[Cites 8, Cited by 0]
Punjab-Haryana High Court
Xxxxxxxxxxxx vs Xxxxxxxxxxxx on 18 April, 2026
CRM-M-36953-2019 (O&M) -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
CRM-M-36953-2019 (O&M)
Reserved on:-08.04.2026
Date of Decision: 18.4.2026
Abhikshek Shah ......Petitioner
Versus
State of Haryana and another .....Respondents
1 The date when the judgment is reserved 08.4.2026
2 The date when the judgment is pronounced 18.04.2026
3 The date when the judgment is uploaded on the website 18.4.2026
4 Whether only operative part of the judgment is Full
pronounced or whether the full judgment is pronounced
5 The delay, if any, of the pronouncement of full N.A.
judgment, and reasons thereof.
CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE KIRTI SINGH
Argued by: Mr. Kunal Dawar, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Jagjot Singh, Advocate
for the petitioner.
Mr. Anmol Malik, DAG, Haryana.
Mr. H.S.Randhawa, Advocate (Legal Aid Counsel)
for respondent No. 2.
****
KIRTI SINGH, J.
1. The present petition has been filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
seeking quashing of FIR No. 35 dated 10.3.2019, under Section 354-A IPC,
registered at Police Station Women, Gurgaon, District Gurugram (Annexure
P-8) and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom including the
challan/final report under Section 354-A IPC (Annexure P-9).
CRM-M-36953-2019 (O&M) -2-
Factual matrix
2. The facts in brief are that the petitioner is the Director of
CommerceX Solutions Private Limited Company (for short 'the company'),
which had hired the complainant as a Business Manager (North) vide
appointment letter dated 19.3.2018. As per the version narrated in the FIR,
the company had planned an organization event on 20.10.2018, which was
required to be attended by all the employees. The complainant, being a
member of the core team, was managing the network side and was thus
expected to be present at the event. However, due to a health emergency, the
complainant was constrained to apply for a 04 day medical leave, which she
did vide email dated 16.10.2018 addressed to the petitioner. In response,
the petitioner vide email dated 17.10.2018 requested the complainant to
adjust the medical procedure and plan the same after the event of the
organization. Thereafter on 17.10.2018, multiple e-mails were exchanged
between the complainant and the petitioner, during the course of which
certain cuss words were used, whereupon the complainant conveyed that she
was resigning from her job. The said resignation was accepted at 5.58 P.M.
on email dated 17.10.2018. After accepting the resignation of the
complainant, her official email ID was suspended. It was clarified to the
complainant that since she has left the job without any prior notice, therefore
as per the terms of the letter of appointment, two months' salary of the
complainant was the compensation due to the company and the termination
clause of the appointment letter could be brought into force, however,
keeping in mind the reputation of the company, vide email dated 4.11.2018,
the complainant was offered a clear exit from the company. Thereafter a
legal notice was issued to the complainant on 11.11.2018 for discarding all
digital/non digital information related to the company list, contract,
CRM-M-36953-2019 (O&M) -3-
proposals, internal process etc. of the company and not to engage or deal
with the clients of the company. The complainant vide reply dated
22.11.2018 to the said legal notice, raised a claim for salary for the period of
17 days for the month of October 2018 alongwith two months' notice period
salary and incentive totalling to Rs. 1,00,000/-; Rs. 25,000/- towards legal
fee; no negative feedback; a written apology from the petitioner and a MoU.
In the response of the company dated 4.12.2018, the complainant was again
called upon to comply with the legal notice regarding breach of contract.
Thereafter on 22.2.2019 i.e. after about more than 04 months from her
resignation from the company, the complainant got lodged the present FIR
against the petitioner with the allegations of harassment, and use of
derogatory and abusive language.
Submissions made by learned senior counsel for the petitioner
3. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner has argued that
petitioner has falsely been implicated in the present case by the complainant-
respondent No. 2, who was working as a Business Manager in the company
of the petitioner. The present FIR has been lodged by the complainant after
four months from her resignation, after she was served with a legal notice
for breach of contract. It is further argued that the present FIR is an abuse of
process of law and has been lodged only to pressurize the petitioner to
accede to the unreasonable demands of the complainant made in the legal
notice dated 11.11.2018 (Annexure P-5). Learned senior counsel has further
argued that during investigation, neither the statements of any of the
employees of the company were recorded, nor the legal notices exchanged
between the parties were taken into consideration.
