Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

Kamal Meena vs State on 26 March, 2025

Author: Manoj Kumar Garg

Bench: Manoj Kumar Garg

             [2025:RJ-JD:14487]

                   HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                                        JODHPUR
                         S.B. Criminal Appeal (Sb) No. 254/2020

             Kamal Meena S/o Shri Babu Lal Meena, Aged About 32 Years,
             Resident Of Village Dabir, Post Bukna Tehsil Sapotra, District
             Karauli (Raj.). The Then Junior Engineer, Ajmer Vidyut Vitaran
             Nigam Limited, Gilund, Tehsil Railmagra, Dist. Udaipur.
                                                                                ----Appellant
                                                 Versus
             State, Through Pp
                                                                              ----Respondent



             For Appellant(s)          :     Mr. Mahendra Shandilya
                                             Mr. Vikram Beniwal
             For Respondent(s)         :     Mr. Y.S. Charan assistant to
                                             Mr. NK Gurjar, GA-cum-AAG



                       HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR GARG

Judgment

Order Reserved on : 18/03/2025 Date of pronouncement: 26/03/2025

REPORTABLE

Instant criminal appeal has been filed by the appellant

against the judgment dated 03.02.2020 passed by learned Special

Judge, Sessions Court (Prevention of Corruption Act Cases),

Udaipur, in Sessions Case No.58/2014 by which the learned Judge

convicted the appellant for offence under Section 7 of Prevention

of Corruption Act and sentenced him to undergo six months SI

along with fine of Rs.5,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to

further undergo one month's simple imprisonment.

Brief facts of the case are that on 03.12.2013 complainant

Nathu Lal (PW-2) filed a written report (Ex-P/1) before the Addl.

SP, ACB Outpost Rajsamand alleging inter alia that when he went

to the office of A.En. Railmagra for depositing the amount of

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demand notice issued to him for electricity connection to his

agricultural land, he was asked to contact Sh. Kamal Meena, J.En

Gilund. When the complainant reached out to Kamal Meena, he

demanded illegal gratification of Rs.2000-3000/- for issuing

electricity meter. On the basis of complaint, verification of demand

was made by the ACB and thereafter, a trap was arranged.

As per prosecution, though a trap was planned but appellant

became suspicious and did not accept the illegal gratification.

Later on, the accused sent a message through his friends that he

made a mistake and requested not to initiate any proceedings

against him. However, on the basis of illegal demand, a prima

facie case was found against the accused-appellant and therefore,

FIR was registered against him and investigation was commended.

After thorough investigation, challan was filed against the

appellant. Thereafter, the trial court framed charge for offences

under Section 7 of PC Act against the appellant. The accused

appellant denied the charge and claimed trial.

During the course of trial, the prosecution examined as many

as fourteen witnesses in support of its case and also exhibited

various documents. Thereafter, statement of the accused appellant

was recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C. In defence, no witness was

examined, but certain documents were exhibited by the accused

appellant.

Upon conclusion of the trial, the learned trial court vide

impugned judgment dated 03.02.2020 convicted and sentenced

the appellant for offence under Section 7 of PC Act. Hence, this

criminal appeal on behalf of the appellant against his conviction.

[2025:RJ-JD:14487] (3 of 17) [CRLAS-254/2020]

The counsel for the appellant submits that the learned trial

court erred in law by convicting the appellant under Section 7 of

the Prevention of Corruption Act, as there is no reliable material or

evidence on record to substantiate his conviction. Counsel

contends that, according to the complaint (Ex-P/1), the

complainant visited the office of A.En. Railmagra, where he was

instructed to meet Kamal Meena, J.En., Gilund (the present

appellant). The complainant further asserts that approximately

10-15 days prior to this meeting, the appellant had demanded an

illegal gratification of Rs. 2,000-3,000. Counsel further submits

that the trial court placed reliance on the transcript (Ex-P/2) for

convicting the appellant; however, the transcript fails to

demonstrate that any work was pending with the appellant.

