Rajasthan High Court
Jaheer Ahamad S/O Shri Fateh ... vs State Of Rajasthan on 24 February, 2021
Bench: Sanjeev Prakash Sharma
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
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For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Ajay Nabee, Adv.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. MS Singhvi, Advocate General
with Mr. Sheetanshu Sharma, Adv.,
Mr. Siddhant Jain, Adv. and
Mr. Darsh Pareek, Adv.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA
Judgment / Order
Reserved on 10/02/2021
Pronounced on 24/02/2021
1. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties,
arguments were heard finally at this stage and the judgment was
reserved.
2. Petitioner is a candidate who has applied for the post of
Constable (Driver) under the advertisement dated 04/12/2019
issued by the Director General of Police, Rajasthan, Jaipur inviting
applications for the posts of Constable and Constable (Driver).
3. The number of posts, eligibility, qualifications and procedure
of selection have been mentioned in the advertisement to be in
accordance with the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Service Rules,
(2 of 33) [CW-14992/2020]
1989 (for short, 'the Rules of 1989') and as per the Standing
Order No.14/2019 dated 06/11/2019 issued by the Director
General of Police, Rajasthan, Jaipur.
4. The petitioner by way of this writ petition has prayed for
directing the respondents to strictly follow the procedure laid down
under the Standing Orders and the Rules of 1989 while making
selections for the posts of Constable and Constable (Driver).
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the process
which has been constantly followed by the respondents while
making selections for the posts of Constable in the earlier
selections is contrary to the Rules of 1989 and the Standing
Orders issued by the DGP from time to time.
5.1 It was further submitted that while candidates from all over
Rajasthan apply for the post of Constables and the written
examination is conducted for all jointly and the merit list of written
examination is common but the respondents prepare separate cut-
offs for separate district and after conducting Physical Efficiency
Test/Interviews at district level, the merit list is prepared at
district level.
5.2 It was further pointed out that in the Constables
Examinations-2013, the cut-off for unreserved general category
was 69.75 at Dausa District while for Sikar District, it was 74.5,
however, for Pratapgarh District, it was only 49.75.
5.3 Similar instances were mentioned for Constables Selections-
2018.
5.4 It was further stated that the petitioner had raised grievance
immediately after issuance of the advertisement by making a
representation in this regard to the authorities. However, when
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nothing was done at the level of the respondents, the present writ
petition has been filed.
5.5 It was further submitted that similar anomaly will arise in the
present selections which would result in higher meritorious
candidates being deprived of selection although lower merit
candidates in other districts would have a march over them and be
appointed as Constables.
5.6 It was further submitted that the advertisement and the
Standing Orders provide that only single form has to be filled by
each candidate wherein he would mention a particular district as
an option for the purpose of conducting Physical Efficiency Test.
The advertisement also provides that a candidate, who is finally
selected, may be posted in any of the District/Battalion/IT
Battalion.
5.7 It was further submitted that the standard of Physical
Efficiency Test is same in all the District apart from the provisions
for lowering down of standard in relation to certain categories of
candidates and the same also is common in all the Districts and is
also similarly common in all Districts of TSP areas.
5.8 It was further submitted that the number of posts mentioned
in various districts in the advertisement cannot be restricted to
those candidates who appear for Physical Efficiency Test in that
particular district. The criteria for Constable (General Duties) and
Constable (Drivers) so far as physical parameters are concerned
and the written examination is concerned, is the same. Hence,
discrimination amongst candidates on the basis of district opted by
them is clearly illegal, arbitrary and discriminatory as well as
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Such a practice
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being followed, dehors the rules, cannot be allowed to be
continued.
5.9 It was further submitted that once all the candidates are
asked to fill only one single form and when the applicant is an
aspirant for not only the posts mentioned district-wise but also for
different battalions, a common merit has to be prepared as laid
down in the Standing Orders and the selection has to be made on
the basis of overall merit. Providing different cut-off marks for
different districts is neither envisaged in the Standing Orders nor
in the Rules of 1989. It was further submitted that the appointing
authority as per the Rajasthan Police Act, 2007 and the Rules of
1989 is not only the Superintendent of Police but also the Director
General of Police.
5.10 It was further submitted that the Supreme Court had issued
directions for improvement of Police Cadre and the State of
Rajasthan enacted the Rajasthan Police Act, 2007 in pursuance of
such directions issued by the Apex Court in Prakash Singh &
Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors.: 2006(8) SCC 1. In pursuance
thereof, provision was entered in the Act of 2007 providing the
method of recruitment for Constables. It was further submitted
that once an Act has come into force in Rajasthan, the procedure
has to be strictly followed in consonance with the same and no
other criteria, which goes contrary to the Act and rules which
results in discrimination and arbitrariness, can be allowed to be
followed.
6. Learned Advocate General firstly raised a technical objection
to the effect that the petitioner cannot be allowed to raise
objection after he has participated in the selection process and
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has relied on several judgments which shall be considered
hereinafter.
6.1 Secondly, the learned Advocate General submitted that as
the Rules of 1989 define appointing authority for Constables to be
the Superintendent of Police/Commandant of the Unit or an officer
of equivalent rank, therefore, the selection is being done at the
district headquarter level. It is further submitted that the
vacancies are being determined year-wise by the Superintendent
of Police and therefore, the selection has to be done for the
particular district alone.
6.2 Learned Advocate General further submitted that there is no
departure from the Standing Orders and the merit list at the level
of district-wise can be prepared and it is a long practice which has
been followed in the State of Rajasthan to prepare district-wise
merit. It was submitted that even if the practice goes contrary to
the rules, the same ought to be allowed to be continued.
6.3 Learned Advocate General further submitted that as the
result of the written examination has not been declared as yet, the
writ petition ought not be entertained.
6.4 Learned Advocate General relied upon the judgments
rendered by the Supreme Court in Ram Sharan Vs. Dy.
Inspector General of Police, Ajmer & Ors.: AIR 1964 (SC)
1964; N. Suresh Nathan & Anr. Vs Union of India &
Ors.:1992 Supp (1) SCC 584; Kumari N. Vasundara Vs.
State of Mysore & Anr.: 1971(2) SCC 22; Balbir Kaur & Anr.
