Friday, 22, May, 2026
 
 
 
Expand O P Jindal Global University
 
  
  
 
 
 

State Of Pb vs Regional Dir Esic Chd Etc
2025 Latest Caselaw 5308 P&H

Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 5308 P&H
Judgement Date : 19 November, 2025

Punjab-Haryana High Court

State Of Pb vs Regional Dir Esic Chd Etc on 19 November, 2025

           RSA No.1266 of 1995(O&M)                        1

                               IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
                                            AT CHANDIGARH

           (202)                                               RSA No.1266 of 1995(O&M)
                                                               Reserved on : 14.11.2025
                                                               Pronounced on: 19.11.2025
                                                               Uploaded on: 19.11.2025


           State Of Punjab Through Executive Engineer, P.W.D , Public health
           (Goverment works), Division Patiala
                                                                          ... Appellant


                                                  Versus


           Regional Director, Employees State Insurance Corporation, Chandigarh
           And Others
                                                                          ... Respondents


           CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIRINDER AGGARWAL


           Present: Mr. I.S.Kingra, Senior DAG,Punjab
                    for the appellant/State.

                               Mr. Adarsh Malik, Advocate
                               for the respondents.
                                     *****
           VIRINDER AGGARWAL, J.

1. The instant Regular Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of

Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), has been filed by the State of Punjab (hereinafter

referred to as "the Appellant") against the judgment and decree dated

02.12.1994 passed by the Additional District Judge, Patiala, whereby the appeal

filed by the Appellant against the judgment and decree dated 25.07.1991 passed

by the Senior Sub Judge, Patiala was dismissed. The suit was filed by the

Appellant seeking a declaration that Notice No. 921 dated 29.06.1987(EX-P1)

issued by the Assistant Collector, Class-II, Patiala, demanding recovery of Rs.

31,855.46/- towards Employees' State Insurance (ESI) contributions is illegal,

null and void, and for a consequential permanent injunction restraining the

Respondents from effecting such recovery.

BACKGROUND FACTS

2. The Appellant-State installed a laundry plant in Rajindra Hospital,

Patiala, exclusively to provide laundry services to the Government Hospital at

Patiala. The plant is operated by regular work-charged Government employees

who are entitled to all benefits under the Punjab Civil Services Rules,

Government instructions, and the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. These

benefits include medical leave, earned leave, medical reimbursement under

Punjab Medical Attendance Rules, 1940, pension, gratuity, family pension in

case of death, and other superior entitlements, which surpass those available

under the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 ( hereinafter referred to as ESI

Act). An inspection by the ESI Inspector revealed the operation of the plant

with washing machines powered by electricity, involving 10 regular work-

charged employees and 15 helpers. Notices(Ex.D2 to Ex.D14) were issued

from 1982 onwards demanding ESI contributions, culminating in the impugned

notice of 29.06.1987(Ex.P1) for recovery of arrears. The Appellant contested

the coverage, arguing that the plant does not qualify as a "factory" under

Section 2(12) of the ESI Act, as it employs fewer than 20 persons, involves no

"manufacturing process," and is not run for commercial purposes but solely for

internal Government use. Further, no exemption notification under Section 87

of the ESI Act was required, as the plant falls outside the Act's ambit.

3. The learned trial court (Senior Sub Judge, Patiala) dismissed the suit,

holding the plant covered under the ESI Act as a factory satisfying the threshold

of 20 or more workers engaged in a manufacturing process with power. Issues

regarding jurisdiction and maintainability were decided in favour of the

Respondents. On appeal, the Additional District Judge affirmed these findings,

observing that washing and ironing constitute a manufacturing process under

ESI Act, and no exemption under Section 87 was notified. Aggrieved, the

Appellant filed the present second appeal.

CONTENTIONS

4. Learned counsel for the Appellant vehemently argued that the plant does

not meet the definitional threshold of a "factory" under Section 2(12) of the ESI

Act, as it employs only 15 persons since installation, and washing/ironing does

not constitute a "manufacturing process" under Section 2(m) of the Factories

Act, 1948 (incorporated by reference). Further, Learned counsel for the

Appellant, relied on the judgement of Employees' State Insurance

Corporation v. Triplex Dry Cleaners, 1998(1) SCC 196 and argued that prior

to the insertion of Section 2(14-AA) in the ESI Act via the 1989 amendment

(effective 20.10.1989), processes like washing and ironing in laundries did not

qualify as a "manufacturing process" under Section 2(12). The impugned notice

dated 29.06.1987 issued prior to this and thus making the demand

retrospectively invalid. He contended that the laundry plant's governmental,

non-commercial character and employee count below 20 further exclude it. It

was urged that the balance of convenience and irreparable loss favor staying

enforcement, and the appeal merits allowance.

5. Learned counsel for the Respondents defended the lower courts' findings,

contending that the said laundry plant satisfies the 20-worker threshold

(including helpers), uses power for manufacturing processes like cleaning and

ironing, and no exemption was notified under Section 87 by state Government.

