Rajasthan High Court
Sonika Singh Daughter Of Virendra ... vs The Rajasthan Public Service ... on 1 December, 2023
Author: Ganesh Ram Meena
Bench: Ganesh Ram Meena
[2023:RJ-JP:37305]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 22072/2018
Sonika Singh Daughter Of Virendra Pratap Singh, Aged About 34
Years, Resident Of Purani Mandi, Atru, Tehsil Atru, District Baran
(Rajasthan).
----Petitioner
Versus
1. The Rajasthan Public Service Commission, Through Its
Secretary, Ajmer (Rajasthan).
2. The Director, Secondary Education, Bikaner (Rajasthan).
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Bharat Yadav
For Respondent(s) : Mr. M.S. Singhvi learned Advocate
General with Mr. Siddhant Jain
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE GANESH RAM MEENA
Judgment / Order
01/12/2023
1. The factual matrix of the case is that the petitioner
possessed the Degree of Post Graduate Biotechnology and
B.Ed. having qualification for School Teacher. She being
qualified for recruitment to the post of Sr. Teacher Gr.II
(Science) applied for recruitment under the Advertisement
No.8/18 issued by the respondents on 9.4.2018. The last
date of submitting the application form was 9.6.2018 and the
petitioner submitted her application form No. 201803821695
on 24.5.2018 with the mention of her marital status as
'married'.
It is also a fact on record that a decree of divorce
was passed on 11.9.2018 by the Court of learned Addl.
[2023:RJ-JP:37305] (2 of 21) [CW-22072/2018]
District Judge, Chhabra, District Baran (Rajasthan) on the
joint application filed by the petitioner and her husband under
section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act.
2. Counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that
though the petitioner has applied for recruitment to the post
of Sr. Teacher Gr.II (Science) pursuant to advertisement
No.8/2018 under the General Woman Category but since
divorce decree has been passed on the mutual consent and
joint application on 11.9.2018, her candidature should have
been considered by the respondents against the vacancies
reserved for divorcee category. He further submits that non-
consideration of the candidature of the petitioner under the
divorcee category, be declared illegal, arbitrary and
unconstitutional and the respondents be directed to allow the
petitioner against the vacancies reserved for divorcee
category on the post of Sr. Teacher Gr.II (Science).
3. Shri M.S. Singhvi, learned Advocate General
assisted by Mr. Siddhant Jain, submits that the eligibility of a
candidate for a particular post on the basis of his/her
educational qualifications and the other requirements and so
also his /her candidature under a particular category, is
considered on the basis of the requisite documents possessed
by that candidate on the last date of submission of the
application form if no other date has been given in the
advertisement or in the rules. He further submits that the
[2023:RJ-JP:37305] (3 of 21) [CW-22072/2018]
petitioner filled up the application form for recruitment on
the post of Sr. Teacher Gr.II (Science) mentioning her marital
status as 'married' and on the last date of submitting the
application form she was not having a decree of divorce. So
also in view of the terms and conditions of the advertisement,
no candidate can be allowed to change his/ her category after
the last date of submitting the application form or the date
upto which the candidates are allowed to make amendments
in their application forms. He also submits that the last date
for submitting the application from in the present case was
9.6.2018 and on the last date the petitioner was not having
the decree of divorce from the Competent Court. Therefore,
her candidature in divorcee category in any no manner could
be considered.
In support of his submissions Shri M.S. Singhvi,
learned Advocate General has placed reliance upon the
following judgments:-
1. Hirandra Kumar Vs. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
& Anr., reported in (2020) 17 SCC 401; and
(2) Piyush Kaviya & Ors. Vs. The Rajasthan Public Service
Commission & Ors. (DB Spl. Appl. Writ No.198/2018 & Other
connected special appeals) decided on 10.04.2018 by the
Division Bench of the Principal Seat at Jodhpur.
4. Considered the submissions made by the counsel
appearing for the petitioner as well as the learned Advocate
[2023:RJ-JP:37305] (4 of 21) [CW-22072/2018]
General Shri M.S. Singhvi and also perused the material
made available on record with the petition.
5. The admitted facts on record are that the
advertisement No.8/2018 for recruitment on the post of Sr.