Vs. Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Selection
Board, Allahabad & Ors.: (2008) 12 SCC 1; S.D.S. Shipping
(P) Ltd. Vs. Jay Container Services Co. (P) Ltd.: (2003)9
SCC 439; ONGC Ltd. Vs. Sendhabhai Vastram patel & Ors.:
(6 of 33) [CW-14992/2020]
(2005) 6 SCC 454; Anupal Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh: (2020) 2 SCC 173; Vikesh Kumar Gupta & Anr.
Vs. The State of Raj. & Ors.: (2020) 13 SCALE 689. He also
relied on judgments of this Court in Surendra Singh Rathore
Vs. State of Raj. & Anr. (SB Civil Writ Petition
No.13208/2019), decided on 06/12/2019; Rajkumar &
Ors. Vs. State of Raj. & Ors. (SB Civil Writ Petition
No.6207/2009), decided on 30/11/2015; Bodu Ram & Ors.
Vs. The State of Raj. & Ors.(SB Civil Writ Petition
No.2231/2017), decided on 12/05/2017 & Deepak Kumar
Sharma & Ors. Vs. State of Raj. & Ors. (SB Civil Writ
Petition No.11920/2017), decided on 17/10/2019. He also
relied on judgment rendered by Supreme Court in West Bengal
Central School Service Commission & Ors. Vs. Abdul Halim
& Ors.: (2019) 18 SCC 39.
7. Heard learned counsels for the parties.
8. Before addressing to the aspects, it would be appropriate to
quote the provisions of the Rajasthan Police Act, 2007 and the
Rules of 1987 which govern the selection process.
9. Section 28 of the Rajasthan Police Act, 2007 provides as
under:-
28: Police Establishment Board:- (1) The State
Government shall constitute a Police Establishment
Board (hereinafter referred to as the "Board") with
the Director General of Police as its Chairman and
four police officers not below the rank of Inspector
General of Police as its members.
(2) The Board shall perform the following functions:-
(a) recruitment of Constables in
accordance with the relevant service rules;
(b) promotion in the subordinate ranks in
accordance with relevant service rules;
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(c) prescribe guidelines for transfer of
subordinate ranks with the approval of the State
Government;
(d) transfer of subordinate ranks from one range
to another and transfer of police officers in the
rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police;
(e) prepare proposal for transfer of police
officers in the rank of Additional Superintendent
of Police and submit the same to the State
Government; and
(f) analyze the grievances of police personnel
and suggest remedial measures to the State
Government.
(3) For recruitment of constables and for promotion in
the subordinate ranks, the Board may appoint one or
more Committees headed by an officer not below the
rank of Inspector General of Police.
(4) The Police Establishment Board shall follow such
rules with regard to its meetings, quorum and
transaction of business as may be made by the State
Government."
10. Rule 2(a) of the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Service Rules,
1989 provides as under:-
2. Definitions.- In these Rules, unless the context
otherwise requires:-
(a) "Appointing Authority" means:-
(i) For the posts of Inspectors/Company
Commanders-The Director General-cum-Inspector
General of Police.
(ii) For the posts of Sub-Inspectors/Platoon
Commanders, Supervisors and Sub-Inspectors of
Police Tele-Communications-The Dy. I.G. of Police
(Hqrs.) or an officer of the equivalent rank.
(iii) For the posts of Assistant Sub-Inspectors/Head
Constables & Constables in Rule 4, Section I, II IV, V
and VI-The Supdt. of Police/Commandant or an officer
of the equivalent rank
(iv) For the posts of Assistant Sub-Inspectors in Rule
4, Section III-The Director, Police Tele-
Communications.
(v) For the posts of Constables & Head Constables,
other than those belonging to General Duties Branch,
in Rule 4, Section III- S.P. Police Tele-
Communications.
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(vi) For the posts of Constables & Head Constables in
General Duties Branch of Police Tele-Communications
and Mechanical Transport Branch in the District-The
Supdt. of Police District concerned:
Provided that all authorities superior to the
Appointing Authority, in the Police Establishment,
mentioned in rule (2) (a) shall also be deemed to be
the Appointing Authority:
11. Rule 2 (c) and 2(f) of the Rajasthan Police Subordinate
Service Rules, 1989 provide as under:-
2(c) "Board" means the Selection Board constituted
under the relevant rules and a Board of Examiners as
constituted by the Director General of Police-cum-I.G.
of Police under these rules;
2(f) "District" means and includes the District of the
State including Government Railway Police District and
Unit or Units which are declared equivalent to a
District by the Director General-cum-Inspector General
of Police for the purposes of these Rules;
12. Rule 10 of the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Service Rules,
1989 provides as under:-
"Determination of Vacancies. - (1)(a) Subject to
the provisions of these Rules, the Appointing
Authority shall determine on 1st April every year, the
actual number of vacancies likely to occur during the
financial year.
(b) Where a post is to be filled in by single method as
prescribed in the rule or Schedule-I, the vacancies so
determined shall be filled in by that method.
(c) Where a post is to be filled in by more than one
method as prescribed in the rules or Schedule-I, the
apportionment of vacancies, determined under clause
(a) above, to each such method shall be done
maintaining the prescribed proportion for the over- all
number of posts already filled in. If any fraction of
vacancies is left over after apportionment of the
vacancies in the manner prescribed above, the same
shall be apportioned to the quota of various methods
prescribed in a continuous cyclic order giving
precedence to the promotion quota.
(2) The Appointing Authority shall also determine the
vacancies of earlier years, yearwise which were
required to be filled in by promotion, if such vacancies
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were not determined and filled earlier in the year in
which they were required to be filled in."
13. Rule 17(1) of the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Service
Rules, 1989 provides as under:-
"17 Inviting of Applications: (1) Applications for
direct recruitment to the post of Constables in all the
six Sections of the Schedule-I shall be invited by such
officers and in such manner as may be laid down by
the Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police."
14. Rule 23A of the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Service Rules,
1989 provides as under:-
"23A Recruitment to the post of Constable.-
Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules,
there shall be no interview for selection to the post of
Constable and selection to the post of Constable shall
be made by the following Board in accordance with
the scheme of examination and procedure specified
by the Director General of Police:-
(a) Deputy Inspector General of Police Chairman
Range/Officer of equivalent rank in
the concerned Unit.
(b) Superintendent of Police/ Member
Commandant of the concerned
District/Unit
(c) One Officer of the rank of Member
Superintendent of
Police/Commandant Member
nominated by the Director General of
Police
Explanation.- The Director General-cum-Inspector
General of Police may constitute more than one Board
for the purpose of selection of candidates for the post
of Constables."