Learned counsel Contends Said learned counsel contended that the laundry

plant was covered even under the pre-amendment definition of the ESI Act, as it

involved powered operations such as washing and ironing, which qualified as a

manufacturing process, and met the required worker threshold of 10 or more

persons as detailed in the ESI Inspector's report (Ex. P1). Furthermore, the

learned counsel urged that the judgement of Triplex Dry Cleaners(Supra) is

inapplicable to the present case. Additionally, the learned counsel affirmed that

the civil court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the suit due to the bar under Section

77 of the ESI Act.

OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS

6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the

record, including the judgments of the learned courts below, exhibits, and cited

precedents.

7. The following substantial question of law arise, with the core pivoting on

the temporal applicability of statutory definitions:

"Whether the courts below erred in applying the post-1989 definition of

"manufacturing process" under the ESI Act to the impugned notice dated

29.06.1987, ignoring the prospective effect of the amendment inserting

Section 2(14-AA) effective 20.10.1989?"

8. To resolve this, the controlling authority is the judgment of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in Employees' State Insurance Corporation v. M/s Triplex Dry

Cleaners,1998 (1) SCC 196. The Court held unequivocally that dry-cleaning,

washing, or ironing of clothes does not constitute a "manufacturing activity"

within the meaning of the ESI Act as it stood before the statutory amendment

introduced on 20.10.1989. It was emphasised that such activity does not bring

into existence any new product, and therefore, establishments engaged in

washing/cleaning could not be treated as factories under Section 2(12) for that

earlier period. The relevant portion of the authority is reproduced below:

"6. We, however, hasten to point out that we are here concerned

with the show cause notice dated January 21,1978. At that point or

time, Section 2(14aa) had not been inserted in the Act which

defines manufacturing process as having the same meaning which

is assigned to it under the Factories Act, 1948. The provision was

inserted with effect from October 20,1989. We, therefore, express

no opinion with regard to the applicability of the Act to an

establishment engaged in the business of dry cleaning after

October 20, 1989 in asmuch as Section 2(14aa) attracts the

applicability of Section 2(k) of the Factories Act, 1948 which

defines manufacturing process which may conceivably include the

process of repairing, washing or cleaning of any articles with a

view to its use. However, sofar as this appeal is concerned, in as

much as it relates to a period prior to October 20,1989 when there

was no such definition of manufacturing process applicable to the

Act, it must fail and is accordingly, dismissed. There will be no

order as to costs."

Therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court expressly clarified that its decision was

confined to a period prior to 20.10.1989, because the definition of

"manufacturing process" as having same meaning as that under Factory

Act,1948 did not apply to the ESI Act until the insertion of Section 2(14-AA),

effective from that date. The Court noted that only after 20.10.1989 did the ESI

Act begin to borrow the broader definition from Section 2(k) of the Factories

Act, 1948, which may conceivably include washing or cleaning.

9. This clarification is determinative. The impugned demand in the present

case arises out of inspections and notices issued between 1982 and 1987 ,

culminating in the notice dated 29.06.1987 (Ex.P1). The entire period under

consideration falls squarely within the pre-20.10.1989 era, when the ESI Act

did not contain the expanded definition of manufacturing process. Therefore,

the legal position applicable to the Appellant is exactly the legal regime applied

in Triplex Dry Cleaners(supra), where the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that

washing and dry-cleaning activities could not be treated as manufacturing

processes and hence the establishment could not be treated as a "factory."

Accordingly, any reliance by the respondents on the post-1989 expanded

definition is misplaced. The amendment cannot be applied retrospectively, nor

can a concept introduced in 1989 be invoked to justify coverage for assessment

years preceding it. As the Hon'ble Supreme Court itself held, the ESI Act, as it

existed before the amendment, did not permit laundries or dry-cleaning units to

be treated as factories, and such establishments lay outside the Act's ambit.

10. For these reasons, and applying the ratio of Triplex dry clearner (Supra),

this Court holds that the laundry of Rajindra Hospital, Patiala, did not constitute

a factory under Section 2(12) of the ESI Act during 1982-1987, and the demand

of ESI contributions for that period is legally unsustainable. Therefore the

judgments/decrees of the courts below are patently erroneous, based on

misappreciation of law and facts, warranting interference under Section 100

CPC.

11. Accordingly, the present appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree dated

02.12.1994 passed by the Additional District Judge, Patiala, and the judgment

and decree dated 25.07.1991 passed by the Senior Sub Judge, Patiala are set

aside. The suit of the Appellant is decreed, declaring Notice No. 921 dated

29.06.1987 illegal, null, void, and ineffective. The Respondents are

permanently restrained from recovering Rs.31,855.46/- or any ESI contributions

pertaining to the laundry plant.

19.11.2025 (VIRINDER AGGARWAL) Saurav Pathania JUDGE

(i) Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No (ii) Whether reportable : Yes/No

 
Download the LatestLaws.com Mobile App
 
 
Latestlaws Newsletter
 

Publish Your Article

 

Campus Ambassador

 

Media Partner

 

Campus Buzz

 

LatestLaws Guest Court Correspondent

LatestLaws Guest Court Correspondent Apply Now!
 

LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026

 

LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!

 
 

LatestLaws Partner Event : IJJ

 

LatestLaws Partner Event : MAIMS

 
 
Latestlaws Newsletter