Arihant Market Organization vs Prakash Suthar (2025:Rj-Jd:11133)
2025 Latest Caselaw 7876 Raj

Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 7876 Raj
Judgement Date : 25 February, 2025

Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

Arihant Market Organization vs Prakash Suthar (2025:Rj-Jd:11133) on 25 February, 2025

Author: Manoj Kumar Garg

Bench: Manoj Kumar Garg

[2025:RJ-JD:11133]

      HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                       JODHPUR
               S.B. Crml Leave To Appeal No. 227/2024

Arihant Market Organization, Through Its Proprietor Rajat Jain
S/o Late Shri Mangi Lal R/o Shanti Nagar, Sirohi,teh And Dist
Sirohi.
                                                                   ----Appellant
                                    Versus
Prakash Suthar S/o Jhala Ram Ji, R/o Village And Post Ud, Ps
Barloot, Dist Sirohi, Raj.
                                                                 ----Respondent


For Appellant(s)          :     Mr. Deepak Menaria
For Respondent(s)         :     Mr. Sikander Khan



          HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR GARG

Order

25/02/2025

Instant criminal leave to appeal has been filed by the

appellant-complainant under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C. against the

acquittal of the accused-respondent from offence under Section

138 of NI Act vide judgment dated 09.04.2024 passed by learned

Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sirohi in Regular Cr. Case No.779/2018.

Brief facts of the case are that for a legally enforceable debt,

accused-respondent had given a cheque of Rs.4,34,700/- of his

banker to the appellant, which was presented in the Bank and was

returned with an endorsement of "insufficient fund". Thereafter,

the appellant sent a legal notice to the accused-respondent, which

was duly served upon him. Despite service of legal notice, the

accused-respondent did not pay the amount. Hence, the appellant

filed complaint under Section 138 of NI Act before the trial court.

[2025:RJ-JD:11133] (2 of 5) [CRLLA-227/2024]

On the complaint, the trial court took cognizance against the

accused-respondent under Section 138 of NI Act and thereafter

framed charge against him.

In support of the complaint, the appellant examined herself

as PW-1 and exhibited various documents. Thereafter, statement

of accused respondent was recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C.

Upon conclusion of the trial, the learned trial court vide

impugned judgment dated 09.04.2024 acquitted the accused-

respondent from offence under Section 138 of NI Act. Hence, this

criminal leave to appeal.

Learned counsel for the appellant-complainant submits that

the learned trial court has committed grave error in acquitting the

accused-respondent for offence under Section 138 of NI Act. While

passing the impugned judgment, the learned trial court did not

consider the fact that the signature on the cheque was not denied

by the accused-respondent and therefore, offence under 138 of NI

Act is made out against the accused-respondent. The appellant by

producing oral and documentary evidence has proved the burden

that the cheque in question was given to him by the accused-

respondent against the legal liability of borrowed money. But the

learned trial court without appreciating the evidence in proper

manner, acquitted the accused-respondent. Thus, the impugned

judgment being per se illegal deserves to be quashed and set

aside and the accused-respondent No.2 ought to have been

convicted and sentenced for offence under Section 138 of NI Act.

Learned counsel for respondent has vehemently opposed the

prayer made by the counsel for the petitioner and submitted that

the cheque was issued in the year 2017 in the name of Firm

[2025:RJ-JD:11133] (3 of 5) [CRLLA-227/2024]

Arihant Market Organization and the said firm was closed in the

year 2015. Since, the Firm was closed in the year 2015, therefore,

the petitioner cannot file a complaint being proprietor of the said

closed firm in the year 2017 and the same is against the legal

provisions. The learned trial court has considered each and every

aspect of the matter and has rightly acquitted the accused-

respondent. The order of acquittal is just and proper and

therefore, no interference is required.

Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

evidence of the prosecution as well as defence and the judgment

passed by the trial.

On perusal of the impugned judgment, it appears that the

complaint was filed by the petitioner against the respondent being

the proprietor of Firm Arihant Market Organization and the said

firm was closed way back in the year 2015. The petitioner did not

produce any documents in respect of the said firm before the trial

court. The cheque in dispute was issued in year 2017. As the firm

was not in existence since 2015, the petitioner cannot file a

complaint being proprietor of the said closed firm in the year

2017, which is against the law.

The learned trial court while passing the impugned judgment

has considered each and every aspect of the matter and also

considered the evidence produced before it in its right perspective.

The prosecution has failed to prove its case against the accused-

respondent beyond all reasonable doubts and thus, the trial court

has rightly acquitted the accused-respondent from offence under

Section 138 of NI Act.

[2025:RJ-JD:11133] (4 of 5) [CRLLA-227/2024]

In the case of 'Mrinal Das & others v. The State of

Tripura, :2011(9) SCC 479,' decided on September 5, 2011, the

Hon'ble Supreme Court, after looking into many earlier

judgments, has laid down parameters, in which interference can

be made in a judgment of acquittal, by observing as under:

"An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are "compelling and substantial reasons",for doing so. If the order is "clearly unreasonable", it is a compelling reason for interference. When the trial Court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declaration/report of ballistic experts etc.,the appellate court is competent to reverse the decision of the trial Court depending on the materials placed.

Similarly, in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Shera Ram

alias Vishnu Dutta, reported (2012) 1 SCC 602,' the Hon'ble

Supreme Court has observed as under:--

"A judgment of acquittal has the obvious consequence of granting freedom to the accused. This Court has taken a consistent view that unless the judgment in appeal is contrary to evidence, palpably erroneous or a view which could not have been taken by the court of competent jurisdiction keeping in view the settled canons of criminal jurisprudence, this Court shall be reluctant to interfere with such judgment of acquittal."

There is a very thin but a fine distinction between an appeal

against conviction on the one hand and acquittal on the other. The

preponderance of judicial opinion is that there is no substantial

difference between an appeal against acquittal except that while

dealing with an appeal against acquittal the Court keeps in view

the position that the presumption of innocence in favour of the

accused has been fortified by his acquittal and if the view adopted

by the trial Court is a reasonable one and the conclusion reached

[2025:RJ-JD:11133] (5 of 5) [CRLLA-227/2024]

by it had grounds well set out on the materials on record, the

acquittal may not be interfered with.

In the light of aforesaid discussion, the appellant has failed