Rajasthan High Court

Ram Gopal Yadav S/O Shri Ganga Ram ... vs State Of Rajasthan Through The ... on 4 February, 2022

Bench: Sameer Jain

      HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
                  BENCH AT JAIPUR

            S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 14306/2015

1.    Ram Gopal Yadav S/o Shri Ganga Ram Yadav, Aged About
      71 Years, R/o Azad Nagar, Near Balaji Mandir, Madanganz
      Kishangarh, Ajmer
2.    Sita Ram Yadav S/o Shri Madho Lal Yadav,                       R/o Azad
      Nagar, Near Balaji Mandir, Madanganz Kishangarh, Ajmer
3.    Norat mal So Shri Madho Lal Yadav,                       R/o Azad Nagar,
      Near Balaji Mandir, Madanganz Kishangarh, Ajmer
4.    Ganeshi Lal S/o Shri Ramchandra, R/o Azad Nagar, Near
      Balaji Mandir, Madanganz Kishangarh, Ajmer
5.    Premchand S/o Shri Motilal, R/o Azad Nagar, Near Balaji
      Mandir, Madanganz Kishangarh, Ajmer
6.    Amarchand S/o Shri Chhaganlal, R/o Azad Nagar, Near
      Balaji Mandir, Madanganz Kishangarh, Ajmer
7.    Omprakash S/o Shri Chhotulal, R/o Azad Nagar, Near
      Balaji Mandir, Madanganz Kishangarh, Ajmer
8.    Satya Narayan S/o Shri Ramswaroop, R/o Azad Nagar,
      Near Balaji Mandir, Madanganz Kishangarh, Ajmer
9.    Kalyan Mal S/o Shri Ramswaroop, R/o Azad Nagar, Near
      Balaji Mandir, Madanganz Kishangarh, Ajmer
10.   Hansraj S/o Shri Mohan Lal, R/o Azad Nagar, Near Balaji
      Mandir, Madanganz Kishangarh, Ajmer
11.   Vinod Yadav S/o Shri Mohan Lal, R/o Azad Nagar, Near
      Balaji Mandir, Madanganz Kishangarh, Ajmer
12.   Smt. Gyarsi Devi W/o Shri Bhagwan Sahai Yadav, R/o
      Azad Nagar, Near Balaji Mandir, Madanganz Kishangarh,
      Ajmer
                                                                 ----Petitioners
                                  Versus
1.    State Of Rajasthan Through The Principal Secretary,
      Department      Of     Industries,         Government        Secretariat,
      Rajasthan, Jaipur
2.    Dy.     Secretary,       Industries         (Group-I)       Department,
      Government Secretariat, Rajasthan, Jaipur
3.    Rajasthan State Industrial Development And Investment


                   (Downloaded on 04/02/2022 at 09:22:39 PM)
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       Corporation (Riico), Udyog Bhawan, Tilak Marg, Jaipur,
       Through Its Managing Director
4.     Sub- Divisional Officer Cum Land Acquisition Officer,
       Kishangarh, District Ajmer
                                                                ----Respondents

Connected With S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 12012/2015

1. Ram Kanwar S/o Late Shri Gopi aged about 90 year R/o Village & Post Sawantsar Teh. Kishangarh, Distt. Ajmer. 1/1. Lal Ram S/o Late Shri Ram Kanwar aged about 62 years R/o Village & Post Sawantsar Teh. Kishangarh, Distt. Ajmer. 1/2. Jagdish Prasad S/o Late Shri Ram Kanwar aged about 57 years R/o Village & Post Sawantsar Teh. Kishangarh, Distt. Ajmer. 1/3. Mangal Chand S/o Late Shri Ram Kanwar aged about 53 years R/o Village & Post Sawantsar Teh. Kishangarh, Distt. Ajmer.