15. Rule 25 of the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Service Rules,
1989 provides as under:-
"25. Selection by the Appointing Authority:
Subject to the provisions of rule 7, the Appointing
Authority shall select and appoint candidates who
stand highest in the order of merit, in the list prepared
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by the Authority/Recruitment Board/Commission
under rule 17-23A;
Provided that the inclusion of a candidate's name
in the list confers no right to appointment unless the
Appointing Authority is satisfied, after Medical Test by
a Medical Board, to be constituted by the Director
General-cum-Inspector General of Police in
consultation with the Medical Department, in case of a
Sub-Inspector and Government Medical Officer for
lower cadres and such other enquiry as may be
considered necessary that the candidate is suitable in
all other respects for appointment to the post
concerned."
16. First of all, this Court will deal with the judgments cited by
learned Advocate General for the State.
17. In Ram Sharan Vs. Dy. Inspector General of Police,
Ajmer & Ors.: AIR 1964 (SC) 1964, the Supreme Court was
examining the issue relating to promotion range-wise and it was
observed as under:-
"4. It is true that under Section 2 of the Police Act,
the entire police establishment under a State
Government is for the purposes of the Act, deemed to
be one police force, and pay and all other conditions
of service of members of the subordinate ranks of any
police force have to be determined by the State
Government. Even so, the Act envisages the
Organisation of police administration under the
Inspector General of Police by creation of ranges
under Deputy Inspectors General of Police and
districts under District Superintendents of Police.
Such Organization is obviously necessary for the
efficient functioning of the police force and that is why
in practically all the States we find that the
administration of the police force, though under one
Inspector General of Police, is further sub-divided into
ranges under Deputy Inspectors General of Police and
districts under Superintendents of Police. Further it
cannot be denied that local knowledge is generally
speaking conducive to administrative efficiency in the
police force and that is the reason for recruiting
constables on district wise basis and providing for
their promotion as head-constables also on district
wise basis by the Superintendent of Police who is
expected to know their work. The same idea is
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apparent in the second tier of the system by which
head-constables in a range consisting of a number of
districts are treated as one for promotion to the rank
of Sub-Inspector which is vested in the Deputy
Inspector General of Police. By providing promotion
within the range, the area is a little widened as
compared to a district. Even so, the advantage of
local knowledge is still available when such selections
are made on a range-wise basis. It is only when we
reach third tier and come to promotion of Sub-
Inspectors of Police as Inspectors of Police that local
knowledge is not insisted upon so much as the work
of Inspectors of Police and those above them is more
of a supervisory nature. On the other hand so far as
the work of a constable, head-constable and Sub-
Inspector is concerned, they deal with the public
directly and in such a situation local knowledge
certainly plays an important part in the matter of
efficiency of these ranks of the police force. If the
State has evolved the three tier system of giving
promotion from constables to head-constables, from
head- constables to Sub Inspectors and from Sub-
Inspectors to Inspectors, which is done in the interest
of administrative efficiency of the police force, it
cannot in our opinion be said that such a system
should be struck down on the ground that the police
force being deemed one for the whole State,
promotion throughout from constable upwards should
be on the basis of the whole State. Apart from
administrative difficulties which may arise if all
promotion of members in the police force is
concentrated in the hands of the Inspector General of
Police which is what the petitioner is contending for, it
seems to us that there is a good deal of force in the
contention of the State that the three tier system
works for the efficiency of the police force of these
ranks and is designed with that object. It is not
denied that it may sometimes happen that in one
range a head-constable may be promoted who may
be junior to a head-constable in another range who
does not get promotion at the same time because the
promotion is range wise. But it is urged that this has
to be balanced against considerations of efficiency
which have led to the evolving of the three tier
system of promotion already referred to and therefore
the system should not be struck down, simply
because at times it may happen that a junior head-
constable may get promotion while a senior head-
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constable in another range may have to wait.
Balancing the various considerations mentioned above
therefore it seems to us that the system in force in
the State of Rajasthan evolved as it has been for the
efficiency of the police in the State as well as for
administrative convenience cannot be said of itself to
deny equality before the law or to deny equality in the
matter of employment in public service, even though
at times it may happen, because of the system that a
junior head-constable in one range may get
promotion as officiating Sub-Inspector while in
another range a senior head-constable may have to
wait for some time. We are therefore not prepared to
strike down this system as denying equality before
the law or denying equality in the matter of
employment in the public service, simply on the
ground of these possible cases of hardship."
Learned Advocate General submitted that the Constables,
therefore, are required to be recruited district-wise and the same
has been approved by the Supreme Court in the year 1964 itself.
18. In N. Suresh Nathan & Anr. Vs Union of India &
Ors.:1992 Supp (1) SCC 584, the Apex Court observed as
under:-
"4 In our opinion, this appeal has to be allowed. There
is sufficient material including the admission of
respondents Diploma-holders that the practice
followed in the Department for a long time was that in
the case of Diploma-holder Junior Engineers who
obtained the Degree during service, the period of
three years' service in the grade for eligibility for
promotion as Degree-holders commenced from the
date of obtaining the Degree and the earlier period of
service as Diploma-holders was not counted for this
purpose. This earlier practice was clearly admitted by
the respondents Diploma-holders in para 5 of their
application made to the Tribunal at page 115 of the
paper book. This also appears to be the view of the
Union Public Service Commission contained in their
letter dated December 6,1968 extracted at pages 99-
100 of the paper book in the counter affidavit of re-
spondents 1 to 3. The real question, therefore, is
whether the construction made of this provision in the
rules on which the past practice extending over a long
period is based is untenable to require upsetting it. If
(13 of 33) [CW-14992/2020]
the past practice is based on one of the possible
constructions which can be made of the rules then
upsetting the same now would not be appropriate. It is
in this perspective that the question raised has to be
determined."
Learned Advocate General submitted that a long practice has
been followed in recruiting Constables and the same ought not be
disturbed.
19. In Kumari N. Vasundara Vs. State of Mysore & Anr.:
1971(2) SCC 22, the Apex Court was examining admission to
Pre-Professional Course in Medical College which prescribed
condition of residence for 10 years and it was held that such cases
of hardship are likely to arise in the working of almost any rule
which may be framed for selecting a limited number of candidates
for admission out of a long list. This, however, would not render
the rule unconstitutional.
