Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Iqbal Singh vs Inderjeet Singh And Ors. ... on 20 February, 2025
Author: Birendra Kumar
Bench: Birendra Kumar
[2025:RJ-JD:10162]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 12/2017
Iqbal Singh S/o Shri Hardayal Singh, R/o Ajeetgill, Block
Kotakpura, Tehsil Jaito, District Faridkot Punjab
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Inderjeet Singh S/o Shri Gurudayal Singh, R/o Chak
Dharam Singh Wala Post Office, Riko, Tehsil Sadulshahar,
District Shriganganagar
2. Balkaran Singh S/o Shri Gajaan Singh, R/o Chak Dharam
Singh Wala Post Office, Riko, Tehsil Sadulshahar, District
Shriganganagar
3. Jaskaran Singh S/o Shri Gajaan Singh, R/o Chak Dharam
Singh Wala Post Office, Riko, Tehsil Sadulshahar, District
Shriganganagar
4. Gursaran Kaur W/o Late Shri Gurcharan Singh, R/o
Ajeetgill, Block Kotakpura, Tehsil Jaito, District Faridkot
Punjab
5. Rajveer Inder Singh S/o Shir Gurcharan Singh, R/o
Ajeetgill, Block Kotakpura, Tehsil Jaito, District Faridkot
Punjab
6. Resham Singh S/o Shri Gajaan Singh S/o Shri Gurdayal
Singh, R/o Dharam Singh Wala, Tehsil Sadulshahar,
District Shriganganagar
7. Sukhcharan Singh S/o Shri Gajaan Singh S/o Shri
Gurdayal Singh, R/o Dharam Singh Wala, Tehsil
Sadulshahar, District Shriganganagar
8. Sukhpal Singh S/o Shri Gajaan Singh S/o Shri Gurdayal
Singh, R/o Dharam Singh Wala, Tehsil Sadulshahar,
District Shriganganagar
9. Teejkaur W/o Shri Gajaan Singh S/o Shri Gurdayal Singh,
R/o Dharam Singh Wala, Tehsil Sadulshahar, District
Shriganganagar
10 Harbansh Kaur D/o Shri Gajaan Singh W/o Shri Gurmale
Singh, R/o Jodhpur, Tehsil Malot, District Punjab
11. Paramjeet Kaur D/o Shri Gajaan Singh W/o Shri Manjeet
Singh, R/o Chibadawali, Tehsil And District Muktsar
Punjab.
----Respondents
(Downloaded on 27/02/2025 at 09:16:50 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:10162] (2 of 9) [CR-12/2017]
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Sushil Bishnoi.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. B.S. Sandhu.
Mr. Chirag Kalani.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BIRENDRA KUMAR
Order
Reserved On : 17.01.2025
Pronounced On : 20.02.2025
1. The petitioner is aggrieved by refusal of prayer to reject the
plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The impugned order was
passed on 27.8.2016 in Civil Suit No. 23/2014 brought by
plaintiffs/respondent nos. 1 to 3 against the petitioner and
proforma respondents. The challenge was/is on the ground that
the plaintiffs have no real cause of action, rather illusionary cause
of action is stated in the plaint and the plaint is hopelessly barred
by limitation.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the plaintiffs/
respondents have brought the suit for specific performance of oral
contract dated 30.4.1978 and the suit was filed on 2.11.2014.
There is no acceptable explanation for such a delay. Moreover, it is
frivolous to claim oral agreement to sale so old that many of the
person present on the date of agreement already left the world.
3. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents contend that
the parties were so closely related having strong faith on each
other that the transaction took place on oral assurance that in
future when it would be required, a sale deed would be executed.
4. The legal position is well settled, in the matter of
consideration of prayer under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, by a catena
[2025:RJ-JD:10162] (3 of 9) [CR-12/2017]
of decision. The petitioner has relied on the judgment of Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Dahiben Vs. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali
(Gajra)(D) the LRS & Ors. reported in (2020) 7 SCC 366. In
para 12 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as
follows:-
"The remedy under Order VII Rule 11 is an
independent and special remedy, wherein the Court is
empowered to summarily dismiss a suit at the
threshold, without proceeding to record evidence,
and conducting a trial, on the basis of the evidence
adduced, if it is satisfied that the action should be
terminated on any of the grounds contained in this
provision.
The underlying object of Order VII Rule 11 (a)
is that if in a suit, no cause of action is disclosed, or
the suit is barred by limitation under Rule 11 (d), the
Court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily
protract the proceedings in the suit. In such a case, it
would be necessary to put an end to the sham
litigation, so that further judicial time is not wasted.
In Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi this Court held
that the whole purpose of conferment of powers
under this provision is to ensure that a litigation
which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive,
should not be permitted to waste judicial time of the
court, in the following words:
"12. ...The whole purpose of conferment of such
power is to ensure that a litigation which is
meaningless, and bound to prove abortive
should not be permitted to occupy the time of
the Court, and exercise the mind of the
respondent. The sword of Damocles need not be
kept hanging over his head unnecessarily
without point or purpose. Even if an ordinary
civil litigation, the Court readily exercises the
power to reject a plaint, if it does not disclose
any cause of action."