Teacher Gr.II (Science) was issued on 9.4.2018 and the last
date for submitting the application form was fixed as
9.6.2018 and further the divorce decree was passed on the
joint application of the petitioner and her husband on
11.9.2018 by the Court of learned Addl. District Judge,
Chhabra, District Baran (Rajasthan) i.e. after the last date of
submitting the application form.
6. It is a well settled law that the eligibility of a
candidate for recruitment to a post as well as under a
particular category is considered on the basis of requirements
which a candidate should possess on the last date of
submission of the application form if otherwise no date is
given under the advertisement or in the relevant rules.
In the special note No.2 given at internal page No.3
of the advertisement dated 9.4.2018 it has been specifically
stated that after passing of the date for amendments/
corrections in the Online application form no-one can have
any legal right to seek corrections in the application form of
any nature.
7. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Hirandra
Kumar (supra), relied upon by Shri M.S. Singhvi, learned
[2023:RJ-JP:37305] (5 of 21) [CW-22072/2018]
Advocate General, in paragraphs No.21 to 26 has observed as
under:-
"21. The legal principles which govern the
determination of a cut-off date are well settled. The
power to fix a cut-off date or age limit is incidental
to the regulatory control which an authority
exercises over the selection process. A certain
degree of arbitrariness may appear on the face of
any cut-off or age limit which is prescribed, since a
candidate on the wrong side of the line may stand
excluded as a consequence. That, however, is no
reason to hold that the cut-off which is prescribed,
is arbitrary. In order to declare that a cut-off is
arbitrary and ultra vires, it must be of such a
nature as to lead to the conclusion that it has been
fixed without any rational basis whatsoever or is
manifestly unreasonable so as to lead to a
conclusion of a violation of Article 14 of the
Constitution.
22. Several decisions of this Court have dealt with
the issue. In Dr. Ami Lal Bhat v. State of Rajasthan
MANU/SC/0772/1997 : (1997) 6 SCC 614, a two
judge Bench of this Court dealt with the provisions
contained in the Rajasthan Medical Services
(Collegiate Branch) Rules, 1962. Rule 11(1)
prescribed that a candidate for direct recruitment
should not have attained the age of 35 years on
the first day of January following the last date fixed
for the receipt of applications. Rejecting the
contention that the cut-off was arbitrary, this Court
held that the fixation of a cut-off prescribing
maximum or minimum age requirements for a post
[2023:RJ-JP:37305] (6 of 21) [CW-22072/2018]
is in the discretion of the Rule making authority.
The Court held thus:
"5....In the first place the fixing of a cut-off
date for determining the maximum or
minimum age prescribed for a post is not, per
se, arbitrary. Basically, the fixing of a cut-off
date for determining the maximum or
minimum age required for a post, is in the
discretion of the rule-making authority or the
employer as the case may be. One must
accept that such a cut-off cannot be fixed with
any mathematical precision and in such a
manner as would avoid hardship in all
conceivable cases. As soon as a cut-off date is
fixed there will be some persons who fall on
the right side of the cut-off date and some
persons who will fall on the wrong side of the
cut-off date. That cannot make the cut-off
date, per se, arbitrary unless the cut-off date
is so wide off the mark as to make it wholly
unreasonable."
The same view has been adopted in other decisions,
including those in (i) State of Bihar v. Ramjee Prasad
MANU/SC/0418/1990 : (1990) 3 SCC 368 ("Ramjee
Prasad"); (ii) Union of India v. Sudheer Kumar
Jaiswal MANU/SC/0540/1994 : (1994) 4 SCC 212
("Sudheer Kumar Jaiswal"); (iii) Union of India v.
Shivbachan Rai (2001) 9 SCC 356 ("Shivbachan
Rai"); and (iv) Council of Scientific and Industrial
Research v. Ramesh Chandra Agarwal
MANU/SC/8455/2008 : (2009) 3 SCC 35 ("Ramesh
Chandra Agarwal").