2. Gopal S/o Late Shri Lalu Ahir aged about 55 years R/o Village & Post Sawantsar Teh. Kishangarh, Distt. Ajmer.

3. Dev Karan S/o Late Shri Laxman aged about 54 years R/o Village & Post Sawantsar Teh. Kishangarh, Distt. Ajmer.

4. Suraj Mal S/o Late Shri Laxman aged about 52 years R/o Village & Post Sawantsar Teh. Kishangarh, Distt. Ajmer.

Petitioners Versus

1. State Of Rajasthan Through The Principal Secretary, Department Of Industries, Government Secretariat, Rajasthan, Jaipur

2. Dy. Secretary, Industries (Group-I) Department, Government Secretariat, Rajasthan, Jaipur

3. Rajasthan State Industrial Development And Investment Corporation (Riico), Udyog Bhawan, Tilak Marg, Jaipur, Through Its Managing Director

4. Land Acquisition Officer and Sub- Divisional Officer, Kishangarh, District Ajmer

----Respondents

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For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Amit Kuri, Adv. through VC Mr. Sarthak Rastogi, Adv. through VC For Respondent(s) : Mr. RP Singh, AAG through VC Mr. Virendra Lodha, Sr. Adv. through VC Mr. Vikas Jain, Adv. through VC

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SAMEER JAIN

Judgment / Order

REPORTABLE Reserved on 28/01/2022 Pronounced on 04/02/2022

1. Petitioners have preferred instant writ petitions praying for

quashing and setting aside the impugned award dated 01/07/2015

passed by the respondent no.4-Land Acquisition Officer & Sub-

Divisional Officer, Kishangarh, District Ajmer (hereinafter referred

as 'LAO') in so far as the same relates to land of the petitioners

having been acquired by the State Government for respondent

No.3-Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment

Corporation (hereinafter referred to as 'RIICO') for development of

Industrial Area, Kishangarh Phase-VI.

2. For the sake of brevity and as the instant two writ petitions

invoke the same cause of action and controversy on similar facts

and identical questions of law, the same are being decided

together and the same may be read as mutatis-mutandis. The

lead file in the case is SB Civil Writ Petition No.12012/2015.

3. The respondents issued a notification dt. 14/06/2012 under

Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred

as the 'Act of 1894') for acquisition of the land measuring 541.07

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Bigha, situated in village Sanwatsar, Tehsil Kishangarh District

Ajmer for industrial area Kishangarh Phase-VI.

4. The said notification dated 14/06/2012 was published in two

widely circulated daily newspapers on 14/07/2012. In addition,

the said notification was also locally affixed on the site on

19/07/2012.

5. In response to the said notification, objections were filed by

the petitioners under Section 5A of the Act of 1894 before the LAO

and the same were duly considered by the LAO.

6. On 04/06/2013, declaration was issued under Section 6 of

the Act of 1894 for the area measuring 541.07 Bigha and the

same was affixed locally on the site on 02/07/2013 as well as

published in two widely circulated newspapers on 03/07/2013. On

01/07/2015, final Award of Rs.67.52 crore approximately

incorporating additional amount of compensation under the

provisions of The Right To Fair Compensation And Transparency In

Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation And Resettlement Act, 2013

(hereinafter referred to as the Act of 2013) was passed. On

31/08/2015, the amount of Award was sent by the RIICO to the

LAO, Kishangarh vide cheque No.011878 and out of the total

compensation as stated above, payment of compensation to the

tune of Rs.63.37 crore approximately has been disbursed to 221

Khatedars out of 234 Khatedars as per the available records which

amounts that almost 94% of the total compensation has already

been given to the Khatedars. It has also come on record that on

05/02/2016, possession of area measuring 176.02 Bigha; on

31/03/2016, possession of area measuring 217.19 Bigha and on

14/06/2018, possession of 49.02 Bigha was taken by the State

and handed to RIICO. It is also important to state that on

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28/03/2016, the LAO deposited the rest of the award amount in

the reference court. So, the facts suggest that entire amount of

compensation has been duly disbursed in above terms and

substantial possession out of 541.07 Bigha has been carried out.