20. In Balbir Kaur & Anr. Vs. Uttar Pradesh Secondary
Education Services Selection Board, Allahabad & Ors.:
(2008) 12 SCC 1, the Supreme Court was considering the
arguments raised against the selection process on the ground that
the selection process was region-wise selection. Refuting the said
arguments, the Supreme Court held as under:-
"45. In our view, the said contention is also not well-
founded. There is no warrant for accepting as a
general proposition that a region wise or district wise
selection is per se violative of equality clause
enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It
would be discriminatory only when the person, who
alleges discrimination, demonstrates certain
appreciable disadvantages, qua similarly situated
persons, which he would not have faced but for the
impugned State action. Therefore, the onus was on
the writ petitioners to show by cogent material that
by resorting to region wise selection, they were
placed in some disadvantageous position as compared
to their counterparts or that in this process merit was
the casualty."
(14 of 33) [CW-14992/2020]
Learned Advocate General contended that the district-wise
selection, therefore, would not perse violate the equality clause.
21. In S.D.S. Shipping (P) Ltd. Vs. Jay Container Services
Co. (P) Ltd.: (2003)9 SCC 439, the Supreme Court observed as
under:-
"14. Even if it is accepted for the sake of arguments
that there was some faulty conclusion in law, the
impugned order being an interim one, we do not
consider this to be fit case for interference in exercise
of jurisdiction under Article 136. But, taking note of
the peculiar facts, ends of justice would be best
served if the appellant is directed to deposit Rupees
Fifty lacs instead of Rupees Eighty two lacs by end of
June, 2003."
Learned Advocate General contended that even if there is a
technical flaw, the power would be exercised for showing
substantial injustice and relief may be refused in the instant case.
22. He also relied on the same proposition in ONGC Ltd. Vs.
Sendhabhai Vastram patel & Ors.: (2005) 6 SCC 454 and
submitted that the selection process would be affected if any relief
is granted in the preset writ petiton. In ONGC Ltd. Vs.
Sendhabhai Vastram patel & Ors. (supra), the Supreme
Court observed as under:-
"23. It is now well-settled that the High Courts and
the Supreme Court while exercising their equity
jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 32 of the
Constitution as also Article 136 thereof may not
exercise the same in appropriate cases. While
exercising such jurisdiction, the superior courts in
India even may not strike down a wrong order only
because it would be lawful to do so. A discretionary
relief may be refused to be extended to the Appellant
in a given case although the Court may find the same
to be justified in law. [See S.D.S. Shipping (P) Ltd. Vs.
Jay Container Services Co. (P) Ltd. and Others, (2003)
9 SCC 439]"
(15 of 33) [CW-14992/2020]
23. Learned Advocate General has also drawn attention of this
Court to the judgment of the Apex Court in Anupal Singh & Ors.
Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh: (2020) 2 SCC 173 to submit that
the principle of estoppel would lie. In Anupal Singh & Ors. Vs.
State of Uttar Pradesh (supra), the Supreme Court observed
as under:-
"61. The private respondents knew that by the
revised notification dated 12.10.2014, the number of
vacancies of different categories have been changed
and knowing the same, they participated in the
interview and have taken a chance and opportunity
thereon without any protest. Having participated in
the interview and having failed in the final selection, it
is not open to the private respondents to turn around
and challenge the revised notification dated
12.10.2014 and the revised requisition of the number
of vacancies in different categories. Having regard to
the consistent view taken by the Supreme Court, the
High Court should not have granted any relief to the
private respondents/ intervenors".
24. Learned Advocate General also relied on judgment of the
Apex Court in Vikesh Kumar Gupta & Anr. Vs. The State of
Raj. & Ors.: (2020) 13 SCALE 689 wherein the Apex Court
observed as under:-
"13. A perusal of the above judgments would make it
clear that courts should be very slow in interfering
with expert opinion in academic matters. In any
event, assessment of the questions by the courts
itself to arrive at correct answers is not permissible.
The delay in finalization of appointments to public
posts is mainly caused due to pendency of cases
challenging selections pending in courts for a long
period of time. The cascading effect of delay in
appointments is the continuance of those appointed
on temporary basis and their claims for
regularization. The other consequence resulting from
delayed appointments to public posts is the serious
damage caused to administration due to lack of
sufficient personnel."
(16 of 33) [CW-14992/2020]
Learned Advocate General thus submitted that the selection
process on public post is required to be done urgently.
25. Learned Advocate General submitted that the petitioner had
applied for the post of Constable (Driver) and therefore, he cannot
claim discrimination relating to the other posts of Constable
(General Duties). He relied on the judgment passed by this Court
in Surendra Singh Rathore Vs. State of Raj. & Anr. (SB Civil
Writ Petition No.13208/2019), decided on 06/12/2019
alongwith other connected writ petitions wherein it was held as
under:-
"39. For upholding an argument relating to
discrimination, one has to examine the case whether
the persons amongst whom discrimination is alleged,
are similarly situated and come from the same class.
The classification of candidates on the basis of their
respective categories cannot be said in any manner to
be unjustified. Merely because one particular class of
persons has been put to an additional advantage vis-
a-vis another class, it cannot be said that there has
been a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is
within the same class of individuals that the right
exists for claiming parity."
26. Learned Advocate General further relied on observations
made by Full Bench of this Court in Rajkumar & Ors. Vs. State
of Raj. & Ors. (SB Civil Writ Petition No.6207/2009),
decided on 30/11/2015 alongwith other connected writ petitions to
support the classification made at the level of district of
Constables. The Full Bench of the High Court in the said case
observed as under:-
"From perusal of the entire scheme, it is apparent that
the scheme is to be implemented by taking care of the
basic units of rural area with a view to reach to each
and every person for protecting and promoting his/her
health. The scheme is having a very wide amplitude
with an ambition to have healthy citizens and for that
purpose a complete network of experts is to be
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unrolled at foundation level. It is also found necessary
in the scheme that such an ambitious project can be
executed by taking aid and assistance of local
residents, therefore, a complete action is provided to
train local residents and utilise their services to make
the scheme successful. Under the scheme the
Panchayat Raj Institutions are required to play a vital
role in its implementation. The scheme requires
knowledge of the area concerned from various aspects
including its social, political, economical and
geographical conditions including the fact relating to
general health of the natives. The basic unit of the
scheme is Panchayat and i.e. having control by the
District Level Committee created with the aid of Zila
Parishad. The State Level phenomenon in the entire
scheme is only for providing funds and for general
administrative control relating to broad
implementation of the scheme. The minute and
effective control of the scheme, as a matter of fact is
in the hands of the smaller units created at Panchayat
Raj Institutions level, block level and district level. In
such circumstances the classification while engaging
para medical staff including the GNMs on basis of their
place of residence appears to be in consonance with
the object sought to be achieved by establishment of
the NRHM. We are having no hesitation in saying that
the scheme is not meant to provide employment but
to take care of health of Indian citizens in rural and
remote areas, thus, it emphasises for availing services
of the persons who are aware with the local
circumstances, local geography, local ailments, local
habits etc.
