Punjab-Haryana High Court
Badri Mandal And Others vs State Of Haryana And Another on 12 November, 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
CRM-M-54453-2025
Date of decision: 12.11.2025
Badri Mandal & others
....Petitioners
V/s
State of Haryana and another
....Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL
Present: Mr. Najar Singh, Advocate for
Mr. Navmohit Singh, Advocate for the petitioners.
Mr. Gurmeet Singh, AAG Haryana.
Mr. Smit Kamboj, Advocate for respondent No.2.
*****
SUMEET GOEL, J.
1. The petition in hand has been preferred by the accused -
petitioners, under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
2023, for quashing of FIR No.38 dated 27.06.2025 (hereinafter to be referred
as the impugned FIR) registered under Sections 318(4), 336(3), 338, 340, 61
of BNS at Police Station PS Cyber Sonipat, Haryana, as also the proceedings
subsequent thereto, on the basis of a compromise deed dated 20.09.2025
(appended as Annexure P-2 with the present petition).
2. The gravamen of the impugned FIR is that the complainant
namely Divya daughter of Suresh Kumar, Resident of 1008/3, SBI Lane, New
Colony, Railway Road, Sonipat alleged that she is employed as an
Accountant at Institute of Competitive Studies Pvt. Ltd, having an account
with the HDFC Bank bearing Account No.50200053031318. On 24.06.2025,
a total of seven unauthorized transactions amounting to Rs.14,83,696/- were
carried out from the said account without the knowledge or consent of the
complainant. No OTP or transaction message was received at the time of
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these transactions. Upon logging into net banking, the complainant
discovered the fraudulent withdrawals. The complainant later learned that
the money had been transferred to fraudulent accounts opened using fake
documents through a fake website. Thereafter, an online complaint was
lodged at the Cyber Crime Helpline (1930) and a complaint was registered
under No.31306250043329. Based on this complaint, the present FIR has
been registered.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that the
petitioners have been falsely implicated into the impugned FIR. According
to learned counsel, the matter has been amicably resolved between the parties
with the intervention of the respectable persons and respondent No.2-
complainant does not want to continue with the impugned FIR. Learned
counsel has further urged that a compromise was entered into between the
petitioners and the FIR-complainant on 20.09.2025, relevant whereof reads
as under:-
"1. That the First Party agrees to withdraw the complaint/FIR/no
longer pursue the legal case against the Second Party in respect of the
aforementioned cybercrime and has no further grievance or claim in this
matter.
2. That both parties affirm that this compromise has been entered into
voluntarily, with full understanding of its legal implications.
3. That both parties undertake to cooperate in filing appropriate
applications before the Hon'ble Court/Police Authorities for quashing of
FIR (if registered), withdrawal of complaint or seeking permission for
compromise under applicable law.
4. That this compromise shall be binding on both parties, their legal
heirs, representatives and assigns."
Learned counsel has, thus, iterated that the FIR in question,
which was got registered on account of a misunderstanding, has since been
resolved between the parties and in order to keep peace as also harmony, the
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parties do not wish to continue with proceedings against each other, including
the impugned FIR. Learned counsel has further submitted that, pursuant to
order dated 25.09.2025 earlier passed by this Court, statements of the rival
private parties were recorded before the concerned Magistrate wherein the
said parties have reiterated having entered into settlement and a report dated
10.10.2025 has been received from the said Magisterial Court. Learned
counsel has further urged that no useful purpose would likely be served by
allowing the criminal prosecution to continue against the petitioners. Thus,
it has been entreated that the petition in hand be granted.
4. Learned State counsel has argued that the impugned FIR was
registered for serious allegations of cyber fraud involving fraudulent
transactions. According to learned State counsel, the offence of cyber fraud
not only affects the complainant but also erodes the public confidence in
digital banking transactions. Though the parties have entered into a
compromise and the complainant has expressed no objection to quashing of
the impugned FIR but while considering the compromise, the nature and
gravity of allegations are also to be taken into account as the offence(s) in
question pertains to cyber and financial fraud. Learned State counsel has
emphasized that the power to quash lies with this Court under Section 528 of
BNSS, 2023 but it has to be exercised sparingly and cautiously. On the basis
of aforesaid submissions, learned State counsel has prayed for dismissal of
the petition in hand.
