Rajasthan High Court
Union Of India vs Jai Singh Meena S/O Shri Durga Prasad ... on 3 January, 2024
Author: Arun Bhansali
Bench: Arun Bhansali, Ashutosh Kumar
[2023:RJ-JP:38713-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 1651/2019
1. Union of India, Through its Secretary, Government of
India, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi-110011
2. Director General, Central Industrial Security Force,
Headquarter, CGO Complex, Lodhi Road, New Delhi-
110003
3. The Inspector General, Central Industrial Security Force,
Office Premises, East Division Headquarter, Boring Road,
Patna (Bihar)-800013 (Now at Ranchi, Jharkhand)
----Appellants
Versus
Jai Singh Meena S/o Shri Durga Prasad Meena, Aged About 30
Years, R/o Village Shishram Kali Dhani, Post Hardiya, Tehsil
Khetri, District Jhunjhunu (Raj.)
----Respondent
For Appellant(s) : Mr. R.D. Rastogi, ASG with
Mr. Ashish Kumar.
Mr. C.S. Sinha.
Mr. Devesh Kumar Bansal.
Mr. Devesh Yadav.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Mahendra Singh Gurjar.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN BHANSALI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHUTOSH KUMAR
Judgment
(Per Hon'ble Mr. Justice Arun Bhansali)
03/01/2024
1. This appeal is directed against the order dated 22.07.2019
passed in SBCWP No.15565/2012 passed by learned Single Judge,
wherein, the writ petition filed by the respondent/petitioner has
been allowed and the petitioner has been ordered to be reinstated
in service. However, it has been ordered that he shall not be
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entitled for actual salary during interregnum period and the same
shall be fixed notionally.
2. The petitioner was offered appointment on the post of
Constable/Driver in CISF on 25.02.2011; on 05.03.2011, he
submitted his attestation form and on 27.03.2011, the petitioner
was appointed as Constable/Driver on temporary basis.
3. The attestation form submitted by the petitioner, at the time
of appointment, was sent to District Magistrate, Jhunjhunu for
character and antecedents verification.
4. The verification report was submitted by the District
Magistrate in which it was indicated that as per the records of
Khetri Police Station, a police case No.162/2003 was registered
against the petitioner under Section 498A, 406 IPC and Section 4
of Dowry Prohibition Act and charge-sheet was submitted to the
Court of ACJM, Khetri on 02.10.2003. Later on, the petitioner was
acquitted by the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Khetri vide order dated 13.08.2009.
5. Based on the said antecedent report, by order dated
27.02.2012 pursuant to the provisions Rule 26 (4) of the Central
Industrial Security Force Rules, 2001 ('Rules of 2001'), services of
the petitioner were terminated w.e.f. receipt of the order. It was
also indicated that he would be entitled for one month's pay plus
allowances in lieu of one month's notice.
6. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner filed departmental appeal.
The appellate authority by its order dated 11.06.2012 dismissed
the appeal.
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7. Feeling aggrieved of the orders terminating the services and
rejecting the appeal, the writ petition was filed by the petitioner.
8. Learned Single Judge by its order impugned came to the
conclusion that termination order was passed simply on the
ground of concealment, however, as the petitioner had already
been acquitted prior to his selection referring to judgment in Avtar
Singh Vs. Union of India & Ors.: 2016 (8) SCC 471 and another
Single Bench judgment of this Court came to the conclusion that it
cannot be said that concealment was material for the purpose of
discontinuing the petitioner and consequently, passed the order
impugned and the writ petition was allowed.
9. Learned ASG made vehement submissions that from the
facts of the case, it is apparent that in the attestation form, the
petitioner inter-alia was required to disclose whether he has ever
been prosecuted and other criminal antecedent related questions
to which he clearly indicated 'No'. The attestation form inter-alia
clearly want the candidates that furnishing of the false information
or suppression of any factual information would be a
disqualification and would render the candidate unfit for
employment.
10. Further, it was also indicated that if there is any suppression
of any factual information, which comes to the notice at any time
during the service of person, his services would be liable to be
terminated.
11. The petitioner despite having been prosecuted for offence
under Section 498A, 406 IPC & Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition
Act gave wrong information/suppressed the said aspect and
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verified in the attestation form that the information was correct
and complete to best of his knowledge.
12. Admittedly, the petitioner was prosecuted for criminal
offence and he suppressed the said information. It was submitted
that mere acquittal before filling up the application form by itself
cannot wash away the fact that the petitioner had suppressed
material facts pertaining to his criminal antecedents.
13. It was emphasized that irrespective of acquittal, for coming
to a conclusion whether the petitioner was fit to be appointed on
the post of a Constable, the said aspect could be taken into
consideration and, therefore, the suppression of the material facts
pertaining to his criminal antecedents were sufficient for the
appellants to have terminated his employment.
14. Further submissions were made that under Rule 26 (4) of the
Rules of 2001, the appointing authority during the period of
probation without assigning any reason could terminate the
services of a member of a force on the ground of furnishing false
and incorrect information at the time of appointment and as such,
in terms of the policy guidelines framed by the appellants dated
01.02.2012, which indicates serious offences/offences involving
moral turpitude which inter-alia includes the offence under Section
498A/406 IPC & Dowry Prohibition Act, the order was passed and,
therefore, the dismissal was justified.
15. It was submitted that learned Single Judge did not properly
appreciate the judgment in the case of Avtar Singh (supra),
wherein, under Clause 38.5, even if the declaration pertaining to
the acquittal was made truthfully by the petitioner, the appellants
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had the right to consider the antecedents and could not be
compelled to appoint him and as such, the suppression being
material, the order impugned deserves to be quashed and set
aside.
16. Reliance was also placed on Devendra Kumar Vs. State of
Uttaranchal & Ors.: (2013) 9 SCC 363 to emphasize that
suppression of facts itself amounts to moral turpitude; State of
Odisha & Ors. Vs. Gobinda Behera: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 199,
which emphasized the requirement of a person seeking to be
employed in Police Force to be truthful in the disclosure of
information sought about the antecedents and Ex-Const/Dvr
Mukesh Kumar Raigar Vs. Union of India & Ors.: 2023 SCC OnLine
SC 27, wherein, a case pertaining to CISF after analyzing the
judgment in the case of Avtar Singh (supra) and Satish Chandra
Yadav Vs. Union of India: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1300 inter-alia on
account of not revealing the pendency of a case upheld the
judgment of the Division Bench reversing the relief granted by the
learned Single Judge.
17. Learned counsel for the respondent made vehement
submissions that the action of the respondents in terminating the
services of the petitioner is ex-facie illegal and, therefore, the
learned Single Judge was justified in allowing the writ petition filed
by him.
18. It was submitted that the petitioner was acquitted way back
in the year 2009 and the attestation form was filled up by the
petitioner on 05.03.2011 and as the fact of acquittal was not
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relevant, the same was not disclosed, as no case was pending
against him.
19. It was submitted that petitioner was accorded appointment
and without providing opportunity of hearing, his services have
been terminated, which is in violation of principles of natural
justice and contrary to appellants' own Policy Guidelines.
20. It was submitted that Hon'ble Supreme Court in various
judgments has laid down that non-disclosure of acquittal cannot
be made a basis for termination.
21. Reliance was placed on judgment in Avtar Singh (supra),
Umesh Chandra Yadav Vs. The Inspector General and Chief
Security Commissioner, R.P.F., Northern Railway, New Delhi &
Others: Civil Appeal No.1964/2022, decided by Hon'ble Supreme
Court on 02.03.2022; Ram Kumar Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh &
Ors.: (2011) 14 SCC 709. It was prayed that the appeal be
dismissed.
22. Learned counsel for the appellants with reference to the
submissions pertaining to violation of principles of natural justice
made submissions that in view of the admitted and undisputed
facts when only one conclusion is possible, the order passed
cannot be vitiated on account of purported non-grant of hearing.
Reliance was placed on M.C. Mehta Vs. Union of India: 1999 (6)
SCC 237 and Rule 26 (4) of Rules of 2001.
23. We have considered the submissions made by learned
counsel for the parties and have perused the material available on
record.
