Ramesh Chandra Meena vs The Rajasthan Marudhara Gramin ...
2021 Latest Caselaw 2268 Raj

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JODHPUR S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 8363/2020

Ramesh Chandra Meena S/o Shri Ram Pal Meena, Aged About 50 Years, R/o H.no. 1130, Shankar Colony, 4-C Scheme, New Lohamandi Road (V.k.i. Road), Jaipur, Rajasthan. (Hall Officer Scale-Ii, Rajasthan Marudhara Gramin Bank, Regional Business Officer (R.b.o.), Barmer, Rajasthan).

----Petitioner Versus

1. The Rajasthan Marudhara Gramin Bank (R.m.g.b.), Through Its Chairman, Head Office Tulsi Tower, 9Th 'b' Road, Sardarpura, Jodhpur, Rajasthan.

2. The Chairman (The Disciplinary Authority), Rajasthan Marudhara Gramin Bank (R.m.g.b.), Head Office Tulsi Tower, 9Th 'b' Road, Sardarpura, Jodhpur, Rajasthan.

3. Shri K.c. Gupta, Officer Scale-Iv, (Enquiry Authority, Department Enquiry), R.m.g.b. Staff Training Center, Udaipur, Rajasthan.

                                                                   ----Respondents


For Petitioner(s)         :     Mr. S. P. Sharma
For Respondent(s)         :     Mr. Jagdish Vyas
                                Mr. Deepak Vyas



                      JUSTICE DINESH MEHTA

                                     Order

28/01/2021

1. By way of the present writ petition, the petitioner has

impugned the orders dated 14.07.2020 (Annexure-1) and

27.05.2020 (Annex.4), whereby the respondents have turned

down his request of being represented through an advocate in the

disciplinary proceedings that has been instituted against him.

2. He pointed out that though by way of above referred orders,

petitioner's request to engage a lawyer has been refused, but later

(2 of 7) [CW-8363/2020]

on by way of the letter dated 19.08.2020, he had requested the

respondents to permit him to be represented through some retired

employee of the Bank but the same too was not acceded to and

even by way of communication dated 11.09.2020 (Annex.13) the

same has been rejected.

3. While confining his request for a retired Bank employee as

his representative, learned counsel for the petitioner, argued that

the respondents cannot compel the petitioner to engage an in-

service bank employee, as there is every likelihood of him being

influenced by the Bank or its officers, conducting or supervising

the departmental enquiry.

4. He argued that Regulation No.44 of Rajasthan Marudhara

Gramin Bank (Officers & Employees) Service Regulation, 2010

(hereinafter referred to as the 'Regulation of 2010') imposes

restriction only on engaging a lawyer so also is the Circular dated

31.01.2014 issued by the Bank in this regard, but the enquiry

officer has misinterpreted the same and has practically taken

away his right of defending his cause. He added that if the

interpretation which has been given by the respondent - Bank in

its reply is accepted, then, the circular would fall foul to Regulation

No.44, which has a force of law.

5. Mr. Jagdish Vyas, learned counsel appearing for the

respondent - Bank, navigated the Court through the circular dated

31.01.2014 and argued that the respondent - Bank can very well

refuse the petitioner's right of being represented through a retired

employee, inasmuch as a retired employee cannot be treated to

be an 'employee of the bank' for the purpose of circular dated

31.01.2014.

(3 of 7) [CW-8363/2020]

6. Mr. Vyas further argued that the principles of natural justice

cannot be stretched to the extent of claiming right of audience

through a representative of an incumbent's own choice and

disciplinary enquiry including engaging a counsel/representative

are required to be governed by established procedure.

7. In support his submissions, learned counsel for the

respondents cited judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case

of Cipla Ltd & Ors Vs. Ripu Daman Bhanot & Anr reported in

(1999) 4 SCC 188 and judgment dated 08.12.2008 passed by

this Court in Satish Prakash Bhatt Vs. State Bank of Bikaner

& Jaipur & Ors. (SB Civil Writ Petition No.7110/2008).

8. Heard.

9. The statutory regulations on the issue of representation in

the departmental enquiry is contained in Regulation 44 (which was

earlier Regulation 39) of Regulation of 2010. Regulation 44 of the

Regulation of 2010 reads thus :

"44. Restriction on engagement of a Legal Practitioner

- For the purposes of any enquiry under these regulations, the officer or employee shall not engage a legal practitioner without prior permission of the Competent Authority."

