Rajasthan High Court
Harvendra Choudhary Son Of Shri ... vs State Of Rajasthan (2024:Rj-Jp:16967) on 8 April, 2024
Author: Sameer Jain
Bench: Sameer Jain
[2024:RJ-JP:16967]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 9478/2022
Harvendra Choudhary Son Of Shri Shvidayal Chechu, Aged About
27 Years, Resident Of Abhaypura, Sikar (Raj.), At Present Posted
As Forest Guard At Dy. Forest Conservator, Range Dug, District
Jhalawar (Raj.)
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Its Principal Secretary,
Forest And Environment Department, Govt. Secretariat,
Jaipur (Raj.)
2. Head Chief Forest Conservator (Hoff), Van Bhawan, Jaipur
(Rajasthan)
3. Chief Forest Conservator And Technology Assistant, Head
Chief Forest Conservator, Van Bhawan, Jaipur (Rajasthan)
4. Dy. Forest Conservator, Jhalawar (Raj.)
5. Dy. Forest Conservator, Kota (Raj.)
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Bajrang Sepat
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Ajay Pratap Singh, AGC
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SAMEER JAIN
Order
08/04/2024
The instant petition is listed on specific directions of this
Court, as pursuant to the grant of interim protection vide order
dated 06.07.2022, the petition has been kept in abeyance for a
prolonged period of time.
At the outset, it is noted that the Hon'ble Apex Court,
through a plethora of judgments, has time and again held that the
permissibility and scope of judicial review against transfer orders
is minuscule. The rationale exercised to circumscribe the Courts
[2024:RJ-JP:16967] (2 of 4) [CW-9478/2022]
interference with transfer orders whilst exercising writ jurisdiction,
primarily pertains to the fact that a bedlam of an aggravated
magnitude shall ensue within the workings of the Government, if
all employees, posted at a location of their liking, refuse to and/or
contest their postings, when issued on account of administrative
exigencies. Inevitably, the only scope of interference subsists in an
eventuality where the transfer orders are issued on account of
certain malafides, at the end of the transferring authority.
The consideration regarding which employee should be
posted 'where', falls purely within the administrative domain of the
appropriate authority/department to decide, in the best interests
of the working of the said department, whilst seeking to advance
the department's resultant output and service efficiency. Unless
the order is vitiated by mala fides or is passed in violation of any
applicable statutory provisions, the Courts ought not to extend
interference in such orders. By logical deduction, it is made rather
obvious that no Government will be able to smoothly function if
the Government Servants insist that once appointed or posted in a
particular place, they should continue at such place, as long as
they desire whilst meeting out their individualistic and familial
ease. The fact of the transfer being an indispensable part of an
employee's service is of paramount importance, which often loses
favourability at the end of the employee, when they become
comfortable with the place of their choosing.
It is noted that a government employee, posted at a
location of their liking, does not have the fundamental protection
to continue serving at the said location, especially in light of the
[2024:RJ-JP:16967] (3 of 4) [CW-9478/2022]
fact that the incident of transfer, is a part and parcel of the
conditions of service, when employed on a transferable post. It is
true that the order of transfer often causes a lot of difficulties and
dislocation in the family set up of the concerned employees but on
that score alone, the order of transfer cannot be struck down.
Administrative exigencies ought to prevail and/or take precedence
over the familial and individualistic priorities of the employees
posted on transferable jobs. The only eventuality, where the
Courts may extend interference in transfer orders, is when the
transfer orders violate an applicable statute or are passed on
account of certain malice. In support of the aforesaid reliance can
be placed upon the dictum of the Hon'ble Apex Court as
enunciated in Shilpi Bose (Mrs.) and Ors. vs. State of Bihar
and Ors. reported in 1991 Supp. (2) SCC 659, Varadha Rao
vs. State of Karnataka and Ors reported in (1986) 4 SCC 131,
Rajendra Roy vs. Union of India and Anr. reported in (1993)
1 SCC 148, National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd.
vs. Shri Bhagwan reported in (2001) 8 SCC 574 and S.K.
Nausad Rahaman vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in
(2022) 12 SCC 1.
At this juncture, learned counsel for the petitioner has
submitted that as the interim protection has been operative in
favour of the petitioner for a prolonged period of over one year,
then in such an eventuality, said interim order ought to be
assumed as and/or treated to be absolute. In this regard, learned
counsel also placed reliance upon the dictum of the Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court as enunciated in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.
[2024:RJ-JP:16967] (4 of 4) [CW-9478/2022]
2140/2007 titled as Brijendra Singh Meena vs. State of
Rajasthan and Anr.
Therefore, considering the dictum of this Court as enunciated
in Brijendra Singh Meena (Supra), this Court deems it
appropriate to make the interim order dated 06.07.2022,
absolute.
Having made the observations noted herein-above regarding
the scope of judicial review/interference in transfer orders, with
the consent of learned counsel for both the sides, this Court
deems it appropriate to dispose of the instant petition with
directions to the respondent-Department/employer to the effect
that the respondent-Department/employer shall be at liberty in
the future to pass necessary orders qua the petitioner's transfer,
keeping in mind the paramount consideration of administrative
exigency, if any, independent of any observations made by this
Court while granting aforesaid interim protection.
Accordingly, in terms of the above, the instant petition is
disposed of. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
(SAMEER JAIN),J
DEEPAK/s-565
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