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24. The facts are undisputed, wherein, the petitioner was
prosecuted for offence under Section 498 A, 406 IPC and Section
4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and came to be acquitted on
13.08.2009.
25. In the attestation form filled up by him for appointment on
the post of Constable, in the columns relating to criminal
antecedent, wherein, the specific question asked was 'Have you
ever been prosecuted ?', the petitioner indicated 'No'.
26. In the attestation form, in the beginning itself following
warnings indicated:-
"The furnishing of false information or suppression of any
factual information in the Attestation Form would be a
disqualification and is likely to render the candidate unfit
for employment under the Government.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
If the fact that false information has been furnished or that
there has been suppression of any factual information in
the Attestation Form comes to notice at any time during
the service of a person, his services would be liable to be
terminated."
27. Further, the verification of the attestation form given by the
petitioner indicated as under:-
"I certify that the foregoing information is correct and
complete to the best of my knowledge and belief. I am not
aware of any circumstances which might impair my fitness
for employment under the Government."
28. From the above facts, it is absolutely undisputed that the
petitioner for reasons best known to him had suppressed the fact
that he was prosecuted for offence under Section 498A, 406 IPC
and Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act.
29. The issue, which requires consideration is whether on
account of his acquittal in the year 2009 can the petitioner claim
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immunity from the allegation of suppression of material facts,
though not disclosing the said aspect in his attestation form.
30. The issue of conviction, acquittal, arrest, pendency of
criminal case and its disclosure by the candidates at the time of
seeking employment, has been considered in detail by Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Avtar Singh (supra), wherein, it was
inter-alia laid down as under:-
"38.1. Information given to the employer by a candidate
as to conviction, acquittal or arrest, or pendency of a
criminal case, whether before or after entering into service
must be true and there should be no suppression or false
mention of required information.
38.2. While passing order of termination of services or
cancellation of candidature for giving false information, the
employer may take notice of special circumstances of the
case, if any, while giving such information.
38.3. The employer shall take into consideration the
government Orders/instructions/rules, applicable to the
employee, at the time of taking the decision.
38.4. In case there is suppression or false information of
involvement in a criminal case where conviction or
acquittal had already been recorded before filling of the
application/verification form and such fact later comes to
knowledge of employer, any of the following recourses
appropriate to the case may be adopted:
38.4.1. In a case trivial in nature in which conviction had
been recorded, such as shouting slogans at young age or
for a petty offence which if disclosed would not have
rendered an incumbent unfit for post in question, the
employer may, in its discretion, ignore such suppression of
fact or false information by condoning the lapse.
38.4.2. Where conviction has been recorded in case which
is not trivial in nature, employer may cancel candidature or
terminate services of the employee.
38.4.3. If acquittal had already been recorded in a case
involving moral turpitude or offence of heinous/serious
nature, on technical ground and it is not a case of clean
acquittal, or benefit of reasonable doubt has been given,
the employer may consider all relevant facts available as
to antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to
the continuance of the employee.
38.5. In a case where the employee has made declaration
truthfully of a concluded criminal case, the employer still
has the right to consider antecedents, and cannot be
compelled to appoint the candidate.
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38.6. In case when fact has been truthfully declared in
character verification form regarding pendency of a
criminal case of trivial nature, employer, in facts and
circumstances of the case, in its discretion, may appoint
the candidate subject to decision of such case.
38.7. In a case of deliberate suppression of fact with
respect to multiple pending cases such false information by
itself will assume significance and an employer may pass
appropriate order cancelling candidature or terminating
services as appointment of a person against whom
multiple criminal cases were pending may not be proper.
38.8. If criminal case was pending but not known to the
candidate at the time of filling the form, still it may have
adverse impact and the appointing authority would take
decision after considering the seriousness of the crime.
38.9. In case the employee is confirmed in service, holding
departmental enquiry would be necessary before passing
order of Termination/removal or dismissal on the ground of
suppression or submitting false information in verification
form.
38.10. For determining suppression or false information
attestation/ verification form has to be specific, not vague.
Only such information which was required to be specifically
mentioned has to be disclosed. If information not asked for
but is relevant comes to knowledge of the employer the
same can be considered in an objective manner while
addressing the question of fitness. However, in such cases
action cannot be taken on basis of suppression or
submitting false information as to a fact which was not
even asked for.
