[Cites 13, Cited by 0]
Punjab-Haryana High Court
Xxxxxxxxxxxx vs Xxxxxxxxxxxx on 8 April, 2026
CRM-M-973-2021 -1
103
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CRM-M-973-2021
Date of Decision:08.04.2026
Ajay Pal @ Ajay Kumar and Ors. ...Petitioners
Vs.
State of Punjab and Anr. ...Respondents
Coram : Hon'ble Mr. Justice N.S.Shekhawat
Present: Mr. Gurdeepinder Singh Dhillon, Advocate
Mr. Karan Kumar Sachdeva, Advocate
for the petitioners.
Mr. M.S. Bajwa, DAG, Punjab.
Ms. Dheerja, Legal Aid Counsel
for respondent No.2.
***
N.S.Shekhawat J. (Oral)
1. The petitioners have filed the present petition under Section 482
Cr.P.C with a prayer to quash the FIR No.131, dated 16.09.2020, under
Sections 366/120-B of IPC [offences under Sections 363,366-A,376,344,509 of
IPC and Sections 4 & 6 of POCSO, Act were added later on], registered at
Police Station Makhu, District Ferozepur and all subsequent proceedings
arising out therefrom.
2. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners contends
that the F.I.R in the present case was registered on the basis of the statement
made by Jagir Singh, respondent No.2 father of Monika Rani/prosecutrix. In the
F.I.R, he alleged that his daughter Monika Rani had passed 11th class and her
date of birth is 12.02.2002. On 13.09.2020, his daughter had gone to
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Provisional Store to buy some house hold items and Ajay Pal @ Ajay Kumar,
Parveen Rani and Amarjit Singh i.e. the petitioners No.1,2 and 4 along with 2/3
unknown persons had taken her away on the motorcycles with the intention to
force her to marry with the petitioner No.1.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that Ajay Pal @
Ajay Kumar, petitioner No.1 and Monika Rani, daughter of respondent
No.2/complainant were having love affair and wanted to marry each other
against the wishes of their family members. The respondent No.2/complainant
and his family members wanted to marry Monika Rani to some other person of
their choice and they had even threatened the petitioner No.1 to stay away from
Monika Rani. Ultimately, Ajay Pal @ Ajay Kumar, petitioner No.1 and
Monika Rani, both being major, ran away from their respective homes and
decided to get married as per Sikh Rites and Ceremonies. Ajay Pal @ Ajay
Kumar, petitioner No.1 and Monika Rani performed marriage on 14.09.2020 at
Gurudwara Dashmesh Pita Patshahi Dasvi, Tehsil Kharar, District Mohali and
the Marriage Certificate in this regard is annexed as (Annexure P-3). Even,
Ajay Pal @ Ajay Kumar, petitioner No.1 and Monika Rani/prosecutrix filed a
Criminal Writ Petition No.7315-2020 before this Court to protect their life and
liberty as they had performed their marriage against the wishes of their family
members. Ultimately, vide the order dated 17.09.2020 (Annexure P-4), this
Court disposed of the petition with a direction to the police to look into their
grievances and to take action, accordingly.
4. Learned counsel further submits that in fact, one day prior to order
dated 17.09.2020 (Annexure P-4), the respondent No.2 got the present FIR
registered by levelling false and baseless allegations against the petitioners. He
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further contends that the petitioner No.2 is sister of Ajay Pal @ Ajay Kumar,
petitioner No.1, whereas, petitioner No.3 is husband of petitioner No.2. Even,
petitioner No.4 Amarjit Singh is 18 years old and distant relative of Ajay Pal @
Ajay Kumar, petitioner No.1 and they have been falsely involved in the present
case. He further contends that even from the allegations levelled by the
complainant, no offence as alleged is made out against the petitioners. He
further contends that after the registration of the present FIR, father of
petitioners No.1 and 2 has filed a Habeas Corpus petition i.e.CRWP-8790-2020
before this Court for release of Monika Rani, prosecutrix from the illegal
custody of her parents and others. In pursuance of the notice issued by this
Court, Monika Rani, prosecutrix was brought before the Court as she was being
kept by the police at Gandhi Vanita Ashram, Jalandhar. She stated before this
Court that she was married and she had solemnized marriage with Ajay Pal @
Ajay Kumar, petitioner No.1. She further stated that she wanted to go with
petitioner No.1/her parents-in-law and her custody was handed over to the
father of the petitioners No.1 and 2. Thus, it has been falsely alleged that the
prosecutrix was subjected to rape by anyone.
