State vs Smt.Alol Kanwar ...
2025 Latest Caselaw 5828 Raj

Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

State vs Smt.Alol Kanwar ... on 7 August, 2025

Author: Manoj Kumar Garg

Bench: Manoj Kumar Garg

[2025:RJ-JD:35007-DB]

      HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                       JODHPUR
                  D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 636/2009

State of Rajasthan
                                                                         ----Appellant
                                       Versus
Smt. Alol Kanwar W/o Shri Udai Singh, by caste Rajput, R/o
Chokedi, P.S. Amet, District Rajsamand.
                                                                       ----Respondent


For Appellant(s)             :      Mr. Vikram Singh Rajpurohit, PP
For Respondent(s)            :      Mr. Chakravarti Singh Rathore with
                                    Mr. Bajrang Singh



         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR GARG

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVI CHIRANIA

Judgement

Per Hon'ble Mr. Manoj Kumar Garg, J.

07/08/2025

Instant criminal appeal has been filed by the State against

the judgment dated 05.03.2009, passed by learned Additional

Sessions Judge (Fast Track), Rajsamand, in Sessions Case

No.39/2008, whereby the learned trial court acquitted the

accused-respondent from the offences punishable under Sections

498-A, 304-B and 302 IPC.

Brief facts necessary to be noted for deciding the controversy

are that on 12.06.2008, complainant-Sajjan Singh gave a written

report at C.H.C., Amet to the effect that his daughter-Antar Kuwar

was married to Maan Singh about six years ago. Out of their

wedlock two children were born. After the marriage, accused

respondent, mother-in-law of the deceased, mentally and

physically harassed her. It was stated submitted by the

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complainant that about five months ago, his daughter came to her

parental house and on 10.06.2008, his son-in-law Maan Singh

alongwith some other family members visited his house for taking

Antar Kanwar back to her matrimonial home and they also

assured that in future they will not harass her. Upon which, the

complainant sent his daughter with them. On 12.06.2008 at about

1:00 p.m., complainant received a telephonic information that his

daughter- Antar Kunwar got burned and admitted in Amet

Hospital. On this information, complainant alongwith Lal Singh,

Pappu Singh, Gopal Singh went to the hospital, where Antar

Kunwar told the complainant that her mother-in-law Alok Kunwar

(accused respondent) poured kerosene oil on her and lit fire with

the intention to kill her and due to which she received burn

injuries.

On the aforesaid complaint, Police registered the case

against the accused-respondent for offence under Sections 307,

498-A and 323 IPC. Thereafter on 21.06.2008 Antar Kunwar died

and the Police added offence under Section 302 IPC and started

investigation. On completion of investigation, Police filed challan

against the accused respondents for offence under Sections 498-

A, 304-B and 302 of IPC.

Thereafter, learned Trial Court framed, read over and

explained the charges for the offence under Sections 498-A, 304-B

and 302 IPC to the accused respondent. She denied the charge

and sought trial.

During the course of trial, the prosecution examined as many

as twenty-one witnesses and also got exhibited relevant

documents in support of its case.

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The accused-respondent was examined under Section 313

Cr.P.C. and in defence, certain documents were exhibited and also

examined one witness as DW/1 Maan Singh.

Learned trial Court, after hearing the arguments from both

the sides, taking into consideration and appreciating the

documentary evidence and the statements of witnesses, vide

judgment dated 05.03.2009 acquitted the accused-respondent

from offence under Sections 498-A, 304-B and 302 IPC. Hence

this appeal preferred by the State against the acquittal of the

accused-respondent.

Learned Public Prosecutor-Mr. Vikam Singh Rajpurohit has

vehemently submitted that there is a dying declaration before the

learned Magistrate in which the deceased clearly mentioned that

the accused respondent poured kerosene on her and lit fire and

there is no question to disbelieve this dying declaration. He further

submits that the learned trial Court had not appreciated this

material dying declaration. The learned trial Court mentioned that

according to the statement of Dr. Nishit Kumar (PW/10) in his

cross examination, the deceased might have poured kerosene on

her body and lit fire. Doctor further mentioned in his statement

that if anyone else had poured the kerosene, then the person

would have tried to run away, but in this case, deceased did not

try to run away from the place of incident. According to him if

kerosene was poured by someone, then it would be on some part

of the body and not on the whole body, on this erroneous finding,

the learned trial Court has acquitted the accused respondent.

Thus, the impugned judgment of acquittal being per se illegal and

erroneous, deserves to be quashed and set aside.

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Per contra, counsel for the accused-respondent submits that

when the deceased gave dying declaration, at that time family

members of deceased were present and she was tutored by them

before giving her statement. It is further argued that the death

took place after the nine days of the incident; this shows that due

to the negligence on the part of the doctors, Smt. Antar Kunwar

died. It is further argued that the prosecution has also failed to

prove any motive for which the accused-respondent committed

this incident. He further submits that the respondent was aged

about 50 years at the time of incident and now she is aged about

78 years and not keeping good health, as she is suffering from

various old age diseases. The learned trial court has passed a

detailed and reasoned judgment of acquittal after proper

appreciation of evidence available before it, which requires no

interfere from this Court.