4. It is submitted that a perusal of the correspondence through e-
mails between the petitioner and the complainant would reveal that there
CRM-M-36953-2019 (O&M) -4-
was a mild verbal spat between the both, whereby the complainant
threatened to resign from her assignment and during the course of the said
conversation, at one point of time, the petitioner used the words 'f*** off',
which has now been made the basis for settling scores by the complainant.
It is the submission of the learned senior counsel that the said remarks,
though admittedly not made in good taste, must not be taken in isolation, but
be read as a part of the entire correspondence whereby the complainant was
seeking exemption from an important event of the company at the last
minute for a procedure which did not require immediate medical
intervention and had blatantly refused the request of the petitioner to
postpone the same.
5. It is the further submission that be that as it may, since no overt
allegations of any unwelcome sexual advance, physical contact or sexual
favours have been leveled against the petitioner, therefore, the ingredients of
Section 354-A IPC are not attracted in the present case. It is contended that
the utterance of an abusive word in an email cannot be construed as falling
with the ambit of sexual harassment, even if seen from the parameters laid
down under Section 354-A IPC or even the Sexual Harassment of Women at
Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013. In support of
his submissions, learned senior counsel has placed reliance upon the
judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in (i) Bindeshwari Prasad
Singh versus Kali Singh (SC), 1977 AIR (SC) 2432, (ii) Veeda Menezes
versus Yusuf Khan Haji Ibrahim Khan 1966AIR (SC) 1773, (iii) Ms.
NeelamMahajan Singh versus Commissioner of Police and others (FB)
1994 (1) RCR (Criminal) 6, (iv) Asharam Bapu versus Aman Singh
Dangi 2015(5) RCR (Criminal) 458 and (v) State of Karnataka versus L.
CRM-M-36953-2019 (O&M) -5-
Muni Swami AIR 1977 SC 1489. Therefore, it is prayed that the instant
petition be allowed and the present FIR be quashed and set aside.
Submissions made the learned State counsel
6. Learned State counsel submits that there are specific allegations
levelled against the petitioner and that all contentions raised herein are a
subject matter of trial. It is further submitted that the statement of the
complainant-respondent No. 2 under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was recorded on
11.3.2019. However, further proceedings before the learned trial Court were
stayed by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 03.09.2019.
Submissions made by the learned counsel for respondent No.2
7. Learned counsel for respondent No.2-complainant contends that
there are specific allegations qua the present petitioner in the instant FIR that
he made the sexually coloured remark of 'f*** off' against the complainant-
respondent No. 2, and by misusing his position as a Director of the company,
he subjected the complainant-respondent No. 2 to harassment and
humiliation. Therefore, it is prayed that the instant petition be dismissed.
Analysis & conclusion
8. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and
having perused the material on record, the singular moot point for the
consideration of this Court is whether the present FIR lodged against the
petitioner herein deserves to be quashed.
9. Before proceeding to adjudicate the instant case, a gainful
reference can be made to the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Criminal Appeal No.3831 of 2025 titled as 'Pradeep Kumar
Kesarwani V. The State of Uttar Pradesh and another', wherein the steps to
be followed to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an
CRM-M-36953-2019 (O&M) -6-
accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482
of the Cr.P.C. were enlisted, which are as follows:-
"20...(i) Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused
is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the materials is of
sterling and impeccable quality?
(ii) Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused,
would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled
against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and
overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the
material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss
and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false.
(iii) Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused,
has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the
material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the
prosecution/complainant ?
(iv) Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an
abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of
justice?
If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial
conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such
criminal proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to
the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise
be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising
therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not
conclude in the conviction of the accused. [(See: Rajiv Thapar &
Ors. v. Madan Lal Kapoor (Criminal Appeal No. 174 of 2013)]."