5. On the other hand, learned State counsel has vehemently opposed
the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioners on the ground that
as per the Birth Certificate of Monika Rani, her date of birth is 29.11.2003 and
she was raped by petitioner No.1 in collusion with other petitioners. However,
he is not a position to controvert the factual submissions made by learned
counsel for the petitioners.
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6. Still further, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent
No.2 has also opposed the submissions made by learned counsel for the
petitioners on the ground that on the date of occurrence, Monika Rani was
minor, as per her Birth Certificate and the police had correctly invoked the
provisions of Section 4 and 6 of POCSO, Act. Still further, the petitioners have
raised several disputed questions of fact before this Court and they may lead
their evidence before the Trial Court in this regard. However, such disputed
questions of fact can never be adjudicated by this Court while exercising the
jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their able
assistance; I have gone through the record carefully.
8. In the present case, as per the Aadhar Card (Annexure P-2) as well
as Matriculation Certificate (Annexure P-2/A) issued by Punjab School
Education Board, the date of birth of Monika Rani, prosecutrix is 12.02.2002.
Even, it is apparent from the Marriage Certificate dated 14.09.2020 (Annexure
P-3) that Monika Rani had performed marriage with Ajay Pal @ Ajay Kumar,
petitioner No.1 at Gurudwara as per Sikh Rites and Ceremonies. Even, at the
time of solemnization of her marriage, Monika Rani prosecutrix was major.
Thereafter, the prosecutrix and petitioner No.1 filed a Criminal Writ Petition
No.7315-2020 before this Court with a prayer to direct the State of Punjab to
protect their life and liberty at the hands of respondents No.4 to 9 which
included the complainant in the present case. Ultimately, the petition was
disposed of vide order dated 17.09.2020 (Annexure P-4) by this Court with a
direction to official respondents to look into the matter and to take action,
accordingly. Thereafter, Joginder Singh, father of petitioners No.1 and 2 had
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filed a Habeas Corpus petition i.e.CRWP-8790-2020 before this Court for the
release of detenue namely Monika Rani wife of Ajay Pal @ Ajay Kumar,
petitioner No.1 from the illegal custody of Gandhi Vanita Ashram, Jalandhar.
Again, Monika Rani, prosecutrix appeared before this Court on 24.11.2020 and
stated that she was major and she had married with Ajay Pal @ Ajay Kumar,
petitioner No.1 out of her own free will. She expressed her desire to join the
company of her in-laws in the matrimonial home and the custody of Monika
Rani was handed over to her parents-in-law i.e. parents of petitioners No.1 and
2. Thus, it is apparent that the F.I.R and all consequential proceedings arising
therefrom are abuse of the process of the Court.
9. Still further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of "Naim
Ahamed Vs. State (NCT of Delhi),2025(2),SCC (Cri)640, held as follows:-
"12. The exposition of law in this regard is discernible in
various decisions of this Court, however the application of such
law or of such decisions would depend upon the proved facts in
each case, known as legal evidence. The ratio laid down in the
judgements or the law declared by this Court do provide the
guidelines to the judicial mind of the courts to decide the cases on
hand, but the courts while applying the law also have to consider
the evidence before them and the surrounding circumstances under
which the alleged offences are committed by the accused.
13. A reference of some of the decisions of this Court dealing with
the different dimensions and angles of the word consent in the
context of Section 90 and Section 375 would be beneficial for
deciding this appeal.
14.In Uday v. State of Karnataka (2003) 4 SCC 46, the prosecutrix
aged about 19 years had given her consent for having a sexual
intercourse with the accused with whom she was deeply in love,
and it was alleged by the prosecution that the prosecutrix
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continued to meet the accused as the accused had given her a
promise to marry her on a later date: The prosecutrix became
pregnant and the complaint was lodged on failure of the accused to
marry her. This Court while holding that under the circumstances,
the consent could not be said to have been given under a
misconception of fact under Section 90 of IPC, held in para 21 and
23 as under:-
"21. It therefore appears that the consensus of judicial opinion is
in favour of the view that the consent given by the prosecutrix to
sexual intercourse with a person with whom she is deeply in love
on a promise that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be
said to be given under a misconception of fact. A false promise is
not a fact within the meaning of the Code. We are inclined to agree
with this view, but we must add that there is no straitjacket formula
for determining whether consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual
intercourse is voluntary, or whether it is given under a
misconception of fact. In the ultimate analysis, the tests laid down
by the courts provide at best guidance to the judicial mind while
considering a question of consent, but the court must, in each case,
consider the evidence before it and the surrounding circumstances,
before reaching a conclusion, because each case has its own
peculiar facts which may have a bearing on the question whether
the consent was voluntary, or was given under a misconception of
fact. It must also weigh the evidence keeping in view the fact that
the burden is on the prosecution to prove each and every
ingredient of the offence, absence of consent being one of them.