10. A bare look at Regulation 44 of the Regulation of 2010

reveals that it only restricts representation by a legal practitioner,

and even that too is permissible, of course with the leave of

competent authority. There is no complete or absolute bar even on

engaging a lawyer. Hence, it is difficult nay impossible to accept

that a retired employee of the Bank cannot be engaged to

represent a delinquent officer in the disciplinary enquiry.

                                                (4 of 7)                    [CW-8363/2020]



11.   Reproduction          of    relevant       part      of    the    circular      dated

31.01.2014 would not be out of context. Hence, the same is being

done :

"vkjksi ikf=r vf/kdkjh dks vius futh ekeysa ij vfHkosnu djus dk iwjk gd gksrk gSA mudh bPNk ij] bUgsa cSad ds fdlh vU; deZpkjh ;k ,slh VªsM ;wfu;u ftlds os lnL; gSa ds inkf/kdkjh ds ek/;e ls viuk izfrfuf/kRo djkus dh vuqefr nh tk ldsxhA ,sls ekeyksa esa] vkjksi if=r deZpkjh cSad dks i= fy[ksa vFkok ;fn tkap vf/kdkjh igys gh fu;qDr gks x;k gks rks lEcaf/kr tkap vf/kdkjh dks i= fy[ksa ftlesa og vius ,sls izfrfuf/k dk vius ukfefr ds :i esa izLrko djsa vkSj ;g ?kks'k.kk djs fd og ¼vkjksi if=r vf/kdkjh½ ukfefr tks dqN dgsxk] djsxk ;k gLrk{kj djsxk] ml lc ds izfr vkc) jgsxkA tc Hkh VªsM ;wfu;u dk dksbZ inkf/kdkjh ;k vU; lnL; ;wfu;u }kjk vkjksi if=r vf/kdkjh ds cpko gsrq izfrfu;qDr fd;k tkrk gS rc VsªM ;wfu;u }kjk ,d vkSipkfjd i= Hkstk tk, ftlesa ;g crk;k x;k gks fd vkjksi if=r vf/kdkjh ds ukfefr dks mlds izfrfuf/k ds :i esa vkjksi if=r vf/kdkjh ds cpko gsrq fd;k x;k gSA ;g vko";d ugha gS fd ;wfu;u dks cSad }kjk ekU;rk izkIr gksuk pkfg;sA ;fn cSad deZpkfj;ksa dh ;wfu;u ,d iathd`r ;wfu;u gS rks cl bruk gh i;kZIr gSA lkekU;r;k vkjksi if=r vf/kdkjh dks fdlh fof/k O;olk;h ;k fdlh ckgjh O;fDr] tks cSad ls lEcaf/kr u gks] dks viuk izfrfuf/k cukus dk vf/kdkj ugha gksrk gSA rFkkfi] ;fn izLrqrdrkZ vf/kdkjh] fof/k vf/kdkjh ;k cSad ds fof/k lykgdkj lfgr fof/k esa izf"kf{kr gS rks nks'kh vf/kdkjh dks] e:/kjk xzkeh.k cSad ¼vf/kdkfj;ksa vkSj deZpkfj;ksa½ lsok fofu;e] 2010 ds fofu;e 39 esa fufgr fu'ks/k ds gksrs gq;s Hkh fdlh odhy }kjk cpko dk vf/kdkjh gksxkA ¼cpko vkWQ VªLVht vkWQ nh iksVZ vkWQ cksEcs olsZt Mh-vkj-ukMd.khZ & ,vkbZvkj 1983 lqizhe dksVZ i`'B&109½ ;fn fdlh deZpkjh ij /kks[kk/kM+h] xMcMh] jkf"k ds xcu] tkylkth] pksjh bR;kfn tSls vkijkf/kd ekeyksa lfgr xEHkhj dnkpj.k dk vkjksi yxk;k tkrk gS vkSj ;fn og tkap esa fdlh odhy ds izfrfuf/kRo gsrq vuqefr izkIr djus ds fy, vuqjks/k djrk gS rks tkap vf/[email protected]"kklfud izkf/kdkjh] e:/kjk xzkeh.k cSad ¼vf/kdkfj;ksa vkSj deZpkfj;ksa½ lsok fofu;e] 2010 ds fofu;e 39 esa fufgr fu'ks/k ds gksrs gq;s Hkh ekeysa ds rF;ksa vkSj ifjfLFkfr;ksa ds ifjizs{; esa ,sls vuqjks/kksa ij fopkj djsxk vkSj nks'kh deZpkjh dks fof/k O;olk;h ;k nks'kh dh bPNk ds vuq:i ckgjh "kfDr }kjk izfrfuf/k fn;s tkus ds elys ij vuqefr nsus dk fopkj djsxkA ,sls ekeyksa esa cSad Hkh vius ekeysa dk fof/k esa izf"kf{kr O;fD;k ;k fof/k O;olk;h ;k cSd a ds fof/k vf/kdkjh }kjk izfrfuf/kRo djkus ij fopkj dj ldrk gSA "

12. One needs a simple reading of the above quoted part of the

circular to reach to a conclusion that the argument of learned

counsel for the Bank is untenable so is the order impugned.