The question before Full Bench of the High Court in the said
case was whether in view of the frame and purport of the National
Rural Health Mission (NRHM) Scheme, engagement of Para-
Medical Staff with preparation of merit at District level, as a post
to that at State level, is permissible in law.
27. Learned Advocate General has also relied on judgment of
this Court in Bodu Ram & Ors. Vs. The State of Raj. & Ors.
(SB Civil Writ Petition No.2231/2017), decided on
12/05/2017 and other connected writ petitions to support that
(18 of 33) [CW-14992/2020]
district-wise merit could be prepared of Constable. In Bodu Ram
& Ors. Vs. The State of Raj. & Ors. (supra), this Court
observed as under:-
"13. Having considered the submissions of both the
parties, this Court finds that the nature and manner
of selection for the said post of Gram Panchayat
Sahayak carve out separately under the Rules of
1996. By way of an amendment dated 2.11.1996, a
separate rules for the said post have been framed.
Thus, the criteria for the said post cannot be equated
to the criteria for selection of encadered post under
the Rules of 1996 and no parity can be drawn
between the same. More so, when the post is not of
permanent nature. It is to be of either on part time or
on fixed honorarium or on contract basis as per the
Notification dated 2.11.1996. As has been informed
by the learned Counsel for the respondents,
presently, appointment is only made for one year
which is on the basis of grant received from the State
Finance Commission. In the circumstances, the
submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioners
for an adopting a criteria akin to the criteria as laid
down for the other post under the Rules of 1996
cannot be accepted.
28. Learned Advocate General also relied on judgment of the
Apex Court in West Bengal Central School Service
Commission & Ors. Vs. Abdul Halim & Ors.: (2019) 18 SCC
39 wherein the Apex Court held as under:-
"30. In exercise of its power of judicial review, the
Court is to see whether the decision impugned is
vitiated by an apparent error of law. The test to
determine whether a decision is vitiated by error
apparent on the face of the record is whether the
error is self-evident on the face of the record or
whether the error requires examination or argument
to establish it. If an error has to be established by a
process of reasoning, on points where there may
reasonably be two opinions, it cannot be said to be an
error on the face of the record, as held by this Court
in Satyanarayan vs. Mallikarjuna reported in AIR 1960
SC 137. If the provision of a statutory rule is
reasonably capable of two or more constructions and
one construction has been adopted, the decision
(19 of 33) [CW-14992/2020]
would not be open to interference by the writ Court.
It is only an obvious misinterpretation of a relevant
statutory provision, or ignorance or disregard thereof,
or a decision founded on reasons which are clearly
wrong in law, which can be corrected by the writ
Court by issuance of writ of Certiorari."
29. On the question of estoppel, learned Advocate General also
relied on judgment of this Court in Deepak Kumar Sharma &
Ors. Vs. State of Raj. & Ors. (SB Civil Writ Petition
No.11920/2017), decided on 17/10/2019 alongwith other
connected writ petition.
30. However, after considering the submissions, as noted above,
this Court finds that as regards to the question of estoppel, this
Court rejects the contention at the outset. The petitioner has been
able to satisfy this Court that before approaching this Court he
had raised objection to the advertisement dated 04/12/2019
before applying vide letter dated 07/12/2019. He has also given
several representations and also received reply to the same and
thereafter has also submitted e-mail on 25/11/2020 even before
written examination was conducted.
On the question of estoppel, learned counsel for the
petitioner also pointed out that the petitioner has only last chance
in the present selection and next year, he will be overage and
therefore, he has requested this Court to direct the respondents to
act in consonance with law. The participation of the petitioner in
the examination, therefore, is after intimating the respondents
and raising objections. The law of estoppel and acquiescence
would therefore not apply to the present case. The petitioner
cannot be said to be a person who has failed in the examination
and, therefore, the facts of the present case are found to be
(20 of 33) [CW-14992/2020]
different from those which have been cited by learned Advocate
General.
31. In West Bengal Central School Service Commission &
Ors. Vs. Abdul Halim & Ors. (supra), the Supreme Court was
examining the scope of exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India and held as under:-
"27. It is well settled that the High Court in exercise
of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India does not sit in appeal over an administrative
decision. The Court might only examine the decision
making process to ascertain whether there was such
infirmity in the decision making process, which
vitiates the decision and calls for intervention under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
28. In any case, the High Court exercises its
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India to enforce a fundamental right or
some other legal right or the performance of some
legal duty. To pass orders in a writ petition, the High
Court would necessarily have to address to itself the
question of whether there has been breach of any
fundamental or legal right of the petitioner, or
whether there has been lapse in performance by the
respondents of a legal duty.
29. The High Court in exercise of its power to issue
writs, directions or orders to any person or authority
to correct quasi-judicial or even administrative
decisions for enforcement of a fundamental or legal
right is obliged to prevent abuse of power and neglect
of duty by public authorities.
30. In exercise of its power of judicial review, the
Court is to see whether the decision impugned is
vitiated by an apparent error of law. The test to
determine whether a decision is vitiated by error
apparent on the face of the record is whether the
error is self-evident on the face of the record or
whether the error requires examination or argument
to establish it. If an error has to be established by a
process of reasoning, on points where there may
reasonably be two opinions, it cannot be said to be an
error on the face of the record, as held by this Court
in Satyanarayan vs. Mallikarjuna reported in AIR 1960
SC 137. If the provision of a statutory rule is
(21 of 33) [CW-14992/2020]
reasonably capable of two or more constructions and
one construction has been adopted, the decision
would not be open to interference by the writ Court.
It is only an obvious misinterpretation of a relevant
statutory provision, or ignorance or disregard thereof,
or a decision founded on reasons which are clearly
wrong in law, which can be corrected by the writ
Court by issuance of writ of Certiorari.