It is also to be considered that Kishangarh is a fast growing

industrial area which is also called as Marble & Granite Mandi and

not only in India but abroad, exports and domestic supplies are

made. Recently, the Government has also acquired lands through

their instrumentality like National Highway Authority of India,

Indian Railways, Airport Authority and Rajasthan Housing Board to

develop the said area as an industrial belt looking to non-

availability of land for industries and close proximity to major

cities of Rajasthan.

7. In this background, the above petitioners have filed these

two writ petitions being aggrieved by the land acquisition

proceedings carried out by the respondents.

8. The submission of the petitioner is that in terms of the Act of

1894, on account of non-application of mind by the LAO, while

considering objections under Section 5A of the Act of 1894, the

acquisition proceedings were initiated. The LAO ignored to

consider that the only source of livelihood of the petitioners is the

land in question which gives them three crops anf is a cultivated

and irrigated land. The LAO has not considered that there is an

alternative land which is available in the adjacent area, residential

area is also nearby and that the adjacent villages namely; Kali

Doongri and village Tonkda have been included in the municipal

limits of Kishangarh.

9. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the

acquisition proceedings are also illegal and bad because the

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procedure required for issuance of notice Section 9 of the Act of

1894 has not been followed and that the publication of declaration

done on 03/07/2013 issued under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 has

not been published in two prominent daily newspapers. Further,

the award dated 01/07/2015 passed by the LAO suffers from non-

application of mind and that the land in question is not acquired

by the private company. Alternatively, learned counsel for the

petitioners submitted also submitted that while calculating

compensation under the Act of 2013, correct multiplier effect has

not been given and the compensation amount has been wrongly

calculated on a very lower side. Learned counsel further submitted

that as 371 Bigha of land acquired by the Rajasthan Housing

Board is adjacently situated which is a residential area, therefore,

the present acquisition cannot be used for industrial purpose. The

petitioners are in possession of land and have not accepted any

cheque towards compensation. Lastly, during course of

arguments, in addition to above, learned counsel for the

petitioners relied upon judgment of the Apex Court in The

Executive Engineer, Goshikhurd Vs. Mahesh & Ors. [SLP

(Civil) Nos.13093-13094 of 2018], decided on 10/11/2021

and on relying upon the same, submission of learned counsel for

the petitioners was that in terms of Para 20 of the said judgment,

the proceedings under Section 24(1)(a) of the Act of 2013 are

waived as by virtue of Section 25 of the Act of 1894, notification

under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 was not issued within 12

months from January 1st, 2014. Learned counsel for the

petitioners also relied upon the judgments rendered in Anil

Kumar Gupta Vs. State of Bihar & Ors.: (2012)12 SCC 443;

Raghbir Singh Sehrawat Vs. State of Haryana & Ors.:

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(2012)1 SCC 792; Kamal Trading Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of West

Bengal & Ors.: (2012)2 SCC 25; Hindustan Petroleum

Corporation Ltd. Vs. Darius Shapur Chenai & Ors.: (2005) 7

SCC 627; Vinod Kumar Vs. State of Haryana & Ors.:

(2014)3 SCC 203 & Union of India Vs. Shiv Raj & Ors.:

(2014)6 SCC 564 with reference to his above arguments towards

opportunity of hearing not been granted as per provisions of

Section 5A of the Act of 1894 and submitted that if the LAO has

not applied his mind in a rational manner, the acquisition

proceedings are liable to be set aside and that challenge to

notifications under Section 4 and 6 of the Act of 1894 can be

made at a belated stage also.

10. The above contentions were vehemently advanced by

learned counsel-Mr. Sarthak Rastogi and endorsed by learned

counsel-Mr. Amit Kuri for the petitioners.