5. Learned counsel for the respondent No.2 has submitted that the
parties have amicably settled the matter with the petitioners. The complainant
has executed a compromise affidavit dated 20.09.2025 and categorically
stated that she has no objection if the impugned FIR and all proceedings
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arising therefrom are quashed against the petitioners. Furthermore, the
compromise has been arrived at voluntarily without any threat coercion or
undue influence. Thus, in view of the compromise duly executed between
the parties, learned counsel has prayed that the petition in hand be allowed
and the impugned FIR and all consequential proceedings emanating
therefrom be quashed.
6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the
record.
Prime Issue
7. The issue that arises for consideration in the petition in hand is
as to whether the impugned FIR and the proceedings arising therefrom
deserve to be quashed on the basis of compromise/settlement having been
arrived at between the rival private parties.
The seminal legal issue that arises for rumination is as to whether
an FIR (as also proceedings emanating therefrom) can be quashed on the basis
of compromise/settlement between the rival parties wherein the FIR pertains
to allegations of cyber fraud.
8. Relevant Statutory Provisions
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter to be
referred as 'the Cr.P.C.)
Section 482 of Cr.P.C., 1973 reads as under:
"482. Saving of inherent power of High Court - Nothing in this Code shall
be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make
such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code,
or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the
ends of justice."
The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter
to be referred as BNSS, 2023)
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Section of the BNSS, 2023 reads as under:
"528. Saving of inherent powers of High Court - Nothing in this Sanhita
shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to
make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this
Sanhita, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice."
Relevant Case Law
9. The precedents, apropos to the matter(s) in issue, are as follows:
Re: Powers of the High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.,vis-a-vis.,
quashing of the FIR/criminal proceedings on the basis of
compromise
(i) In a judgment titled as Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and
another, 2012 (10) SCC 303 a three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has held as under:-
"48. The question is with regard to the inherent power of the High Court in
quashing the criminal proceedings against an offender who has settled his
dispute with the victim of the crime but the crime in which he is allegedly
involved is not compoundable under Section 320 of the Code.
xxx xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx xxx
57. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be
summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal
proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is
distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for
compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power
is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised
in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the
ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what
cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may
be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would
depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can
be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court
must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and
serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity,
etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family
and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in
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nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise
between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special
statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by
public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any
basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the
criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour
stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the
offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership
or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating
to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private
or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In
this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its
view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the
possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal
case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme
injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite
full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other
words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary
to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or
continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of
process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and
wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that
criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is
in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash
the criminal proceeding.
(ii) In a judgment titled as Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab,
2014(6) SCC 466 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
"31. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the
following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving
adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its
power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and
quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction
to continue with the criminal proceedings:
(I) Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be
distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound
the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section
482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the
criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not
compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between
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themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and
with caution.
(II)When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis
petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding
factor in such cases would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. While exercising
the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the
aforesaid two objectives.
(III) Such a power is not be exercised in those prosecutions which
involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences
like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in
nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for offences
alleged to have been committed under special statute like
the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by
Public Servants while working in that capacity are not to be
quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and
the offender.
(IV) On the other, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and
pre-dominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of
commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship
or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have
resolved their entire disputes among themselves.
(V) While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to
whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and
continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great
oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to
him by not quashing the criminal cases.
(VI) Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of
heinous and serious offences and therefore is to be generally treated
as crime against the society and not against the individual alone.
However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because
there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is
framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to
examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for
the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence,
which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section
307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to
go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted
on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc.
Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can
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generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie
analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong
possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and
bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and
quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the later case it would
be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding
the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At
this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the
settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between
them which may improve their future relationship.
(VII) While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section
482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role.
Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the
alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under
investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the
settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is
because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on
and even the charge sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases
where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the
evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show
benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima
facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above.
On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost
complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the
stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from
exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases
the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on
merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence
under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases
where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the
matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere
compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept
the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been
convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section
307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and,
therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of
such a crime."
(iii) In a judgment titled as Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai
Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat and anr. AIR 2017
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SUPREME COURT 4843, a three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has held as under:-
"15 The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject,
may be summarised in the following propositions :
(i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to
prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends
of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only
recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;
(ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a
First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground
that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the
victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the
purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an
offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions
of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power
to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-
compoundable.
(iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or
complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of
justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power;
(iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit
and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice
or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;
(v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information
Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and
victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and
circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of
principles can be formulated;
(vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while
dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court
must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence.
Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or
offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be
quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled
the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature
but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue
with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of
public interest in punishing persons for serious offences;
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(vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal
cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a
civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the
exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;
(viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from
commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar
transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate
situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute;
(ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal
proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the
possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a
criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and
(x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions
(viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial and
economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond
the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High
Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is
involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or
misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the
financial or economic system will weigh in the balance."
(iv) In a judgment titled as State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi
Narayan and others AIR 2019 SUPREME COURT 1296, a three Judge
Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
"13. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court
on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held as under:
i) that the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash
the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under
Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly
and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising
out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial
relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved
the entire dispute amongst themselves;
ii) such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which
involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or
offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not
private in nature and have a serious impact on society;
iii) similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences
under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the
offences committed by public servants while working in
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that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of
compromise between the victim and the offender;
iv) offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would fall
in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to
be treated as crime against the society and not against the
individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the
offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act etc. which have
a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of
powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the
parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves.
However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because
there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is
framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to
examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for
the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence,
which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section
307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to
go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted
on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc.
However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible
only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the
charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such
exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under
investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs
29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder
Singh (supra) should be read harmoniously and to be read as a
whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove;
v) while exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to
quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable
offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious
impart on society, on the ground that there is a
settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the
High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused;
the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was
absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with
the complainant to enter into a compromise etc."
Analysis (re law)
10. The conventional outlook, in view of the statutory framework,
was that criminal offence(s) could be settled only by way of compounding, as
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per the provisions of Section 320 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 (now Section 359 of
BNSS, 2023). In ordinary parlance, "compounding" is known as
"compromise" or "settlement". This expression is, ordinarily, understood as
condoning a felony in exchange for repatriation received by the victim-
complainant from the felon. In other words, no compounding/compromise of
a criminal offence could be permitted by the Court, except for an offence
which met with rigours of the Section 320 of Cr.P.C. Therefore; the question
arose whether the High Court, by exercising its plenary/inherent jurisdiction,
under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., could quash ongoing FIR/criminal proceedings
on the basis of compromise/settlement having been arrived at between the
rival parties.
10.1. Before proceeding further, it would be germane to delve into the
nature, scope and ambit of powers of the High Court under Section 482 of
Cr.P.C., 1973.
10.2. Inherent powers of the High Court are those which are incidental
replete powers, which if did not so exist, the Court would be obliged to sit
still and helplessly see the process of law and the Courts being abused for the
purposes of injustice. In other words; such power(s) is intrinsic to the High
Court, it is its very life-blood, its very essence, its immanent attribute.
