State vs Rajaram @ Raju (2025:Rj-Jd:35730-Db)
2025 Latest Caselaw 6065 Raj

Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

State vs Rajaram @ Raju (2025:Rj-Jd:35730-Db) on 11 August, 2025

Author: Manoj Kumar Garg

Bench: Manoj Kumar Garg

[2025:RJ-JD:35730-DB]



      HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                       JODHPUR
                 D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 1068/2003

State of Rajasthan
                                                                      ----Appellant
                                        Versus
Rajaram @ Raju S/o Shri Khanu ram, by caste Vishnoi, R/o
Nokhda, P.s. Gajner, Tehsil Phalodi, District Jodhpur (Raj.)
                                                                    ----Respondent


For Appellant(s)             :     Mr. Prem Singh Panwar, PP
For Respondent(s)            :     Mr. Pritam Solanki


         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR GARG
              HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVI CHIRANIA

                                    Judgment

11/08/2025
BY THE COURT (PER HON'BLE MANOJ KUMAR, J.)

The appellant State has filed the present criminal appeal

being aggrieved by the judgment dt. 06.01.2003 passed by the

learned Additional Sessions Judge (FT), Bikaner in Sessions Case

No. 142/2001 whereby, the trial court acquitted the respondent

from offence under Section 302 IPC.

Brief facts of the case are that on 13.02.1998 at 12:15 P.M.

complainant Harphool, submitted a written report at P.S. Gajner to

the effect that between him and Budhram an enmity existed for

bus route for last few months. It was alleged that he was driving

the bus no. RJ-07-P-1668 with conductor Ramesh Kumar. They

started from Naachna to Bikaner in the morning. When they

reached Bajju at 10:10 A.M. a bus no. RRF-3270 was parked at

the bus stand. He asked the driver of said Bus to depart, as the

[2025:RJ-JD:35730-DB] (2 of 9) [CRLA-1068/2003]

time was over. Madan lal started the bus but instead of taking

Kolayat bypass route, he came to Techri Fanta. It was alleged that

Madan lal stopped the bus about 10 km from the Kolayat towards

Bikaner. He came out and broke the glass of driver side. At that

time two buses numbered RJ-13 P-1150 and RJ-07-P-0631 driven

by Raju and Om Parkash, respectively arrived. The conductor of

bus No. RJ-07-P-0631-Subhash came to his rescue but Madan lal

inflicted a lathi blow to Subhash. He fell down and Raju started his

bus and ran over Subhash. It was thus alleged that Subhash was

murdered by respondent Raja Ram @ Raju.

On this report, an FIR was lodged and investigation

commenced. The police filed chargesheet against the respondent

accused for offence under Section 302 IPC. The case was

committed to the court of Additional Sessions Judge (FT), Bikaner

where charges were framed against the respondent for offence

under Section 302 IPC.

The prosecution in support of its case examined eleven

witnesses and various documents were exhibited. The statement

of accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. were recorded who pleaded

not guilty. In defence, five documents were exhibited.

After conclusion of trial, the trial court acquitted the

respondent from offence mentioned above vide judgment dated

06.01.2003, as the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond

reasonable doubt.

Learned Public Prosecutor argued that the Court below

without going through the entire record and evidence acquitted

[2025:RJ-JD:35730-DB] (3 of 9) [CRLA-1068/2003]

the respondent on the basis of minor contradictions. It is argued

that it was the specific case of prosecution that some quarrel took

place among the bus drivers, then Madan lal inflicted lathi blow on

Subhash who fell down. At that time the accused respondent ran

over the bus and killed him. The complainant injured Harphool has

specifically stated that Raju asked Madan lal to give beating and

kill Subhash. Thus, the evidence of eye witness could not have

been disbelieved unless there is contrary to prove otherwise. He,

therefore, contends that the guilt of the accused stands

established beyond doubt and thus, the present appeal may be

allowed and the accused respondent may be convicted and

sentenced appropriately.

Per contra, counsel for the accused/respondent contends that

the allegations are unsubstantiated by any corroborative evidence.

It is argued that all the eye witnesses Chhotu Khan, Om Prakash

and Bagra Ram have stated that the act was not deliberate and

intentional on the part of accused respondent. In fact, Subhash

had attacked accused respondent and in order to save himself, the

accused tried to drive the bus away but Subhash fell down and

bus ran over him. It is submitted that the prosecution has failed to

prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, the learned

Trial Court has rightly acquitted the accused-respondent from

offence under Section 302 IPC.

We have heard the counsels for the parties and gone through

the record.