11. Per-contra, the State being represented by learned Senior

Counsel Mr. RP Singh, AAG and the RIICO being represented by

learned Senior Counsel Mr. Virendra Lodha, it was contended that

claim of the petitioners is invalid on account of the fact that the

RIICO is an undertaking of the State Government which is

constituted to accelerate the pace of industrialization in the State

and Kishangarh being a Marble and Granite Mandi, having scarcity

of industrial plots which are high in demand, expansion of VI

Phase is highly required on account of the present litigation

against the acquisition proceedings which has stagnated the

development and is opposed to public interest, infrastructure

development specially when enhanced amount of compensation

has been determined under the Act of 2013.

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12. The next contention of the respondents was that in addition

to 5 phases, VI phase measuring 540.07 Bigha has been carried

out qua the compensation and possession in acquisition

proceedings to the extent of 94% as stated above. Equally, NHAI,

Rajasthan Housing Board, Indian Railways and Airport Authority of

India have also developed the said area and possession of

remaining land measuring 98.03 Bigha on account of the

petitioners has hindered the development.

13. The respondents have further submitted that in the light of

above facts, the mandate required under Sections 4 and 6 of the

Act of 1894 qua publication in widely circulated newspapers has

been duly carried out, compensation in entirety has been

deposited and realized by the Khatedars and the disputed money

is accounted for in reference court. It is misrepresented that the

land in question is a cultivated land, alternative land is available

and that the land in question has not been acquired in public

interest and on the contrary, the submission of the respondents

was that the present writ petitions are not maintainable on

account of the fact that the same were filed at a belated stage i.e.

at the stage of award and that in terms of the judgment rendered

by the Supreme Court in Reliance Petroleum Ltd. Vs. Zaver

Chand Popatlal Sumaria & Ors.: (1996)4 SCC 579, the delay

in challenging the acquisition proceedings after publication of

award is only with an aim of compensation and is at a belated

stage, there is no dispute on account of valid acquisition in the

given situation. On this count alone, the respondents submitted

that the present writ petitions are not maintainable. The

respondents relied upon judgment rendered by the Apex Court in

Ramniklal N. Bhutta & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors.:

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(1997) 1 SCC 134, and explained in Para no.10 which reads as

under:-

"10. Before parting with this case, we think it necessary to make a few observations relevant to land acquisition proceedings. Our country is now launched upon an ambitious programme of all-round economic advancement to make our economy competitive in the world market. We are anxious to attract foreign direct investment to the maximum extent. We propose to compete with China economically. We wish to attain the pace of progress achieved by some of the Asian countries, referred to as "Asian tigers", e.g., South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. It is, however, recognised on all hands that the infrastructure necessary for sustaining such a pace of progress is woefully lacking in our country.

The means of transportation, power and communications are in dire need of substantial improvement, expansion and modernisation. These things very often call for acquisition of land and that too without any delay. It is, however, natural that in most of these cases, the persons affected challenge the acquisition proceedings in courts. These challenges are generally in the shape of writ petitions filed in High Courts. Invariably, stay of acquisition is asked for and in some cases, orders by way of say or injunction are also made. Whatever may have been the practices in the past, a time has come where the courts should keep the larger public interest in mind while exercising their power of granting stay/injunction. The power under Article 226 is discretionary. It will be exercised only in furtherance of interests of justice and not merely on the making out of a legal point. And in the matter of land acquisition for public purposes, the interests of justice and the public interest coalesce. They are very often one and the same. Even in a civil suit, granting of injunction or other similar orders, more particularly of an interlocutory nature, is equally discretionary. The courts have to weigh the public interest vis-a-vis the private interest while exercising the power under Article 226 indeed any of their discretionary powers. It may even be open to the High Court to direct, in case it finds finally that the acquisition was vitiated

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on account of non-compliance with some legal requirement that the persons interested shall also be entitled to a particular amount of damages to be awarded as a lumpsum or calculated at a certain percentage of compensation payable. There are many ways of affording appropriate relief and redressing a wrong; quashing the acquisition proceedings is not the only mode of redress. To wit, it is ultimately a matter of balancing the competing interest. Beyond this, it is neither possible nor advisable to say. We hope and trust that these considerations will be duly borne in mind by the courts while dealing with challenges to acquisition proceedings."