[2023:RJ-JP:37305] (7 of 21) [CW-22072/2018]
23. In Ramjee Prasad (supra), the State issued
advertisements for the post of Assistant Professors
and prescribed 31 January 1988 as the last date for
the receipt of applications. Applicants must have had
three years of experience. Contending that applicants
could not meet the prescribed requirement of
experience by the date prescribed, the cut-off date
was challenged as being arbitrary and ultra vires
Article 14 of the Constitution. A two judge Bench of
this Court upheld the cut-off date and held thus:
"8. ....... It is obvious that in fixing the last
date as January 31, 1988 the State
Government had only followed the past
practice and if the High Court's attention had
been invited to this fact it would perhaps have
refused to interfere since its interference is
based on the erroneous belief that the past
practice was to fix June 30 of the relevant year
as the last date for receipt of applications.
Except for leaning on a past practice the High
Court has not assigned any reasons for its
choice of the date. As pointed out by this Court
the choice of date cannot be dubbed as
arbitrary even if no particular reason is
forthcoming for the same unless it is shown to
be capricious or whimsical or wide off the
reasonable mark. The choice of the date for
advertising the posts had to depend on several
factors, e.g. the number of vacancies in
different disciplines, the need to fill up the
posts, the availability of candidates, etc. It is
not the case of anyone that experienced
candidates were not available in sufficient
[2023:RJ-JP:37305] (8 of 21) [CW-22072/2018]
numbers on the cut-off date. Merely because
the Respondents and some others would
qualify for appointment if the last date for
receipt of applications is shifted from January
31, 1988 to June 30, 1988 is no reason for
dubbing the earlier date as arbitrary or
irrational."
24. In Sudhir Kumar Jaiswal (supra), the date with
reference to which the age eligibility of a person
desirous of sitting in the competitive examination
for recruitment to the Indian Administrative
Service/Indian Foreign Service was fixed as 1
August of every year. The preliminary exam would
normally be held annually before 1 August.
Rejecting the contention that that the cut-off date
is arbitrary and hence ultra vires, a two judge
Bench of this Court held thus:
"5. As to when choice of a cut-off date can be
interfered was opined by Holmes, J. in
Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Clell Coleman
[277 US 32: 72 L Ed 770 (1927)] by stating
that if the fixation be "very wide of any
reasonable mark", the same can be regarded
arbitrary. What was observed by Holmes, J.
was cited with approval by a Bench of this
Court in Union of India v. Parameswaran Match
Works [MANU/SC/0094/1974 : (1975) 1 SCC
305 : AIR 1974 SC 2349] (in paragraph 10) by
also stating that choice of a date cannot
always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no
[2023:RJ-JP:37305] (9 of 21) [CW-22072/2018]
particular reason is forthcoming for the choice
unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical
in the circumstances. It was further pointed
out where a point or line has to be, there is no
mathematical or logical way of fixing it
precisely, and so, the decision of the
legislature or its delegate must be accepted
unless it can be said that it is very wide of any
reasonable mark.
6. The aforesaid decision was cited with
approval in D.G. Gouse and Co. v. State of
Kerala [MANU/SC/0330/1980 : (1980) 2 SCC
410 : AIR 1980 SC 271]; so also in State of
Bihar v. Ramjee Prasad [MANU / SC/ 0418 /
1990 : (1990) 3 SCC 368] ...
7. In this context, it would also be useful to
state that when a court is called upon to
decide such a matter, mere errors are not
subject to correction in exercise of power of
judicial review; it is only its palpable arbitrary
exercise which can be declared to be void...
8. ...As to why the cut-off date has not been
changed despite the decision to hold
preliminary examination, has been explained
in paragraph 3 of the special leave petition.
The sum and substance of the explanation is
that preliminary examination is only a
screening test and marks obtained in this
examination do not count for determining the
order of merit, for which purpose the marks
obtained in the main examination, which is still
[2023:RJ-JP:37305] (10 of 21) [CW-22072/2018]
being held after 1st August, alone are
material. In view of this, it cannot be held that
continuation of treating 1st August as the cut-
off date, despite the Union Public Service
Commission having introduced the method of
preliminary examination which is held before
1st August, can be said to be "very wide off
any reasonable mark" or so capricious or
whimsical as to permit judicial interference.