31. The sweep of power under Article 226 may be
wide enough to quash unreasonable orders. If a
decision is so arbitrary and capricious that no
reasonable person could have ever arrived at it, the
same is liable to be struck down by a writ Court. If
the decision cannot rationally be supported by the
materials on record, the same may be regarded as
perverse.
32. However, the power of the Court to examine the
reasonableness of an order of the authorities does not
enable the Court to look into the sufficiency of the
grounds in support of a decision to examine the
merits of the decision, sitting as if in appeal over the
decision. The test is not what the Court considers
reasonable or unreasonable but a decision which the
Court thinks that no reasonable person could have
taken, which has led to manifest injustice. The writ
Court does not interfere, because a decision is not
perfect."
32. Thus, the Court would examine on merits whether the
decision making process of getting the merit prepared at the
district level of Constables is in consonance and in conformity with
the Rajasthan Police Act, 2007, Rules of 1989 and with the
Standing Orders issued by the Director General of Police,
Rajasthan.
33. Rule 2(a) of the Rules of 1989 shows that the 'appointing
authority' of a Constable is the Superintendent of Police of the
concerned District, however, as per proviso to Rule 2(a)(vi) of the
Rules of 1989, all authorities superior to the appointing authority,
in the Police Establishment, mentioned in Rule 2(a) of the Rules of
1989 are also deemed to be the appointing authority.
(22 of 33) [CW-14992/2020]
Hence, the argument advanced by learned Advocate General
that only the Superintendent of Police can give appointment to a
Constable is not accepted.
Section 28 of the Rajasthan Police Act, 2007 lays down that
the State Government would constitute a Police Establishment
Board which will perform the functions of recruitment of
Constables in accordance with the relevant service rules. Thus, the
contention of learned Advocate General that only the appointing
authority shall recruit Constables is misconceived and is rejected.
In the opinion of this Court, the recruiting body and the
appointing authority are two different entitles in law. While
recruitment can be done at the State level, it is always open to
issue appointment orders at the district level.
34. A look at the advertisement issued by the respondents shows
that the advertisement has been issued by the office of the
Director General of Police on 04/12/2019. It mentions the posts
which are available in various districts as well as in RAC Units in
various districts and GRP Units in various districts in Rajasthan as
well as at Delhi and Hadi Rani Women Battalion at Ajmer and in
Kota Rural, Jodhpur Rural etc.
35. The scheme of examination as incorporated in the Rules of
1989 and the Standing Order issued by the DGP has been laid
down. It is noticed that the written examination is of 75 marks
and there is a negative marking also. The benchmark for
appearing for the physical efficiency test requires a candidate to
have 40% in written examination so far as General, OBC, MBC
candidates are concerned and 36% marks for SC/ST candidates.
The Ex-servicemen have been given relaxation of 5% in the
(23 of 33) [CW-14992/2020]
minimum passing marks and for those, who are from TSP areas
and Saharia community, there is no minimum passing marks.
36. Thus, in the written examination, which is conducted for all
the candidates commonly who may appear from any district have
to clear the aforesaid minimum benchmarks. The marks obtained
in the written examination are added to the marks obtained in the
physical efficiency test for arriving at the final merit. While the
Physical Efficiency Test is conducted of 15 marks for Constables
(General Duties), for Constables (Driver), it is conducted of 10
marks. As regards interview, it is not conducted for Constable
(General Duties) while it is conducted of 10 marks for Constables
(Driver) and as regards Special Qualification head, it is of 10
marks for Constables (General Duties) while for Constable
(Drivers) it is not applicable. Thus, the merit list is prepared on
the basis of the marks obtained by the candidates out of overall
100 marks.
37. The issue, which has been essentially raised by the petitioner
is that while the written examination is conducted at State level,
the physical efficiency test is conducted at the respective districts
which have been opted by the candidates in the application form.
However, the overall combined merit is also prepared at district
level. Thus, a candidate, who has appeared in physical efficiency
test, say at Ajmer, would be allowed to be in merit list for district
Ajmer alone while another candidate, who appears for physical
efficiency test, say at Udaipur, would be placed in the merit list
prepared for Udaipur alone and the appointments will be made as
per the vacancies which are available in the said district,
resultantly, a person, who may have scored high marks in written
examination and scores sufficient marks in physical efficiency test,
(24 of 33) [CW-14992/2020]
may in all get 85% and may be offered appointment as the
number of posts in that particular district where he appeared for
physical efficiency test, were less.
38. Thus, this aspect has to be examined with reference to the
Rules of 1989. Rule 23A of the Rules of 1989 lays down that the
Board for selection of Constables shall be consisting of Deputy
Inspector General of Police Range/Officer of equivalent rank in the
concerned Unit; Superintendent of Police/Commandant of the
concerned District/Unit and One Officer of the rank of
Superintendent of Police/Commandant nominated by the Director
General of Police. The Board nowhere requires that the
Superintendent of Police has to be of that particular district and
only refers to one Board of three officers.
39. As per explanation to Rule 23A of the Rules of 1989, there
can be more than one Board for the purpose of selection of
candidates for the post of Constables.
40. Section 28(2) of the Rajasthan Police Act, 2007 also states
that the State Government shall constitute a Police Establishment
Board which shall perform functioning of recruitment of Constables
in accordance with the relevant service rules.
Sub-section (3) of Section 28 of the Act of 2007 states that
for recruitment of Constables, the Board may appoint one or more
Committees headed by an officer not below the rank of Inspector
General of Police.
The Act of 2007 has come into force w.e.f. 19/05/2008 while
the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Service Rules are in existence
since 1989. Rule 23A of the Rules of 1989 has been added vide
notification dated 22/02/2011 w.e.f. 04/03/2011.
(25 of 33) [CW-14992/2020]
A harmonious reading of Rule 23A of the Rules of 1989 with
Section 28 of the Act of 2007, shows that the 'Board' as envisaged
under Rule 23A of the Rules of 1989, is essentially the same
Committee which is mentioned in Section 28(3) of the Act of
2007.
Thus, the 'recruiting authority' for Constables is found to be
the Board headed by the Director General of Police while
selections can be done at the level of the 'Board' as constituted
under Rule 23A of the Rules of 1989.
41. The Standing Orders dated 06/11/2019 issued by the
Director General of Police, Rajasthan provide that a combined
merit list has to be prepared of all the candidates of all categories
by the Recruitment Board by inter-lacing on the basis of the marks
obtained by them in each stage of selection. (see Clause 11 of the
Standing Orders).