12.2 The power conferred on the court to terminate a
civil action is, however, a drastic one, and the
conditions enumerated in Order VII Rule 11 are
required to be strictly adhered to.
[2025:RJ-JD:10162] (4 of 9) [CR-12/2017]
12.3 Under Order VII Rule 11, a duty is cast on the
Court to determine whether the plaint discloses a
cause of action by scrutinizing the averments in the
plaint, read in conjunction with the documents relied
upon, or whether the suit is barred by any law.
12.4 Order VII Rule 14(1) provides for production of
documents, on which the plaintiff places reliance in his
suit, which reads as under :
"Order 7 Rule 14: Production of document
on which plaintiff sues or relies.-
(1) Where a plaintiff sues upon a document or
relies upon document in his possession or
power in support of his claim, he shall enter
such documents in a list, and shall produce it in
Court when the plaint is presented by him and
shall, at the same time deliver the document
and a copy thereof, to be filed with the plaint.
(2) Where any such document is not in the
possession or power of the plaintiff, he shall,
wherever possible, state in whose possession or
power it is.
(3) A document which ought to be produced in
Court by the plaintiff when the plaint is
presented, or to be entered in the list to be
added or annexed to the plaint but is not
produced or entered accordingly, shall not,
without the leave of the Court, be received in
evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the
suit.
(4) Nothing in this rule shall apply to document
produced for the cross examination of the
plaintiff's witnesses, or, handed over to a
witness merely to refresh his memory."
(emphasis supplied)
Having regard to Order VII Rule 14 CPC, the
documents filed alongwith the plaint, are required to
be taken into consideration for deciding the
application under Order VII Rule 11 (a). When a
document referred to in the plaint, forms the basis of
the plaint, it should be treated as a part of the plaint.
12.5 In exercise of power under this provision, the
Court would determine if the assertions made in the
plaint are contrary to statutory law, or judicial dicta,
[2025:RJ-JD:10162] (5 of 9) [CR-12/2017]
for deciding whether a case for rejecting the plaint at
the threshold is made out.
12.6 At this stage, the pleas taken by the defendant
in the written statement and application for rejection
of the plaint on the merits, would be irrelevant, and
cannot be adverted to, or taken into consideration.
12.7 The test for exercising the power under Order
VII Rule 11 is that if the averments made in the
plaint are taken in entirety, in conjunction with the
documents relied upon, would the same result in a
decree being passed. This test was laid down in
Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V.Sea
Success I & Anr., [(2004) 9 SCC 512] which reads
as :
"139. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of
action or not is essentially a question of fact.
But whether it does or does not must be
found out from reading the plaint itself. For
the said purpose, the averments made in
the plaint in their entirety must be held to
be correct. The test is as to whether if the
averments made in the plaint are taken to
be correct in their entirety, a decree would
be passed."
In Hardesh Ores (P.) Ltd. v. Hede & Co. [(2007) 5
SCC 614] the Court further held that it is not
permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage, and
to read it in isolation. It is the substance, and not
merely the form, which has to be looked into. The
plaint has to be construed as it stands, without
addition or subtraction of words. If the allegations in
the plaint prima facie show a cause of action, the
court cannot embark upon an enquiry whether the
allegations are true in fact [(D.Ramachandran v. R.V.
Janakiraman, {(1999) 3 SCC 267}].
12.8 If on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it is
found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and
without any merit, and does not disclose a right to
sue, the court would be justified in exercising the
power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
12.9 The power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC may be
exercised by the Court at any stage of the suit,
either before registering the plaint, or after issuing
summons to the defendant, or before conclusion of
[2025:RJ-JD:10162] (6 of 9) [CR-12/2017]
the trial, as held by this Court in the judgment of
Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra [(2003) 1 SCC
557]. The plea that once issues are framed, the
matter must necessarily go to trial was repelled by
this Court in Azhar Hussain.
12.10 The provision of Order VII Rule 11 is
mandatory in nature. It states that the plaint "shall"
be rejected if any of the grounds specified in clause
(a) to (e) are made out. If the Court finds that the
plaint does not disclose a cause of action, or that the
suit is barred by any law, the Court has no option,
but to reject the plaint."
5. Before considering the averment in the plaint, it would be
apt to go through the relationship between the parties. One
Gurdayal Singh had two sons, Inderjeet Singh (plaintiff no. 1) and
Late Gajaan Singh (who is represented by plaintiff no. 2 Balkaran
Singh and plaintiff no. 3 Jaskaran Singh). Late Gurdayal Singh had
a daughter Ajmer Kaur who was married to Hardayal Singh,
Hardayal Singh had two sons Iqbal Singh (defendant no. 1 of the
suit who is petitioner herein) and Late Gurcharan Singh. The legal
heirs of Late Gurcharan Singh and Gajaan Singh are proforma
respondents.
