions clearly stipulate that any statutory bar
enacted to prevent the initiation, institution, or continuation of
criminal proceedings serves to protect the rights of the accused.
The Court has a duty to balance the individual's liberty with the
prosecution's right to investigate and prosecute. The judicial
process must not be misused for ulterior or extraneous purposes.
Furthermore, the Court is not empowered to evaluate the entire
[2025:RJ-JD:22537] (10 of 11) [CRLR-446/2023]
factual matrix, evidence, or materials on record to determine the
likelihood of conviction at this preliminary stage. Its primary
concern is whether the allegations, taken as a whole, constitute an
offence and whether their continuation would amount to abuse of
the process, leading to injustice. The Court is not required to
conduct a detailed inquiry or assess the admissibility and reliability
of evidence collected by investigating authorities. Lastly, if the
charge-sheet or report under Section 173(2) of the Code contains
fundamental legal defects, the Court remains within its jurisdiction
to frame a charge, provided that the allegations satisfy the basic
legal requirements of the offence.
In light of the Supreme Court's pronouncements and upon a
preliminary review of the case record, it is apparent that no
individual sustained injuries as a result of the incident and it is
evident that the evidence does not establish a prima facie case
against the petitioner. The absence of injuries and the minimal
damage suggest that the incident did not involve culpable
negligence or any criminal intent, thereby justifying that no
further proceedings are warranted at this stage.
The case referred by the respondent was passed by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Orissa (Supra), which
observed that, during the framing of charges, a prima facie case
must be established. This Court underscored that such an
assessment is inherently dependent on the specific facts and
circumstances of each case. In the present matter, upon a
thorough consideration of the evidence and circumstances, it is
evident that no prima-facie case has been established against the
accused petitioner for the offence under Section 307 of the Indian
Penal Code. This observation is grounded in the assessment that
[2025:RJ-JD:22537] (11 of 11) [CRLR-446/2023]
the available evidence does not substantiate a reasonable belief
that the accused committed the alleged act, thereby precluding
the framing of charges at this stage for the offence under section
307 of IPC.
Hence, the order dated 14.02.2023 passed by the learned
Sessions Judge, Jodhpur in Sessions Case No.16/2020 to the
extent of framing the charge against the petitioners for offence
under Section 307 IPC is hereby quashed and set aside.
Consequently, the petitioners shall be discharged of the charges
under Section 307 IPC. So far as the charges framed under
Sections 341 & 427/34 of IPC are concerned, no interference is
called for by this Court. Stay application is also decided
accordingly.
Record of the case be sent back forthwith.
(MANOJ KUMAR GARG),J
73-Ishan/-
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