We have considered the submissions of the counsel for the

parties made at bar and perused the impugned judgment as well

as record of the case.

The incident took place on 12.06.2008, upon which, the

father of deceased filed a written report before the Police Station

and in pursuance of that report, FIR was registered. As per the

dying declaration, recorded on 12.06.2008 allegation has been

levelled against the accused respondent for pouring kerosene on

her and lighting the fire, but on the contrary, according to the

statement of Dr. Nishit Kumar (PW/10), the way the smell of

kerosene was coming from the clothes of deceased, it cannot be

ruled out that she herself poured kerosene on her and commit

suicide. From the record, it is also found that Antar Kunwar died

[2025:RJ-JD:35007-DB] (5 of 7) [CRLA-636/2009]

on 21.06.2008 i.e. after nine days of the incident and the

prosecution has not established the reason for mental and

physical harassment of deceased. The trial Court while discussing

all these material aspect of the case, acquitted the accused-

respondent. It is also found from the record that the accused-

respondent was aged about 50 years at the time of occurrence

and now her age is 78 years old and she is not having good health

either.

The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Madhya

Pradesh vs. Phoolchand Rathore reported in 2023 CriLR 724,

while observing that courts are generally reluctant to interfere

with an order of acquittal, recognized that such interference is

warranted when it becomes evident that the acquittal was based

on an entirely flawed reasoning process, legally erroneous, and

involved a perverse approach to the facts of the case. In such

circumstances, where the order of acquittal has led to a grave and

substantial miscarriage of justice, the Court may reverse the

acquittal and convert it into a conviction. In support of this

principle, the Court relied upon its prior judgments, emphasizing

the exceptional nature of such interference to rectify substantial

errors in the acquittal order. these are:-

21. In State of M.P. & Others v. Paltan Mallah & Others, (2005) 3 SCC 169, reiterating the same view it was observed:

"8. ... This being an appeal against acquittal, this Court would be slow in interfering with the findings of the High Court, unless there is perverse appreciation of the evidence which resulted in serious miscarriage of justice and if the High Court has taken a plausible view this Court would not be justified in interfering with the acquittal passed in favour of the accused and

[2025:RJ-JD:35007-DB] (6 of 7) [CRLA-636/2009]

if two views are possible and the High Court had chosen one view which is just and reasonable, then also this Court would be reluctant to interfere with the judgment of the High Court."

22. In a recent decision rendered by this Court in Basheera Begam v. Mohd. Ibrahim & Others, (2020) 11 SCC 174, it was observed:

"190. ... Reversal of a judgment and order of conviction and acquittal of the accused should not ordinarily be interfered with unless such reversal/acquittal is vitiated by perversity. In other words, the court might reverse an order of acquittal if the court finds that no person properly instructed in law could have upon analysis of the evidence on record found the accused to be "not guilty". ..."

Similarly in the case of State of State of Uttrakhand Vs. Sanjay

Ram Tamta, reported in (2025) 2 SCC (Cri) 159,' the Hon'ble

Supreme Court has observed as under:--

"6. Trite is the principle that the appellate courts would be slow in reversing an order of acquittal, especially since the presumption of innocence that is always available to the accused; as a basic principle of criminal jurisprudence, stands reinforced and reaffirmed by the acquittal and unless there are very substantive and compelling reasons to do so, there cannot be a reversal of an order of acquittal. Unless it is found that the findings are perverse and the only conclusion possible from the compelling evidence is of guilt; appellate courts will be slow to reverse an order of acquittal.

7. Recently, in Surender Singh Vs. State of Uttrakhand, one of us (B.R. Gavai, J.) referring to various binding precedents of this Court succinctly laid down the principle in the following manner in SCC para 24:

24 It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be

[2025:RJ-JD:35007-DB] (7 of 7) [CRLA-636/2009]

warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record."

In view of the discussion made hereinabove, we are of the

opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against

the accused-respondent for offence under Sections 498-A, 304-B

and 302 IPC beyond all reasonable doubt. The appellant/State has

failed to show any error of law or on facts on the basis of which

interference can be made by this Court in the judgment under

challenge. The judgment passed by the learned trial court is

detailed, reasoned and perfectly justified and the same does not

suffer from any infirmity and does not warrant any interference

from this Court.

With these observations, the present criminal appeal has no

substance and the same is hereby dismissed.

Record of the trial court be sent back forthwith.

                                   (RAVI CHIRANIA),J                                   (MANOJ KUMAR GARG),J
                                    58-Ishan/-









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