Moreover, according to the prosecution's case, the appellant

neither accepted any money nor engaged in any conversation with

the complainant. As such, it is evident that no illegal gratification

was recovered from the appellant's possession.

Counsel also points out that the complainant, who testified

as PW-2, clearly stated that when he visited the office of A.En.,

two individuals were present, one of whom was the appellant. The

complainant testified that the second individual demanded Rs.

2,500 for a connection. However, this second individual was not

identified by the complainant, nor was any complaint filed against

him. Furthermore, the complaint made no mention of this

individual. Subsequently, the trial court declared the complainant

(PW-2) hostile. In his cross-examination, the complainant deposed

that he had indeed paid Rs. 13,500, but that the villagers had

provoked him by stating that unless he paid the amount, he would

[2025:RJ-JD:14487] (4 of 17) [CRLAS-254/2020]

not receive the connection. Additionally, according to the

testimony of Investigating Officer Gopal Swaroop Mewara (PW-

12), he did not overhear the conversation recorded in the fard

transcript between the complainant and the appellant. He further

admitted that neither the officers nor any colleagues of the

appellant had identified the alleged conversation in the transcript.

Moreover, the voice sample of the appellant was not sent to the

Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) for examination. But all these

aspects of the matter were not taken into consideration by the

learned trial court while passing the impugned judgment and thus

wrongly convicted and sentenced the appellant for offence under

Section 7 of the Act. Therefore, the impugned judgment being per

se illegal deserves to be quashed and set aside.

Learned AAG appearing for the State submits that the

learned trial court has rightly convicted and sentence the appellant

under Section 7 of the Act as there is ample evidence against him

for commission of the offence. The impugned judgment is just and

proper and does not warrant any interference from this Court.

Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

impugned judgment as well as evidence available on record.

In the first instance, it is deemed appropriate to reproduce

Section 7 and 20 of the Act for easy reference:

"Section--7. Public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act.-

Whoever, being, or expecting to be a public servant, accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification whatever, other than legal

[2025:RJ-JD:14487] (5 of 17) [CRLAS-254/2020]

remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour to any person or for rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to any person, with the Central Government or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State or with any local authority, corporation or Government company referred to in clause (c) of Section 2 or with any public servant, whether named or otherwise, shall be punishable with imprisonment which shall be not less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanations.-

(a) "Expecting to be a public servant"- If a person not expecting to be in office obtains a gratification by deceiving others into a belief that he is about to be in office, and that he will then serve them, he may be guilty of cheating, but he is not guilty of the offence defined in this section.

(b) "Gratification". The word "gratification" is not restricted to pecuniary gratifications or to gratifications estimable in money.

(c) "Legal remuneration"- The words "legal remuneration" are not restricted to remuneration which a public servant can lawfully demand, but include all remuneration which he is permitted by the Government or the organisation, which he serves, to accept.

(d) "A motive or reward for doing". A person who receives a gratification as a motive or reward for doing what he does not intend or is not in a position to do, or has not done, comes within this expression.

(e) Where a public servant induces a person erroneously to believe that his influence with the

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Government has obtained a title for that person and thus induces that person to give the public servant, money or any other gratification as a reward for this service, the public servant has committed an offence under this section.

20.Presumption where public servant accepts any undue advantage. [Substituted by Act No. 16 of 2018, dated 26.7.2018.]

- Where, in any trial of an offence punishable under section 7 or under section 11, it is proved that a public servant accused of an offence has accepted or obtained or attempted to obtain for himself, or for any other person, any undue advantage from any person, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that he accepted or obtained or attempted to obtain that undue advantage, as a motive or reward under section 7 for performing or to cause performance of a public duty improperly or dishonestly either by himself or by another public servant or, as the case may be, any undue advantage without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate under section 11.] [Inserted by Act No. 16 of 2018, dated 26.7.2018.]"

