[Cites 8, Cited by 0]

Punjab-Haryana High Court

Rahul Singh vs State Of Punjab on 18 April, 2026

                CRR-124-2026
                                                    -1-

                               IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
                                           AT CHANDIGARH
                242

                                                     CRR-124-2026
                                                     Date of decision: 18.04.2026


                RAHUL SINGH


                                                                      ....Petitioners
                                                  Versus

                STATE OF PUNJAB
                                                                     ....Respondent


                CORAM:- HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE RUPINDERJIT CHAHAL


                Present:         Mr. Sidhant Vermani, Advocate
                                 for the petitioners.

                                 Mr. Amrit Pal Singh Gill, DAG, Punjab.

                                      *****

                RUPINDERJIT CHAHAL, J. (ORAL)

1. The present petition has been filed challenging the

impugned order dated 18.12.2025 passed by the ADJ/ASJ Tarn

Taran whereby the application filed by the petitioners for default

bail under Section 187(2) of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha

Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 in FIR No.91, dated 19.06.2025,

registered under Section 21-C of NDPS Act at Police Station City

Patti, District Tarn Taran was dismissed.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the

petitioner has been falsely implicated in the present case and

was arrested on 19.06.2025 with the alleged contraband and

CRR-124-2026

produced before Illaqa Magistrate and has been in custody since

then. He submits that it is settled law that in case under NDPS

Act, prosecution has to present challan within 180 days after

registration of FIR. Since, the prosecution failed to file challan

within the stipulated time, an indefeasible right accrued in

favour of the petitioner and he was entitled for default bail. He

further submits that an application for default bail was filed

before the learned trial Court, which was dismissed on the

ground that the prosecution has already got extension of one

month time to file the challan.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that it is

settled law if the prosecution is unable to file challan within a

stipulated time, they have to get the permission of the Court,

however, a notice is also to be given to the accused and he

should be heard before any such extension is granted. He

contends that in the present case the prosecution made an

application for extension of time on 10.12.2025 which was

allowed on the same day whereas, the period of 180 days was

to expire on 15.12.2025. He argues that though the application

was made by prosecution before the expiry of 180 days,

however, no notice was served to the accused and the principles

of law have been violated. Thus, he prays that the impugned

order suffers from grave illegality and be set aside and the

petitioner be granted the concession of default bail.

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4. Opposing the prayer for bail, learned counsel for the

State submits that the offence committed by the petitioner is

serious in nature. He submits that the prosecution had filed the

application seeing extension of time to file the challan before the

expiry of 180 days, which was allowed by the learned trial Court.

Hence, there is no illegality in the order passed by the learned

trial Court and the present petition lacks merit.

5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at

length and after perusing the record of the case, it is evident

that the prosecution had filed an application seeking extension

of time to file the challan on 10.12.2025 which was allowed on

10.12.2025 itself, whereas the period of 180 days expired on

15.12.2025. It is established law that right to default bail arises

only when the statutory period for filing the challan has expired

and no valid extension has been granted. As far as the

requirement of giving notice to the accused is concerned the law

is well settled by the Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Supreme

Court in Sanjay Dutt v. State through C.B.I. Bombay, (1994)

5 SCC 410; wherein while examining a similar question under

the pari materia provision of TADA Act 1987 it was observed as

under:-

"48. We have no doubt that the common

stance before us of the nature of indefeasible

right of the accused to be released on bail by

virtue of Section 20(4)(bb) is based on a correct

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reading of the principle indicated in that decision.

The indefeasible right accruing to the accused in

such a situation is enforceable only prior to the

filing of the challan and it does not survive or

remain enforceable on the challan being filed, if

already not availed of. Once the challan has

been filed, the question of grant of bail has to be

considered and decided only with reference to

the merits of the case under the provisions

relating to grant of bail to an accused after the

filing of the challan. The custody of the accused

after the challan has been filed is not governed

by Section 167 but different provisions of the

Code of Criminal Procedure. If that right had

accrued to the accused but it remained

unenforced till the filing of the challan, then there

is no question of its enforcement thereafter since

it is extinguished the moment challan is filed

because Section 167 CrPC ceases to apply. The

Division Bench also indicated that if there be

such an application of the accused for release on

bail and also a prayer for extension of time to

complete the investigation according to the

proviso in Section 20(4)(bb), both of them should

be considered together. It is obvious that no bail

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can be given even in such a case unless the

prayer for extension of the period is rejected. In

short, the grant of bail in such a situation is also

subject to refusal of the prayer for extension of

time, if such a prayer is made. If the accused

applies for bail under this provision on expiry of

the period of 180 days or the extended period, as

the case may be, then he has to be released on

bail forthwith. The accused, so released on bail

may be arrested and committed to custody

according to the provisions of the Code of

Criminal Procedure. It is settled by Constitution

Bench decisions that a petition seeking the writ

of habeas corpus on the ground of absence of a

valid order of remand or detention of the

accused, has to be dismissed, if on the date of

return of the rule, the custody or detention is on

the basis of a valid order."

6. More recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jigar

vs State of Gujarat, (2023) 6 SCC 484, relying upon its earlier

decision in Sanjay Dutt (Supra) reiterated that while

considering request for extension judicial custody, the accused

must be produced, either physically or through virtual mode,

the presence of the accused is a safeguard as it enables the

accused to oppose the request for further remand or extension

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of time. This requirement is a pre-requisite for legitimate

exercise of the Courts power to extend custody. It was further

observed that absence of accused while granting extension of

time for filing of challan is not a mere procedural irregularity,

rather it amounts to violation of his fundamental right conferred

under Article 21 of the Constitution. The relevant part of the

order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is reproduced as under:-

"45. The logical and legal consequence of

the grant of extension of time is the deprivation

of the indefeasible right available to the accused

to claim a default bail. If we accept the argument

that the failure of the prosecution to produce the

accused before the Court and to inform him that

the application of extension is being considered

by the Court is a mere procedural irregularity, it

will negate the proviso added by sub-section (2)

of Section 20 of the 2015 Act and that may

amount to violation of rights conferred by Article

21 of the Constitution. The reason is the grant of

the extension of time takes away the right of the

accused to get default bail which is intrinsically

connected with the fundamental rights

guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

The procedure contemplated by Article 21 of the

Constitution which is required to be followed

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before the liberty of a person is taken away has

to be a fair and reasonable procedure. In fact,

procedural safeguards play an important role in

protecting the liberty guaranteed by Article 21.

The failure to procure the presence of the accused

either physically or virtually before the Court and

the failure to inform him that the application

made by the Public Prosecutor for the extension

of time is being considered, is not a mere

procedural irregularity. It is gross illegality that

violates the rights of the accused under Article