Clause 15 of the Standing Orders mentions that the
appointment shall be made to those, who are found medically fit
and whose documents are found genuine and against whom
nothing adverse has come to notice of verification of their
character strictly on the basis of their category-wise merit, as per
the prescribed roster, on probation (underline is mine)
42. A reference in Clause 10 of the Standing Orders requires
tobe noticed which reads as under:-
"The combined merit list of all successful
candidates shall be forwarded first to Director
General of Police in accordance with Rule 23 of
RPSSR 1989 and after DGP's perusal, be declared by
affixing on the notice board of the
District/Unit/Battalion and also on the website of the
department."
(26 of 33) [CW-14992/2020]
43. From the aforesaid, it is apparent that a combined merit list
has to be prepared which will be published on the website of the
department mentioning names of all the Constables who may
have cleared the examination. From above, therefore, this Court
finds that the combined merit list has to be prepared for the entire
State jointly. It is from this combined merit list that the candidates
may be appointed in districts/units/battalions.
44. There is no rule or provision either in the Act of 2007 or in
the Rules of 1989 or the Standing Orders to prepare merit list
district-wise and to give appointment on district-wise basis alone.
Neither the Rules nor the Standing Orders mention of preparing
separate merit list at district level.
45. The candidates have mentioned one of the districts in their
application form. The argument of the respondents that because a
candidate has mentioned a particular district, he would necessarily
be considered for that district alone and would be placed in the
merit of that district alone is found to be erroneous and dehors
the Rules. Such an interpretation would neither serve the purpose
of the Act of 2007 nor the Rules of 1989.
46. As noticed above, it would also defeat the merit. All the
candidates, who have applied under a single advertisement and
have cleared the common written examination from a single class
on the basis of mentioning of a district for the purpose of physical
efficiency test, would not declassify them into various classes
district-wise. The entire procedure is found to be in violation of
doctrine of equality on the anvil of Article 14 of the Constitution of
India.
47. In Ram Sharan Vs. Dy. Inspector General of Police,
Ajmer & Ors. (supra), the facts of the case were different and
(27 of 33) [CW-14992/2020]
related to range-wise promotion. The observation of the Supreme
Court regarding district-wise recruitment is to be examined with
reference to the present position of the Act of 2007 and the Rules
of 1989. The Court was not examining the issue on the anvil of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The recruitment is not being
done at district-wise level as of now. Since the advertisement is
issued for the entire State, a candidate can apply only by filling
one form. It cannot be said that he has opportunity to participate
in a selection for the posts in different districts since his physical
efficiency test is conducted only in a particular district. The
advertisement does not provide for filling up more than one form.
In fact, the advertisement also does not provide for option to a
candidate as to for which district he would like to give his option
as a first choice. However, this aspect would deter this Court to
hold otherwise.
48. The submission of learned Advocate General of long practice
based on the judgment in N. Suresh Nathan & Anr. Vs Union
of India & Ors. (supra) is also without basis. Long practice has
to give way to the provisions of the Act and the Rules if they have
been framed subsequently. It may be true that earlier a practice of
selection at district-wise level was being made, however, after
coming into force of the Act of 2007 and the adding Rule 23A in
the Rules of 1989 vide notification dated 22/02/2011, the
respondents were bound to follow the provisions therein and could
not have ignored the rule as laid down. Any practice, which dehors
the provisions of the Act and Rules, would have to be considered
as unhealthy, arbitrary and illegal.
49. The arguments of learned Advocate General relying on
hardship is also found to be misconceived. There would be no
(28 of 33) [CW-14992/2020]
hardship if selections are done at the State level. The only
requirement is to strictly follow a combined merit list and at the
stage of preparing a combined merit list, option can always be
taken from the selected candidates regarding choice of their
district/unit/battalion where they are ready to serve as Constables
and thereafter, as per their merit-cum-preference, the posting can
always be given in different districts.
50. The other judgments relied upon by learned Advocate
General, as noticed herein above, would therefore, have no
application to the present case.
51. Further submission of learned Advocate General that the
selection process is delayed on account of pendency of the cases,
as observed in Vikesh Kumar Gupta & Anr. Vs. The State of
Raj. & Ors.(supra), goes to the root of the present case also. If
the State would have followed the provisions of the Act of 2007
and the Rules of 1989 as well as the Standing Orders issued by
the DGP in earlier selections, there would have been no occasion
of delay in making selections. This Court finds that as of now only
written examination has been conducted and the result whereof
has been stayed by this Court so that no further complication may
arise.
52. The Supreme Court in Ajay Hasia etc. Vs. Khalid Mujib
Sehravardi & Ors.: AIR 1981 (SC) 487 held as under:-
"It must therefore now be taken to be well settled
that what Article 14 strikes at is arbitrariness because
any action that is arbitrary, must necessarily involve
negation of equality.The doctrine of classification
which is evolved by the courts is not para-phrase of
Article 14 nor is it the objective and end of that
Article. It is merely a judicial formula for determining
whether the legislative or executive action in question
is arbitrary and therefore constituting denial of
equality. If the classification is not reasonable and
(29 of 33) [CW-14992/2020]
does not satisfy the two conditions referred to above,
the impugned legislative or executive action would
plainly be arbitrary and the guarantee of equality
under Article 14 would be breached. Wherever
therefore there is arbitrariness in State action
whether it be of the legislature or of the executive or
of an "authority" under Article 12, Article 14
immediately springs into action and strikes down such
State action. In fact, the concept of reasonableness
and non-arbitrariness pervades the entire
constitutional scheme and is a golden thread which
runs through the whole of the fabric of the
Constitution."
53. In Bachan Singh Vs. State of Punjab: AIR 1982(SC)
1325, the Apex Court held as under:-
"It is now settled law as a result of the decision of this
Court in Maneka Gandhi's case (supra) that Article
14enacts primarily a guarantee against arbitrariness
and inhibits State action whether legislative or
executive, which suffers from the vice of arbitrariness.