The twin conditions i.e. proof of demand and acceptance of

illegal gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the

prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the guilt of the

accused public servant under section 7 of the Act. In order to

bring the accused to book, the prosecution has to prove the

demand of 'illegal gratification' and its 'subsequent acceptance'

either by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence.

The link between these two sections is clear and vital in the

fight against corruption. Section 7 criminalizes the act of accepting

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a bribe or gratification by a public servant in exchange for

performing official duties improperly. It defines the scope of

corrupt behavior by public officials and sets out the legal basis for

prosecution. Section 20 complements this by simplifying the legal

process by establishing a presumption that, if a public servant

accepts an undue advantage, it is assumed to be for performing

an official duty improperly. The presumption in Section 20

strengthens the case against a public servant accused under

Section 7 by removing some of the difficulties in proving the intent

behind the act of accepting a bribe. In essence, these sections

work together to create a strong legal framework for prosecuting

corruption, ensuring that public servants who engage in bribery

are held accountable, and making it easier to secure convictions

even in cases where direct evidence is scarce. This dual

mechanism of defining the offence and presuming corrupt intent is

designed to deter corrupt practices in public offices by raising the

consequences of such offences and facilitating the prosecution of

offenders.

Pertinently, it is also to be noted that the Constitutional

Bench in Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in

(2023) 4 SCC 731 has answered the issue 'whether in the

absence of evidence of the complainant / direct or primary

evidence of demand of illegal gratification, it is permissible to draw

an inferential deduction of culpability / guilt of a public servant

under Sections 7 of the Act based on other evidence adduced by

the prosecution' in affirmative, with the following conclusions:-

"88. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is

summarised as under:

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88.1. (a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.

88.2. (b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or documentary evidence.

88.3. (c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral and documentary evidence. 88.4. (d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind:

(i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe-giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant.

(ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and the bribe-giver accepts the demand and tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In the case of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification emanates from the public servant.

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This is an offence under Sections 13(1) (d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.

(iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe-giver and the demand by the public servant respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii), respectively of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be an offer which emanates from the bribe-giver which is accepted by the public servant which would make it an offence.

Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the bribe giver and in turn there is a payment made which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.

88.5. (e) The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands.

88.6. (f) In the event the complainant turns "hostile", or has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during trial, demand of illegal gratification can be

[2025:RJ-JD:14487] (10 of 17) [CRLAS-254/2020]

proved by letting in the evidence of any other witness who can again let in evidence, either orally or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant.

88.7. (g) Insofar as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.

88.8. (h) We clarify that the presumption in law under Section 20 of the Act is distinct from presumption of fact referred to above in sub-para 88.5(e), above, as the former is a mandatory presumption while the latter is discretionary in nature."

The Constitution Bench has definitively ruled that proof of

demand (or offer) and acceptance of illegal gratification by a

public servant is a material fact in criminal proceedings and is an

essential requirement for establishing the guilt of the accused

under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. In the

absence of satisfactory evidence before the Court proving that the

demand and acceptance of illegal gratification occurred, the

presumption under Section 20 of the Act cannot be invoked. The

presumption cannot arise solely on the basis of mere allegations,

as the appellant has correctly pointed out. In the present case, the

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complainant denied the allegation that the appellant demanded a

bribe, and he was declared hostile by the trial court. Furthermore,

the Investigating Officer, examined as PW-12, admitted that the

appellant's voice had not been identified by any officer in the

appellant's office, and no voice sample was sent to the Forensic

Science Laboratory (FSL) for analysis. The witnesses also testified

that the trap did not succeed and no illegal gratification was

recovered from the appellant.

Concededly, trap was planned and conducted based on the

complainant's complaint, but it failed to yield any results.