14. It is further submitted by the respondents that the LAO and

the respondents have duly complied with the law, the objections

were appropriately considered by the LAO, the submission with

regard to alternative land and other vacant land is a myth. It is a

policy decision of the respondents and the acquisition proceedings

have been carried out with wisdom and with no malafides. In reply

to the submission of the petitioners with regard to availability of

Charagah Land, as defined under Section 5(28) of the Rajasthan

Tenancy Act, 1955, in village Kali Doongri and village Tonkda, it

was submitted by the respondents that it is prerogative and policiy

decision of the State Government that which land is suitable for

the purpose of industrial development or in public interest and the

petitioners cannot raise any finger unless the action is arbitrary

and contrary to law. Qua same the reliance was placed upon Apex

Court Judgment in The Executive Engineer, Goshikhurd Vs.

Mahesh & Ors. (supra) an the proceedings lapsed under Section

25 of the Act of 2013 read in conjoin with Section 24(1)(a) of the

Act of 2013, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that

the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) of the Act of 2013 only deal

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with the situation for calculation of compensation. They further

submitted that the Supreme Court in its Constitutional Bench

Judgment in Indore Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal &

Ors.: (2020) 8 SC 129, has held in Para 366 that under the

provisions of Section 24(1)(a), in case the award is not made as

on 01/01/2014, the date of commencement of the Act of 2013,

there is no lapse of proceedings and only compensation has to be

determined. The provisions of Section 25 are qua Section 19 of

the Act of 2013. They further submitted that in terms of Section

11A of the Act of 1894, the publication of declaration under

Section 6 was made on 03/07/2013 and the award in terms of

Section 11-A of the Act of 1894 was made within a period of two

years on 01/07/2015. Hence, the argument of lapse of

proceedings is not tenable.

15. This Court has considered the respective arguments

advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners as well as

learned counsel for the respondents, records of the writ petitions,

written submissions and the judgments cited at bar were also

analyzed minutely.

16. This Court is of the considered view that in the case in hand,

the land acquisition proceedings were carried out in the year 2012

in public interest and as per aims and objections of the Act of

1894 i.e. for the public purpose as defined under Section 3(f) of

the Act of 1894. It is also a fact that Kishangarh is a Marble and

Granite Mandi and popular throughout India as well as

internationally and not only giving revenue to the Government,

State & Central but also employment to lakhs of people and

business to different parts of the country. Kishangarh is a brand in

itself and is developing at rapid pace which can be visualized by

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the fact that acquisition proceedings in the nearby area are also

carried out by the other State Instrumentalities like Indian

Railways, Rajasthan Housing Board, Airport Authority of India,

State and RIICO.

17. The present lis pertains to Kishangarh area and the VI Phase

wherein admittedly, a total compensation of 67.52 crore has been

disbursed to 221 Khatedars out of 234 Khatedars and possession

has been taken leaving apart approximately 98 Bighas of land out

of 541 Bighas of land i.e. only on account of the present two writ

petitions, the whole industrial area is not developed and is at a

stand-still pace on account of the status-quo interim order granted

by this Court dated 19/05/2016 on account of two private

petitioners only.

18. It has been settled in Indore Development Authority Vs.

Manoharlal & Ors. (supra) that deemed lapse of proceedings

initiated under the Act of 1894 is occasioned where the award

under Section 11 of the Act of 1894 has been made five years or

more prior to the date of commencement of the Act of 2013 and if

two conditions under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 are

cumulatively satisfied i.e. possession & compensation, there would

be no lapse.