6. The case of the plaintiffs, as disclosed in the plaint, is that
Hardayal Singh the husband of Ajmer Kaur had very good
relationship with plaintiff no. 1 and his deceased brother. In
Village- Dharam Singh Wala Ki Rohi, Chak No. 14, BNW, Pillar No.
5/134, Murabba No. 34, Khasra No. 1 to 23, area 5.313 acre, an
agricultural land, was purchased in the year 1973-74 by
Gurcharan Singh. The residential Village of the defendant is in
Village Ajeetgilli Block Kotakpura, District Faridkot, Punjab. The
defendants wanted to settle in their native Village at Punjab and
they were also willing to purchase property in their native village
[2025:RJ-JD:10162] (7 of 9) [CR-12/2017]
after selling out the suit property. The plaintiffs were already
settled in the Village where suit property was there as such agreed
to purchase the suit property. Accordingly on 30.4.1978 oral
agreement between the parties took place on total consideration
money of Rs.95,000/-.
7. The aforesaid consideration money was paid to Iqbal Singh
as well as Gurcharan Singh to the proportion of their respective
share. As per oral agreement, the share of Gurcharan Singh was
to be purchased by plaintiff Inderjeet Singh and share of Iqbal
Singh was to be purchased by Gajaan Singh. Late Gajaan Singh
was maintaining a personal diary as he was a literate person and
in the said diary there is entry of the deal between the parties
dated 30.4.1978 as well as receipt of consideration money by
defendant Iqbal Singh which is in the writing of Iqbal Singh and
signed by Iqbal Singh. On 28.5.1978, Hardayal Singh the father of
Iqbal Singh had taken the consideration share of Gurcharan Singh.
Since the parties were so intimate and incordial relationship that
they did not take much care of getting the agreement reduced to
writing. Soon after receipt of the consideration money, the
defendants purchased immovable property in their Village which
the plaintiff asserts to prove by production of their registered sale
deed. The remaining consideration money was received by
defendant lastly on 3.3.1985. The plaintiffs further asserted that
when the market value of the land increased the defendant
became greedy and started showing gesture of not complying with
the agreement. On 13.4.2013, a Village Panchayat was convened
but the defendant refused to accept the request of the Panchayat
and started threatening for forceful dispossession of the plaintiffs
[2025:RJ-JD:10162] (8 of 9) [CR-12/2017]
from the suit property. A proceeding before the Revenue Court
started between the parties for temporary injunction, the prayer
for injunction was refused on 20.4.2014. Then the plaintiffs were
convinced that the defendants are not going to comply with the
agreement to sale. Consequently, the suit was filed on 2.11.2014.
8. On a careful consideration of the averments in the plaint, it
cannot be said that the plaintiffs had no cause of action and the
suit is result of clever drafting of the plaint disclosing a case of
illusionary cause of action. Since, no time limit was fixed for the
performance of the contract, the suit was filed when the plaintiffs
had notice of non compliance of the agreement as such the suit
was well within time under Article 54 of the Limitation Act.
9. An oral agreement to sale of immovable property is not
barred under the law, rather hard to prove which would be subject
matter of the trial. The relationship between the parties and their
intimacy goes to show that there was reason to go by oral
agreement to sale. Just to respect the relationship between the
parties as well as to dispel any chances of subject on the
trustworthiness of the defendant, the parties might have agreed to
go by oral agreement. Other attending circumstances pleaded in
the plaint that in pursuance of oral agreement, consideration
money was received by defendant Iqbal Singh on his behalf as
well as on behalf of Gurcharan Singh, which is maintained in the
routine diary of Late Gajaan Singh. Coupled with the fact that
soon after receipt of consideration money, defendants purchased
immovable property in their native village in Punjab goes to show
that the suit was not having an imaginary cause of action or
[2025:RJ-JD:10162] (9 of 9) [CR-12/2017]
having no leg to stand in the trial, therefore, this is not a case
wherein a fair dispute should not be allowed to be adjudicated.
10. The petitioner has further relied on the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust & Ors.
Vs. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj
Bhonsle & Anr. in Civil Appeal No. 14807/2024, wherein the
Hon'ble Supreme Court stated that a plaint can be rejected at the
threshold under Order VII Rule 11 (d) CPC, if it is evident from the
statement in the plaint that the suit is barred by any law including
limitation. As noticed above, in the case on hand, the plaint was
not barred by limitation as no time limit was fixed for performance
of the contract and the plaintiff has stated the date of accrual of
cause of action. The suit was within time under Section 54 of the
Limitation Act from the date of notice of refusal to perform.
11. Consequently, there is no reason to interfere with the
impugned order. Hence, the Civil Revision stands dismissed as
devoid of any merit.
(BIRENDRA KUMAR),J
273-supll. sumer/-
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