According to the prosecution, the appellant approached the

complainant at the location but left without any interaction. Thus,

no money was accepted by the appellant, nor was any money

recovered from him. The complainant's testimony further

undermines the prosecution's case, as he denied the bribery

allegations and was declared hostile. Given that no evidence of

demand or acceptance of illegal gratification was presented, and

the trap failed, the prosecution has not proven its case beyond a

reasonable doubt. As such, the presumption under Section 20 of

the Prevention of Corruption Act cannot be invoked, and the

allegations made against the appellant stand unsubstantiated.

In the case of Dileepbhai Nanubhai Sanghani vs State of

Gujarat & Anr. in Diary No.46289 of 2024 decided on

27.02.2025, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that:-

"22. The only charge is with respect tom misuse of authority which does not come under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act and none of the ingredients regarding demand or obtaining or

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acceptance of bribe or any illegal gratification has come out. The accusation was only that the policy of the State required a tender process to be adopted but the Minister had sanctioned the grant of fishing rights on an upset price, which is alleged to be misuse of authority especially since the Policy can be deviated from, only on orders of the Chief Minister or the Cabinet as per the policy document and the Rules of Business framed. The investigation report, as we observed, speaks only of an allegation of misuse of authority, without any allegation of demand and acceptance of bribe as against the appellant. The presumption under Section 20 of the Act is that, if there is a demand and acceptance of bribe, then there is a presumption that it is to dishonestly carry out some activity by a public servant, for which, first, proof will have to be offered of the demand and acceptance. It is not otherwise that, if there is a misuse of authority then there is always a presumption of a demand and acceptance of bribe, resulting in a valid allegation of corruption.

23. The learned Counsel for the respondent also led us to the statements recorded, as coming out from the investigation report, which are only with respect to such demands made by the Minister for State, the first accused and not as against the second accused. We accept the contention raised by the appellant that there is not even an iota of material available from the investigation report, the pre-charge statements recorded from the complainant or the police officers or even the statements of persons questioned by the investigation team, as available in the report, to attract the ingredients of the provisions under the Prevention of Corruption Act. We are of the opinion that the discharge application of the appellant ought to have been allowed by the Special Court especially

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since there is not even an allegation of demand and acceptance of bribe, by the second accused/appellant.

24. We make it clear that the observations made by us with respect to the first accused, insofar as the allegations having been raised, is only to emphasise that even such an accusation is not available as against the appellant herein."

In the case of Imamsab Moulasab Toragal Vs. The State

of Karnataka in (Criminal Appeal No. 2553/2013), the Hon'ble

Supreme Court considered the earlier judgment in A. Subair Vs.

State of Kerala reported in (2009) 6 SCC 507, wherein it was

observed and held that in order to secure order of conviction of

offence punishable under Section 7, 13(1)(D)/13(2) of the

Prevention of Corruption Act, the prosecution has to establish the

following ingredients:-

1. Demand and acceptance of bribe money.

2. Handling of tainted money by the accused on the day of trap

(colour test).

3. Work of the complainant must be pending as on the date of

trap with the accused.

In Chandresha Vs State of Karnataka Lokayukt Police

Kalburgi in Criminal Appeal No. 200105/2015 decided on

16.2.2022, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that when the work of

complainant is not pending before accused as on the date of trap

the important ingredient to attract and complete the offence

punishable under Section 7, 13(1)(d)/13(2) of the Prevention of

Corruption Act cannot be sustained. Identical view was expressed

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in Karnataka Vs. Narayanswamy in Criminal Appeal No.

2506/2012.

In the case of A. Subair Vs. State of Kerala reported in

(2009) 6 SCC 507, the Hon'ble Supreme Court stated in para 28

as follows :-

"28. It needs no emphasis that the prosecution has to

prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt like any

other criminal offence and the accused should be

considered innocent till it is established otherwise by

proper proof of demand and acceptance of the illegal

gratification, the vital ingredient, necessary to be

established to procure a conviction for the offences

under consideration."