Without such power(s), the High Court would have a form but lack the
substance. These powers of the High Court, hence, deserve to be construed
with the widest possible amplitude. These inherent powers are in consonance
with the nature of the High Court which ought to be, and has in fact been,
invested with power(s) to maintain its authority to prevent the process of
law/Courts being obstructed or abused. It is a trite posit of jurisprudence that
though the laws attempt to deal with all cases that may arise, the infinite
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variety of circumstances which shape events and the imperfections of
language make it impossible to lay down provisions capable of governing
every case, which, in fact, arise. The High Court which exists for the
furtherance of justice in an indefatigable manner, should therefore, have
unfettered power(s) to deal with situations which, though not expressly
provided for by the law, need to be dealt with, to prevent injustice or the abuse
of the process of law and Courts. The maxim, namely, "quando lex aliquid
alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsa, esse non potest"
(when the law gives anything to anyone, it also gives all those things without
which the thing itself cannot exist) also signifies that the inherent powers of
the High Court are all such powers which are necessary to do the right and to
undo a wrong in the course of administration of justice. Further, the maxim
"ex debito justitiae" stipulates that such powers are given to do real and
substantial justice, for which purpose alone, the High Court exists. Hence, the
powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., are aimed at preserving the inherent
powers of a High Court to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to
secure the ends of justice. The juridical basis of these plenary power(s) is the
authority; in fact, the seminal duty and responsibility of the High Court; to
uphold, to protect and to fulfil the judicial function of administering justice,
in accordance with the law, in a methodical, orderly and effective manner. In
other words; Section 482 of Cr.P.C. reflects peerless powers, which a High
Court may draw upon as necessary, whenever it is just and equitable to do so;
in particular, to ensure the observance of the due process of law, to prevent
vexation or oppression, to do justice nay substantial justice between the
parties and to secure the ends of justice.
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10.3 The above principle(s), in context of provisions of Section 482
of Cr.P.C, 1973, would apply with complete vigour, to the provisions of
Section 528 of BNSS of 2023 as well, since there is no alteration in the
wording of these two provisions.
11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gian Singh (supra)
has enunciated that the powers of the High Court for quashing of criminal
proceedings on the basis of settlement are materially different from
compounding of offence in terms of Section 320 of Cr.P.C., (Now Section
359 of BNSS, 2023) as a Court while exercising power under Section 320 of
Cr.P.C. (Now Section 359 of BNSS, 2023) is circumscribed by the statutory
provision but the High Court may proceed to quash a criminal
offence/criminal proceedings if the ends of justice justify exercise of such
power. It was thus held that the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and
predominantly civil flavour, offences arising out of matrimonial dispute,
offences arising out of family dispute, as also offences which are basically
private or personal in nature, could be quashed by the High Court in case the
parties have resolved their entire dispute(s). Further, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra) has held that the possibility of
conviction being remote and bleak, whereas continuation of the criminal case
is putting the accused to oppression and prejudice & the parties being put to
general inconvenience, as also prejudice could also be considered as
contributing factors by the High Court, while examining a plea for quashing
of criminal proceedings on the basis of settlement/compromise. However a
caution was made that cases involving heinous and serious offences of mental
depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity; offences under the
Prevention of Corruption Act committed by public servants etc., ought not to
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be quashed while exercising such plenary jurisdiction. To the same effect is
the dicta of the judgment of three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the case of Parbatbhai Aahir case (supra). Further, a three Judge Bench
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a judgment of Laxmi Narayan case (supra)
reiterated the principles laid-down in cases of Gian Singh (supra), Narinder
Singh (supra) and Parbatbhai Aahir (supra). The aureate enunciation of law,
in above case-law, essentially points out that the prime factors for
consideration of quashing of FIR/criminal proceedings on the basis of
compromise/settlement is that the dispute/offence is essentially private in
nature; continuation of criminal proceeding would be an exercise in futility
as its fait-accompli is known; pendency of such proceedings would be an
undesirable burden on the police/prosecution as also the Courts, who are
already struggling ardously to manage the ever increasing and unmanageable
docket and/or such quashing would ensure the ends of justice.