25. In Shivbachan Rai (supra), the Union Public
Service Commission advertised for direct
recruitment to the post of Assistant Director in
the Central Poultry Breeding Farms and
prescribed an age limit of 35 years as on 31 May
1990 with a relaxation of five years for
government servants. The earlier notification did
not provide a limitation on the age relaxation. The
five-year stipulation was challenged as being
arbitrary and ultra vires. A two judge Bench
upheld the notification and held thus:
"6. ...Prescribing of any age limit for a
given post, as also deciding the extent to
which any relaxation can be given if an age
limit is prescribed, are essentially matters
of policy. It is, therefore, open to the
Government while framing Rules under the
proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution to
prescribe such age limits or to prescribe the
extent to which any relaxation can be
given. Prescription of such limit or the
extent of relaxation to be given, cannot be
[2023:RJ-JP:37305] (11 of 21) [CW-22072/2018]
termed as arbitrary or unreasonable. The
only basis on which the Respondent moved
the Central Administrative Tribunal was the
earlier Rules of 1976 under which, though
an age limit was prescribed, a limit had not
been placed on the extent of relaxation
which could be granted. If at all any charge
of arbitrariness can be levied in such cases,
not prescribing any basis for granting
relaxation when no limit is placed on the
extent of relaxation, might lead to
arbitrariness in the exercise of power of
relaxation...."
26. In Ramesh Chandra Agarwal (supra), the
Council of Scientific and Industrial Research
framed a scheme for the absorption of
researchers working in their laboratories and
institutes following the directions of this Court. It
was prescribed that eligible applicants must have
15 years of continuous research on 2 May 1997.
The Director was conferred powers to relax the
requirement. Contending that that the tenure of
researchers is ordinarily 13 years, the prescription
of 15 years was challenged as being ultra vires
and arbitrary. This contention was accepted by
the High Court. On appeal, a two judge Bench of
this Court examined the scheme and applicable
avenues to researchers. Noting that there was no
ceiling of 13 years on researchers, this Court
upheld the prescription of 15 years and the cut-
off date. The Court held thus:
"29. "State" is entitled to fix a cut-off date.
[2023:RJ-JP:37305] (12 of 21) [CW-22072/2018]
Such a decision can be struck down only
when it is arbitrary. Its invalidation may
also depend upon the question as to
whether it has a rational nexus with the
object sought to be achieved. 2-5-1997 was
the date fixed as the cut-off date in terms of
the Scheme. The reason assigned therefore
was that this was the date when this Court
directed the Appellants to consider framing
of a regularisation scheme. They could have
picked up any other date. They could have
even picked up the date of the judgment
passed by the Central Administrative
Tribunal. As rightly contended by Mr.
Patwalia, by choosing 2-5-1997 as the cut-
off date, no illegality was committed. Ex
facie, it cannot be said to be arbitrary.
30. The High Court, however, proceeded on
the basis that the cut-off date should have
been the date of issuance of the notification.
The employer in this behalf has a choice. Its
discretion can be held to be arbitrary but
then the High Court only with a view to
show sympathy to some of the candidates
could not have fixed another date, only
because according to it, another date was
more suitable. In law it was not necessary.
The Court's power of judicial review in this
behalf although exists but is limited in the
sense that the impugned action can be
struck down only when it is found to be
arbitrary. It is possible that by reason of
[2023:RJ-JP:37305] (13 of 21) [CW-22072/2018]
such a cut-off date an employee misses his
chance very narrowly. Such hazards would
be there in all the services. Only because it
causes hardship to a few persons or a
Section of the employees may not by itself
be a good ground for directing fixation of
another cut-off date."
The Division Bench of the Principal Seat at Jodhpur
in the case of Piyush Kaviya & Ors. (supra), relied upon by
Shri M.S. Singhvi, learned Advocate General, in paragraphs
No.29 to 32 has observed as under:-
"29. It needs to be highlighted that seeking public
employment the number of applicants swell into
thousands for every appointment offered. The
cumbersome process of processing the applications
manually and at each stage of the selection
process manual intervention being time consuming,
aid of technology is being taken. On-line
applications are being received. Opportunities to
correct mistakes in the on-line application forms
are provided by opening a window period. When
the window period closes, the forms, applications
etc. as amended are processed. The computer
generates the admit cards. The results of the
examination are fed in the computer for various
categories of posts and in the instant case, the
number being 30, select list based on merits and
categories are generated by the computer. The
candidates need to be vigilant and specially when,
as in the instant advertisement, they were
[2023:RJ-JP:37305] (14 of 21) [CW-22072/2018]
cautioned time and again to check their particulars
and a window period within which corrections could
be made was made available to the candidates.
30. Whilst it may be true that every endeavour
should be made to induct meritorious candidates
but at the same time administrative inconvenience
caused by permitting applicants to correct errors
committed by them has to be kept in mind. It
serves public interest that appointments to civil
posts are made as early as possible.
31. Thus, the conflict between merit and public
interest subserved by timely filling up of public
posts has to be balanced. The balance is stuck in
the instant case by giving a window period to the
candidates to correct the on-line application forms.
The balance was stuck by prohibiting any
application to be submitted after last date notified.
32. The writ petitioners were negligent. They
never disclosed in the on-line application forms
submitted that they were non-gazetted
Government employees. Thus, it was too late in
the day for them to seek change in the category in
which they had applied after the admit cards were
issued by informing the Commission that they were
non-gazetted Government employees."
8. This Court in the case of Rekha Sharma Vs. State
of Rajasthan & Anr. (SB Civil Writ Petition No.
18802/2023) decided on 28.11.2023 has observed as
under:-
[2023:RJ-JP:37305] (15 of 21) [CW-22072/2018]
"8. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
J&K Public Service Commission vs. Israr
Ahmad, reported in (2005) 12 SCC 498, in para
5 has observed as under:-
"We have considered the rival contentions
advanced by both the parties. The
contention of the first Respondent cannot
be accepted as he has not applied for the
selection as a candidate entitled to get
reservation. He did not produce any
certificate along with his application. The
fact that he has not availed the benefit for
the preliminary examination itself is
sufficient to treat him as a candidate not
entitled to get reservation. He passed the
preliminary examination as a general
candidate and at the subsequent stage of
the main examination he cannot avail the
reservation on the ground that he was
successful in getting the required
certificate only at a later stage. The nature
and status of the candidate who was
applying for the selection could only be
treated alike and once a candidate has
chosen to opt for the category to which he
is entitled, he cannot later change the
status and make fresh claim. The Division
Bench was not correct in holding that as a
candidate he had also had the qualification
and the production of the certificate at a
later stage would make him entitled to
seek reservation. Therefore, we set aside
[2023:RJ-JP:37305] (16 of 21) [CW-22072/2018]
the judgment of the Division Bench and
allow the appeal. No costs."
9. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Ankita Thakur & Ors. Vs. The H.P. Staff
Selection Commission & Ors., decided on
November 9, 2023 (Civil Appeal No.7602 of
2023 with four other connected matters) apart
from other issues framed an issue No.(i) 'Whether
relaxation in the essential eligibility qualifications
could be made post the last date fixed for receipt
of application from the candidates?'. The Hon'ble
Apex Court decided the aforesaid issue No.(i) as
under:-
"Issue No.(i)
24. It is well settled that eligibility criteria /
conditions, unless provided otherwise in the
extant rules or the advertisement, must be
fulfilled by the candidate by the last date for
receipt of applications specified in the
advertisement [See: Rakesh Kumar Sharma
(supra)].
25. In Bedanga Talukdar (supra), this Court
observed:
"29. ............... In our opinion, it is too well
settled to need any further reiteration that
all appointments to public office have to be
made in conformity with Article 14 of the
Constitution of India. In other words, there
must be no arbitrariness resulting from
any undue favour being shown to any
candidate. Therefore, the selection process
has to be conducted strictly in accordance
[2023:RJ-JP:37305] (17 of 21) [CW-22072/2018]
with the stipulated selection procedure.
Consequently, when a particular schedule
is mentioned in an advertisement, the
same has to be scrupulously maintained.
There cannot be any relaxation in the
terms and conditions of the advertisement
unless such a power is specifically
reserved. Such a power could be reserved
in the relevant statutory rules. Even if
power of relaxation is provided in the
rules, it must still be mentioned in the
advertisement. In the absence of such
power in the rules, it could still be provided
in the advertisement. However, the power
of relaxation, if exercised, has to be given
due publicity. This would be necessary to
ensure that those candidates who become
eligible due to the relaxation, are afforded
an equal opportunity to apply and
compete. Relaxation of any condition in
advertisement without due publication
would be contrary to the mandate of
equality contained in Articles 14 and 16 of
the Constitution of India.