22. -XXX-XX-
23. Keeping in view the approach that the court must adopt in such
cases, we shall now proceed to consider the evidence on record. In
the instant case, the prosecutrix was a grown-up girl studying in a
college. She was deeply in love with the appellant. She was,
however, aware of the fact that since they belonged to different
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castes, marriage was not possible. In any event the proposal for
their marriage was bound to be seriously opposed by their family
members. She admits having told so to the appellant when he
proposed to her the first time. She had sufficient intelligence to
understand the significance and moral quality of the act she was
consenting to. That is why she kept it a secret as long as she could.
Despite this, she did not resist the overtures of the appellant, and
in fact succumbed to them. She thus freely exercised a choice
between resistance and assent. She must have known the
consequences of the act, particularly when she was conscious of
the fact that their marriage may not take place at all on account of
caste considerations. All these circumstances lead us to the
conclusion that she freely, voluntarily and consciously consented
to having sexual intercourse with the appellant, and her consent
was not in consequence of any misconception of fact".
15.In Deelip Singh alias Dilip Kumar State of Bihar (supra), this
Court after discussing various earlier decisions of this Court and
other High Courts, further explained the observations made in
Uday case (supra) and observed as under-
"28. The first two sentences in the above passage need some
explanation. While we reiterate that a promise to marry without
anything more will not give rise to "misconception of fact within
the meaning of Section 90, it needs to be clarified that a
representation deliberately made by the accused with a view to
elicit the assent of the victim without having the intention or
inclination to marry her, will vitiate the consent. If on the facts it is
established that at the very inception of the making of promise, the
accused did not really entertain the intention of marrying her and
the promise to marry held out by him was a mere hoax, the consent
ostensibly given by the victim will be of no avail to the accused to
exculpate him from the ambit of Section 375 clause secondly. This
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is what in fact was stressed by the Division Bench of the Calcutta
High Court in the case of Jayanti Rani Panda [1984 Cri LJ 1535:
(1983) 2 CHN 290 (Cal)) which was approvingly referred to in
Uday case [(2003) 4 SCC 46: 2003 SCC (Cri) 775 (2003) 2 Scale
329]. The Calcutta High Court rightly qualified the proposition
which it stated earlier by adding the qualification at the end (Cri
LJ p. 1538, para 7) "unless the court can be assured that from the
very inception the accused never really intended to marry her.
(emphasis supplied) In the next para, the High Court referred to
the vintage decision of the Chancery Court which laid down that a
misstatement of the intention of the defendant in doing a particular
act would tantamount to a misstatement of fact and an action of
deceit can be founded on it. This is also the view taken by the
Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Jaladu case [ILR
(1913) 36 Mad 453: 15 Cri LJ 24] (vide passage quoted supra). By
making the solitary observation that "a false promise is not a fact
within the meaning of the Code", it cannot be said that this Court
has laid down the law differently. The observations following the
aforesaid sentence are also equally important. The Court was
cautious enough to add a qualification that no straitjacket formula
could be evolved for determining whether the consent was given
under a misconception of fact. Reading the judgment in Uday case
((2003) 4 SCC 46:2003 SCC (Cri) 775: (2003) 2 Scale 329] as a
whole, we do not understand the Court laying down a broad
proposition that a promise to marry could never amount to a
misconception of fact. That is not, in our understanding, the ratio
of the decision. In fact, there was a specific finding in that case
that initially the accused's intention to marry cannot be ruled out."
10. Thus, in view of the above discussion, the present petition is
allowed by this Court and the FIR No.131, dated 16.09.2020, under Sections
366/120-B of IPC [offences under Sections 363,366-A,376,344,509 of IPC and
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Section 4 and 6 of POCSO, Act were added later on], registered at Police
Station Makhu, District Ferozepur and all consequential proceedings arising
therefrom are quashed by this Court qua the petitioners only.
(N.S.SHEKHAWAT)
08.04.2026 JUDGE
hitesh
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