19. In the case in hand, the matter pertains to Section 24(1)(a)

of the Act of 2013 wherein as per Indore Development

Authority Vs. Manoharlal & Ors. (supra), it has been

specifically held in Para 366.1 that there is no lapse of proceedings

under Cause 24(1)(a) of the Act of 2013. Under Section 24(1)(a)

of the Act of 2013, only compensation has to be determined under

the provisions of the Act of 2013. The analogy given in Indore

Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal & Ors. (supra) can

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alternatively be established from the fact that as per provisions of

Section 6 of the Act of 1894, notification was duly published on

03/07/2013 and under Section 11A of the Act of 1894, final award

was quantified under the Act of 2013 within a period of two years

on 01/07/2015. It is also worthwhile to mention that as per

Section 114, Repeal and Saving clause, of the Act of 2013 read

with Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, the affect of any right,

privilege, obligation or liability will be continued and enforced

under the existing law as if the law is not repealed.

20. In the light of above, reading cumulatively the judgment of

Indore Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal & Ors.

(supra), the provisions of the Act of 1894 in terms of Section 6,

11A and Sections 24, 25, 113 and 114 of the Act of 2013, this

Court is of the view that there was no lapse of proceedings.

21. The judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the

petitioners in The Executive Engineer, Goshikhurd Vs.

Mahesh & Ors. (supra) also supports the view of the Apex Court

in Indore Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal & Ors. (supra)

and Para 14 of the same reads as under:-

"14. In paragraph 195 in Indore Development Authority (supra), the Constitution Bench held that the 2013 Act operates prospectively. Further, Section 114 of the 2013 Act effects a repeal but with certain savings, in accordance with Section 24. Thus, the acquisition proceedings are preserved under the 1894 Act till the stage of making of the award. Where an award is not made, the provisions relating to determination of compensation under the 2013 Act would apply; where the award is made, proceedings would continue under the provisions of the 1894 Act as if the said Act has not been repealed. Our interpretation of Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act respectfully follows this precedent."

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22. Further, in The Executive Engineer, Goshikhurd Vs. Mahesh &

Ors. (supra), it has been specifically held by the Apex Court in

para 20 that intention of Section 24(1)(a) of the Act of Act of 2013

was twofold: (i) to give sufficient time to the authorities to

determine compensation payable under the Act of 2013 and (ii) to

ensure early and expedited payment to the landowners. The Apex

Court in its aforesaid judgment has specifically held in Para 20 in

following words:-

"This dictum is subject to the caveat state in paragraph

16(supra) that a declaration which has lapsed in terms of Section

11A of the 1894 Act would not get revived."

In other words, the Apex Court has specifically said that if

under the provisions of Section 11A of the Act of 1894, two years'

period is not lapsed and was running, the provisions of Section 25

and the cut-off date of 01/01/2014 will not apply with a limit of 12

months.

23. It is important to note that the provisions of Section 24 of

the Act of 2013 have been drafted with a great wisdom by the

legislature in as much as under Section 24(1)(a) of the Act of

2013, it has been specifically said that all provisions of the Act of

2013 will apply "only qua compensation" and not otherwise. Under

Section 25 of the Act of 2013, there is no reference to Section 6

but only Section 19. A harmonious interpretation of both the Acts

of 1894 and 2013 read with the judgment rendered by the

Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority Vs.

Manoharlal & Ors. (supra), will exhibit that in the present case,

as the publication of declaration under Section 6 of the Act of

1894 was made on 03/07/2013 and the final award was passed on

01/07/2015, it was well within specified time under Section 11A of

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the Act of 1894 which stood as per saving clause under Section

