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Punjab-Haryana High Court
Kharaiti Lal vs Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam ... on 14 January, 2026
CWP-38946-2025 -1-
110
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
CWP-38946-2025 (O&M)
Date of decision: 14.01.2026
Kharaiti Lal
... Petitioner
Vs.
Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. and others
... Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARPREET SINGH BRAR
Present: Mr. Mohnish Sharma, Advocate
for the petitioner.
Mr. Divyansh Shukla, Advocate for
Mr. Sukhdeep Parmar, Advocate
for respondents No.1 to 4.
*******
HARPREET SINGH BRAR, J. (ORAL)
1. Present civil writ petition has been filed under Articles 226/227
of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari
seeking quashing of the office order dated 28.08.2025 (Annexure P-19) issued
by respondent No.3 and office dated 29.07.2019 (Annexure P-12) issued by
respondent No.4, whereby punishment to recover the sharing portion of
surcharge amounting to Rs.43,310/- along with stoppage of one annual
increment with future effect was imposed in complete violation of Regulation
7 of the Haryana State Electricity Board (HSEB) Employees (Punishment and
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Appeal) Regulations, 1990 and Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Employees
(Punishment and Appeal) Regulations, 2018 and further to issue a writ in the
nature of mandamus directing the respondents to decide the representations
dated 23.04.2025 (Annexures P-21, P-22 & P-28) in a time bound manner.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner, inter alia, contends that the
petitioner was serving as Upper Division Clerk in the respondent-Corporation
in the year 2013 and on 19.07.2013, he was issued a chargesheet (Annexure
P-2) for alleged non-billing of a consumer, to which he submitted a detailed
reply on 28.03.2017 (Annexure P-4). Despite the fact that the consumer had
paid the dues and a circular fixing the responsibility of SDOs and Junior
Engineers was issued, the petitioner was awarded punishment of recovery and
stoppage of one annual increment with future effect vide office order dated
29.07.2019 (Annexure P-12). Against this order, the petitioner preferred an
appeal before the appellate authority, which was rejected vide order dated
13.03.2021 (Annexure P-14) and in the revision filed by him, the order
(Annexure P-14) passed by the appellate authority was upheld, as discernible
from the order dated 28.08.2025 (Annexure P-19). Thereafter, on the same set
of allegations, the petitioner was served multiple additional chargesheets in
the year 2025, which are annexed with the present petition as Annexures P-23
to P-27.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contends that the
petitioner is a whistle blower and he is being subjected to harassment on this
account. Further, the petitioner filed CWP-21692-2024 and this Court, vide
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judgment dated 04.03.2025, partly allowed the same along with a bunch of
petitions and set aside the orders dated 13.03.2021 (Annexure P-14) and dated
28.08.2025 (Annexure P-19) passed by the appellate authority and revisional
authority respectively. In purported compliance of the judgment dated
04.03.2025, the matter has been decided afresh, however, the grounds of
appeal or the arguments raised by the petitioner have not been considered and
even there is no discussion with regard to ground taken by the petitioner. The
appellate authority has merely referred to the facts of the case and dismissed
the appeal by recording that no merit has been found in the same. It is further
contended that issuance of multiple additional chargesheets vindicates the
case of the petitioner that he is being intentionally harassed by the senior
officers, as SDOs and Junior Engineers, against whom similar allegations
were levelled, have been exonerated vide office orders dated 14.09.2012 and
06.06.2018 (Annexures P-1 & P-7 respectively). Learned counsel for the
petitioner relies upon a judgment dated 04.03.2025 rendered by the
Coordinate Bench of this Court in CWP-2316-2020 titled as Suresh Pal Vs.
Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. and others, along with a bunch of
petitions, wherein the petition filed by the petitioner i.e. CWP-21692-2024
was also decided and the order passed by the appellate authority was set aside
on the ground that the same was not a reasoned order.
4. Per contra, learned counsel for respondents No.1 to 4 opposes
the prayer made by the petitioner on the ground that in earlier round of
litigation, fundamental issue raised in the writ petition was regarding passing
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of the order by Under Secretary based upon a noting and order of the
appellate authority was conveyed in this regard. In compliance of the
aforesaid order dated 04.03.2025, the appellate authority afforded an
opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and he was also allowed to make his
verbal submissions and written representation during the course of hearing as
well. Further, the appellate authority considered the material available on
record and upon examination, finding no merit in the appeal dated 28.08.2019
(Annexure P-13), the same was dismissed, upholding the decision taken by
the punishing/competent authority. Further, it is trite law that only in case of
diversion of view, the appellate authority is required to give reasoned order.
He relies upon a judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of
Rajasthan and Others Vs. Bhupendra Singh, 2024 INSC 592. Moreover,
challenge to the chargesheets (Annexures P-23 to P-27) is premature, as it is
settled law that against the chargesheet and show cause notice, writ petition is
not maintainable. The disciplinary proceedings have been initiated and the
same would be taken to its logical end by following the drill of procedure
prescribed under the applicable rules.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record of the case with their able assistance.
6. It is a settled proposition of law that the scope of judicial review
in matters relating to departmental enquiry proceedings is extremely limited.
Such review cannot assume the character of an appeal, nor does it permit a
reassessment of the merits of the decision. The Court is confined to
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scrutinizing the decision-making process to ensure that it conforms to
principles of legality and fairness, and that the findings are not rendered
perverse or wholly unsupported by evidence. Once it is demonstrated from the
record that the findings rest upon some material evidence, it is not open to the
Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, to re-appreciate or re-
weigh the evidence for arriving at a different conclusion. This lakshman
rekha, demarcating the boundaries of judicial interference, has been
consistently recognized and reaffirmed in a catena of judgments of this
Hon'ble Court.
