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Punjab-Haryana High Court
Gurinderjit Singh vs State Of Punjab And Anr on 14 January, 2026
CRM-M No.31812 of 2017
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
CRM-M No.31812 of 2017
Date of decision: 14.01.2026
Gurinderjit Singh ... Petitioner
Vs.
State of Punjab and another ... Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE MANISHA BATRA
Present:- Mr. Preetinder S.Ahluwalia, Senior Advocate with
Mr. H.S. Randhawa, Advocate,
for the petitioner.
Ms. Ruchika Sabherwal, Sr. DAG, Punjab,
for the respondent-State.
----
MANISHA BATRA, J. (Oral)
1. The instant petition has been filed by the petitioner under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (For short "Code")
seeking quashing of a Kalendra instituted and filed under Section 66 of
the Police Act, 2007 (For short "Act, 2007") as well the order dated
29.08.2016 passed by the Court of learned Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Kapurthala in the abovesaid Kalendra whereby an application
moved by the State under Section 321 of the Code for withdrawal of the
Kalendra had been dismissed.
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2. Brief facts relevant for the purpose of disposal of this petition
are that a complaint was submitted by Gurmeet Singh with the police
alleging that his daughter Narinderjit Kaur was married with the
petitioner on 03.07.2011. She had obtained an ex parte decree of divorce
from the Courts at America from the petitioner. The complainant had
been residing abroad. He had visited India and had fixed the second
marriage of his daughter with one Balvir Singh for 06.01.2014. The
petitioner and Balbir Singh who is relative of the petitioner gave a false
information at the Police Station NRI Kapurthala to the effect that
Narinderjit Kaur was performing second marriage without getting
divorce. By alleging that due to the false information so given, the
complainant suffered insult in society and in relations and by further
alleging that the petitioner and his family members/relatives were
extending threats to his family members and son-in-law, the complainant
prayed for taking action.
3. On the abovementioned complaint, inquiry was conducted and
the information given by Balvir Singh, uncle of the present petitioner at
the Police Station against Narinderjit Kaur and complainant was found to
be false. The Station House Officer, Police Station NRI Kapurthala
prepared Kalendra under Section 66 of the Act, 2007 and presented the
same before the Court. As further revealed from the record, during the
pendency of the Kalendra, the public prosecutor filed an application
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under Section 321 of the Code for allowing the prosecution to withdraw
the Kalendra by submitting that the information given by Balvir Singh
was not found to be false as the fact that Narinderjit Kaur had secured ex
parte divorce decree from the present petitioner in USA was not in the
knowledge of Balvir Singh at the relevant time. It was also submitted that
the petitioner was not residing in India and, therefore, his involvement in
giving any false information was not proved. As such, prayer had been
made for withdrawal of the Kalendra.
4. The learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate considered
the pleas as taken in the application and dismissed the same by observing
that the application was not supported by any affidavit and that no
material had been produced on record by the prosecution to conclude that
the withdrawal of the Kalendra from the prosecution would serve public
interest.
5. Feeling aggrieved, the present petition has been filed.
6. It is argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that the
impugned order is not sustainable in the eyes of law as while passing the
same, the learned trial Magistrate ignored the fact that the Kalendra had
been filed on the allegations that Balbir Singh, uncle of the petitioner had
moved an application on 29.11.2014 at the concerned police station
giving an information which was found to be false and there was no
allegation that any such information was given by the petitioner or at the
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behest of the petitioner. The petitioner was not even in India at that point
of time and was residing abroad. He had not supplied any information
whatsoever to the police official what to say about a false information.
The Kalendra was filed just to harass the petitioner and his family
members/relatives. No case for filing Kalendra under Section 66 of the
Act, 2007 had been made out against him. More so, while filing
application under Section 321 of the Code, the prosecution had
independently examined the matter and had given detailed reasons
seeking permission to withdraw the Kalendra, which had not been
properly considered by the learned trial Court. The prosecution had been
wrongly launched against the petitioner who was living abroad. A wrong
attempt had been made to connect him with the alleged offence only on
account of the fact that he had executed a Power of Attorney in favour of
his uncle. The learned Magistrate was not required to assess the
evidence/material placed on record while dealing with the application for
withdrawal of prosecution and was required to exercise judicial
discretion by considering the material placed on record by the
prosecution which had not been done. The learned Magistrate did not
apply her judicious mind. The prosecution/State was master of litigation
and was very much competent to seek withdrawal of the prosecution
which had rightly been done but the learned Magistrate did not consider
the pleas as taken in the application in a proper manner and passed a non
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speaking and cryptic order which is not sustainable in the eyes of law.
With these broad submissions, it is urged that the impugned Kalendra and
the order dated 29.08.2016 are liable to be quashed, the application filed
by the prosecution under Section 321 of the Code deserves to be allowed
and the Kalendra as filed against the petitioner deserves to be withdrawn.
7. The learned Senior Deputy Advocate General, Punjab has not
raised any serious objection to the pleas as taken by the petitioner's
counsel.
8. This Court has considered the submissions as made by learned
counsel for the petitioner.
9. Section 321 of Cr.P.C. enables the public prosecutor/incharge
of a case to withdraw from prosecution of any person at any time before
the judgment is pronounced, but the application for withdrawal is
required to get the consent of the Court. Upon such withdrawal, the
person named as accused is to be discharged, if charge is not framed and
to be acquitted, if charge has been framed. The Hon'ble Apex Court had
summarized the legal position flowing from Section 321 of the Code in
case cited as R.K. Jain v. State through Special Police Establishment,
(1980) 3 SCR 982 as follows:-
(i) Under the scheme of the Code, prosecution of an offender for a
serious offence is primarily the responsibility of the Executive.