38.11. Before a person is held guilty of suppressio veri or
suggestio falsi, knowledge of the fact must be attributable
to him."
31. Several judgments came to be delivered by Hon'ble Supreme
Court, after judgment was delivered in the case of Avtar Singh
(supra), based on facts resulting in divergent views.
32. Whereafter, Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Satish
Chandra Yadav (supra) after taking into consideration the various
views inter-alia observed and laid down as under:
"89. The only reason to refer to and look into the various
decisions rendered by this Court as above over a period of
time is that the principles of law laid therein governing the
subject are bit inconsistent. Even after, the larger Bench
decision in the case of Avtar Singh (supra) different courts
have enunciated different principles.
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90. In such circumstances, we undertook some exercise to
shortlist the broad principles of law which should be made
applicable to the litigations of the present nature. The
principles are as follows:
a) Each case should be scrutinised thoroughly by the public
employer concerned, through its designated officials- more
so, in the case of recruitment for the police force, who are
under a duty to maintain order, and tackle lawlessness,
since their ability to inspire public confidence is a bulwark
to society's security.
b) Even in a case where the employee has made
declaration truthfully and correctly of a concluded criminal
case, the employer still has the right to consider the
antecedents, and cannot be compelled to appoint the
candidate. The acquittal in a criminal case would not
automatically entitle a candidate for appointment to the
post. It would be still open to the employer to consider the
antecedents and examine whether the candidate concerned
is suitable and fit for appointment to the post.
c) The suppression of material information and making a
false statement in the verification Form relating to arrest,
prosecution, conviction etc., has a clear bearing on the
character, conduct and antecedents of the employee. If it is
found that the employee had suppressed or given false
information in regard to the matters having a bearing on
his fitness or suitability to the post, he can be terminated
from service.
d) The generalisations about the youth, career prospects
and age of the candidates leading to condonation of the
offenders' conduct, should not enter the judicial verdict and
should be avoided.
e) The Court should inquire whether the Authority
concerned whose action is being challenged acted mala
fide.
f) Is there any element of bias in the decision of the
Authority?
g) Whether the procedure of inquiry adopted by the
Authority concerned was fair and reasonable?"
(emphasis supplied)
33. In State of Rajasthan & Ors. Vs. Chetan Jeff: AIR 2022 SC
2274, in a case, where, the information about facing criminal
prosecution was suppressed, after referring to several judgments
on the issue of suppression, the Division Bench judgment of this
Court was set aside.
34. The Division Bench of this Court in State of Rajasthan & Ors.
Vs. Mahendra Singh Rathore: D.B. Spl. Appeal (Writ)
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No.1377/2019 decided on 02.09.2022, laid down that in a case,
where the candidate is desirous of seeking employment in a
disciplined force he is expected to carry high moral standards and
any deliberate mis-statement or omission in furnishing vital
information is to be viewed seriously and consequently, set aside
the judgment of learned Single Judge.
35. In the case of Devendra Kumar (supra), Hon'ble Supreme
Court categorically laid down that suppression of information itself
amounts to moral turpitude by observing as under:-
"12. So far as the issue of obtaining the appointment by
misrepresentation is concerned, it is no more res integra.
The question is not whether the applicant is suitable for
the post. The pendency of a criminal case/proceeding is
different from suppressing the information of such
pendency. The case pending against a person might not
involve moral turpitude but suppressing of this information
itself amounts to moral turpitude. In fact, the information
sought by the employer if not disclosed as required, would
definitely amount to suppression of material information.
In that eventuality, the service becomes liable to be
terminated, even if there had been no further trial or the
person concerned stood acquitted/discharged."
36. Similarly in the case of Gobinda Behera (supra), Hon'ble
Supreme Court inter-alia observed as under:-
"The respondent was seeking public employment in the
State police service. His duties, on appointment to the
service, would be of a responsible character, bearing
intrinsically on the maintenance of law and order and with
consequences for personal liberty of citizens. To expect that
an applicant for such a position would be truthful in the
disclosure of information sought about the antecedents is a
justifiable basis for assessment of personality and
character. The employer can legitimately conclude that a
person who has suppressed material facts does not deserve
to be in its employment."