13. Argument of Mr. Vyas that the petitioner has not challenged

the Circular dated 31.01.2014 is not required to be gone into in

view of the following stipulation contained in circular dated

31.01.2014 :

(5 of 7) [CW-8363/2020]

"e:/kjk xzkeh.k cSad ¼vf/kdkfj;ksa vkSj deZpkfj;ksa½ lsok fofu;e] 2010 ds fofu;e 39 esa fufgr fu'ks/k ds gksrs gq;s Hkh ekeysa ds rF;ksa vkSj ifjfLFkfr;ksa ds ifjizs{; esa ,sls vuqjks/kksa ij fopkj djsxk vkSj nks'kh deZpkjh dks fof/k O;olk;h ;k nks'kh dh bPNk ds vuq:i ckgjh "kfDr }kjk izfrfuf/k fn;s tkus ds elys ij vuqefr nsus dk fopkj djsxkA"

14. This being the position, argument of Mr. Vyas that the

circular dated 31.01.2014, issued by the respondents provides

that a delinquent shall be entitled to be represented only through

an inservice employee is not well founded. And in case his

argument is accepted, the same would do violence with Regulation

44 of Regulation of 2010.

15. The respondent - Bank, therefore, cannot be justified in

compelling the petitioner to engage an inservice bank employee

by way of stipulation in the circular dated 31.01.2014.

16. Adverting to the judgment relied upon by Mr. Vyas in the

case of Cipla Ltd (supra), this Court finds that the relevant

Regulation 16 (a) reproduced in para No.11 of the Apex Court

judgment clearly shows that the concerned Regulation provided

"defended by a co-representative of his choice". Considering that

the stipulation in the relevant service regulation was a co-

representative the Supreme Court in the case of Cipla Ltd. (supra)

denied the right of the engaging a retired employee or legal

practitioner.

17. Such is not the position in the present case so far as the

Regulation 44 of the Regulations of 2010 or circular under

consideration are concerned.

18. The judgment in the case of Satish Prakash Bhatt (supra)

does not lend much support to the case of the respondents. The

position that a party cannot claim representation as a matter of

right is not disputed. The judgment in the case of Satish Prakash

(6 of 7) [CW-8363/2020]

Bhatt (supra) involved the issue of denial of right to be

represented by a representative, who is already engaged in two or

more cases. The issue, so also the facts involved in the case at

hands cannot be equated with the judgment aforesaid. As has

already been noticed hereinbefore, the regulation itself provides

for representation through a defence representative and does not

place an absolute bar on being represented by an advocate.

19. That apart, principles of natural justice demands that a

delinquent facing departmental enquiry should be given a fair

opportunity to defend his case, which includes engaging a

representative of his choice albeit subject to relevant

rules/regulations. Contention of Mr. Vyas that there are serious

allegations against the petitioner does not deter this Court from

taking the above view. Howsoever serious charges, an employee

may be facing, he cannot be denied proper representation merely

because charges against him are grave. Graver the charges,

possibility of being biased against or being influenced by the Bank

is higher. In a given case, co-employees may even hesitate or

refuse to represent an employee faced with charges of corruption

or moral turpitude.

20. This Court is reminded of the judgment in the case of Laxmi

Kanwar Vs. Laxman Rathore reported in I (2005) DMC 745,

wherein this Court has even gone to the extent of allowing the

representation through a Counsel before a Family Court looking to

the inconvenience faced by the parties. Reasonable opportunity to

defend is an essential part of principles of natural justice.

21. As a result of discussion foregoing, this Court has reached to

an irresistible conclusion that respondents' action of not permitting

the petitioner to be represented by a retired employee, is contrary

(7 of 7) [CW-8363/2020]

to Regulation 44 of Regulation 2010 so also the Circular dated

31.01.2014.

22. As an upshot of the discussion aforesaid, the instant writ

petition is allowed; order dated 11.09.2020 (Annex. R/3) is hereby

quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to permit

the petitioner to be represented through a retired officer of the

bank in the disciplinary proceedings pending against him.

(DINESH MEHTA),J 32-A.Arora/-

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