(ii) The withdrawal from the prosecution is an executive function of
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the Public Prosecutor.
(iii) The discretion to withdraw from the prosecution is that of the
Public Prosecutor and none else, and so, he cannot surrender that
discretion to someone else.
(iv) The Government may suggest to the Public Prosecutor that he
may withdraw from the prosecution but none can compel him to do
so.
(v) The Public Prosecutor may withdraw from the prosecution not
merely on the ground of paucity of evidence but on other relevant
grounds as well in order to further the broad ends of public justice,
public order and peace. The broad ends of public justice will
certainly include appropriate social, economic and, political
purposes sans Tammany Hall enterprise.
(vi) The Public Prosecutor is an officer of the Court and responsible
to the Court.
(vii) The Court performs a supervisory function in granting its
consent to the withdrawal.
(viii) The Court's duty is not to reappreciate the grounds which led
the Public Prosecutor to request withdrawal from the prosecution
but to consider whether the Public Prosecutor applied his mind as
a free agent, uninfluenced by irrelevant and extraneous
considerations. The Court has a special duty in this regard as it is
the ultimate repository of legislative confidence in granting or
withholding its consent to withdrawal from the prosecution.
10. In Sheo Nandan Paswan v. State of Bihar and others, AIR
1987 SC 877, which has been cited by learned counsel for the petitioner,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court had observed that the function of the Court is
to give consent after taking into consideration all the materials produced
before it. It has to exercise judicial discretion after considering such
material either by giving consent or declining consent. The Court is
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required to satisfy that the exercise of discretion by public prosecutor is
proper. It was also observed that Section 321 is virtually a step by way of
a composition of offence by the State. The State is the master of the
litigation in criminal cases. The Magistrate is required to consider that the
application is made in good faith, in the interest of public policy and
justice and not to thwart or stifle the process of law. It was also observed
that the function of the Court is to give consent and this section does not
obligate the Court to record reasons before consent is given. A private
complaint can still be filed if a party is aggrieved by withdrawal of the
prosecution. Reliance can also be placed upon M.N. Sankaranarayanan
Nair v. P.V. Balakrishnan, (1972) 2 SCR 599 and State of Orissa v. C.
Mohapatra, (1977) 1 SCR 335, wherein it was observed by Hon'ble
Supreme Court that ultimate guiding consideration must be in the interest
of administration of justice.
11. In view of the principles laid down in the above cited cases, it
is clear that public policy, interest of administration, inexpediency to
proceed with the prosecution for reasons of State and paucity of evidence
can be considered good grounds for withdrawal from prosecution. Apart
from that, it is to be considered that the public prosecutor has moved
application for withdrawal in good faith after careful consideration of the
material placed before him. Filing of an application for withdrawal from
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prosecution is well within the domain of public prosecutor and while
acting independently, he has to be satisfied.
12. Now coming to the peculiar facts of the instant case. The
public prosecutor had moved application under Section 321 of the Code
seeking withdrawal of the Kalendra in question from prosecution by
submitting that making the accused faced proceedings would be a waste
of time and energy as investigating agency has given clean chit to the
accused and FIR registered against them separately had been cancelled. It
was also submitted that the entire circumstances had been examined and
the withdrawal was in public interest. The learned jurisdictional
Magistrate while passing the impugned order, observed that the
application was not supported by any affidavit and material that it will
serve the public interest. However, on going through the record, this
Court is of the considered opinion that the learned Magistrate was not
required to delve deeper into the merits of the case and was required to
satisfy herslf that the withdrawal from prosecution was or was not in the
administration of justice. The present petitioner was not in India at the
time when the Kalendra was filed by the co-accused Balvir Singh who
was a Power of Attorney holder of the petitioner. As per Section 66 of
the Act, 2007 any person making a false statement to the police officer
for the purpose of obtaining any benefit is liable for punishment. There is
nothing on record to show that the information that the daughter of the
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complainant was performing marriage without obtaining divorce was
given by co-accused in connivance with the petitioner or in order to
obtain any benefit. The prosecution submitted that Kalendra had been
presented in a hasty manner by the investigating agency without
conducting proper inquiry and no purpose was going to be served by
continuing with the same. Even the FIR lodged by the father of
Narinderjit Kaur against the petitioner had been cancelled. As per the law
laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court, the discretion to withdraw from the
prosecution was that of the public prosecutor and the learned trial
Magistrate was performing a merely supervisory function in granting
consent for such withdrawal. As such, he was not to re-appreciate the
grounds which led the public prosecutor to request withdrawal from the
prosecution and was only required to consider that the public prosecutor
had been acting as a free agent uninfluenced by extraneous consideration.
However, no such observation was made that the public prosecutor had
not applied his mind or has misconducted himself. As such, the judgment
of public prosecutor seeking withdrawal could not have been lightly
interfered with unless it was apparent on record that his decision was not
bona fide which is not the position in the instant case.
13. In view of this discussion, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the impugned order is not sustainable in the eyes of law and
is liable to be set aside as the learned trial Court was only required to
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satisfy itself that the executive function of the public prosecutor has not
been properly exercised and that withdrawal was not sought as an attempt
to interfere with the normal course of justice for illegitimate reasons and
purposes. In view of the discussion as made above, this Court finds that
application for withdrawal from prosecution was made by the public
prosecutor in good faith after a due consideration of the material placed
on record and hence, the same deserves to be allowed. Accordingly, the
petition is allowed, the impugned order is set aside and the application
filed by the public prosecutor is allowed resulting into withdrawal of the
prosecution launched against the petitioner resultantly quashing of the
impugned Kalendra.
(MANISHA BATRA)
14.01.2026 JUDGE
manju
Whether speaking/reasoned Yes/No
Whether reportable Yes/No
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