11.1 It is, thus, unequivocal that the plenary powers vested in a High
Court, by virtue of its very constitution, are to be exercised with
circumspection and in a manner befitting judicial propriety. The invocation
of inherent jurisdiction must serve the ends of justice, necessitating a holistic
evaluation of all the attendant circumstances. The criminal justice system is
not merely a forum for resolving interpersonal disputes; it embodies the
sovereign obligation of the State to safeguard the fundamental rights of its
citizens, including the protection of life, liberty, and property. In adjudicating
petitions seeking quashing of criminal proceedings on the basis of a purported
compromise between the parties, the court must transcend the immediate
assertions of harmony. While the absence of current grievances between
parties may be a material consideration, it cannot be the determinative
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criterion. The court is duty-bound to scrutinize the gravity of the allegations,
the nature of the offences, and their ramifications on the public order and
societal welfare. This judicial responsibility is accentuated in cases involving
heinous or egregious offences, where the broader societal interest outweighs
private settlements. Compromising such cases on the ground of mutual accord
risks undermining the public confidence in the justice delivery system and
jeopardizing the larger interest of law enforcement and might also imply some
kind of impunity being accorded to the erring party(s).
12. The contemporary felony of cyber fraud presents a transgression
sui generis that mandates its categorical exclusion from the judicial
indulgence for quashing of criminal proceedings solely on the basis of a
compromise/settlement having been arrived at between the
complainant/victim and the accused. Digital economy is the unassailable
locus of modern commerce, sustained entirely by the bedrock of public trust.
Cyber Fraud acts as a corrosive insurgency, causing not merely an isolated
pecuniary loss, but an aggravated systemic damage upon the public financial
exchequer, thereby inflicting profound in rem detriment. Owing to the
anonymity, trans-border expanse and a propensity of causing substantial
adverse impact, a court is compelled to look beyond the private settlement,
lest it may tantamount to granting judicial imprimatur to an ongoing systemic
threat. When such an offender escapes prosecution simply by offering post
facto restitution, the penal measure is ipso facto converted into a mere
calculus of profit and risk. The perpetrator of such an organized crime is
emboldened to treat the compromise/settlement as a predictable expense,
creating a deleterious lacuna in the law and gravely impacting the sanctity of
criminal justice system. When a cyber fraud is perpetrated, the immediate and
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visible financial deceit/loss is only the tip of the spear; the real victim is the
digital ecosystem itself. A private compromise/settlement between the rival
private parties, i.e. the accused and the complainant/victim, is merely an
ineffectual repudiation of individual liability, lacking utterly in addressing the
cascading and unquantifiable institutional injury.
Pertinently, this Court is abundantly cognizant of the fact that
the sine qua non behind a complainant/victim's assent to a
compromise/settlement in cases of financial fraud remains the assured
restitution of the monies of which she has been duped/criminally divested.
This assurance of monetary indemnification acts as a sole allurement
motivating her to participate in compromise/settlement proceedings.
Nevertheless, such a compromise/settlement, having been arrived under the
allurement of monetary restitution, is inherently incapable of ameliorating the
inherent gravity and egregious nature of the offence of cyber fraud, which has
the propensity of causing extensive public detriment and imparting a
pernicious impact on the foundational trust, underpinning any commercial
activity.
12.1. Another aspect nay vital aspect of the lis in hand craves
attention.
The legal landscape is replete with cases where invocation of
serious/grievous allegations pertaining to the stringent penal provisions (such
as those relating to the offence of cyber fraud), constitute an instrument of
premeditated hyperbole, scrupulously invoked to artificially inflate the
gravity of allegations, otherwise rooted in pecuniary bilateral transactions.
However, a more ruminated scrutiny reflects the inherent nature of
transgression to be that of simpliciter cheating, conspicuously devoid of the
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ingredient of public detriment required of an offence pertaining to cyber
fraud. In such a factual milieu, the rigid denial to exercise inherent powers as
saved by way of Section 528 of the BNSS, 2023, to sanction an otherwise
bona fide compromise/settlement of dispute(s), solely, because the
FIR/Criminal Complaint is ridden with the allegations of cyber fraud, would
tantamount to abdication of judicial duty, defeating the cause of substantial
justice. For, it is an irrevocable judicial principle that a court, in its
transcendent duty to ensure complete justice, must unflinchingly be cognizant
of practical exigencies and social verities.