10. It would also be apposite to refer to the dictum of law as laid
down in the celebrated judgment cited as "State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan
Lal", 1992 SUPP (1) SCC 335, whereby the Hon'ble Supreme Court
discussed different categories of cases wherein, the power under Section 482
Cr.P.C. could be exercised either to prevent abuse of process of law or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice, while also observing that it might not
CRM-M-36953-2019 (O&M) -7-
be possible to lay down an exhaustive list or myriad kind of cases where
such powers should be exercised. The following principles were culled out
therein:-
"(a) where the allegations made in the First Information Report or
the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence
or make out a case against the accused;
(b) where the allegations in the First Information Report and
other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers
under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code;
(c) where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
'complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not
disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against
the accused;
(d) where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no
investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code;
(e) where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so
absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient
ground for proceeding against the accused;
(f) where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a
criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance
of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the
Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party;
(g) where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala
fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a
view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
11. This Court is mindful of the settled parameters governing the
exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. At this stage, the
CRM-M-36953-2019 (O&M) -8-
Court is not required to assess the probative value of the evidence or conduct
a detailed examination of disputed facts. The sole consideration is whether
the allegations contained in the FIR, read as a whole and taken at face value,
disclose the essential ingredients of the offences alleged, so as to justify the
continuation of the criminal proceedings.
12. Before proceeding further, it would be apposite to extract the
provisions of Section 354-A IPC, which are as under:-
"354-A. Sexual harassment and punishment for sexual harass-
ment-
(1) A man committing any of the following acts--
(i) physical contact and advances involving unwelcome
and explicit sexual overtures; or
(ii) a demand or request for sexual favours; or
(iii) showing pornography against the will of a woman; or
(iv) making sexually coloured remarks, shall be guilty of
the offence of sexual harassment.
(2) Any man who commits the offence specified in clause (i) or
clause (ii) or clause (iii) of sub-section (1) shall be punished with
rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years,
or with fine, or with both.
(e) Any man who commits the offence specified in clause (iv) of
sub-section (1) shall be punished with imprisonment of either de-
scription for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or
with both."
13. The said statutory provision contemplates sexual harassment to
include all acts which are intrinsically sexual in nature, including
unwelcome physical contact, a demand or request for sexual favours,
showing pornography or making sexually coloured remarks.
14. Reverting to the case in hand, the correspondence wherein the
remarks in question were made took place in October 2018, but the instant
FIR was got registered only in February 2019. Admittedly, the parties had a
CRM-M-36953-2019 (O&M) -9-
disagreement regarding an issue of leave, while discussing which the said
remark was made by the petitioner. The same, though undeniably uncouth
and discourteous, does not, in its ordinary sense carry any sexual overtone or
insinuation, directed at the modesty or sexuality of the complainant.
15. It is also pertinent that the context of the communication in the
present case prima facie arises out of a work related interaction. No doubt
the standards of decorum ought to be maintained in every such
correspondence, yet at the same time, a solitary instance of an abusive
remark, in the absence of any element of sexual intent or pattern of conduct,
would not meet the threshold of criminal culpability under the penal
provision intended to address gender-based harassment.
16. In the considered opinion of this Court, the expression
attributed to the petitioner, even if taken at its face value and accepted in its
entirety, lacks the essential ingredients of Section 354A IPC. Trite to say that
where the uncontroverted allegations and the material collected fail to
disclose the basic ingredients of the offences alleged, the continuation of
criminal proceedings would not serve any useful purpose, but would amount
to abuse of the process of law.
17. Accordingly, to secure the ends of justice and prevent the
misuse of the criminal process, the present petition is allowed and FIR
No. 35 dated 10.3.2019, under Section 354-A IPC, registered at Police
Station Police Station Women, Gurgaon, District Gurugram (Annexure P-8)
and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, including challan/final
report under Section 354-A IPC (Annexure P-9) are quashed qua the
petitioner, albeit subject to payment of Rs. 20,000/- to be deposited by the
petitioner in the Poor Patient Welfare Fund, PGIMER, Chandigarh within a
period of one month.
CRM-M-36953-2019 (O&M) -10-
18. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stands
disposed of.
(KIRTI SINGH)
JUDGE
April 18, 2026
Gurpreet Singh
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