In the present case, the allegation against the accused

[2025:RJ-JD:35730-DB] (4 of 9) [CRLA-1068/2003]

respondent is that he deliberately ran over the deceased,

Subhash, with his vehicle, resulting in his death. The witnesses

PW/1-Harphool, PW/7-Ilias, PW/4-Magha Ram, PW/3-Ramesh

Kumar, PW/5-Asha Ram, and PW/8-Kishore Singh appear to have

supported the version of the prosecution; however, the

independent witnesses PW/2- Chhotu Khan and PW/6- Bagra Ram

turned hostile. Based on the analysis of the testimonies of PW/1-

Harphool, PW/4-Magha Ram, PW/5-Asha Ram, and PW/7-Ilias, it

is evident that the front driver-side tyre of the bus RJ 13-P-1150,

driven by the accused Raju, ran over the head of the deceased.

However, trial court observed that the credibility of the

prosecution witnesses' assertion, that the front driver-side tyre of

bus ran over the head of Subhash is highly questionable. This

skepticism is primarily because no bloodstains have been found on

the front driver-side tyre of the vehicle, also, seizure report as

Exhibit-12 mentioned that there was blood stain on the inside of

the driver's side rear tyre. In the cross-examination, the

investigator P.W. 11 Dileep Singh admitted that apart from the

blood stains on the rear inner side tyre of the driver side of the

bus RJ 13-P-1150, no blood was seen anywhere else on the bus.

Additionally, it is also mentioned in Exhibit-P-10 and 15 that there

is a blood stain on the inner side of the rear tyre of the driver's

side of the bus. The front tyre of the driver's side of the bus has

not been seized and no stain has been found on it.

Thus, from the above analysis of Exhibit-P-10, Exhibit-P-12

and Exhibit-P-15, it appears that there was no blood on the

driver's side front tyre of bus RJ 13-P-1150, rather there was

[2025:RJ-JD:35730-DB] (5 of 9) [CRLA-1068/2003]

blood on the driver's side rear tyre. In view of this fact, the

statement of prosecution witnesses PW/1-Harphool, PW/7-Ilias,

PW/4-Magha Ram, PW/3-Ramesh Kumar, PW/5-Asha Ram that

accused Rajaram started the bus RJ 13 P-1150 and drove driver's

side front tyre over the head of deceased Subhash, due to which

Subhash died, proved to be completely false.

On the contrary, upon meticulous consideration of the

version of defence, it is observed that his statement is

substantially corroborated by the prosecution evidence. This

alignment between the accused's account and the tangible

evidence obtained through investigation lends credence to his

assertions and reinforces the reliability of the evidentiary

framework. Such consistency underscores the importance of

the corroborative material in establishing the veracity of the

accused's narrative, thereby bearing significant weight in the

overall assessment of the case. The relevant version of accused

respondent recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. reads as under:-

?kVuk okys fnu ?kVuk LFky ij eSa cl ysdj igqpk rc esjs HkkbZ enu dh cl dks gjQwy o lqHkk'k ?ksjs gq, [kM+s FksA eSaus viuh cl esa cSBs gq, gh iwNk fd D;k ckr gS] rc lqHkk'k ydM+h ysdj esjh cl dh rjQ vk;k vkSj eq>s ekjus dh dksf"k"k dhA eSaus viuk MªkbZoj lkbZM dk "kh"kk Åij dj fy;k rc lqHkk'k us ydM+h ls MªkbZoj lkbZM dk "kh"kk rksM+ fn;kA ml le; gjQwy] jes"k esjs cl ds QkVd dh rjQ ls vk, vkSj cl ds vanj ?kqlus dh dksf"k"k dhA rc d.MsDVj vkse izdk"k us QkVd vanj ls can dj fn;kA mUgksaus QkVd dk gRFkk rksM+ fn;kA lqHkk'k MªkbZoj lkbM ds njoktk ds vanj ls vkus dh dksf"k"k dh rks eSaus viuh tku cpkus ds fy, cl dks Hkxkuk pkgkA lqHkk'k QkVd idM+dj yVd x;kA pw¡fd lM+d ij gjQwy vkSj lqHkk'k dh clsa [kM+h Fkh blfy, eSaus viuh cl dks lM++d ls uhps

[2025:RJ-JD:35730-DB] (6 of 9) [CRLA-1068/2003]

mrkjdj Hkxkus dh dksf"k"k dhA lqHkk'k us LVsfjax idM+us dh dksf"k"k dhA esjh cl bl nkSjku dPps jkLrs ij vk xbZ tks mcM+ [kkcM+ FkkA lqHkk'k dk gkFk NwV x;k vkSj og cl ds MªkbZoj lkbZM ds ihNs okys pDds ds uhps vkdj dqpy x;kA eSaus lqHkk'k dh gR;k ugha dh gSA

This Court opines that in the realm of criminal jurisprudence,

the credibility and probative value of evidence are fundamental to

establishing the veracity of the allegations and the guilt of the

accused. The "prosecution story," being an elaboration

constructed by the prosecution through a combination of

circumstantial and documentary evidence, is inherently

susceptible to embellishment, misinterpretation, or bias. Its

reliability diminishes when it is not corroborated by independent,

tangible evidence. In contrast, the "accused version", especially

when corroborated by tangible prosecution evidence, assumes a

more significant and relevant role than the prosecution story. This

is grounded in the principles of directness, consistency, and the

pursuit of truth, which collectively underpin the integrity of judicial

proceedings and the accurate determination of guilt or innocence.