In Soundarajan Vs. State Rep. By the Inspector of

Police Vigilance Anti Corruption Dindigul reported in AIR

2023 SC 2136, the Hon'ble Supreme Court stated the law as

follows:-

"11.................. To attract Section 7 of the PC Act, the demand for gratification has to be proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. The word used in Section 7, as it existed before 26th July 2018, is 'gratification'. There has to be a demand for gratification. It is not a simple demand for money, but it has to be a demand for gratification. If the factum of demand of gratification and acceptance thereof is proved, then the presumption under Section 20 can be invoked, and the Court can presume that the demand must be as a motive or reward for doing any official act. This presumption can be rebutted by the accused."

[2025:RJ-JD:14487] (15 of 17) [CRLAS-254/2020]

In the case of The State of Karnataka vs

Chandrasha in Criminal Appeal NO.2646 OF 2024 decided

on 26.11.2024 The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as

under:-

It is settled law that the two basic facts viz., 'demand' and 'acceptance' of gratification have been proved, the presumption under Section 20 can be invoked to the effect that the gratification was demanded and accepted as a motive or reward as contemplated under Section 7 of the Act. However, such presumption is rebuttable. Even on the basis of the preponderance of probability, the accused can rebut the same. In the present case, the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, in respect of the 'demand' and 'acceptance' of the bribe amount from the complainant and recovery of tainted currency notes from the possession of the respondent. The said operation is preceded by recording of the demand in the tape recorder. In such circumstances, the respondent has to rebut the presumption by disproving the case of the prosecution either in the crossexamination of the prosecution side witnesses or by adducing material evidence that the receipt of Rs.2,000/- was not a bribe amount, but a legal fee or repayment of loan. However, he failed to do so and on the contrary, we find the prosecution to have proved the case beyond any doubt.

In the cited case, the prosecution successfully established

the crucial elements of demand and acceptance of illegal

gratification. However, in the present case, the prosecution has

failed to prove these essential elements. The record clearly reveals

that there was no pending work of the complainant with the

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appellant, neither on the date the complaint was made nor on the

date of the trap. Therefore, a critical ingredient of the offence--

namely, the existence of pending work with the public servant--is

entirely absent. Additionally, there is no recovery of money in this

case. Regarding the alleged conversation between the appellant

and the complainant, in which the demand was supposedly made,

it is noteworthy that the appellant's voice sample was neither sent

for forensic examination nor identified by any officer. As a result,

the prosecution has failed to substantiate the demand for and

acceptance of illegal gratification. Unlike the cited case, where

these elements were proven, in the present matter, they remain

unproven, and the allegations against the appellant stand without

sufficient evidence.

Moving on to the concept of standard of legal proof, the well

entrenched principle of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is

presumed to be innocent and, therefore, the burden lies on the

prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable

doubt is required to be considered here.

In Sujit Biswas vs. State of Assam: : (2013) 12 SCC

406, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:

"The reiteration of the golden principle runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases has been done. It has further been held that suspicion, however grave, cannot take the place of proof and the prosecution cannot afford to rest its case in the realm of "may be" true but has to upgrade it in the domain of "must be" true in order to steer clear of any possible surmises or conjectures. Thus, on the material on record when judged on the touch stone of

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legal principles adumbrated hereinabove, leave no manner of doubt that the prosecution, in the instant case, has failed to prove unequivocally, the demand of illegal gratification."

The sum and substance of the above reasoning go to show

that there is no acceptable or clinching evidence proving that

appellant, with dishonest intention, committed any acts and

obtained any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage.

In view of foregoing discussion, the appeal is allowed. The

impugned judgment dated 03.02.2020 passed by learned Special

Judge, Sessions Court (Prevention of Corruption Act Cases),

Udaipur, in Sessions Case No.58/2014 is set aside and the

accused-appellant is acquitted of the offence under Section 7 of

the PC Act. Appellant is on bail, therefore, his bail bonds are

discharged.

Keeping in view, however, the provisions of Section 437-A