37. In a very recent judgment dated 20.10.2023, which applies
on all force to the present case, Hon'ble Supreme Court in almost
similar circumstances in Director General of Police Tamilnadu,
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Mylapore Vs. J. Raghunees: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1379 laid down
as under:-
"9......................... Additionally, the respondent was required
to disclose certain information about himself by filling the
verification roll. The said verification roll is very relevant
and important for the purposes of the present case,
especially its column 15 and in particular the language of
the said column which reads as under:
"15 - Have you ever been concerned in any criminal case
as defendant?"
10. The aforesaid column in unequivocal terms inquires
from the candidate about his involvement in any criminal
case whether in past or present and unaffected by its status
or result.
11. The respondent in filling up the said verification roll in
reply to the query made in the aforesaid column stated 'NO'
meaning thereby he clearly stated that he had not been
involved in any criminal case.
12. Apparently in the admitted facts, the respondent was
involved in a criminal case but had been acquitted
therefrom. Thus, it cannot be said that the respondent was
not concerned with any criminal case. Therefore, he ought
to have disclosed the correct position that he was involved
in a criminal case but had been acquitted. The respondent
instead of giving the full and complete information as above
simply stated 'NO' as if he was never involved in any
criminal case. The answer of the respondent to the question
posed in column 15 of the verification roll undoubtedly
conveys the wrong information and amounts to the
suppression of the correct information.
13. The issue in the matter is not of eligibility of the
respondent to the post in the light of Rule 14(b) of the
Tamil Nadu Special Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1978
rather that of suppression of material information which
was required to be disclosed in column 15 of the verification
roll. The respondent has certainly not disclosed the correct
information. His honorable acquittal or acquittal by giving
benefit of doubt is not material and relevant but what is
relevant is the full and complete disclosure of the
information regarding his involvement in a criminal case
which has been suppressed by him.
14. In Avtar Singh case, a three-Judge Bench of this Court
while dealing with a similar kind of situation summarised
the legal position by stating that (i) Information given by
the candidate to the employer as to his conviction,
acquittal, arrest or pendency of a criminal case, whether
before or after entering into service must be true and there
should be no suppression or false mention of required
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information. (ii) In cases where conviction or acquittal had
already taken place before filling the application/verification
form, the employer may consider all relevant facts available
as to antecedents and may take appropriate decision as to
the continuance of the employee. (iii) and even if the
employee had made truthful declaration of a concluded
criminal case, the employer still has the right to consider
antecedents of the candidate/employee and cannot be
compelled to appoint him/her.
15. In other words, the candidate in the first instance is
obliged to give correct information as to his conviction,
acquittal or arrest or pendency of the criminal case and
there should be no suppression or false mention of required
information. Secondly, even if truthful declaration is made
by him, he would not be entitled to appointment as a
matter of right and that the employer still has the right to
consider his antecedents.
16. In the case at hand, though the respondent may be
eligible for
appointment but since he has not disclosed the complete
information with regard to his involvement in a criminal
case, wherein he might have been acquitted earlier even
before verification, he cannot escape the guilt of
suppressing the material information as required by column
15 of the verification roll. Keeping in mind that the
respondent was a candidate for recruitment to a disciplined
force, the non-disclosure of the information of his
involvement in the criminal case and subsequent acquittal
therefrom cast a serious doubt upon his character and the
antecedents which is sufficient enough to disentitle him
from employment.
17. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the
judgment and order of the Division Bench passed in writ
appeal cannot be sustained in law and is hereby set aside
restoring that of the writ court.
18. The appeal is allowed and the writ petition stands
dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs"
38. Therefore, it can be concluded that on the ground of
admitted suppression by the respondent/petitioner in seeking
appointment to a disciplined force, which conduct casts a serious
doubt upon his character and the same is sufficient enough to
disentitle him from employment.
39. Coming to the aspect of violation of principles of natural
justice, as observed hereinbefore, the facts are absolutely
undisputed rather the counsel for the petitioner himself indicated
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that the fact that in the attestation form, the petitioner did not
disclose his acquittal, is admitted. However, the implication needs
to be examined.