In the present case from the evidence on record so also

finding arrived by the learned trial court, it appears that the court

below came to the conclusion by way of detailed and speaking

order that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges against

the accused respondent beyond reasonable doubt.

The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Madhya

Pradesh vs. Phoolchand Rathore reported in 2023 CriLR 724,

while observing that courts are generally reluctant to interfere

with an order of acquittal, recognized that such interference is

[2025:RJ-JD:35730-DB] (7 of 9) [CRLA-1068/2003]

warranted when it becomes evident that the acquittal was based

on an entirely flawed reasoning process, legally erroneous, and

involved a perverse approach to the facts of the case. In such

circumstances, where the order of acquittal has led to a grave and

substantial miscarriage of justice, the Court may reverse the

acquittal and convert it into a conviction. In support of this

principle, the Court relied upon its prior judgments, emphasizing

the exceptional nature of such interference to rectify substantial

errors in the acquittal order. these are:-

21. In State of M.P. & Others v. Paltan Mallah & Others, (2005) 3 SCC 169, reiterating the same view it was observed:

"8. ... This being an appeal against acquittal, this Court would be slow in interfering with the findings of the High Court, unless there is perverse appreciation of the evidence which resulted in serious miscarriage of justice and if the High Court has taken a plausible view this Court would not be justified in interfering with the acquittal passed in favour of the accused and if two views are possible and the High Court had chosen one view which is just and reasonable, then also this Court would be reluctant to interfere with the judgment of the High Court."

22. In a recent decision rendered by this Court in Basheera Begam v. Mohd. Ibrahim & Others, (2020) 11 SCC 174, it was observed:

"190. ... Reversal of a judgment and order of conviction and acquittal of the accused should not ordinarily be interfered with unless such reversal/acquittal is vitiated by perversity. In other words, the court might reverse an order of acquittal if

[2025:RJ-JD:35730-DB] (8 of 9) [CRLA-1068/2003]

the court finds that no person properly instructed in law could have upon analysis of the evidence on record found the accused to be "not guilty". ..."

In the case of State of State of Uttrakhand Vs. Sanjay

Ram Tamta, reported (2025) 2 SCC (Cri.) 159,' the Hon'ble

Supreme Court has observed as under:--

"6. Trite is the principle that the appellate courts would be slow in reversing an order of acquittal, especially since the presumption of innocence that is always available to the accused; as a basic principle of criminal jurisprudence, stands reinforced and reaffirmed by the acquittal and unless there are very substantive and compelling reasons to do so, there cannot be a reversal of an order of acquittal. Unless it is found that the findings are perverse and the only conclusion possible from the compelling evidence is of guilt; appellate courts will be slow to reverse an order of acquittal.

7. Recently, in Surender Singh Vs. State of Uttrakhand, one of us (B.R. Gavai, J.) referring to various binding precedents of this Court succinctly laid down the principle in the following manner in SCC para 24:

24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record."

[2025:RJ-JD:35730-DB] (9 of 9) [CRLA-1068/2003]

There is a very thin but a fine distinction between an appeal/

revision against conviction on the one hand and acquittal on the

other. The preponderance of judicial opinion is that there is no

substantial difference between an appeal/revision against acquittal

except that while dealing with an appeal/revision against acquittal

the Court keeps in view the position that the presumption of

innocence in favour of the accused has been fortified by his

acquittal and if the view adopted by the trial Court is a reasonable

one and the conclusion reached by it had grounds well set out on

the materials on record, the acquittal may not be interfered with.

In the light of aforesaid discussion, the State has failed to

show any error of law or on facts on the basis of which

interference can be made by this Court in the judgment under

challenge. The order passed by the learned trial court is detailed

and reasoned order and the same does not warrant any

interference from this Court.

In the facts and circumstances of the case, the present

criminal appeal has no substance and the same is hereby

dismissed.

Record of the trial court be sent back forthwith.

                                   (RAVI CHIRANIA),J                                   (MANOJ KUMAR GARG),J
                                   27-BJSH/-









Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)