30. A perusal of the advertisement in this
case will clearly show that there was no
power of relaxation. In our opinion, the
High Court committed an error in directing
that the condition with regard to the
submission of the disability certificate
either along with the application form or
before appearing in the preliminary
examination could be relaxed in the case of
[2023:RJ-JP:37305] (18 of 21) [CW-22072/2018]
Respondent 1. Such a course would not be
permissible as it would violate the mandate
of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of
India.
32. .......... It is settled law that there can
be no relaxation in the terms and
conditions contained in the advertisement
unless the power of relaxation is duly
reserved in the relevant rules and/or in the
advertisement. Even if there is a power of
relaxation in the rules, the same would still
have to be specifically indicated in the
advertisement. .............."
26. The above decision has been followed in Sanjay
K. Dixit (supra). Thus, the law is settled that if the
extant Rules provide for the power to relax the
eligibility criteria, the same could be exercised only
if such power is reserved in the advertisement. And
when this power is exercised, there must be wide
publicity of its exercise so that persons who are
likely to benefit by exercise of such power may get
opportunity to apply and compete.
27. In the instant case, it is not shown that the
advertisement reserved the power to relax the
essential eligibility qualifications specified in the
advertisement at any later stage. Rather, the
advertisement is specific that eligibility criteria
must be fulfilled by an aspiring candidate by the
last date fixed for receipt of the application. It is
not demonstrated that after the decision to relax
the eligibility criteria was taken, the same was
widely publicised, and the last date to apply under
the advertisement was extended to enable persons
[2023:RJ-JP:37305] (19 of 21) [CW-22072/2018]
benefited by such relaxation to apply and compete.
In these circumstances, in our view, the power to
relax the eligibility criteria, even if it existed, was
not exercised in consonance with the settled legal
principles and it violated the constitutional
mandate enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution. Issue No.(i) is decided in the terms
above. "
"10. There is a specific condition mentioned in
the advertisement itself that a candidate claiming her
consideration for recruitment under the DV (divorcee)
category is required to have a divorce decree from the
Competent Court on the last date of submission of the
application form. In the instant case the last date for
submission of the application form under the
advertisement dated 28.06.2023 is 31.07.2023 and
the petitioner got the decree of divorce on 20.10.2023
i.e. much after the last date of submitting the
application form.
11. In view of the proposition in the above
judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court, no relaxation is
permissible for diverting from the terms and
conditions of the advertisement."
9. If the relaxation as prayed for by the petitioner is
allowed then there may be several other candidates who may
claim on similar facts the same benefit. So also if any
candidate gets a divorce decree even during the recruitment
process till the interview or declaration of final result, he/she
may also claim the same benefit for consideration of his/ her
[2023:RJ-JP:37305] (20 of 21) [CW-22072/2018]
candidature under the divorce decree which will create
hindrance in the smooth recruitment process and may change
the merit of the candidates at each stage/ level of the
recruitment process. The Courts are to ensure the completion
of the recruitment process smoothly and earliest as per the
schedule of the recruitment and if any kind of relaxation is
allowed beyond the permissible limits then the whole
recruitment process will derail which can never be the
intention of the Court. The completion of recruitment process
smoothly is the demand of the Society because of much
unemployment in the youths. A candidate who is aspirant of
participating in the recruitment process is required to go
through the terms and conditions of the advertisement and
the rules and has to apply according to his /her qualification
as required under the law and under the category for which
he /she is eligible. The terms and conditions given in the
advertisement on the basis of the relevant recruitment rules
are the sole basis for proceeding with the recruitment
process. Until and unless there is a gross violation of any
condition or there is a claim of a candidate within the
parameters of the fundamental rights given under the
Constitution of India, no interference is required from the
Court.
10. In view of the discussion made above and the
proposition given in the judgments referred to above, the
[2023:RJ-JP:37305] (21 of 21) [CW-22072/2018]
claim of the petitioner for consideration of her candidature
under the divorcee decree is contrary to the rules, terms and
conditions of the advertisement and the petitioner could not
establish her case within the rights given under the
Constitution of India.
11. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed having no
merits.
12. Since the main petition has been dismissed, the
stay application and pending application/s, if any, also stand
dismissed.
(GANESH RAM MEENA),J
Sharma NK-Dy. Registrar
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