12.2. To determine as to whether offence(s) in question pertains to a
situation where the allegations of cyber fraud have been made merely to lend
severity or it is inherently a case of cyber fraud simplicter, the Court is,
essentially, required to look into the entire factual milieu of the particular case
in hand. No exhaustive set of guideline(s) to govern, the exercise of this
aspect by the High Court, can possibly be laid down, however illecebrous this
aspect may be. It is neither fathomable nor desirable to lay down any
straightjacket formula in this regard. To do so would be to crystallize into a
rigid definition, a judicial discretion, which for best of all reasons deserve to
be left undetermined. Any attempt in this regard would be, to say the least, a
quixotic endeavour. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different
fact, may make a sea of difference between conclusions of two cases. Ergo,
such exercise would thus, indubitably, be dependent upon the factual matrix
of the particular case which the High Court is in seisin of, since every case
has its own peculiar factual conspectus.
13. As a sequitur of the above rumination, the following postulates
emerge:
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I. The inherent jurisdiction vested in the High Court ought not be
exercised for quashing of an FIR/Criminal Complaint, pertaining to the
allegations of cyber fraud, solely on the basis of compromise/settlement. The
pervasive public detriment and the systemic erosion of trust, irrevocably,
supersedes, the purely private remedial adjustment, achieved between the
complainant/victim and the accused.
II. Where a meticulous judicial appraisal of facts reflects that the
cyber fraud allegations have been strategically invoked to lend unwarranted
gravity and seriousness to otherwise simpliciter pecuniary transaction inter-
se the Complainant/victim and the accused, the Court must not permit the
rigidity of law to defeat the ends of justice and may sanction the bona fide
compromise/settlement to put an end to the lis.
III. To effectually determine as to whether the case in hand falls
within the ambit and scope of postulate (I) or postulate (II) (supra), the Court
must undertake a scrupulous and granular scrutiny of the entire factual milieu
of the case at hand.
No exhaustive guidelines can possibly be laid-down for exercise
of aforesaid judicial discretion by a Court as every case has its own unique
factual conspectus. There is no gainsaying that an order passed by the Court,
while exercising such discretion, must be a speaking order clearly giving out
reasons therein & must be in consonance with the basic canons of Justice,
good conscience and equity.
Analysis (re facts of the present case)
14. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the petition in hand
has been filed for quashing of the impugned FIR (as also the proceeding
emanating therefrom) on the basis of compromise deed(s) dated 20.09.2025.
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It is neither pleaded nor decipherable from the factual milieu of the case in
hand that the rival private parties were known to each other before hand or
that the offence is in the nature of a private dispute between them. On the
contrary, a bare perusal of the contents of the FIR in question, as also the
other factual aspects of the case in hand, it is abundantly deducible that the
case in hand pertains to a cyber fraud simpliciter. Ergo, the petition in hand
ought not to be entreated and deserves rejection.
Decision
15. In view of the prevenient ratiocination, it is ordained thus:
(i) The petition; seeking quashing of FIR No.38 dated 27.06.2025
(the impugned FIR) registered under Sections 318(4), 336(3), 338, 340, 61 of
BNS at Police Station PS Cyber Sonipat, Haryana, as also the proceedings
subsequent thereto, on the basis of a compromise deed dated 20.09.2025
(Annexure P-2); is dismissed.
(ii) Any observations made hereinabove shall not have any effect on
the merits of the case and the trial Court/police shall proceed further, in
accordance with law, without being influenced with the same.
(iii) No disposition as to costs, for the nonce.
(iv) Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
(SUMEET GOEL)
JUDGE
November 12, 2025
Naveen/Ajay
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes
Whether reportable: Yes
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