This interpretation placed on Article 14 by the Court in
Maneka Gandhi's case has opened up a new dimension
of that Article which transcends the classificatory
principle. For a long time in the evolution of the
constitutional law of our country, the courts had
construed Article 14 to mean only this, namely, that
you can classify persons and things for the application
of a law but such classification must be based on
intelligible differentia having rational relationship to the
object sought to be achieved by the law. But the court
pointed out in Maneka Gandhi's case that Article 14
was not to be equated with the principle of
classification. It was primarily a guarantee against
arbitrariness in State action and the doctrine of
classification was evolved only as a subsidiary rule for
testing or determining whether a particular State action
was arbitrary or not. The Court said "Equality is
antithetical to arbitrariness. In fact, equality and
arbitrariness are sworn enemies. One belongs to the
rule of law while the other to the whim and caprice of
an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is
implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political
logic and constitutional law and is, therefore, violative
of Article 14." The Court thus laid down that every
State action must be non-arbitrary and reasonable; if it
is not, the court would strike it down as invalid."
(30 of 33) [CW-14992/2020]
54. In Kailash Chand Sharma Vs. State of Raj.: 2002(6)
SCC 562, the Supreme Court held as under:-
"13. Before proceeding further we should steer clear
of a misconception that surfaced in the course of
arguments advanced on behalf of the State and some
of the parties. Based on the decisions which
countenanced geographical classification for certain
weighty reasons such as socio- economic
backwardness of the area for the purpose of
admissions to professional colleges, it has been
suggested that residence within a district or rural
areas of that district could be a valid basis for
classification for the purpose of public employment as
well. We have no doubt that such a sweeping
argument which has the overtones of parochialism is
liable to be rejected on the plain terms of Article
16(2) and in the light of Art. 16(3). An argument of
this nature flies in the face of the peremptory
language of Article 16 (2) and runs counter to our
constitutional ethos founded on unity and integrity of
the nation. Attempts to prefer candidates of a local
area in the State were nipped in the bud by this Court
since long past. We would like to reiterate that
residence by itself be it be within a State, region,
district or lesser area within a district cannot be a
ground to accord preferential treatment or
reservation, save as provided in Article 16(3). It is
not possible to compartmentalize the State into
Districts with a view to offer employment to the
residents of that District on a preferential basis. At
this juncture it is appropriate to undertake a brief
analysis of Article 16.
27. These observations, in our view, cannot be
legitimately pressed into service for the purpose of
justifying reservation or weightage in favour of rural
candidates on the ground of nativity/residence for
purposes of public employment. The difference in
approach in relation to Articles 15 and 16 was
indicated by Bhagwati, J. in Pradeep Jain's case and
we have quoted the relevant passage extensively. It
was made clear in Pradeep Jain's case that in the
matter of admissions to professional colleges the
considerations were different. As far as public
employment is concerned, the classification on the
basis of residence in a region or locality was broadly
held to be constitutionally impermissible. Moreover,
(31 of 33) [CW-14992/2020]
the preferential treatment of rural candidates in the
instant case is not on the ground that they hail from
the backward region. All or most of the villages in the
district or the State cannot be presumed to be
backward educationally or economically. Such a claim
was not accepted in Pradip Tandon's case by a three
Judge Bench. Even in Nidamarti's case, it was held
that in absence of material, certain regions cannot be
dubbed as backward.
28. The justifiability of the plea stemming from the
premise that uplifting the rural people is an
affirmative action to improve their lot can be tested
from the concrete situation which confront us in the
present cases. We are here concerned with the
selections to the posts of teachers of primary schools,
the minimum qualification being SSC coupled with
basic training course in teaching. Can the Court
proceed on the assumption that the candidates
residing in the town areas with their education in the
schools or colleges located in the towns or its
peripheral areas stand on a higher pedestal than the
candidates who had studied in the rural area schools
or colleges? Is the latter comparatively a
disadvantaged and economically weaker segment
when compared to the former? We do not think so.
The aspirants for the teachers jobs in primary schools
be they from rural area or town area do not generally
belong to affluent class. Apparently they come from
lower middle class or poor background. By and large,
in the pursuit of education, they suffer and share the
same handicaps as their fellow citizens in rural areas.
It cannot be said that the applicants from non-rural
areas have access to best of the schools and colleges
which the well to do class may have. Further, without
any data, it is not possible to presume that the
schools and colleges located in the towns- small or
big and their peripheral areas are much better
qualitatively, that is to say, from the point of view of
teaching standards or infrastructure facilities so as to
give an edge to the town candidates over the rural
candidates."
55. In view of above, this Court is of the firm view that the
selections and bifurcation on merits at district level goes against
the principles of Article 14 of the Constitution of India; and an
inherent discrimination between the similarly placed persons is
(32 of 33) [CW-14992/2020]
found to be committed. This Court also does not agree with the
submission of learned Advocate General that because a long
practice has been going on, the same should be allowed. Any
practice, which is found to be dehors the Rules and the Act as well
as against the features of the Constitution, has to be done away
with.
56. In view of the discussions made above, this Court holds and
directs as under:-
(i) The action of the respondents in preparing merit of
Constables at district level, after conducting selection at State
level is illegal, unjustified, dehors Article 14 and Article 16 of the
Constitution of India and also violative of the Rajasthan Police Act,
2007 and the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Service Rules,1989.
(ii) The Director General of Police, Rajasthan is now
directed to act strictly in accordance with the Standing Orders
issued for recruitment and prepare combined merit list of all the
Constables who have appeared under the advertisement.
(iii) It is made clear that the Physical Efficiency Test may be
conducted of the candidates, who have cleared the written
examination, at the concerned district as opted in the application
from by the Board as formed under Rule 23A of the Rules of 1989.
However, after including the marks obtained in the Physical
Efficiency Test and the marks obtained as per the other certificates
and as well as in the interview, as the case may be, a combined
merit list of all such candidates for the post of Constables (General
Duties) and Constable (Driver) has to be prepared respectively at
the State level as per the scheme of the Act of 2007 and Rules of
1989 as well as the Standings Orders.
(33 of 33) [CW-14992/2020]
(iv) Upon preparing combined merit list, as above, the
same has to be forwarded to the Director General of Police,
Rajasthan as laid down in the Standing Orders for approval.
(v) The successful candidates as per the respective cut-off
for each category can be posted at various districts according to
their merit and choice. At that stage, option can always be taken
from the candidates who are found to be in merit. Such a course
of action would enhance the transparency and remove heart-
burning. The appointment orders can always be issued by the
higher authorities or by the concerned Superintendent of
Police/Commandant of the Battalion as the case may be. If the
petitioner falls in merit, he will be considered accordingly.
57. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. The respondents are
now directed to declare the result of the written examination,
proceed with further selection process as directed above and
complete the selection exercise expeditiously within a period of
three months. No costs. All pending applications also stand
disposed of.
(SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA),J
Raghu/
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