114 of the Act of 2013 and on account of the judgment in Indore

Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal & Ors. (supra), more

specifically by placing reliance upon issue no.6 "whether Section

24 revives stale and barred claim" where the Apex Court held as

under:-

"340. Before proceeding further, in our opinion, Section 24 contemplates pending proceedings and not the concluded ones in which possession has been taken, and compensation has been paid or deposited. Section 24 does not provide an arm or tool to question the legality of proceedings, which have been undertaken under the Act of 1894 and stood concluded before five years or more. It is only in cases where possession has not been taken, nor compensation is paid, that there is a lapse. In case possession has been taken, and compensation has not been deposited with respect to majority of landholdings, the beneficial provision of the statute provides that all beneficiaries shall be paid compensation as admissible under the Act of 2013. The beneficiaries, i.e., landowners contemplated under the proviso to Section 24(2), are the ones who were so recorded as beneficiaries as on the date of issuance of notification Under Section 4 of the Act of 1894. The provision is not meant to be invoked on the basis of void transactions, and by the persons who have purchased on the basis of power of attorney or otherwise, they cannot claim the benefit Under Section 24 as is apparent from proviso to Section 24(2) and the decision in Shiv Kumar and Ors. v.

Union of India and Ors

358. We are unable to accept the submission on behalf of the landowners that it is by operation of law the proceedings are deemed to have lapsed and that this Court should give full effect to the provisions. It was submitted that lapse of acquisition proceedings was not contemplated under the Act of 1894, and there is departure made in Section 24 of the Act of 2013. Thus, Section 24 gives a fresh cause of action to the landowners to approach the courts for a declaration that the acquisition lapsed, if either compensation has not been paid or the physical

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possession has not been taken. The decision of this Court in the Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal and Ors. v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy (1970) 1 SCC 613 was relied upon to contend that there cannot be res judicata in the previous proceedings when the cause of action is different; reliance is also placed on Canara Bank v. N.G. Subbaraya Setty and Anr. (2018) 16 SCC 228, where the decision of Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal and Ors. (supra) was followed as to belated challenges. Reliance was further placed on Anil Kumar Gupta v. the State of Bihar (2012) 12 SCC 443 in which it was held that vesting of land in the Government can be challenged on the ground that possession had not been taken in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The invocation of the urgency Clause in Section 17, can be questioned on the ground that there was no real urgency. The notification issued Under Section 4 and declaration Under Section 6 can be challenged on the ground of non-compliance of Section 5-A(1). Notice issued Under Section 9 and the award passed Under Section 11 can also be questioned on permissible grounds. Reliance has also been placed on Ram Chand and Ors. v. Union of India (1994) 1 SCC 4 to contend that inaction and delay on the part of the acquiring authority would also give rise to a cause of action in favour of the landowner.

359. The entire gamut of submissions of the landowners is based on the misinterpretation of the provisions contained in Section 24. It does not intend to divest the State of possession (of the land), title to which has been vested in the State. It only intends to give higher compensation in case the obligation of depositing of compensation has not been fulfilled with regard to the majority of holdings. A fresh cause of action in Section 24 has been given if for five years or more possession has not been taken nor compensation has been paid. In case possession has been taken and compensation has not been deposited with respect to the majority of landholdings, higher compensation to all incumbents follows, as mentioned above. Section 24 does not confer a new cause of action to challenge the acquisition proceedings or the methodology adopted for the deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of reference court, in that case, interest or higher compensation, as the case may be, can follow. In our considered opinion,

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Section 24 is applicable to pending proceedings, not to the concluded proceedings and the legality of the concluded proceedings, cannot be questioned. Such a challenge does not lie within the ambit of the deemed lapse Under Section 24. The lapse Under Section 24(2) is due to inaction or lethargy of authorities in taking requisite steps as provided therein.

366.1 Under the provisions of Section 24(1)

(a) in case the award is not made as on 1.1.2014 the date of commencement of Act of 2013, there is no lapse of proceedings.

Compensation has to be determined under the provisions of Act of 2013."

24. Considering the provisions of Section 24(2) of the Act of

2013 and the judgment in the case of Executive Engineer,

Goshikhurd Vs. Mahesh & Ors. (supra), this Court is of the

view that in the present case, in the facts and circumstances, the

proceedings of land acquisition have not lapsed, the same are

legal, the objections under Section 5A of the Act of 1894 were

duly considered, the act of the respondent for public purpose was

justified and therefore, the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed

specifically when 94% of Khatedars are compensated and 90%