40. Provisions of Rule 26 (4) of the Rules of 2001, which inter-
alia deals with termination, reads as under:-
"26. Termination-
(1) xxxxxxxxx
(2) xxxxxxxxx
(3) xxxxxxxxx
(4) During the period of probation or its extension thereof,
as the case may be, the appointing authority may
without assigning any reason terminate the services of
a member of the Force on the grounds of furnishing
false or incorrect information at the time of
appointment of that member of the Force or for his
failure to pass the basic training or repeat course, by
tendering a notice of one month to that effect or one
month's pay in lieu thereof."
41. The provisions clearly authorize the appointing authority to
terminate the services of a member of the force on the ground of
furnishing false and incorrect information at the time of
appointment without assigning any reason.
42. The order impugned passed by the appellants inter-alia reads
as under:-
"DATED: 27/02/2012
ORDER
In pursuance of the provision of Sub-rule (4) of Rule 26 of
the Central Industrial Security Force Rules-2001
(Amended Rules 2007), the undersigned hereby
terminates the services of CISF No.114400240
Const./Dvr. Jai Singh Meena of CISF Unit BSL Bokaro. The
order of termination will be effective from the date of
receipt of this order by the said No.114400240 Const/Dvr.
Jai Singh Meena.
2. No.114400240 Const/Dvr. Jai Singh Meena is entitled
for one month's pay (Pay Band + Grade Pay) plus
allowances at the rate which he was drawing them
immediately before the termination of his service, which
is in lieu of one month's notice."
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43. As such it is apparent that the power of termination on
account of admitted suppression/total declaration, as provided in
the Rule, has been exercised by the Authority.
44. In the case of M.C. Mehta (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court
inter-alia laid down as under:-
"21. It is, therefore, clear that if on the admitted or
indisputable factual position, only one conclusion is possible
and permissible, the Court need not issue a writ merely
because there is violation of the principles of natural
justice."
45. As noticed hereinbefore, as the factual aspect has not at all
been in dispute, pertaining to suppression by the petitioner of
information, which was specifically asked and which had bearing
on his employment, as a constable, the mere fact that the
appellants exercising power under Rule 26 (4) of the Rules,
passed the order terminating the employment of the petitioner
cannot be vitiated only on account of the fact that the petitioner
was allegedly not afforded prior opportunity of hearing.
46. So far as the judgments relied on by counsel for the
petitioner are concerned, as already discussed hereinbefore, in
Avtar Singh (supra), besides the observations made in para
38.4.3, Hon'ble Court had left it open for the employer to consider
on the relevant facts available as to antecedent and take
appropriate decision and in view of para 38.5, once it has been
laid down that even if a truthful declaration of a concluded
criminal case has been made, the employer has the right to
consider the antecedents, as such it cannot be said that
suppression was irrelevant.
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47. In the case of Umesh Chandra Yadav (supra), the same was
a case of discharge passed by the Court of competent jurisdiction,
as the petitioner therein was neither prosecuted nor arrested and
based on which, it was laid down that the same was not a case of
misrepresentation or concealment, whereas, in the present case,
the petitioner was prosecuted and the said information was clearly
suppressed by him as such, the said judgment has no application
to the facts of the present case.
48. In the case of Ram Kumar (supra), the Court had come to
the conclusion that no finding was recorded pertaining to the
unsuitability of the candidate on account of the suppression and
allowed the petition, whereas, in the present case, under Rule 26
(4) of the Rules, specific power has been conferred and as such,
the said judgment also has no application.
49. In view of the above discussion and the law laid down by
Hon'ble Supreme Court, the judgment of learned Single Judge,
which did not deal with any of the aspects and simply after
quoting the observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Avtar Singh (supra) has arrived at the conclusion that order was
required to be set aside, cannot be sustained.
50. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The order dated
22.07.2019 of the learned Single Judge is set aside and the writ
petition filed by the respondent/petitioner is dismissed.
51. No order as to cost.
(ASHUTOSH KUMAR),J (ARUN BHANSALI),J
PRADEEP KUMAR LIMBA/-
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