7. A two Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of
India Vs. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610, wherein speaking through
Justice Kurian Joseph, made the following observations: -
"12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to
note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in
the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence
before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted
by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the
Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the
High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first
appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles
226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-
appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see
whether:
(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed
in that behalf;
(c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in
conducting the proceedings;
(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a
fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the
evidence and merits of the case;
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(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by
irrelevant or extraneous considerations;
(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary
and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have
arrived at such conclusion;
(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit
the admissible and material evidence;
(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted
inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;
(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High
Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the
same has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings
can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to
be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks
its conscience."
8. Reference in this regard may also be placed on judgments of
three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union
of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 and Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. Vs. Ashok Kumar
Arora, (1997) 3 SCC 72.
9. While exercising its powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution, the High Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence or sit as a
second court of first appeal. Its jurisdiction is confined to examining whether
the enquiry has been conducted by a competent authority, in accordance with
the prescribed procedure, and in compliance with the principles of natural
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justice. The supervisory power extends to ensuring that the decision-making
process is free from bias, irrelevant or extraneous considerations and that the
conclusions drawn are not arbitrary, irrational, or unsupported by any
evidence. Equally, interference is warranted where relevant evidence has been
wrongly excluded, or inadmissible material has improperly influenced the
findings. Beyond these limited grounds, the High Court is not entitled to
interfere with the factual findings or substitute its views for those of the
disciplinary authority.
10. The scope of perversity in this regard has been laid down by a
two Bench judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.R. Tewari Vs. Union of
India, (2013) 6 SCC 602, which speaking through Justice B.S. Chauhan
made the following observation,
" 29. In Union of India v. R.K. Sharma [(2001) 9 SCC 592 :
2002 SCC (Cri) 767 : AIR 2001 SC 3053] , this Court explained
the observations made in Ranjit Thakur [Ranjit Thakur v. Union
of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 1 : (1987) 5 ATC
113 : AIR 1987 SC 2386] observing that if the charge was
ridiculous, the punishment was harsh or strikingly
disproportionate it would warrant interference. However, the
said observations in Ranjit Thakur [Ranjit Thakur v. Union of
India, (1987) 4 SCC 611 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 1 : (1987) 5 ATC
113 : AIR 1987 SC 2386] are not to be taken to mean that a
court can, while exercising the power of judicial review,
interfere with the punishment merely because it considers the
punishment to be disproportionate. It was held that only in
extreme cases, which on their face, show perversity or
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irrationality, there could be judicial review and courts should
not interfere merely on compassionate grounds.
30. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be
perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or
excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration
irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said
to be perverse if it is "against the weight of evidence", or if the
finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of
irrationality. If a decision is arrived at on the basis of no
evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable
person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if
there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which
could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as
perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. (Vide
Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn. [(1984) 4 SCC 635 :
1985 SCC (L&S) 131 : AIR 1984 SC 1805] , Kuldeep Singh v.
Commr. of Police [(1999) 2 SCC 10 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 429 :
AIR 1999 SC 677] , Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P.
[(2009) 10 SCC 636 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 372 : AIR 2010 SC
589] and Babu v. State of Kerala [(2010) 9 SCC 189 : (2010) 3
SCC (Cri) 1179].)
31. Hence, where there is evidence of malpractice, gross
irregularity or illegality, interference is permissible."
(emphasis added)
11. It is equally a well-recognized principle of service jurisprudence
that judicial review over disciplinary proceedings, though limited, is not
altogether excluded. In cases where the issuance of a charge-sheet is shown to
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be actuated by malice, mala fides, or an improper motive, the very foundation
of the inquiry stands vitiated. Likewise, if the authority initiating or
conducting the enquiry is so heavily biased or predisposed against the
delinquent officer that the proceedings are nothing but an empty formality,
where the outcome is a foregone conclusion, such an inquiry cannot be
permitted to run its course. In situations of this nature, the process ceases to
be a fair or genuine inquiry and degenerates into a mere farcical ritual, aimed
only at subjecting the public official to harassment and humiliation. It is
precisely to prevent such abuse of process and to safeguard the dignity and
fairness owed to a public servant that courts have held themselves justified in
exercising their jurisdiction at the very inception, thereby interdicting the
proceedings at the charge-sheet stage itself. Reference in this regard may be
made to a two Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Punjab Vs.
V.K. Khanna, (2001) 2 SCC 330.
12. It is well settled that though the scope of judicial review in
disciplinary proceedings is circumscribed, but the Courts are not powerless
where the action is vitiated by perversity or malice. Findings of fact can be
interfered with if they are demonstrably perverse, in the sense that they are
arrived at by ignoring material evidence, relying upon irrelevant or
inadmissible considerations, or are so outrageously illogical as to defy reason.
Equally, when the very initiation or conduct of the proceedings is actuated by
mala fides, tainted with bias, or reduced to a mere ritual with a foregone
conclusion, the inquiry ceases to be a fair exercise of authority and
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degenerates into a tool of harassment. In such circumstances, judicial
intervention is justified, even at the threshold, to preserve the fairness and
dignity that is the hallmark of service jurisprudence.
13. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case and the
ratio of law laid down in the cases referred to above, this Court does not find
it appropriate to invoke its extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the present petition stands dismissed.
14. The pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.
[ HARPREET SINGH BRAR ]
14.01.2026 JUDGE
vishnu
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
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