Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

Manak Chand Soni vs State Of Rajasthan (2024:Rj-Jd:8992) on 21 February, 2024

Author: Birendra Kumar

Bench: Birendra Kumar

[2024:RJ-JD:8992]

      HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                       JODHPUR
                    S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 55/2022

Manak Chand Soni S/o Premratan Soni, Aged About 48 Years,
Chhipo Ka Mohalla, Behind City Kotwali, Bikaner
                                                                       ----Appellant
                                       Versus
1.       State Of Rajasthan, District Collector, Bikaner
2.       Bikaner       Municipal       Council,        Bikaner,      Through    The
         Commissioner
3.       Ramdayal So-Called Mahant Bada Ramdwara, Bikaner,
         Sunaro Ki Badi Guwad, Bikaner
4.       Station House Officer, City Kotwali, Bikaner
5.       Superintendent Of Police, City Bikaner, Bikaner
                                                                    ----Respondents


For Appellant(s)             :     Mr. Ajay Kumar Vyas
For Respondent(s)            :     Mr. Prashant Tatia
                                   Mr. Anil Kumar Bissa
                                   Mr. Rajat Rajpurohit



            HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BIRENDRA KUMAR

Judgment

21/02/2024

1. This appeal is barred by limitation of 781 days.

2. Heard the parties on application under Section 5 of the

Limitation Act.

3. The background of the case is that respondent No.3,

Ramdayal had brought Civil Original Suit No.49/2012 against

other respondents claiming a decree of permanent injunction. The

trial Court decreed the suit by judgment and decree dated

08.05.2014. Appellant Manak Chand Soni was not a party to the

suit, however, appellant filed an application under Section 151 CPC

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for permission of the Court to file appeal against the judgment

and decree dated 08.05.2014 passed in Civil Original Suit

No.49/2012. The same was registered as Appeal Decree Case

No.24/2017 and by the impugned order dated 23.09.2019, the

learned 1st Appellate Court rejected the prayer for permission to

file appeal. The said prayer was barred by limitation. Hence, the

application was dismissed with cost of Rs.2,000/-. The appellant is

aggrieved by refusal of leave to appeal.

4. When it was brought to the notice of the Bar that a second

appeal would not be maintainable against the aforesaid order of

refusal of leave to appeal. Learned counsel for the appellant drew

attention of the Court that by the same order, the learned

Appellate Court has affirmed the judgment and decree of the trial

Judge.

5. In the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the

appellant has stated that the appellant was having no knowledge

about the limitation period, which is prescribed in the Statute, to

prefer an appeal before the Hon'ble Court, coupled with the fact

that economic condition of the appellant was not good enough to

file the present appeal within prescribed time.

6. Ignorance of law is no excuse.

7. So far claim of poor economic condition is concerned,

nothing is mentioned in the petition that the appellant had taken

any recourse to legal aid etc., therefore, evidently the application

appears to contain no sufficient and satisfactory explanation for

the delay.

8. Identical issue was there before the Hon'ble Supreme Court

in Majji Sannemma v/s Reddy Sridevi and Ors. reported in

[2024:RJ-JD:8992] (3 of 5) [CSA-55/2022]

AIR 2022 SC 332 wherein the High Court in a second appeal had

condoned the delay of 1011 days. The Hon'ble Supreme Court

considered the past judgments and set aside the order of the High

Court condoning delay. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has quoted

earlier observations in the matter of condonation of delay from

Para Nos.7.1 to 7.5 which are being reproduced below :

"7.1 In the case of Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., reported in (1962) 2 SCR 762, it is observed and held as under:

In construing Section 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chattappan, (1890) J.L.R. 13 Mad. 269, "Section 5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words 'sufficient cause' receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the Appellant.

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7.2 In the case of P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and Anr., reported in (1997) 7 SCC 556, while refusing to condone the delay of 565 days, it is observed that in the absence of reasonable, satisfactory or even appropriate explanation for seeking condonation of delay, the same is not to be condoned lightly. It is further observed that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. It is further observed that while exercising discretion for condoning the delay, the court has to exercise discretion judiciously.

7.3 In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project, reported in (2008) 17 SCC 448, it is observed as under:

The laws of limitation are founded on public policy. Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as "statutes of peace". An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for public order. The principle is based on the maxim "interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium", that is, the interest of the State requires that there should be end to litigation but at the same time laws of limitation are a means to ensure private justice suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and preventing oppression. The object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.

7.4 In the case of Basawaraj and Anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, reported in (2013) 14 SCC 81, it is observed and held by this Court that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case. It is further observed that the expression "sufficient cause" cannot be liberally interpreted if

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negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. It is further observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of a party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. It is further observed that in case a party has acted with negligence, lack of bona fides or there is inaction then there cannot be any justified ground for condoning the delay even by imposing conditions. It is observed that each application for condonation of delay has to be decided within the framework laid down by this Court. It is further observed that if courts start condoning delay where no sufficient cause is made out by imposing conditions then that would amount to violation of statutory principles and showing utter disregard to legislature.

7.5 In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (supra), it is observed by this Court that the court cannot enquire into belated and stale claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The Courts help those who are vigilant and "do not slumber over their rights."

9. Evidently, the discretion to condone the delay must be

exercised with care and caution on having objective satisfaction

regarding sufficient cause to condone the delay. In the case on

hand, there is no sufficient reason disclosed in the application

under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay.